Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-756

Current through Act 7 of the 2024 Legislative Session
Section 707-756 - Electronic enticement of a child in the first degree
(1) Any person who, using a computer or any other electronic device:
(a) Intentionally or knowingly communicates:
(i) With a minor known by the person to be under the age of eighteen years;
(ii) With another person, in reckless disregard of the risk that the other person is under the age of eighteen years, and the other person is under the age of eighteen years; or
(iii) With another person who represents that person to be under the age of eighteen years;
(b) With the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of a felony:
(i) That is a murder in the first or second degree;
(ii) That is a class A felony; or
(iii) That is another covered offense as defined in section 846E-1,

agrees to meet with the minor, or with another person who represents that person to be a minor under the age of eighteen years; and

(c) Intentionally or knowingly travels to the agreed upon meeting place at the agreed upon meeting time,

is guilty of electronic enticement of a child in the first degree.

(2) Electronic enticement of a child in the first degree is a class B felony. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, a person convicted of electronic enticement of a child in the first degree shall be sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment as provided by law.

HRS § 707-756

L 2002, c 200 , pt of §1; am L 2006, c 80, §2; am L 2008, c 80, §3 .

Trial court did not err in rejecting defendant's proffered reason for requesting the withdrawal of defendant's second guilty plea on the ground that defendant had not been aware of a potentially meritorious defense that the State was unable to prove that defendant had traveled to the agreed upon meeting place as required under subsection (1)(c), where transcripts of the internet chat room conversations defendant had with minor provided compelling evidence that the meeting place was the Burger King, not a particular area within the Burger King.120 Haw. 480 (App.),210 P.3d 3. Where it was not necessary for defendant to actually commit one of the felony offenses defined in § 846E-1 in order to violate the prohibition against the electronic enticement of a child under subsection (1) but only necessary under subsection (1)(b)(iii) that defendant act with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of a felony offense defined in § 846E-1, the State was not required to specify in the indictment which § 846E-1 felony offense defendant intended to promote or facilitate.120 Haw. 480 (App.),210 P.3d 3. Where State presented evidence to the grand jury that the person communicating with defendant represented to defendant that the person was a 14-year old girl, the State was not required to prove under subsection (1)(a)(iii) that defendant engaged in communication with an actual child, and the record showed that the agreed upon meeting place was the Burger King and not a specific table within the Burger King, evidence before the grand jury that defendant arrived at the Burger King and was arrested was sufficient to establish probable cause regarding the meeting place element.120 Haw. 480 (App.),210 P.3d 3.