Conn. R. Evid. 4-1
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is material to the determination of the proceeding more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Conn. Code. Evid. 4-1
COMMENTARY
Section 4-1 embodies the two separate components of relevant evidence recognized at common law: (1) probative value; and (2) materiality. State v. Jeffrey, 220 Conn. 698, 709, 601 A.2d 993 (1991); State v. Dabkowski, 199 Conn. 193, 206, 506 A.2d 118 (1986).
Section 4-1 incorporates the requirement of probative value by providing that the proffered evidence must tend "to make the existence of any fact . . . more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.'' See, e.g., State v. Prioleau, 235 Conn. 274, 305, 664 A.2d 793 (1995); State v. Briggs, 179 Conn. 328, 332, 426 A.2d 298 (1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 912, 100 S. Ct. 3000, 64 L. Ed. 2d 862 (1980). Section 4-1 's "more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence'' standard of probative worth is consistent with Connecticut law. See, e.g., State v. Rinaldi, 220 Conn. 345, 353, 599 A.2d 1 (1991) ("[t]o be relevant, the evidence need not exclude all other possibilities; it is sufficient if it tends to support the conclusion, even to a slight degree''); State v. Miller, 202 Conn. 463, 482, 522 A.2d 249 (1987) ("[e]vidence is not inadmissible because it is not conclusive; it is admissible if it has a tendency to support a fact relevant to the issues if only in a slight degree'' [emphasis added]). Thus, it is not necessary that the evidence, by itself, conclusively establish the fact for which it is offered or render the fact more probable than not.
Section 4-1 expressly requires materiality as a condition to relevancy in providing that the factual proposition for which the evidence is offered must be "material to the determination of the proceeding . . . .'' See State v. Marra, 222 Conn. 506, 521, 610 A.2d 1113 (1992); State v. Corchado, 188 Conn. 653, 668, 453 A.2d 427 (1982). The materiality of evidence turns upon what is at issue in the case, which generally will be determined by the pleadings and the applicable substantive law. See Williams Ford, Inc. v. Hartford Courant Co., 232 Conn. 559, 570, 657 A.2d 212 (1995).