2021001614 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 2, 2021)

AirWatch LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals BoardNov 2, 2021

2021001614 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 2, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/081,462 03/25/2016 Alok Desai W246 (500103-1590) 1466 152577 7590 11/02/2021 Thomas | Horstemeyer, LLP (VMW) 3200 Windy Hill Road, SE Suite 1600E Atlanta, GA 30339 EXAMINER IQBAL, MUSTAFA ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3683 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 11/02/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docketing@thomashorstemeyer.com ipadmin@vmware.com uspatents@thomashorstemeyer.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte ALOK DESAI, GAURAV HALBE, ADITYA SHROTI, PRANAY SWAR, and AKSHAY DHOKALE ____________ Appeal 2021-001614 Application 15/081,462 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, BRUCE T. WIEDER, and TARA L. HUTCHINGS, Administrative Patent Judges. FISCHETTI, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the Examiner’s Non-Final Rejection2 of claims 1-4, 6, 8-11, 13, 15-17 and 19-22. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies VMWare, Inc., a subsidiary of Dell Technology, Inc., as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 2. 2 All references to the Final Office Action refer to the Final Office Action mailed on February 27, 2020. Appeal 2021-001614 Application 15/081,462 2 SUMMARY OF DECISION We affirm; 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). THE INVENTION Appellant states its invention relates to content access based on location or time. Spec. Title. Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on appeal. 1. A system, comprising: a computing device comprising a processor and a memory; and an application comprising machine readable instructions stored in the memory, wherein the machine readable instructions, when executed by the processor, cause the computing device to at least: create an event comprising a start time of the event and an end time of the event; assign a beacon identifier to the event; associate a document with the event; associate a policy that governs access to the document with the event, wherein the policy specifies that a user of a client device can access the document when the client device is within range of a beacon corresponding to the beacon identifier; and send an invitation to the event and the policy to a client device, wherein the policy is evaluated and enforced by a management component executing on the client device. Appeal Br. 11 (Claims App.). Appeal 2021-001614 Application 15/081,462 3 THE REJECTIONS The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence of unpatentability: Claims 1–4, 6, 8–11, 13, 15–17, and 19–22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception without significantly more than the judicial exception. Claims 1, 6, 8, 13, 15, and 19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 being unpatentable over Trivedi et al. (2016/0142873 A1, published May 19, 2016) in view of Min et al. (US 2015/0339461 A1, published Nov. 26, 2015) in further view of Stott et al. (US 2015/0200786 A1, published July 16, 2015). Claims 2–4, 9–11, 16, and 17 are rejected under U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Trivedi, Min, Stott in view of Staunovo Polacco (US 2017/0068649 A1, published Mar. 9, 2017). Claims 20–22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Trivedi in view of Min in view of Stott in view of Downy et al. (US 2016/0335564 A1, published Nov. 17, 2016). FINDINGS OF FACT We adopt the Examiner’s findings as set forth on pages 4–6 in the Final Office Action and on pages 3–4 in the Examiner’s Answer, concerning only the 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection. ANALYSIS 35 U.S.C. § 101 REJECTION We will affirm the rejection of claims 1–4, 6, 8–11, 13, 15–17, and 19–22 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Appeal 2021-001614 Application 15/081,462 4 The Appellant argues claims 1–4, 6, 8–11, 13, 15–17 and 19–22 as a group. (Appeal Br. 4). We select claim 1 as the representative claim for this group, and so the remaining claims stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2015). An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, Appeal 2021-001614 Application 15/081,462 5 such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Supreme Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, Appeal 2021-001614 Application 15/081,462 6 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”).3 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51;4 see also October 2019 Update at 1. Under the 2019 Revised Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).5 3 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance. USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October 2019 Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf). 4 The 2019 Revised Guidance supersedes MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) § 2106.04 and also supersedes all versions of the USPTO’s “Eligibility Quick Reference Sheet Identifying Abstract Ideas.” See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51 (“Eligibility-related guidance issued prior to the Ninth Edition, R-08.2017, of the MPEP (published Jan. 2018) should not be relied upon.”). Accordingly, Appellant’s arguments challenging the sufficiency of the Examiner’s rejection will not be addressed to the extent those arguments are based on now superseded USPTO guidance. 5 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any Appeal 2021-001614 Application 15/081,462 7 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under Step 2B, to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the [S]pecification, based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant technology or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a tool. See Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335–36. In so doing, as indicated above, we apply a “directed to” two prong test: 1) evaluate whether the claim recites a judicial exception, and 2) if the claim recites a judicial exception, evaluate whether the claim “appl[ies], additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a practical application. See Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84 Fed. Reg. at 54– 55. Appeal 2021-001614 Application 15/081,462 8 rel[ies] on, or use[s] the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53; see also MPEP §§ 2106.04–2106.05. The Specification states: Hard copies of documents are often distributed to attendees of meetings for security reasons. For example, members of a board of directors might be handed paper copies of documents containing confidential information that is not intended to leave the boardroom. In order to control access to the information in these instances, each copy of a paper document can be individually numbered (e.g., “l of 25” or “14 of 15”). Before all attendees are allowed to leave, each document is collected and the documents are counted to confirm that all copies have returned before the attendees leaving the meeting. Using hard copies of documents has a number of security benefits. Documents cannot be copied without the use of a photocopier, camera, or similar equipment. An attendee attempting to use photocopying equipment in a meeting to make unauthorized copies of a document is likely to be noticed. Likewise, destruction of paper documents is essentially permanent. Once burned or shredded in an appropriate manner, a hard copy of a document is impractical, if not impossible, to reassemble in order to recover the information contained in the document. Accordingly, access to physical documents can be limited to the location of a meeting (e.g., the meeting room) and for the duration of the meeting (e.g., requiring all copies to be returned before anyone leaves the meeting room) in a practical manner. Spec. ¶¶ 1, 2. Claim 1 recites in pertinent part: create an event comprising a start time of the event and an end time of the event; assign a beacon identifier to the event; associate a document with the event; Appeal 2021-001614 Application 15/081,462 9 associate a policy that governs access to the document with the event, wherein the policy specifies that a user of a client device can access the document when the client device is within range of a beacon corresponding to the beacon identifier; and send an invitation to the event and the policy to a client . . . , wherein the policy is evaluated and enforced by a management component . . . . The Examiner found claim 1 is directed to the abstract ideas of creating an event, assigning beacons, associating documents to an event, creating/sending policies, determining whether devices are enrolled, updating invitations based on this determination, determining if devices are in range of beacon to provide access to documents, and evaluating policies of the event to provide access to documents. The steps of the claimed inventions relate to the judicial [sic] recognized concepts of collecting/receiving data as well as determining/analyzing data. These steps relate to an abstract idea which fall under the grouping of a mental process. Final Act. 4. Accordingly, all this intrinsic evidence shows that claim 1 recites a way of controlling access to content by physically distancing the user from its source. This is consistent with the Examiner’s determination. As such, we find that claim 1 is directed to at least two judicial exceptions. The first is, a way of managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people because it controls who, when and where an individual can view and have access to the content, and thus constitutes one of certain methods of organizing human activity that are judicial exceptions. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Second, the steps of, “create an event comprising a start time of the event and an end time of the event; assign a[n] . . . identifier to the event; associate a document with the event; associate a policy that governs access Appeal 2021-001614 Application 15/081,462 10 to the document with the event,” constitute, “[c]ontrolling access to resources [which] is exactly the sort of process that ‘can be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper,’ which we have repeatedly found unpatentable.” Ericsson v. TCL Commc’n, 955 F.3d 1317, at 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2020). These limitations are also mental association steps which mimic human thought processes of selecting certain information over others, i.e., evaluation. See In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see, also, Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1340–41 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (identifying the abstract idea of organizing, displaying, and manipulating data). Thus, under the first prong, claim 1 also recites the patent ineligible judicial exception of a mental process. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Turning to the second prong of the “directed to” test, claim 1 only generically requires “a computing device,” “a processor” and “a memory.” These components are described in the Specification at a high level of generality. See Spec. ¶¶ 13, 17, 18, Figs. 1, 3. We fail to see how the generic recitations of these most basic computer components and/or of a system so integrates the judicial exception as to “impose[] a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53. Thus, we find that the claims recite the judicial exceptions of a certain method of organizing human activity and a mental process. That the claims do not preempt all forms of the abstraction or may be limited to document control, does not make them any less abstract. See OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) Appeal 2021-001614 Application 15/081,462 11 (“And that the claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be limited to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them any less abstract.”). Turning to the second step of the Alice analysis, because we find that the claim is directed to abstract ideas/judicial exceptions, the claim must include an “inventive concept” in order to be patent-eligible, i.e., there must be an element or combination of elements sufficient to ensure that the claim in practice amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73). Concerning this step the Examiner found the following: [T]he claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception because the additional computer elements, which are recited at a high level of generality, provide generic computer functions that do not add meaningful limits to practicing the abstract idea. Final Act. 5. We agree with the Examiner. “[T]he relevant question is whether the claims here do more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea . . . on a generic computer.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225. They do not. Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a computer to retrieve, select, and apply decision criteria to data and modify the data as a result amounts to electronic data query and retrieval—one of the most basic functions of a computer. In short, each step does no more than require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions. The claims do not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself. The Specification spells out different generic equipment Appeal 2021-001614 Application 15/081,462 12 and parameters that might be applied using this concept and the particular steps such conventional processing would entail based on the concept of information access under different scenarios. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 13, 17, 18, Figs. 1, 3. Thus, the claims at issue amount to nothing significantly more than instructions to apply the abstract idea using some unspecified, generic computer. Under our precedents, that is not enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 225–26. Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of Appellant’s claim add nothing that is not already present when the steps are considered separately. The sequence of data reception-analysis (create/assign/associate (successively)/send) and store is equally generic and conventional or otherwise held to be abstract. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (sequence of receiving, selecting, offering for exchange, display, allowing access, and receiving payment recited an abstraction); Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that sequence of data retrieval, analysis, modification, generation, display, and transmission was abstract); Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding sequence of processing, routing, controlling, and monitoring was abstract). The ordering of the steps is, therefore, ordinary and conventional. We have reviewed all the arguments Appellant has submitted concerning the patent eligibility of the claims before us that stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (Appeal Br. 4–6; Reply Br. 2–4).6 We find that our 6 Arguments which Appellant could have made but chose not to make in the Briefs have not been considered and are deemed to be waived. See 37 Appeal 2021-001614 Application 15/081,462 13 analysis above substantially covers the substance of all the arguments, which have been made. But, for purposes of completeness, we will address various arguments in order to make individual rebuttals of same. Appellant argues: Because Appellant is claiming a technical solution to a technical problem, claims 1-4, 6, 8-11, 13, 15-17, and 19-22 are not abstract. Even if they were found to be directed to an abstract idea, they would still be patent-eligible because they amount to significantly more than any alleged abstract idea.” Appeal Br 6. (emphasis omitted). We disagree that Appellant is claiming a technical solution, because the limitations of claim 1 do not recite technological implementation details for any of the claim elements. Nor does claim 1 recite, “a particular way of programming or designing the software . . . , but instead merely claim[s] the resulting system.” Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “Technological problem” is too ambiguous a term to be determinative. Merely placing a claim in a technological context cannot confer eligibility. The Supreme Court and this court have repeatedly made clear that merely limiting the field of use of the abstract idea to a particular existing technological environment does not render the claims any less abstract. Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Claim 1 simply recites functional results to be achieved by any means. See, e.g., Content Extraction and Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014). C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2013). Appeal 2021-001614 Application 15/081,462 14 As we found above, claim 1 is directed to the judicial exceptions of a certain method of organizing human activity and a mental process, and thus the arrangement of the elements of the claim must then be ‘non-conventional and non-generic to amount to be ‘significantly more’ than an abstract idea. But, Appellant does not identify the allegedly “non-conventional and non- generic” arrangement of elements. Claim 1 only generically requires “a computing device,” “a processor” and “a memory.” As the Federal Circuit held in Ericsson, “[n]one of these elements are sufficient to turn the claim into anything more than a generic computer for performing the abstract idea of controlling access to resources.” See Ericsson, 955 F.3d at 1330. For the reasons identified above, we sustain the Examiner’s § 101 rejection of claims 1–4, 6, 8–11, 13, 15–17, and 19–22. 35 U.S.C. § 103 REJECTION The Appellant argues claims 1, 6, 8, 13, 15 and 19 as a group. (Appeal Br. 6). We select claim 1 as the representative claim for this group, and so the remaining claims stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2015). Each of independent claims recites in one form or another, “associate a policy that governs access to the document with the event, wherein the policy specifies that a user of a client device can access the document when the client device is within range of a beacon corresponding to the beacon identifier.” The Examiner found that Min discloses this limitation at at least ¶¶ 17 and 57 (Answer 7; see also, Final Act. 12), determining, “¶0017 and ¶0057 Appeal 2021-001614 Application 15/081,462 15 clearly teach proximities, and being able to access a document with respect to a beacon as User A does.” Id. at 7. Appellant argues: With respect to User A, the Office Action (p. 3) states that paragraph [0017] ‘clearly shows that if User A is within range of a beacon they can access documents related to the project.’ Appellant respectfully disagrees. User A’s access is only determined based on whether ‘user A has Project Mayhem access too.’ Min does not disclose that User A’s access is further determined or limited based on other considerations, such as User A’s proximity to a specifically identified beacon. (Appeal Br. 8) We agree with Appellant (Appeal Br. 7–8) that Min at the cited paragraphs noted in the Final Action and in the Answer fails to disclose a policy that specifies that a user of a client device can access the document when the client device is within range of a beacon corresponding to the beacon identifier. However, on review of Min, we find this limitation is explicitly disclosed by Min at paragraph 59 which states, “In yet another embodiment, display computing device 109 is a set top box or smart television that enforces content restrictions by allowing some content to be displayed only if it is determined that user A is within a known area.” Therefore, we sustain the 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection of independent claims 1, 8, and 15, but because our rationale is substantially different from that used by the Examiner, we denominate our affirmance as a new ground of rejection under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). We also affirm the rejections of dependent claims 2–4, 9–11, 16 and 17 and 20–22 since Appellant has not challenged such with any reasonable specificity (see In re Nielson, 816 F.2d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). However, because we have made new findings with respect to the independent claims, we denominate our Appeal 2021-001614 Application 15/081,462 16 affirmace of these claims as a new ground of rejection. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW We conclude the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1–4, 6, 8– 11, 13, 15–17, and 19–22 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We conclude the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1–4, 6, 8– 11, 13, 15–17, and 19–22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed New Ground 1–4, 6, 8– 11, 13, 15– 17, 19–22 101 Eligibility 1–4, 6, 8– 11, 13, 15–17, 19–22 1, 6, 8, 13, 15, 19 103 Trivedi, Min, Stott 1, 6, 8, 13, 15, 19 1, 6, 8, 13, 15, 19 2–4, 9–11, 16–17 103 Trivedi, Min, Stott, Staunovo Polacco 2–4, 9–11, 16–17 2–4, 9– 11, 16– 17 20–22 103 Trivedi, Min, Stott, Downy 20–22 20–22 Overall Outcome 1–4, 6, 8– 11, 13, 15–17, 19–22 1–4, 6, 8–11, 13, 15– 17, 19– 22 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE This decision contains a new ground of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) (effective September 13, 2004, 69 Fed. Reg. 49960 Appeal 2021-001614 Application 15/081,462 17 (August 12, 2004), 1286 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 21 (September 7, 2004)). 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) provides “[a] new ground of rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review.” 37 CFR § 41.50(b) also provides that the appellant, WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise one of the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims: • (1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of the claims so rejected or new evidence relating to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the proceeding will be remanded to the examiner . . . . • (2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same record . . . . No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2006). AFFIRMED; 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)