Opinion
CV176013293S
07-10-2018
James E. WYSOCKI, Administrator of the Estate of Edward B. Wysocki, Jr. v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Farley, J.
On November 14, 2017, the plaintiff, James E. Wysocki, in his capacity as Administrator of the Estate of Edward B. Wysocki, Jr. (estate), filed this appeal from a decree of the Probate Court for the district of Vernon-Ellington that denied the plaintiff’s October 11, 2017 "Revised Motion for Clarification and Modification of Orders." The defendants, Bank of America, N.A. (Bank of America), TCI Realty, LLC (TCI), and Connecticut Attorneys Title Insurance Company (CATIC), move to dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A number of the parties’ arguments do not implicate the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. In particular, the defendants attack the propriety of the October 11, 2017 motion on several grounds. In the court’s view, the arguments that actually implicate the court’s subject matter jurisdiction can be bifurcated into two parts: (I) the appeal is untimely; and (II) the plaintiff is not aggrieved by the order. The court does not address the merits of the parties’ contentions to the extent they do not implicate the court’s jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. As discussed below, the court concludes that the appeal is timely and the plaintiff is aggrieved. The motions to dismiss are denied.
FACTS
On April 9, 2016, the decedent, Edward B. Wysocki, Jr., died intestate and the plaintiff was appointed administrator of the estate on April 18, 2016. One of the principal assets in the estate was the decedent’s former residence located at 8 Lord Road in Ellington (property). The property was encumbered by a mortgage, dated December 21, 1992, and the decedent executed a note, dated December 21, 1992, to secure the mortgage in favor of Arbor National Mortgage. On July 7, 1995, Arbor National Mortgage assigned the mortgage to Bank of America. On July 22, 2016, the plaintiff petitioned the Probate Court for permission to sell the property to TCI for $75,000, which was granted by the Probate Court, Purnell, J., on July 25, 2016. In advance of the August 18, 2016 closing date, the plaintiff attempted to contact Bank of America in an effort to obtain confirmation of the note and mortgage as well as the payoff information. It is a matter in dispute between the parties whether the plaintiff received the requested information.
The mortgage was recorded in Volume 196 at Page 397 of the Ellington Land Records on December 28, 1992.
The assignment was recorded in Volume 219 at Page 412 of the Ellington Land Records. Further, the plaintiff has previously challenged the propriety of this assignment. For purposes of the present motion, the court notes that the assignment was made to Bank of America, FSB and that this entity became a branch of Bank of America, National Association on December 2, 1999.
On August 18, 2016, pursuant to the plaintiff’s motion, the Probate Court held a hearing and received evidence regarding the note and mortgage information sought from Bank of America. Although Bank of America was provided notice of this hearing, it did not appear. On the same date, the Probate Court issued a decree ordering, among other things, that Bank of America produce the original promissory note and mortgage documents, and authorizing the plaintiff to place the "mortgage payoff funds" into escrow to be held until Bank of America provided the requested documents and a release of the mortgage. Also on August 18, 2016, the closing on the property went forward. The estate transferred the property to TCI by way of warranty deed and, in return, TCI presented the plaintiff and his attorney with a check payable to the estate in the amount of $29,551.68, and a check payable to Bank of America in the amount of $35,224.72. At some point thereafter, the check payable to Bank of America, or the funds derived therefrom, was placed into escrow. TCI has held title, possession, and control of the property since that date.
The deed was recorded in Volume 422 at Page 717 of the Ellington Land Records on August 19, 2016.
On September 21, 2016, the Probate Court, sua sponte, held another hearing in an attempt to "expedite the exchange of the original promissory note and mortgage" and to resolve the legitimacy of the assignment of the note and mortgage to Bank of America so that it may receive the funds being held in escrow. Bank of America was again provided notice but did not appear. During the hearing, the Probate Court successfully contacted Bank of America by telephone and granted Bank of America’s oral request to continue the hearing until September 26, 2016, so that it may appear and produce the original note and mortgage as ordered. Nevertheless, Bank of America failed to appear at the hearing scheduled for September 26, 2016.
On September 28, 2016, the Probate Court issued a decree finding that Bank of America failed to appear at the previous three hearings and to produce the note and mortgage. The decree ordered that Bank of America "[is] in default of [its] duties and obligations to this Court, as set forth in this Court’s previous Orders, whereupon the obligations of the Estate to [Bank of America] are declared void as to the Estate and upon the Administrator thereof ..." The decree further ordered that the "escrow funds held for taxes" and the "mortgage payoff funds" are to be remitted to the plaintiff. No party appealed or moved to modify this decree.
This decree was recorded in Volume 480 at Page 110 of the Ellington Land Records on November 1, 2016.
On November 17 and 30, 2016, the plaintiff made formal written demands to TCI to immediately disburse the mortgage payoff funds, in the amount of $35,224.72, to the estate pursuant to the September 28, 2016 decree. On January 5, 2017, TCI responded that it would not disburse the funds, which were still being held in escrow, because the matter was a title claim due to the fact that the September 28, 2016 decree was recorded in the Ellington Land Records and, thus, was being handled by CATIC. On February 2, 2017, the Probate Court served TCI and Bank of America with notices to appear on February 21, 2017, to provide the court with an explanation as to why TCI continued to hold the mortgage payoff funds in escrow. On February 13, 2017, TCI filed a motion for order requesting a decree from the Probate Court ordering that the escrow funds be released to Bank of America and that the plaintiff must pay any remaining balance incurred as a result of the delay caused by the plaintiff. On February 16, 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion to strike TCI’s motion.
On February 21, 2017, the Probate Court held a hearing and entered a decree finding that "[a] closing for the sale of the [property] was held on or about August 18, 2016. The original promissory note was not produced at that time and no payoff check was subsequently mailed to Bank of America the current mortgage holder ... Bank of America is hereby ordered to bring the original promissory note to the hearing and when they are paid for the balance of the mortgage that was owing on the date of $35,224.72 they shall mark said promissory note as paid and exchange it for the payoff check." On March 6, 2017, the plaintiff filed a comprehensive posthearing brief objecting to further proceedings, challenging the impropriety of the note, and requesting that the court enforce its September 28, 2016 decree. On April 12, 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion for clarification and modification of the February 21, 2017 decree requesting that the Probate Court enforce the September 28, 2016 decree because it is valid and unchallenged. The plaintiff’s April 12, 2017 motion also requests that the Probate Court consider the arguments posited in his March 6, 2017 posthearing brief.
The plaintiff submits uncontroverted evidence to establish that the February 21, 2017 decree was not mailed in the usual course, but was sent via email by the clerk of the Probate Court on March 21, 2017. The plaintiff, in his signed and sworn affidavit submitted in opposition, opines that he received the signed copy of the February 21, 2017 decree on April 2, 2017, by way of an envelope postmarked March 28, 2017.
On April 18, 2017, the Probate Court held a status conference at which Bank of America appeared, produced, and authenticated the promissory note. Bank of America also cancelled the note by writing "Paid in full: 4/18/17 JFD per court order, Purnell, J. 4/18/17 Ellington Probate Court." At the same status conference, TCI provided a check payable to Bank of America for the mortgage payoff funds in the amount of $35,224.72.
On April 19, 2017, the Probate Court entered a decree finding that: "Bank of America has appeared with the original Note and authorization ... to mark the note ‘Paid in Full’ ... and a fully executed Release of Mortgage ..." The court further found that "TCI ... has appeared with a check made out to Bank of America for the mortgage payoff in the amount of $35,224.72" and also that the plaintiff "has argued that the Court order of September 28, 2016 absolves the Estate of any responsibility to pay the mortgage." The April 19, 2017 decree ordered that the September 28, 2016 decree be modified to now direct that "TCI is to turn over the said check in the amount of $35,224.72 to the Bank of America," that Bank of America "is to turn over the Note marked ‘Paid in Full’ " to the plaintiff, that Bank of America "provide a statement of the escrow account for 2016 and 2017" to the plaintiff and return the balance to the plaintiff, and that "[t]he Estate shall have no further liability for any reason" to TCI or Bank of America.
On April 21, 2017, the Probate Court entered a decree granting the plaintiff’s motion to strike TCI’s February 13, 2017 motion for order because it was moot. The decree found that: TCI had filed a motion concerning the payoff of the mortgage; the plaintiff filed a motion to strike TCI’s motion; TCI appeared with a check made out to Bank of America for the mortgage payoff; the check was exchanged for a release of mortgage and the original note marked paid in full; and, thus, "[t]here is no longer any case or controversy." On April 21, 2017, the Probate Court also entered a separate supplemental decree opining that the April 19, 2017 decree inadvertently omitted the following additional order: Bank of America shall provide a listing of all transactions concerning the escrow account for 2016 and 2017, and shall remit the balance thereof to the plaintiff within ninety days.
The April 21, 2017 supplemental decree, unless otherwise indicated, is hereinafter incorporated into and referred to as part of the April 21, 2017 decree.
On May 25, 2017, the plaintiff filed an appeal to the Superior Court from the April 21, 2017 decree alleging that the Probate Court erred in failing to enforce the September 28, 2016 decree and in releasing the sale proceeds from the sale of real property to Bank of America. See Wysocki v. Bank of America, N.A., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-17-6078803-S (Wysocki I ). On July 17 and 20, 2017, the defendants, Bank of America, TCI, and CATIC, moved to dismiss Wysocki I on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff’s appeal was filed after the thirty-day appeal period prescribed by General Statutes § 45a-186. On October 5, 2017, the court, Moukawsher, J., granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss concluding that it was without jurisdiction to hear the late appeal.
On October 11, 2017, the plaintiff filed the "Revised Motion for Clarification and Modification of Orders" purporting to seek adjudication of the previously filed April 12, 2017 motion. In the revised motion, the plaintiff sought clarification and modification not only of the February 21, 2017 decree, but also the April 19, 2017 decree, and the April 21, 2017 decree, "as all three orders concern and affect the ... July 29, 2016 order." On or about October 18, 2017, the Probate Court, without holding a hearing, entered a decree denying the plaintiff’s revised motion because "[t]he various issues raised in the prior hearings have all been presented by the [plaintiff]. These issues have all been decided upon in this Court’s decrees of April 19th and April 21st of this year. The Court sees no reason to revisit these issues."
The decree is dated April 18, 2017. The plaintiff affirmatively alleges that this decree was "issued" on October 18, 2017, and there has been no evidence submitted to contradict that date. Therefore, for the purposes of the present motion, the court will consider this decree as being decided and mailed by the Probate Court on October 18, 2017.
On November 14, 2017, the plaintiff filed the present appeal from the Probate Court’s October 18, 2017 decree. The complaint purports to assert independent civil causes of action against each defendant and further alleges that he has been aggrieved by the Probate Court’s decrees dated February 21, 2017, April 19, 2017, April 21, 2017, and October 18, 2017, all of which are attached to the complaint as exhibits. The prayer for relief seeks, among other things, an order disaffirming all four of these decrees as well as an order against the defendants to pay the estate the mortgage payoff funds in the amount of $35,224.72.
On January 5, 2018, the defendants each filed motions to dismiss asserting that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal. On February 2, 2018, the plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion filed by Bank of America, on February 5, 2018, the plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to TCI’s motion and, on February 6, 2018, the plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to CATIC’s motion. The court heard oral argument on the motions to dismiss and the plaintiff’s oppositions on March 23, 2018.
On March 21, 2018, the plaintiff filed a motion for permission to file a supplemental opposition along with the proposed brief, to which TCI and CATIC objected but also responded substantively on March 22, 2018. The plaintiff replied to the objections on March 22, 2018. The court has reviewed and considered all of these materials, thus granting the plaintiff’s motion for permission.
DISCUSSION
"A motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court ... A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction ... [I]n determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged ... Trial courts addressing motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction ... may encounter different situations, depending on the status of the record in the case ... [I]f the complaint is supplemented by undisputed facts established by affidavits submitted in support of the motion to dismiss ... other types of undisputed evidence ... and/or public records of which judicial notice may be taken ... the trial court, in determining the jurisdictional issue, may consider these supplementary undisputed facts and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint ... Rather, those allegations are tempered by the light shed on them by the [supplementary undisputed facts.]" (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 650-51, 974 A.2d 669 (2009). "[I]t is the burden of the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor ... clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Financial Consulting, LLC v. Commissioner of Insurance, 315 Conn. 196, 226, 105 A.3d 210 (2015).
The Superior Court’s special and limited jurisdiction over probate appeals is conferred on it by § 45a-186. Eder’s Appeal From Probate, 177 Conn.App. 163, 168-69, 171 A.3d 506 (2017); Burnell v. Chorches, 173 Conn.App. 788, 793, 164 A.3d 806 (2017). "The right to appeal from a decision of the Probate Court is statutory ... Our legislation has always favored the speedy settlement of estates, and to that end has carefully limited the time within which such appeals [from probate] must be taken ... It is a familiar principle that a court which exercises a limited and statutory jurisdiction is without jurisdiction to act unless it does so under the precise circumstances and in the manner particularly prescribed by the enabling legislation." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Corneroli v. D’Amico, 116 Conn.App. 59, 63, 975 A.2d 107, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 928, 980 A.2d 909 (2009); see Marshall v. Marshall, 71 Conn.App. 565, 570, 803 A.2d 919 (outlining Superior Court’s limited scope of review), cert. denied, 261 Conn. 941, 808 A.2d 1132 (2002).
Section 45a-186(a) provides in relevant part: "[A]ny person aggrieved by any order, denial or decree of a Probate Court in any matter ... may ... not later than thirty days after mailing of an order, denial or decree for any other matter in a Probate Court, appeal therefrom to the Superior Court. Such an appeal shall be commenced by filing a complaint in the superior court ... The complaint shall state the reasons for the appeal. A copy of the order, denial or decree appealed from shall be attached to the complaint ..." The requirements of § 45a-186 that the plaintiff be aggrieved and that the plaintiff file the appeal within the required timeframe both implicate the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Probate Appeal of Red Knot Acquisitions, LLC, 147 Conn.App. 39, 42, 80 A.3d 594 (2013); Gates v. Gates, 51 Conn.Supp. 148, 150, 975 A.2d 147 (2008), aff’d, 115 Conn.App. 293, 971 A.2d 852, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 924, 980 A.2d 910 (2009).
I
TIMELINESS OF APPEAL
It is undisputed that the plaintiff’s November 14, 2017 appeal was filed within thirty days from the issuance of the October 18, 2017 decree. The defendants argue, however, that the plaintiff’s appeal is an attempt to circumvent the thirty-day appeal deadline mandated by § 45a-186 because his appeal also challenges the decrees issued in February through April of 2017. The defendants argue that the plaintiff’s challenge to the earlier decrees is late, pursuant to § 45a-186, noting his appeal from the April 21, 2017 decree was previously dismissed for untimeliness by the Superior Court on October 5, 2017. Essentially, the defendants argue that the purpose of the plaintiff’s October 11, 2017 motion was to prompt a decree from the Probate Court from which he could take a timely appeal in an effort to resurrect his challenge to the 2017 decrees. In response, the plaintiff argues, in relevant part, that the appeal is timely because it was filed within thirty days of the October 18, 2017 decree.
See footnote 7 of this opinion.
Although the defendants’ arguments avoid the talismanic phrasing, they appear to argue that the plaintiff’s appeal from the October 18, 2017 decree is a collateral attack on the 2017 decrees. "A collateral attack is a procedurally impermissible substitute for a direct attack on a prior judgment." Glemboski v. Glemboski, 184 Conn. 602, 605-06, 440 A.2d 242 (1981) (prohibiting collateral attack on Probate Court decree that was not appealed); General Statutes § 45a-24. Nevertheless, our Appellate Court recently held that a challenge to whether an appeal from probate collaterally attacks a previous decree does not implicate the Superior Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See Davis v. Davis-Henriques, 163 Conn.App. 301, 305-06, 135 A.3d 1247 (2016) (Superior Court vested with jurisdiction, pursuant to § 45a-186, when appeal was commenced in timely manner). In the present case, it is undisputed that the plaintiff’s November 14, 2017 appeal was filed within thirty days from the issuance of the October 18, 2017 decree. Section 45a-186 guarantees the plaintiff a right to appeal that order, provided he is aggrieved and his appeal is timely. Whether the plaintiff’s appeal attempts to improperly enlarge the scope of the decree appealed from; see id., 310; does not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction. The motions to dismiss are denied to the extent they rely upon the claim of untimeliness.
General Statutes § 45a-24 provides in relevant part: "All orders, judgments and decrees of courts of probate, rendered after notice and from which no appeal is taken, shall be conclusive and shall be entitled to full faith, credit and validity and shall not be subject to collateral attack, except for fraud."
II
AGGRIEVEMENT
The defendants argue that the plaintiff lacks standing to appeal because he was not aggrieved by the October 18, 2017 decree. The defendants argue that the entirety of the Probate Court’s decrees became final after the Superior Court in Wysocki I dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal from the April 21, 2017 decree as untimely on October 5, 2017. Accordingly, the defendants argue that the Probate Court’s October 18, 2017 decree, which was decided after the final disposition of all prior decrees, cannot impact a cognizable legal interest that would aggrieve the estate. The plaintiff counters that he has standing because he is the statutorily recognized party to proceed in an action on behalf of the estate. The plaintiff additionally argues, inter alia, that the estate has been aggrieved by the October 18, 2017 decree because it denied his challenge to the 2017 decrees.
"In order to prosecute an appeal from a Probate Court, it is necessary that the plaintiff be aggrieved within the meaning of ... [§ 45a-186]. Aggrievement as a concept of standing is a practical and functional one designed to assure that only those with a genuine and legitimate interest can appeal an order of the Probate Court ... The issue of whether [a party] was aggrieved under [§ 45a-186] by the actions of the Probate Court is to be distinguished from the question of whether, on a review of the merits, it will prevail ... The question of whether an order from probate aggrieves a party concerns a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction ..." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Probate Appeal of Red Knot Acquisitions, LLC, supra, 147 Conn.App. 42.
"In order to establish standing to appeal from a probate matter, a party must show that he or she is aggrieved by any order, denial or decree of a court of probate in any matter, unless otherwise specially provided by law ... The test for determining whether a party has been aggrieved by a Probate Court decision is whether there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest that [the party] has in the estate has been adversely affected ... This interest may be a direct pecuniary one, or it may consist of an injurious effect upon some legally protected right or status of the appellant." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Flor v. Pohl, 95 Conn.App. 555, 559, 899 A.2d 46 (2006). "Merely possessing a legal interest in the estate ... is not enough to confer standing upon a party. In order to show aggrievement, that party must show that the legal interest was adversely affected." McBurney v. Cirillo, 276 Conn. 782, 822, 889 A.2d 759 (2006), overruled on other grounds by Batte-Holmgren v. Commissioner of Public Health, 281 Conn. 277, 914 A.2d 996 (2007). "The responsibility for alleging a factual basis for aggrievement for the purpose of taking a probate appeal falls squarely on the person taking the appeal." Doyle v. Abbenante, 89 Conn.App. 658, 663, 875 A.2d 558, cert. denied, 276 Conn. 911, 886 A.2d 425 (2005); see also Lenge v. Goldfarb, 169 Conn. 218, 221, 363 A.2d 110 (1975).
The issue presented in this case is whether the October 18, 2017 decree, which denied the plaintiff’s October 11, 2017 revised motion for clarification and modification of the 2017 decrees, possibly affected a legally cognizable interest of the estate. There can be no dispute that the plaintiff had standing to appeal the 2017 decrees on behalf of the estate. By virtue of the September 28, 2016 decree, the estate’s obligations to Bank of America were vitiated and TCI was ordered to remit the mortgage payoff funds to the estate. The Probate Court reversed the September 28, 2016 decree through the series of events culminating in the 2017 decrees, and TCI did not distribute the funds to the estate. Therefore, the estate was aggrieved as a result of the 2017 decrees and, thus, the plaintiff had standing to challenge the 2017 decrees on behalf of the estate. The issue of aggrievement, however, is complicated by the fact that this appeal is taken from a revised motion for clarification and modification of the 2017 decrees, and not directly from the 2017 decrees.
The defendants argue that the October 18, 2017 decree has no negative effect on the estate because the 2017 decrees became final after the October 5, 2017 dismissal of Wysocki I. See Davis v. Davis-Henriques, supra, 163 Conn.App. 308-09 (decree conclusive until or unless the decree is disaffirmed on appeal); § 45a-24; see also General Statutes § 45a-128 (authorizing reconsideration, modification, and revocation of decrees within 120 days of date of decree). The question whether the 2017 decrees were conclusive on October 5, 2017 turns first upon whether the Probate Court had previously ruled upon the plaintiff’s original April 12, 2017 motion for clarification and modification. If not, because the April 12, 2017 motion challenged the first of the 2017 decrees, the plaintiff would be aggrieved by the Probate Court’s denial of that challenge on October 18, 2017. The court concludes that the April 21, 2017 order was, in practical effect, a denial of the April 12, 2017 motion. The plaintiff, therefore, cannot establish standing based upon the Probate Court’s denial of that motion.
As the plaintiff himself points out, "[i]t is well established that ‘despite the [party’s] or the trial court’s characterization of the motion, we examine the practical effect of the trial court’s ruling in order to determine its nature.’ " Davis v. Davis-Henriques, supra, 163 Conn.App. 307, quoting In re Haley B., 262 Conn. 406, 412-13, 815 A.2d 113 (2003). In the present case, the Probate Court had the plaintiff’s April 12, 2017 motion and the arguments advanced in his March 6, 2017 memorandum before it at the April 18, 2017 hearing. The court expressly acknowledged in its April 19, 2017 decree that the plaintiff had "argued that the Court order of September 28, 2016 absolves the Estate of any responsibility to pay the mortgage." The order that followed is a clear and direct repudiation of that position taken by the plaintiff. The Probate Court’s October 18, 2017 order reiterates the fact that the issues raised in the October 11, 2017 motion, including those first advanced in the plaintiff’s April 12, 2017 motion and his March 6, 2017 memorandum, "have all been decided" in the context of the 2017 decrees.
Assuming the 2017 decrees were conclusive, however, a question remains whether the Probate Court was absolutely precluded from subsequently modifying those decrees in response to the plaintiff’s October 11, 2017 motion. The defendants maintain that is the case, ironically so in light of the fact that, pursuant to their reasoning, the Probate Court acted without authority on April 19, 2017 when it reversed the September 28, 2016 order. Considering the possibility that the Probate Court might have done so again, the October 18, 2017 decree had a potential adverse pecuniary impact on the estate because it denied the requested modification of the 2017 decrees, in which the plaintiff clearly had a legally protected interest. Notably, in refusing to modify a conclusive order in this instance, the Probate Court did not cite a lack of authority or jurisdiction to revisit those issues, but instead ruled that it "[saw] no reason to" do so. This court concludes, without passing upon the merits of the appeal, that the record sufficiently establishes "some legally protected interest that [the plaintiff] has in the estate has been adversely affected." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McBurney v. Cirillo, supra, 276 Conn. 822.
The defendants’ challenge to the Probate Court’s authority to entertain the plaintiff’s October 11, 2017 motion in light of the conclusiveness of the 2017 decrees, like its claim of untimeliness, appears to constitute a claim that the plaintiff’s motion was an improper collateral attack on those decrees. That may be the case, but it does not deprive this court of jurisdiction. Davis v. Davis-Henriques, supra, 163 Conn.App. 305-06. Whether those decrees were immune from attack, thus depriving the Probate Court of authority to entertain the plaintiff’s motion, however, or alternatively whether it is an appropriate exercise of judicial discretion to deny the motion, appears to cross the line between the issue of aggrievement and the merits of the appeal. "The fundamental aspect of standing ... [is that] it focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before [the] court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated ... The issue of [aggrievement] is to be distinguished from the question of whether, on a review of the merits, it will prevail." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hartford Kosher Caterers, Inc. v. Gazda, 165 Conn. 478, 338 A.2d 497 (1973), citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1952, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968). Although the defendants have raised a number of other issues going to the merits of the appeal, the court takes no position on those issues in resolving the defendants’ motions to dismiss.
Accordingly, although the present appeal is not taken directly from the 2017 decrees, the court concludes that the plaintiff has standing to pursue this appeal on behalf of the estate.
CONCLUSION
The defendants’ motions to dismiss are denied because the plaintiff’s appeal is timely and he is aggrieved by the October 18, 2017 decree.