AVIDITY BIOSCIENCES, INC.

11 Cited authorities

  1. In re Huai-Hung Kao

    639 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011)   Cited 88 times   16 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a "food effect" was obvious because the effect was an inherent property of the composition
  2. In re Jung

    637 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011)   Cited 24 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding the prima facie case during patent examination “is merely a procedural device that enables an appropriate shift of the burden of production” from the PTO to the patent applicant
  3. In re Mayne

    104 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 38 times
    Finding a claimed enterokinase recognition sequence containing the amino acid sequence Phe–Pro–Leu was merely “an obvious functional equivalent” to prior art sequences that included arrangements of Phe–Pro–Ile and Leu–Pro–Leu
  4. In re Leithem

    661 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011)   Cited 17 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Concluding that the Board issued a new ground of rejection despite the fact that the Board “agreed with Leithem” that Novak did not teach a fluffed pulp
  5. In re Biedermann

    733 F.3d 329 (Fed. Cir. 2013)   Cited 8 times   2 Legal Analyses

    No. 2013–1080. 2013-10-18 In re Lutz BIEDERMANN and Jurgen Harms. Luke Dauchot, Kirkland & Ellis, LLP, of Los Angeles, CA, argued for appellant. With him on the brief were Nimalka R. Wickramasekera and Benjamin A. Herbert. Of counsel on the brief was Mark Garscia, Christie, Parker & Hale, LLP, of Glendale, CA. Monica B. Lateef, Associate Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, VA, argued for appellee. With her on the brief were Nathan K. Kelley, Deputy Solicitor, and

  6. Application of Kronig

    539 F.2d 1300 (C.C.P.A. 1976)   Cited 18 times
    Holding no new ground of rejection when the Board relied on the same statutory basis and the same reasoning advanced by the examiner
  7. Application of Lindner

    457 F.2d 506 (C.C.P.A. 1972)   Cited 18 times
    Involving dispersant compositions designed to emulsify solutions such as insecticide
  8. In re Dill

    604 F.2d 1356 (C.C.P.A. 1979)   Cited 3 times

    Appeal No. 79-518. August 9, 1979. Robert A. Felsman, Fort Worth, Tex., atty. of record, for appellants; Dennison, Dennison, Mesorole Pollack, Arlington, Va., of counsel. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents; Fred W. Sherling, Associate Solicitor, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, RICH, BALDWIN, and MILLER, Judges, and PENN, Judge. The Honorable John G. Penn, United States District

  9. Application of Klosak

    455 F.2d 1077 (C.C.P.A. 1972)   Cited 6 times

    Patent Appeal No. 8582. March 9, 1972. Charles W. B. Connors, Chicago, Ill. (Johnston, Root, O'Keeffe, Keil, Thompson Shurtleff, Chicago, Ill.), attorneys of record, for appellant. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., son Shurtleff), Chicago, Ill., attorneys E. McKelvey, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent Office Board of Appeals. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges. BALDWIN, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals

  10. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)

  11. Section 41.40 - Tolling of time period to file a reply brief

    37 C.F.R. § 41.40   Cited 2 times

    (a)Timing. Any request to seek review of the primary examiner's failure to designate a rejection as a new ground of rejection in an examiner's answer must be by way of a petition to the Director under § 1.181 of this title filed within two months from the entry of the examiner's answer and before the filing of any reply brief. Failure of appellant to timely file such a petition will constitute a waiver of any arguments that a rejection must be designated as a new ground of rejection. (b)Petition