Anvil Knitwear, Inc. v. Success Ware, Inc.

18 Cited authorities

  1. In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.

    476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973)   Cited 190 times   32 Legal Analyses
    Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"
  2. Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp.

    222 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2000)   Cited 73 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"
  3. In re Nat. Data Corp.

    753 F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1985)   Cited 73 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a "likelihood of confusion cannot be predicated on dissection of a mark"
  4. Lipton Industries, Inc. v. Ralston Purina

    670 F.2d 1024 (C.C.P.A. 1982)   Cited 58 times
    Holding that admission contained in an answer was binding, despite the fact that it was made "on information and belief"
  5. Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of America

    970 F.2d 874 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 39 times
    Finding similarity between "CENTURY 21" and "CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA" in part because "consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word"
  6. In re Majestic Distilling Co., Inc.

    315 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003)   Cited 12 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that malt liquor and tequila sold under the same mark would cause a likelihood of confusion
  7. Canadian Imperial Bank v. Wells Fargo Bank

    811 F.2d 1490 (Fed. Cir. 1987)   Cited 13 times
    Affirming likelihood of confusion
  8. Federated Foods v. Fort Howard Paper Co.

    544 F.2d 1098 (C.C.P.A. 1976)   Cited 16 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Stating that the mere existence of modern supermarket containing wide variety or products should not foreclose further inquiry into the likelihood of confusion arising from the use of similar marks on any goods so displayed
  9. Franklin Mint Corp. v. Master Mfg. Co.

    667 F.2d 1005 (C.C.P.A. 1981)   Cited 8 times

    Appeal No. 81-559. December 10, 1981. Ronald L. Panitch and Roberta L. Jacobs, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant. Jay J. Rice, Clifton, N. D., for appellee. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, MILLER and NIES, Judges. MILLER, Judge. This is an appeal from a decision of the Patent and Trademark Office Trademark Trial and Appeal Board ("board") dismissing the opposition of appellant Franklin Mint Corporation ("Franklin")

  10. Wella Corp. v. California Concept Corp.

    558 F.2d 1019 (C.C.P.A. 1977)   Cited 9 times

    Patent Appeal No. 77-503. July 14, 1977. Frank P. Presta, Jacobi, Lilling Siegel, Arlington, Va., for the Wella Corp. Gary E. Lande, Poms, Smith, Lande Glenny, Los Angeles, Cal., for California Concept Corp. Appeal from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. MILLER Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board ("board"), 192 USPQ 158 (1976), dismissing appellant's opposition No. 55,727, filed June 6, 1974, against application No. 454,056, filed April 20, 1973, for

  11. Rule 902 - Evidence That Is Self-Authenticating

    Fed. R. Evid. 902   Cited 2,199 times   35 Legal Analyses
    Stating that "[p]rinted material purporting to be a newspaper or periodical" is self-authenticating
  12. Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration

    15 U.S.C. § 1052   Cited 1,597 times   274 Legal Analyses
    Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"
  13. Section 2.122 - Matters in evidence

    37 C.F.R. § 2.122   Cited 23 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"