No. 2013–1080. 2013-10-18 In re Lutz BIEDERMANN and Jurgen Harms. Luke Dauchot, Kirkland & Ellis, LLP, of Los Angeles, CA, argued for appellant. With him on the brief were Nimalka R. Wickramasekera and Benjamin A. Herbert. Of counsel on the brief was Mark Garscia, Christie, Parker & Hale, LLP, of Glendale, CA. Monica B. Lateef, Associate Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, VA, argued for appellee. With her on the brief were Nathan K. Kelley, Deputy Solicitor, and
Appeal No. 79-518. August 9, 1979. Robert A. Felsman, Fort Worth, Tex., atty. of record, for appellants; Dennison, Dennison, Mesorole Pollack, Arlington, Va., of counsel. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents; Fred W. Sherling, Associate Solicitor, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, RICH, BALDWIN, and MILLER, Judges, and PENN, Judge. The Honorable John G. Penn, United States District
Patent Appeal No. 8582. March 9, 1972. Charles W. B. Connors, Chicago, Ill. (Johnston, Root, O'Keeffe, Keil, Thompson Shurtleff, Chicago, Ill.), attorneys of record, for appellant. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., son Shurtleff), Chicago, Ill., attorneys E. McKelvey, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent Office Board of Appeals. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges. BALDWIN, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)
(a)Timing. Any request to seek review of the primary examiner's failure to designate a rejection as a new ground of rejection in an examiner's answer must be by way of a petition to the Director under § 1.181 of this title filed within two months from the entry of the examiner's answer and before the filing of any reply brief. Failure of appellant to timely file such a petition will constitute a waiver of any arguments that a rejection must be designated as a new ground of rejection. (b)Petition