Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-720

Current through Act 7 of the 2024 Legislative Session
Section 707-720 - Kidnapping
(1) A person commits the offense of kidnapping if the person intentionally or knowingly restrains another person with intent to:
(a) Hold that person for ransom or reward;
(b) Use that person as a shield or hostage;
(c) Facilitate the commission of a felony or flight thereafter;
(d) Inflict bodily injury upon that person or subject that person to a sexual offense;
(e) Terrorize that person or a third person;
(f) Interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function; or
(g) Unlawfully obtain the labor or services of that person, regardless of whether related to the collection of a debt.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (3), kidnapping is a class A felony.
(3) In a prosecution for kidnapping, it is a defense which reduces the offense to a class B felony that the defendant voluntarily released the victim, alive and not suffering from serious or substantial bodily injury, in a safe place prior to trial.

HRS § 707-720

L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; am L 1986, c 314, §53; gen ch 1992; am L 2008, c 147, §2 .

Evidence held sufficient to show defendant restrained victim to subject victim to sexual offense.61 Haw. 475,605 P.2d 75. Trial judge erred in refusing to instruct jury regarding the possible merger of the robbery and kidnapping counts against defendant.77 Haw. 17,881 P.2d 504. Prosecution adduced substantial evidence from which a person of reasonable caution could conclude that defendant intentionally or knowingly restrained officer and intended to inflict bodily injury upon officer in violation of subsection (1)(d) where officer testified that defendant had pinned officer's arm against car's steering wheel and dragged officer thirty yards down the street while officer was hanging outside the vehicle.95 Haw. 465,24 P.3d 661. Where handgun constituted a significant piece of evidence pertaining to the state of mind requisite to the charged offense of kidnapping-with-the-intent-to-terrorize, trial court's admission of testimony regarding the handgun was not erroneous because the testimony's probative value outweighed any potential prejudice. 118 H. 493, 193 P.3d 409. Where jurors could have found that defendant's culpable acts of either the morning or afternoon of April 10, 2004 established the conduct element of the kidnapping count, and trial court did not issue a specific unanimity instruction to the jury regarding defendant's kidnapping charge, appellate court erred in affirming trial court's kidnapping conviction under this section.118 Haw. 493,193 P.3d 409. A specific unanimity (jury) instruction is not required where (1) the offense is not defined in such a manner as to preclude it from being proved as a continuous offense and (2) the prosecution alleges, adduces evidence of, and argues that the defendant's action constituted a continuous course of conduct; thus, a specific unanimity instruction was not required where prosecution alleged a continuous course of conduct with respect to defendant's kidnapping charge under this section, but was required for defendant's attempted first degree sexual assault charge under § 707-730.121 Haw. 339,219 P.3d 1126. No evidence that defendant voluntarily released the victim in a safe place. 6 H. App. 77,711 P.2d 1303. Trial court's jury instruction that "terrorize means the risk of causing another person serious alarm for his or her personal safety" had no basis in Hawaii's criminal statutes, derogated the culpable state of mind required for conviction under subsection (1)(e), and was not harmless error. 98 H. 208 (App.),46 P.3d 1092. A defense under subsection (3) imposed upon the State the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant (a) did not release the victim alive, (b) prior to trial, (c) voluntarily, (d) the victim was not suffering from serious or substantial bodily injury, or (e) did not release the victim in a safe place; if and when the State satisfied its burden of disproving one or more of these five elements, it disproved the defense; failure of the jury instructions to connect "release" and "prior to trial" was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.102 Haw. 346 (App.),76 P.3d 589.