Opinion
No. CV 05 4011900S
January 26, 2007
I. Procedural History
Presently before the court is the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's amended four-count complaint for failure to exhaust administrative and contractual remedies. In the amended complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant failed to pay him at or above the statutorily required minimum rate for overtime pay in violation of state and federal wage laws. The court finds that because the plaintiff has not obtained a declaratory order from the state of Connecticut department of labor determining the applicability of state and federal wage laws to his particular situation, an available administrative remedy has not been exhausted. The failure to exhaust this remedy, prior to commencing action in Superior Court, deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, as is more fully set forth below, the defendant's motion to dismiss is granted.
On May 26, 2005, the plaintiff, Benedict J. York, filed an amended four-count complaint against the defendant, the state of Connecticut department of environmental protection. In counts one and two of the amended complaint, the plaintiff alleges that from March 27, 1998, through August 30, 2004, the defendant failed to pay him at or above the minimum statutorily required rate for overtime pay in violation of General Statutes § 5-245(a) and General Statutes § 31-76e. In count three of the amended complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant entered into a collective bargaining agreement that governed the rate of overtime pay and mandated an overtime rate below the statutorily required minimum rate, in violation of General Statutes § 31-76e. In count four of the amended complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant's failure to pay him at or above the statutorily required minimum rate for overtime pay violated the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, et seq. In the plaintiff's prayer for relief, the plaintiff seeks damages in excess of $15,000 for the amount of overtime hours that he alleges were paid to him below the minimum statutorily required rate for overtime pay.
On August 11, 2005, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's amended complaint on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff did not exhaust his available administrative and contractual remedies prior to commencing action in Superior Court. In support of its motion to dismiss, the defendant argues that the plaintiff did not exhaust his available administrative remedies of filing a statement of claim for wages with the department of labor or obtaining a declaratory order from the department of labor. The defendant additionally argues that the plaintiff did not exhaust his available contractual remedy provided by the grievance procedure set forth in the collective bargaining agreement.
II DISCUSSION
"It is a settled principle of administrative law that, if an adequate administrative remedy exists, it must be exhausted before the Superior Court will obtain jurisdiction to act in the matter." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) LaCroix v. Board of Education, 199 Conn. 70, 83-84, 505 A.2d 1233 (1986). "Under our exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine, a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an action that seeks a remedy that could be provided through an administrative proceeding, unless and until that remedy has been sought in the administrative forum . . . In the absence of exhaustion of that remedy, the action must be dismissed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) D'Eramo v. Smith, 273 Conn. 610, 616, 872 A.2d 408 (2005).
"The doctrine of exhaustion is grounded in a policy of fostering an orderly process of administrative adjudication and judicial review in which a reviewing court will have the benefit of the agency's findings and conclusions . . . The doctrine . . . furthers the salutary goals of relieving the courts of the burden of deciding questions entrusted to an agency . . . in advance of possible judicial review . . . Most important, a favorable outcome will render review by the court unnecessary [because] as the United States Supreme Court has noted: A complaining party may be successful in vindicating his rights in the administrative process. If he is required to pursue his administrative remedies, the courts may never have to intervene." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 248 Conn. 87, 95-96, 726 A.2d 1154 (1999).
In support of its motion to dismiss, the defendant argues that the plaintiff is required to file a complete statement of claim for wages with the department of labor, pursuant to General Statutes § 31-76a, and that the plaintiff's failure to submit this claim constitutes a failure to exhaust an available administrative remedy. In opposition to the defendant's motion to dismiss, the plaintiff argues that he filed a statement of claim for wages with the department of labor, but that the department declined to pursue his claim. The plaintiff contends that a letter from the department of labor, stating it was declining to pursue his claim, demonstrates that he exhausted his available administrative remedies.
The letter from the Connecticut department of labor states: "Because the nature of your claim concerns an interpretation of your DEP employment contract regarding its On-Call and Standby provisions, it is the Connecticut Labor Department's position that your remedy lies more appropriately with a private cause of action in Superior Court."
Contrary to the plaintiff's assertion, however, is the fact that the statement of claim for wages that he submitted to the department of labor did not contain the same allegations as those asserted in his amended complaint. In the statement of claim for wages, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant failed to pay him for time spent on call, in violation of the defendant's employment policy, and that for hours worked in excess of forty hours per week, he was paid "straight time and should have been paid time and one half." The plaintiff, however, did not allege in his statement of claim for wages that the defendant violated state or federal wage laws, nor did he challenge the legality of the collective bargaining agreement. Because the plaintiff's allegations in his statement of claim for wages differ from those contained in his amended complaint, it is not possible to conclude that the department of labor's letter addresses the substance of the plaintiff's present complaint or that the letter demonstrates that the plaintiff exhausted his available administrative remedies.
Even if this court were to conclude that the plaintiff's statement of claim for wages contained the same allegations as the present complaint, the law remains contrary to the plaintiff's assertion that the letter from the department of labor constitutes an exhaustion of his available administrative remedies. In Housing Authority v. Papandrea, 222 Conn. 444, 610 A.2d 637 (1992), the Supreme Court disagreed with a plaintiff's argument that an adverse letter from an agency commissioner constituted an exhaustion of his available administrative remedies. Id., 428-30. The court in Papandrea determined that even though a commissioner of an agency had stated his intentions in a letter, this did not relieve the plaintiff from the duty of pursuing his available administrative remedies in an effort to persuade the commissioner that the commissioner's position was legally incorrect. Id. Similarly, the Connecticut Supreme Court has stated that "a mere conclusory assertion that an agency will not reconsider its decision does not excuse compliance with the exhaustion requirement." Polymer Resources, Ltd. v. Keeney, 227 Conn. 545, 562, 630 A.2d 1304 (1993). The defendant further argues that the plaintiff's administrative remedies have not been exhausted because the plaintiff did not obtain a declaratory order from the department of labor, pursuant to General Statutes § 4-176, prior to commencing action in Superior Court. In Housing Authority v. Papandrea, the Supreme Court determined that § 4-176 when coupled with agency regulations enabling an aggrieved party to petition for a declaratory ruling, constitutes an administrative remedy that is required to be exhausted before commencing action in Superior Court. Housing Authority v. Papandrea, supra, 222 Conn. 420-28. In accordance with the holding in Papandrea, the plaintiff is required to obtain a declaratory order from the department of labor prior to commencing action in superior court. See Roto-Rooter Services Co. v. Department of Labor, 219 Conn. 520, 593 A.2d 1386 (1991). Ultimately, because there exists an available administrative remedy providing the plaintiff with a mechanism for attaining the remedy he seeks — a determination that the defendant violated state and federal wage laws and that the collective bargaining agreement is invalid — the plaintiff is required to exhaust this administrative remedy prior to commencing action in Superior Court. Housing Authority v. Papandrea, supra, 222 Conn. 420-28; see also Polymer Resources, Ltd. v. Keeney, supra, 227 Conn. 558,
Section 4-176 provides in relevant part that: "(a) Any person may petition an agency . . . for a declaratory ruling as to the validity of any regulation, or the applicability to specified circumstances of a provision of the general statutes, a regulation, or a final decision on a matter within the jurisdiction of the agency. (b) Each agency shall adopt regulations, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, that provide for (1) the form and content of petitions for declaratory rulings, (2) the filing procedure for such petitions and (3) the procedural rights of persons with respect to the petitions." The Connecticut department of labor has issued such regulations; Regs., Conn. State Agencies §§ 31-1-11 through 31-1-17 set forth the rules and procedures a petitioner must take when seeking a declaratory ruling from the department of labor. Section 31-1-12 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies provides in part: "Petitions for declaratory rulings may be filed on . . . the applicability to specified circumstances of a provision of the general statutes, a regulation, or a final decision on a matter within the jurisdiction of this agency."
Section 4-176 enables the plaintiff to petition for a declaratory order from the Connecticut department of labor to determine whether the defendant violated state and federal wage laws. If the department of labor fails to respond to the plaintiff's request for a declaratory order, the plaintiff may seek a declaratory judgment from the Superior Court pursuant to § 4-175. In the alternative, if the plaintiff obtains a declaratory order and is unsatisfied with the department's determination, the plaintiff may appeal to the Superior Court pursuant to § 4-183.
Therefore, for the above-mentioned reasons, the court grants the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's amended complaint. The plaintiff's failure to obtain a declaratory order from the department of labor, prior to commencing action in Superior Court, deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction.
Because the court has dismissed the plaintiff's amended complaint for failure to exhaust an available administrative remedy, the court need not address whether contractual remedies have been exhausted.
III CONCLUSION
The defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's amended complaint is granted because the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
SO ORDERED.