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Arthur R. Jones Syndicate v. Comm'r

5 B.T.A. 853 (B.T.A. 1926)
Arthur R. Jones Syndicate v. Comm'r

5 Cited authorities

  1. Houghton v. Burden

    228 U.S. 161 (1913)   Cited 49 times
    In Houghton v. Burden, 228 U.S. 161, 169, 33 S.Ct. 491, 493, 57 L.Ed. 780, the Supreme Court, citing Scott v. Lloyd, 9 Pet. 418, 9 L.Ed. 178, said: "* * * All of this evidence was excepted to as contradicting the written agreement and was admitted over objection.

  2. Peugh v. Davis

    96 U.S. 332 (1877)   Cited 118 times
    In Peugh v. Davis, 96 U.S. 332, 336 (24 L.Ed. 775), the Supreme Court had before it a deed absolute in form, but claimed to have been executed as security for a loan of money, and the question was whether evidence, written or oral, was admissible to show the real character of the transaction.

  3. Warren v. King

    108 U.S. 389 (1883)   Cited 59 times

    APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF INDIANA. Decided May 7th, 1883. Preferred Stock — Railroads. Certificates of preferred stock of the Ohio and Mississippi Railway Company were issued, containing the following language: "The preferred stock is to be and remain a first claim upon the property of the company after its indebtedness, and the holder thereof shall be entitled to receive from the net earnings of the company seven per cent. per annum, payable semi-annually

  4. Clemens v. Crane

    234 Ill. 215 (Ill. 1908)   Cited 36 times
    In Clemens v. Crane, 234 Ill. 215, 229, it is said: "To constitute usury, in contemplation of law, the following essential elements must be present: (1) There must be a loan or forbearance; (2) the loan must be of money or something circulating as money; (3) it mustbe repayable absolutely and at all events; (4) something must be exacted for the use of the money in excess of and in addition to the interest allowed by law.

  5. Heller v. Marine Bank

    89 Md. 602 (Md. 1899)   Cited 25 times
    In Heller v. Marine Bank, 89 Md. 602, relied on by the appellants, the Maryland law at that time provided that preferred stock should constitute a lien on the corporate property and be preferred over any subsequently created mortgage or other encumbrance. It was held that the preferred stockholders were not general creditors, but were entitled to a statutory lien on fixed assets.