376 U.S. 254 (1964) Cited 7,024 times 37 Legal Analyses
Holding that a public official or public figure can recover damages for defamation on a matter of public concern only if he proves that the speaker acted with actual malice
Holding a request for information from the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency constituted a "suit" under the policy because failure to respond to the request carried legal consequences
Holding that although the NLRA neither prohibits nor protects secondary boycotts, which function as a form of self-help available to unions to aid them in reaching their bargaining goals during negotiations, state-law attempts to regulate them are preempted because use of the boycott was part of the balance struck by Congress between the conflicting interests of the union, the employees, the employer, and the community; exceptions are when the type of conduct constitutes an imminent threat to public order or implicates deeply rooted local concerns
Holding that furniture company's relationship with its 89,000 past customers was not one upon which a tortious interference claim could be based because the company's hope that some of its past customers would continue to buy furniture from it was mere "speculation"
Holding that, to succeed on a tortious interference claim, "a plaintiff must prove ... that the defendant’s tortious interference was intentional and either independently tortious or in violation of a state or federal statute or regulation"
Concluding that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to the falsity of various statements in a defamation case that did not involve a privilege and deciding substantial accuracy as a matter of law