Agile Defense Inc.

25 Cited authorities

  1. Coach Services, Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC

    668 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012)   Cited 108 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding that it is the opposer's burden to prove fame of its mark
  2. In re Bayer

    488 F.3d 960 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 40 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Endorsing the use of internet evidence as admissible and competent evidence for evaluating a trademark
  3. Duopross Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd.

    695 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2012)   Cited 24 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, although the Board may "ascertain the meaning and weight of each of the components that makes up the mark," it "ultimately must consider the mark as a whole and do so in the context of the goods or services at issue"
  4. In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp.

    240 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001)   Cited 38 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that 1–888–M–A–T–T–R–E–S–S “immediately conveys the impressions that a service relating to mattresses is available by calling the telephone number”
  5. In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.

    774 F.2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985)   Cited 61 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the "pink" color of insulation was non-functional because it did not affect the quality of insulation in that the color used had no effect on the product's ability to regulate a building's temperature
  6. In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP

    373 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 30 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that courts "may weigh the individual components of the mark" to assess its overall distinctiveness
  7. In re La. Fish Fry Prods., Ltd.

    797 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2015)   Cited 15 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Discounting advertising expenditures concerning FISH FRY PRODUCTS where the evidence relied on included ads promoting another mark
  8. In re Steelbuilding.com

    415 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2005)   Cited 26 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Affirming the refusal of the Patent and Trademark Office to register the mark STEELBUILDING.COM, because the mark was descriptive of online services for the design of steel buildings, and lacked secondary meaning
  9. In re Nett Designs, Inc.

    236 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001)   Cited 28 times
    Finding that prior registrations of marks including the term ULTIMATE "do not conclusively rebut the Board's finding that ULTIMATE is descriptive in the context of this mark"
  10. In re N.C. Lottery

    866 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2017)   Cited 10 times   1 Legal Analyses

    2016-2558 08-10-2017 IN RE: NORTH CAROLINA LOTTERY, Appellant David E. Bennett, Coats & Bennett, PLLC, Cary, NC, argued for appellant. Also represented by David D. Kalish. William Lamarca, Office of the Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, argued for appellee Joseph Matal. Also represented by Nathan K. Kelley, Thomas L. Casagrande, Christina Hieber. Prost, Chief Judge. David E. Bennett , Coats & Bennett, PLLC, Cary, NC, argued for appellant. Also represented by David

  11. Section 1051 - Application for registration; verification

    15 U.S.C. § 1051   Cited 3,886 times   126 Legal Analyses
    Requiring a filing of a Statement of Use to register a mark
  12. Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration

    15 U.S.C. § 1052   Cited 1,600 times   274 Legal Analyses
    Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"
  13. Section 2.41 - Proof of distinctiveness under section 2(f)

    37 C.F.R. § 2.41   Cited 13 times   4 Legal Analyses

    (a)For a trademark or service mark - (1)Ownership of prior registration(s). In appropriate cases, ownership of one or more active prior registrations on the Principal Register or under the Trademark Act of 1905 of the same mark may be accepted as prima facie evidence of distinctiveness if the goods or services are sufficiently similar to the goods or services in the application; however, further evidence may be required. (2)Five years substantially exclusive and continuous use in commerce. In appropriate