Arsham Hatambeiki et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 20, 2020

14618365 - (D) (P.T.A.B. May. 20, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/618,365 02/10/2015 Arsham Hatambeiki 81230.171US1 4554
34018 7590 05/20/2020
Greenberg Traurig, LLP
77 W. Wacker Drive
Suite 3100
CHICAGO, IL 60601-1732
EXAMINER
DUONG, THAO DUC
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2446
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/20/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
chiipmail@gtlaw.com
clairt@gtlaw.com
jarosikg@gtlaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ARSHAM HATAMBEIKI and PAUL D. ARLING

Appeal 2018-008345
Application 14/618,365
Technology Center 2400
Before ELENI MANTIS MERCADER, JENNIFER L. MCKEOWN, and
CARL L. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20, which constitute all pending
claims. See Final Act. 1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We Affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Universal
Electronics Inc. Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The invention relates to managing a plurality of appliances. Abstract;
Spec. 1:15–23, 2:22–5:14, Figs. 1–4.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter (emphases added):
1. A method for controlling a state of a system comprised of a
plurality of appliances, the method comprising:
using a device discovery process to establish a listing of each of
the plurality of appliances in the system;
using the listing of each of the plurality of appliances in the
system, with reference to a command and/or protoctol [sic] database,
to configure a software agent to exchange communications, via a one
or more communication channels, with each of the plurality of
appliances;
associating an action triggering state of at least one of the
plurality of appliances in the system with an action to be performed
by the software agent;
receiving by the software agent, via the one or more
communication channels, a message from the at least one of the
plurality of appliances in the system, the message having data
indicative of a current state of the at least one of the plurality of
appliances; and
causing the software agent to perform the action when it is
determined by the software agent that the current state of the at least
one of the plurality of appliances corresponds to the action triggering
state;
wherein the action comprises the software agent transmitting
one or more commands, via the one or more communication channels,
to a target one or more of the plurality of appliances in the system to
thereby cause a change in state of the target one or more of the
plurality of appliances.

Appeal Br. 10 (Claim Appendix).
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REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Brown et al. US 2004/0015242 Al Jan. 22, 2004
Weber et al. US 6,480,901 B1 Nov. 12, 2002
Raji et al. US 2005/0216302 Al Sep. 29, 2005
Kotlicki US 2014/0176310 Al Jun. 26, 2014

REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 2, 4–7, 10, 11, 13–16, 19, and 20 are rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Brown in view of Weber.
Final Act. 6–11.
Claims 3 and 12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Brown, Weber, and Raji. Id. at 11–12.
Claims 8, 9, 17, and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Brown, Weber, and Kotlicki. Id. at 12–13.
ANALYSIS
Appellant argues, inter alia, that Brown and Weber do not teach the
claim 1 limitation “wherein the action comprises the software agent
transmitting one or more commands, via the one or more communication
channels, to a target one or more of the plurality of appliances in the system
to thereby cause a change in state of the target one or more of the plurality of
appliances” (also referred to as “disputed limitation”). Appeal Br. 5–7;
Reply Br. 3–5.
In the Final Action, the Examiner finds Brown teaches the limitations
of claim 1, and independent claim 10, except Brown does not fully disclose
the limitations below:
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using a device discovery process to establish a listing of
each of the plurality of appliances in the system; and
using the listing of each of the plurality of appliances in
the system, with reference to a command and/or protoctol [sic]
database, to configure a software agent to exchange
communications, via a one or more communication channels,
with each of the plurality of appliances.

Final Act. 6–7.
The Examiner finds that Weber teaches these limitations and it
would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the
effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Brown in view of
Weber in order to establish a listing of devices in the system and configure a
software management application to the devices, and one of ordinary skill in
the art would have been motivated because it would provide the ability to
configure management software to particular devices. Id. at 6–8.
Appellant argues that “the claimed invention is directed to a software
agent that transmits one or more commands, via the one or more
communication channels, to a target one or more of the plurality of
appliances in the system to thereby cause a change in state of the target one
or more of the plurality of appliance” and “[a]s will be appreciated and in
keeping with the ordinary meaning of the word "command," the claimed
"command" is an instruction -- in the form or a transmitted code or a signal -
that tells a target appliance to do something.” Appeal. Br. 5.
According to Appellant, Brown describes a system in which devices
communicate information within one another via use of the Consumer
Electronics Bus (CEBus) protocol through communication channels, and use
of the CEBus protocol allows for the application software to reside at each
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device. Id. (citing Brown ¶¶ 6, 33, 39). Appellant argues Brown teaches the
application software that resides at each device may include one or more
"workflow managers" wherein a "workflow manager" controls the
implementation of routines called "workflows" and a "workflow" causes a
scenario to be invoked on one device, e.g., a light being turned on, in
response to a trigger condition of another device being met, e.g., a home
alarm system being activated. Id. (citing Brown ¶ 38).
Appellant refers to Figure 4 of Brown and argues
As yet further described within Brown and illustrated in
Fig. 4 thereof, to provide a trigger condition to a "workflow"
resident on a first device 32, a second device 31, via use of the
CEBus protocol, transmits condition information on a
communication channel, e.g., a transmission bus 33, to a central
control section. The central control section comprises a memory
for storing the condition information and one or more routers
that merely function to "direct the various types of information
from the different devices." ¶ 0035; emphasis added). The
central control section then transmits the condition
information to the first device 32 via use of the same
transmission bus 33. The first device 32 receives the condition
information as transmitted via the transmission bus 33
whereupon application code 41 resident on the first device 32,
i.e., the "workflow manager" resident on the first device, causes
the first device 32 to adjust its own state in keeping with the
condition information received from the second device. (¶
0039). Thus, in Brown, it cannot be said that the "workflow
manager may reside external from the device such as with state
man[a]ger manager/central controller" (OA, pg. 4; emphasis
added) when Brown expressly describes that the central
controller only functions to route condition information to
further devices.
In view of the above, it is further submitted that when the
second device 31 is a temperature sensor and the first device 32
is a thermostat in keeping with the example raised in the
rejection of the claims (OA, pg. 7), the temperature sensor will
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inform the central control section that the temperature has
changed, for example, has changed to 68 degrees. The central
control section will then provide a "temperature change
notification" to the thermostat to inform the thermostat that the
temperature has changed, e.g., that the temperature is now 68
degrees. As will be appreciated, the condition information,
e.g., the information that the temperature has changed to 68
degrees, is not a command, i.e., does not tell the thermostat to
do anything. Rather, the workflow manager resident on the
thermostat uses the information received from the temperature
sensor to determine an action to be performed. ¶¶ 0040 and
0042).
From the foregoing, it will be appreciated that, while a
first appliance in Brown will receive, via the one or more
communication channels (e.g., power-line wiring, telephone
wiring, coaxial cable wiring, and radio frequency), an
informational message from a second appliance in the system,
in Brown the first appliance, i.e., the appliance receiving the
information message from the second appliance, will be caused
to perform an internal action when it is determined that the
informational message indicates that a current state of the
second appliance corresponds to an action triggering state. The
first appliance and/or the central control in Brown does not,
however, transmit one or more commands, via the one or more
communication channels (e.g., power-line wiring, telephone
wiring, coaxial cable wiring, and radio frequency), to another,
target one or more of the plurality of appliances in the system to
thereby cause a change in state of the target one or more of the
plurality of appliances as claimed.

Id. at 6–7.
Appellant further argues the Examiner errs in relying on Weber for
the claim 1 limitations “using a device discovery process to establish a
listing of each of the plurality of appliances in the system”; and “using the
listing of each of the plurality of appliances in the system, with reference to
a command and/or protoctol [sic] database, to configure a software agent to
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exchange communications. . .” Id. at 7–9. According to Appellant, the
Examiner’s suggested combination would change the way the Brown central
control section is intended to operate, and Brown already has the capabilities
that are asserted by the Examiner as a reason for modifying Brown. Id.
(citing Brown ¶ 35; Final Act. 3, 8).
In the Answer, the Examiner refers to Brown’s workflow manager
that receives and stores information from various devices and coordinates
communication between various devices. Ans. 3–4 (citing Brown ¶¶ 35, 37,
38). The Examiner finds
Brown gives two examples of the workflow manager. In
the first example, a user wants to limit the amount of time the
cooling unit continuously operates. The work flow manager is
in a constant monitoring state and when a status change is
detected, a workflow manager will determine which workflow
routine to activate based on the particular status change and the
existing condition. The work flow manager can get the
temperature status from the storage location for the temperature
sensor or the thermostat device. When it is determined that the
temperature has increased or decreased, the workflow manager
will process the workflow routine and turn on or off the cooling
system [0040-0044]. Therefore, workflow manager (software
agent) is receiving a status and determining an action based on
the status, and applying a command to the system. (Emphasis
added).
In the second example[,] [a]ll devices connected to the
power outlet will submit to the state manager specific device
attributes. And when a workflow manager detects a change in
the number of devices operating from the outlet, it will
determine if the number of devices connected has increase or
decrease by retrieving the number of devices that are currently
operating from the stored outlet status information. If the
number has increased, the workflow manager will activate the
workflow routine. Based on the workflow routine, when a
device is connected and begins to operate, the workflow
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manager will determine if the amount of available power is
greater than the amount of powered required by all non-
operating devices. If the amount available is not greater than the
amount required by the connected devices, than the workflow
manager will disable the devices that have power requirements
that exceed the available power at the outlet device [0046-
0049]. Therefore, the workflow manager (software agent)
receives a status of a newly connected device and transmits a
command to enable or disable another connected device based
on a trigger state. (Emphasis added).
Additionally, applicant is making an assumption that
each device may include one or more workflow manager[s].
However, applicant cited paragraph [0038, there is no clear
indication that one or more workflow manager[s] are residing
on the device itself.
Furthermore, the claim recites “. . . configure a software
agent to exchange communication, via one or more
communication channels, with each of the plurality of
appliances ... “, “. . . transmitting one or more commands, via
the one or more communication channels, to a target one or
more of the plurality of appliances in the system to thereby
cause a change in state of the target one or more of the plurality
of appliances”.
Based on the broadest reasonable interpretation. A
communication channel can be any form of channel that
transmits data from one device/component to another, whether
it be internally or externally. Based on the claimed limitation
cited above, there is no[] requirement that the software agent
must be external to a device. But rather, a communication
between two devices, or communication between two
components within a device is a form of communication
channel.

Ans. 4–5.
Regarding the combination of Brown and Weber, the Examiner
additionally finds that Brown (rather than relying on Weber as in Final Act.
7–8) teaches “a list maintaining status information of all devices, and a
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workflow manager that manages a set of scenarios, the scenarios [are] user
define[d] action when triggered.” Id. at 7 (citing Brown ¶¶ 37, 38). The
Examiner then relies on Weber to teach a “‘discovery process’ to establish
the listing of each of the plurality of devices and using the listing with
reference to a database, configure a software agent with the devices.” Id. at
7 (citing Weber 7:25–48, 14:50–57). According to the Examiner, “it would
have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective
filing date of the claimed invention to modify Brown in view of Weber in
order to have a discovery process to establish a listing of devices in the
system and configure a software management application to the devices
based off a database of connected devices” and “[o]ne of ordinary skill in the
art would have been motivated because it would provide the ability to
configure management software and the associated devices.” Id. (citing
Weber, 7:36–46).
In the Reply Brief, Appellant reiterates arguments and argues Brown
does not teach a centralized device/software agent that performs an action,
where the action comprises the centralized device/software agent
transmitting one or more commands to a target appliance to thereby cause a
change of state of the target appliance (emphasis added). Reply Br. 2–3.
Appellant argues the word “command” never appears within Brown, and
that “Brown never expressly describes a centralized workflow manager that
determines an action based on a status and that ‘appl[ies] a command to the
system’ (Ex. Ans., pg. 4) or a centralized workflow man[a]ger that receives
a status of a newly connected device and ‘transmits a command to enable or
disable another connected device based on a trigger state.’” Id. (citing Ans.,
pg. 4). Appellant further argues the Examiner has not met the burden that
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the claimed elements are inherently disclosed by showing the claimed
elements necessarily flow from the teachings of Brown.
Appellant argues the Examiner’s asserted claim interpretation set forth
in the Answer is incorrect. In particular, Appellant argues the claims should
not be read such that an "appliance" can be an internal component of a
device and that a command communication can be between "two
components within a device." Id. at 4 (citing Ans., pg. 5). According to
Appellant, the Examiner’s interpretation is inconsistent with the plain and
ordinary meaning of the term “appliance,” the claims, the Specification, and
Brown. Id. In particular, “to one of ordinary skill in the art, an ‘appliance’
would not be considered to be a ‘component’ within a device but would
instead be considered to be a household or office device (such as a stove,
fan, or refrigerator) operated by gas or electric current (See, e.g., Merriam
Webster dictionary, Brown in paragraph 0003, and the subject application at
Pg. 2, line 22–Pg. 3, line 5).” Id. at 5.
Appellant argues the asserted combination of Weber with Brown is
without adequate basis because it would change the information transfer of
the Brown principle of operation and the Examiner has not identified a
problem of Brown that would be cured by using the teaching of Weber. Id.
at 5–6.
On the record before us, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s
arguments and agree, instead, with the findings and conclusion of the
Examiner. As stated by the Supreme Court, the Examiner’s obviousness
rejection must be based on:
[S]ome articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning
to support the legal conclusion of obviousness. . . . [H]owever,
the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the
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specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can
take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person
of ordinary skill in the art would employ.
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (quoting In re Kahn,
441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
During prosecution, claims must be given their broadest reasonable
interpretation when reading claim language in light of the Specification as it
would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of
Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). While we interpret
claims broadly, but reasonably in light of the Specification, we nonetheless
must not import limitations from the Specification into the claims. See In re
Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
We do not agree with Appellant’s claim interpretation as it is
unreasonably narrow. Regarding the term “command,” the term is used in
the Specification “to receive operational command,” “to exit energy-saving
mode,” and “to turn on one or more lights,” and the term “command” is not
explicitly defined in the Specification. See Spec., 3:5–9, 8:3–7. However,
the recited claim term is simply “command,” not an “operational
command,” or a “direct command,” and the command is transmitted to one
of a plurality of appliances. Similarly, the claim does not recite a
“centralized device/software agent transmitting” as argued by Appellant, the
claim simply recites “a software agent.” See Reply Br. 2–3. Moreover, the
claim does not recite that the software agent is external to the “one or more .
. . appliances.” Additionally, the Specification states “it will be understood
that the physical platform upon which the disclosed software agent
functionality is resident may comprise any of the above forms, or any other
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convenient configuration, as appropriate for a particular embodiment. Spec.,
5:11–14. Although a term “communication interface” is utilized at least
once in the Specification, the claim term “communication channel” is not
defined or utilized in the Specification. See Spec. 4:4–19. Additionally,
both the Specification and Brown use the terms “appliances” and “devices”
interchangeably. See, e.g., Spec., 2:22–3:5; Brown ¶ 9.
Brown teaches a system in which devices communicate information
with one another via use of the Consumer Electronics Bus (CEBus) protocol.
Brown ¶ 33). A “workflow manager” controls the implementation of
routines called “workflows.” Id. at ¶ 38. A “workflow” causes a scenario to
be invoked on one device, e.g., a light being turned on, in response to a
trigger condition of another device being met, e.g., a home alarm system
being activated. Id. at ¶ 38. Figure 4 of Brown teaches condition
information is communicated on a communication channel to a central
control section which stores the information and directs the information to
the devices. Id. at ¶ 39. Use of the CEBus protocol allows for application
software to reside at each device. Id. at ¶ 39. The devices perform an
internal action using the information to determine an action to be performed.
Brown ¶¶ 40, 42–44; Figs. 5, 6a, 6b.
Here, applying a broad and reasonable claim interpretation, we agree
with the Examiner’s finding that Brown teaches the “software agent
transmitting one . . . commands” (disputed limitation). In particular, in one
example, Brown’s workflow manager activates the workflow which makes a
determination of the temperature, and turns on the cooling unit. Brown ¶¶
41, 42; Figs. 5, 6a, element 61. This action constitutes the claimed
“command” as broadly and reasonably interpreted. Additionally, although
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Brown notes that the use of Consumer Electronics Bus (CEBus) protocol
allows for application software to reside on each device, this is not described
as required, and the claim does not exclude the use of CEBus protocol.
Brown ¶ 39. Moreover, even if the application software is on each Brown
device, the “communication channel” would constitute the channel within
the device, and the Brown channel includes the channel to the central control
unit. Brown ¶¶ 33–35, Figs. 1, 3, 4, 5, 6a.
Regarding the combination of Brown and Weber, we agree with the
Examiner’s findings and conclusion, particularly as set forth in the Answer
in which the Examiner additionally relies on Brown and provides factual
evidence and articulated reasoning to support the conclusion of obviousness.
Ans. 7. Appellant does not persuasively argue these findings and
conclusion. We note
[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a
secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the
structure of the primary reference; nor is it that the claimed
invention must be expressly suggested in any one or all of the
references. Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of
the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill
in the art.
Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981).
In view of the above, we sustain the rejection of claim 1, independent
claim 10, and dependent claims 2, 4–7, 11, 13–16, 19, and 20 as these claims
are not argued separately. We also sustain the rejection of dependent claims
3, 8, 9, 17, and 18 which are rejected over the combination of Brown, Weber
and the additional cited references as these claims are not argued separately.
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CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 2, 4–7, 10, 11, 13–16, 19, and
20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Brown and Weber is
affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 3 and 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Brown, Weber, and Raji is affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 8, 9, 17, and 18 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as being unpatentable over Brown, Weber, and Kotlicki is affirmed.

DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis  Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 4–7,
10, 11, 13–
16, 19, 20
103(a) Brown, Weber 1, 2, 4–7,
10, 11, 13–
16, 19, 20

3,12 103(a) Brown, Weber, Raji 3, 12
8, 9, 17, 18 103(a) Brown, Weber,
Kotlicki
8, 9, 17, 18
Overall
Outcome:
  1–20
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED