Summary
In Williams, the court dismissed deliberate indifference claims where the inmate never informed prison officials he had been targeted for extortion, identified the inmate, or explained why his interactions gave rise to a reasonable fear that he would be targeted for violence.
Summary of this case from Brewer v. SmithOpinion
Case No. 1:18-cv-170 Erie
08-14-2020
CHARLES WILLIAMS, Plaintiff v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF No. 100] MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 100] be GRANTED. II. Report
A. Procedural Background
Plaintiff Charles Williams, an inmate formerly incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Forest (SCI-Forest), initiated this pro se action on June 6, 2018, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF No. 1. As Defendants, Plaintiff initially named the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC), Secretary of Corrections John Wetzel (Wetzel), DOC employee Renee Foulds (Foulds), Assistant Chief Hearing Examiner Keri Moore (Moore), Superintendent Michael Overmyer (Overmyer), Deputy Superintendent Oberlander (Oberlander), Deputy Superintendent Sawtelle (Sawtelle), Unit Manager Blicha (Blicha), Unit Manager Perry (Perry), Unit Manager Brumagin (Brumagin), Grievance Coordinator Reeher (Reeher), Captain Chiles (Chiles), Corrections Officer T.S. Miller (Miller), Hearing Examiner T. Williams (Hearing Examiner Williams), Unit Manager Best (Best), Counselor Hopkins (Hopkins), and Dr. Eiserman (Eiserman), a prison psychologist. Id. ¶¶ 4-20. Williams maintained that the Defendants - each of whom was sued in both their individual and official capacities - violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, his First Amendment right to be free from unlawful retaliation, deprived him of due process and equal protection in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, unlawfully discriminated against him based on his race, and demonstrated deliberate indifference to his physical safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. (preliminary statement). In addition, Williams raised state law claims of "negligence, gross negligence, breach of contract, harassment, ethnic intimidation, official oppression, conduct unbecoming of a prison official, abuse of authority, misuse of authority, the unlawful taking of another person's property, theft, civil conspiracy, criminal conspiracy, libel, slander, falsifying reports and tampering with evidence." Id.
On November 6, 2018, Defendants filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF No. 34. On May 13, 2019, the undersigned issued a Report and Recommendation that: (1) all claims against the DOC (and the individual Defendants in their official capacities) be dismissed based on sovereign immunity; (2) all claims against Wetzel, Moore, Sawtelle, Chiles, Best, Hopkins, and Eiserman be dismissed for lack of personal involvement; and (3) all claims against Reeher and Hearing Examiner Williams be dismissed for failure to state a claim. ECF No. 62. The Court also recommended that a single claim against Perry be dismissed, although it did not terminate Perry from this action. Id.
On July 25, 2019, United States District Judge Susan Paradise Baxter issued an Order adopting the Report and Recommendation, with one modification. ECF No. 72. While Judge Baxter agreed with the undersigned that the due process allegations set forth in the Complaint against Reeher and Hearing Examiner Williams were insufficient to state a claim, Judge Baxter noted that Williams, in his Objections, appeared to suggest that each of those Defendants had also engaged in unlawful retaliation. Based on Williams' representation, Judge Baxter declined to dismiss Reeher or Hearing Examiner Williams from the action and instead ordered Williams to file an Amended Complaint explicitly stating his retaliation claim. Id.
Williams filed his Amended Complaint on August 22, 2019. ECF No. 74. Following the close of discovery, Defendants filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 100], Brief in Support [ECF No. 101], and Concise Statement of Material Facts [ECF No. 102]. Williams responded with a Brief in Response [ECF No. 116], a supplemental Brief in Response and accompanying exhibits [ECF No. 127], and a Concise Statement of Material Facts [ECF No. 140]. Williams has also filed numerous affidavits and other pieces of correspondence. This matter is ripe for review.
The Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. This matter has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
B. Factual Background
Williams' claims revolve around several incidents that allegedly occurred while he was housed at SCI-Forest. In early 2015, prison officials elected to place a "Step Down Unit" (SDU) in C Unit A Pod (Unit C/A), where Williams resided. ECF No. 74 ¶¶ 20-22. Prior to that time, Unit C/A consisted entirely of inmates who had been approved for general population. Id. ¶ 20. Thereafter, however, Unit C/A became occupied with inmates transitioning to general population from the Restricted Housing Unit (RHU). ECF No. 76 ¶¶ 18-25.
According to the Complaint, the SDU appears to be occupied by prisoners transitioning back into the general population from the Restricted Housing Unit (RHU). ECF No. 18 ¶ 30.
Between June 25 and July 2, 2015, Williams submitted request slips to Blicha, Perry, Oberlander and Overmyer requesting to be moved from Unit C/A. ECF No. 127-1 at 6-7; ECF No. 74 ¶¶ 29-30; ECF No. 103-1 at 16-18; ECF No. 116-1 at 1-2. Williams asserted that the SDU prisoners in Unit C/A had formed a gang and begun robbing, extorting, and physically attacking non-SDU inmates, particularly those who had committed sexual offenses or who were gay. Id. See also ECF No. 103-1 at 16. When he received no response, Williams filed Grievance No. 576641 on July 10, 2015, complaining that several staff members and inmates had already been physically assaulted by SDU inmates and that he feared for his safety. ECF No. 127-1 at 9. Williams did not mention any specific inmates or threats; rather, his concerns stemmed from the general threat that he perceived from seeing other inmates on his housing unit threatened by SDU inmates. ECF No. 103-1 at 15. None of his efforts to move from Unit C/A were successful. Id. at 15-17.
On April 19, 2016, Williams sent Blicha another request slip asking to be moved from Unit C/A because "prisoners who are in the step down unit (SDU) have been robbing, extorting, and physical attacking a number of the inmates who live on C Block who are not in the SDU." ECF No. 116-1 at 3. He added that "a number of" SDU inmates had "tried to extort [him]." Id. Williams sent similar request slips to Perry, Oberlander, and Overmyer, again to no avail. Id. at 4-6.
On May 26, 2016, an inmate on Unit C/A attacked Williams by stabbing him in the back. ECF No. 103-1 at 47. Officers Wells and Gatto attempted to discover who had committed the attack but "Williams would not provide any names." Id. at 48. Although Williams claims he "did not know and still does not know the name of the individual who stabbed him," ECF No. 140 ¶ 3, he admitted at his deposition that he knew who the assailant was but didn't feel safe revealing his name. ECF No. 103-1 at 11-12. Williams also testified that the assailant had attempted to "extort" him several months prior to the attack. Id. at 13.
After he received medical treatment for his injuries, the prison transferred Williams to the RHU and placed him in administrative custody. ECF No. 103-1 at 58-59. According to prison records, Williams was placed in the RHU because he "[was] in danger from some person(s) in the facility and cannot be protected by alternate measures." ECF No. 103-1 at 65.
At a Program Review Committee (PRC) meeting the following week, Williams remained "[un]willing to give up any information about who assaulted him." Id. at 67. The PRC "informed [him] that he ha[d] to give up the name of the person who assaulted him in order for them to process a separation," but Williams responded that "there shouldn't be any more issues" with the assailant. Id. The PRC recommended that Williams "be continued in AC status" because "he is in danger in general population." Id. Williams never again shared a housing unit with the person who assaulted him. ECF No. 103-1 at 19-20.
On June 9, 2016, Williams filed Grievance No. 630096 concerning the attack. ECF No. 103-1 at 1-2. Williams accused staff members of failing to protect him from the attack despite having been warned on numerous occasions of his safety concerns. Id. The reviewing grievance officer denied his grievance, noting that Williams had failed to provide evidence "that he had approached staff prior to being assaulted" and had been "non-compliant" with the investigatory process following the assault. Id. at 3.
After being released from the RHU, the prison transferred Williams to Unit F/A. ECF No. 74 ¶ 55. At some point thereafter, several white "racist gang members" moved into Williams' new housing unit. ECF No. 103-1 at 31. They began to attack and extort other prisoners, including Williams, who were perceived to be sex offenders or homosexuals. Id. at 22, 31. Williams claims that he sent a request slip to Brumagin on or about February 17, 2017, requesting to be moved into a different housing unit to avoid the offending gang members. Id. at 31. Williams implies that Brumagin ignored his request because Williams had previously filed a lawsuit against him when they were both at SCI-Albion. ECF No. 103-1 at 33.
The Court cannot locate this document in the record, and Brumagin denies having any recollection of Williams' request to move to a different unit. See ECF No. 103-1 at 82.
On February 28, 2017, an altercation broke out between Williams and three other inmates: Boothe, Miller, and Quigley. ECF No. 103-1 at 87-91. Williams characterizes the altercation as a "vicious attack" by "racist gang members" who were "going around extorting people" immediately prior to the attack. ECF No. 103-1 at 24, 92. According to Williams, Miller asked him for money and, when Williams refused, Quigley came up behind him and struck him in the ear. Id. at 26. When Williams defended himself, the resulting brawl expanded to include Miller and Boothe. ECF No. 103-1 at 26, 92. Officer Miller arrived at the scene and ordered Williams and Quigley to stop fighting. ECF No. 103-1 at 89. When both inmates ignored his order, Officer Miller briefly deployed pepper spray. Id. at 127. Supporting officers arrived at the scene seconds later and deployed another round of pepper spray. Id. at 123, 125, 127. Williams and Quigley were eventually subdued, ending the altercation. Id.
Defendants dispute Williams' description of the incident, contending that Quigley attacked Williams because Williams had been attempting to pressure an unwilling inmate into a sexual relationship. ECF No. 103-1 at 82.
Williams maintains that he did not hear the order. ECF No. 140 ¶ 26.
After the attack, Officer Miller filed a misconduct report (Misconduct Report No. B982130) charging Williams with fighting. See ECF No. 103-2 at 4. Officer Miller stated that "Inmate Williams and Inmate Quigley [were] swinging at each other with closed fists" and ignored "a direct order for the inmates to stop fighting." Id. Williams maintains that the misconduct was unwarranted because his participation in the altercation consisted entirely of self-defense. ECF No. 140 ¶ 29; ECF No. 103-2 at 7.
On March 6, 2017, Hearing Examiner Williams held a hearing on the fighting misconduct. ECF No. 103-2 at 7. She declined Williams' request to call several witnesses who would have testified "to the fact that he was attacked by inmate Quigley." Id. at 6. After reviewing the videotape of the incident, Hearing Examiner Williams confirmed that Williams had been "throwing closed fist punches" at Quigley. Id. at 7. She ultimately found Williams guilty of "fighting and refus[ing] to obey an order by throwing closed fist punches as observed on video" and "refus[ing] orders to stop fighting." Id. Williams received 30 days in disciplinary custody following the Hearing Examiner's decision. Id. Williams appealed misconduct number B982130 to the PRC for intermediate review but did not appeal the PRC's decision to final review. ECF No. 103-2 at 11.
Williams later filed Grievance Nos. 669476 and 678164 over the incident. Each grievance was rejected because the subject matter of the grievance dealt with a misconduct. ECF No. 103-2 at 13-24.
At some point thereafter, Williams visited the law library and noticed that one of the inmates who had attacked him was also there. ECF No. 103-1 at 32-33. Although nothing inappropriate transpired, William found it "strange" that prison officials would allow one of his attackers into the law library during his scheduled time. Id. at 33.
On July 5, 2017, prison officials moved Williams into the RHU and placed him in administrative custody, stating that he was either at risk from another inmate or posed a risk to another inmate. ECF No. 103-2 at 44. Shortly thereafter, Williams filed Grievance No. 688231 alleging that prison officials had placed him in the RHU to punish him for preparing a civil complaint against them, rather than for his safety. Id. at 50. He also alleged that unidentified individuals stole his civil complaint and summons while he was in the RHU. ECF No. 140 ¶ 37; ECF No. 103-1 at 36.
At some point thereafter, Williams was transferred to SCI-Lafayette. ECF No. 103-2 at 47; ECF No. 103-1 at 37. Williams contends that this transfer was retaliatory because SCI-Lafayette is "by far the worst prison." Id.
Upon arriving at SCI-Lafayette, Williams filed Grievance No. 708286 alleging that several pieces of his personal property had either been lost or destroyed in the transfer from SCI-Forest. ECF No. 103-2 at 61. These items included legal books and papers, musical scores, sheet music, paintings, a television, a typewriter, a Yamaha keyboard and gig bag, a Sony Walkman, and an electric fan. Id. at 62. Williams did not appeal Grievance No. 708286 to final review. ECF No. 103-2 at 37; ECF No. 140 ¶ 47.
On March 15, 2018, Williams filed Grievance No. 725977 alleging that his typewriter and keyboard had both been damaged in the move and that his television had gone missing. ECF No. 103-2 at 65. Williams claimed that SCI-Forest staff had placed the typewriter and keyboard in the same box "knowing that they would be damaged." Id.; ECF No. 103-1 at 38. While awaiting a decision on his grievance, Williams sent several letters to Lisa Reeher, the grievance coordinator, offering to settle his property dispute for various amounts. ECF No. 103-2 at 75-98. The last of these letters, sent on August 8, 2018, asked the prison to "deposit $500 into [Williams'] prison account and [purchase] a Yamaha PSR-S970 Arranger Workstation or a Yamaha PSR-S770 Arranger Workstation . . . within seven (7) days of . . . receiving this written agreement." Id. at 98.
On August 14, 2018, Reeher issued an Initial Review Response granting Williams' grievance and awarding relief on his claim that his typewriter and keyboard had been improperly packed and damaged. Id. at 103. Reeher also stated, inaccurately, that "[c]orrespondence from Mr. Williams . . . indicates that he will settle grievance for the amount of $500.00." Id. Based on Reeher's misconception regarding Williams' settlement demand, the prison deposited $500.00 into Williams' inmate account. Id. at 101-102. Williams contends that Reeher intentionally misinterpreted his settlement request because of his prior grievances against her and other prison officials. ECF No. 140 ¶ 51.
Defendants maintain that Reeher's mistake stemmed from the fact that Williams paid $269.98 for the keyboard and gig bag and $264.17 for the typewriter - an amount in the ballpark of $500. ECF No. 103-2 at 81, 89.
C. Standards of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires the court to enter summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Under this standard "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A disputed fact is "material" if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome of the case under applicable substantive law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992). An issue of material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257; Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (3d Cir. 1991).
When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact remains for trial, the court must view the record and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in favor of the nonmoving party. Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1993); Clement v. Consol. Rail Corp., 963 F.2d 599, 600 (3d Cir. 1992); White v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1988). To avoid summary judgment, however, the nonmoving party may not rest on the unsubstantiated allegations of his or her pleadings. Instead, once the movant satisfies its burden of identifying evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must to go beyond his pleadings with affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or other record evidence to demonstrate specific material facts that give rise to a genuine issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
Further, under Rule 56, a defendant may seek summary judgment by pointing to the absence of a genuine fact issue on one or more essential claim elements. The Rule mandates summary judgment if a plaintiff then fails to make a sufficient showing on each of those elements. When Rule 56 shifts the burden of production to the nonmoving party, "a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id., at 323. See also Harter v. G.A.F. Corp., 967 F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir. 1992).
Williams is proceeding pro se. A filing from a pro se litigant is to be "liberally construed" and a "pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89. 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 206 (1976)). Additionally, when considering a motion in a pro se plaintiff's case, a court must "apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by name." Holley v. Dep't of Veteran's Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999). On a motion for summary judgment, however, "a pro se plaintiff is not relieved of his obligation under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 56 to point to competent evidence in the record that is capable of refuting a defendant's motion for summary judgment." Dawson v. Cook, 238 F. Supp. 3d 712, 717 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (citation omitted). Put another way, just because a non-moving party is proceeding pro se, they are not relieved of their "obligation under Rule 56(c) to produce evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact." Id. (quoting Boykins v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 402, 408 (E.D. Pa. 2000)); see also Winfield v. Mazurkiewicz, 2012 WL 4343176, *1 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2012).
D. Analysis
Williams' claims coalesce around the three major incidents described above. For organizational purposes, the Court will analyze each group of claims separately.
1. Claims related to the May 26, 2016 assault
a. Failure to protect (pre-assault) against Blicha, Perry, Oberlander and Overmeyer
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution imposes a duty on prison officials to "take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of inmates." Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984). This includes the general duty to "protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners." Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994)). To state a viable failure-to-protect claim, the plaintiff must establish that: (1) he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendant was deliberately indifferent to that substantial risk; and (3) the defendant's deliberate indifference caused the plaintiff to suffer harm. Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 367 (3d Cir. 2012). The standard for deliberate indifference is subjective; thus, the prison official "must actually have known or been aware of the excessive risk to inmate safety." Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001).
In the instant case, the record reflects that Williams sent multiple requests and grievances to the Defendants alleging that inmates from the SDU had been robbing, extorting, and physically attacking non-SDU inmates and staff members, particularly those who had committed sexual offenses or who were gay. Williams did not identify any specific inmate or group of inmates in his complaints, and there is no evidence in the record that any inmate or group of inmates threatened Williams or targeted him for violence. Rather, his concerns stemmed from the general threat that he perceived from seeing other inmates on his housing unit threatened by SDU inmates. Defendants dismiss this type of allegation as too generalized and speculative to support an Eighth Amendment violation.
It is well-established that an official's awareness "of overall violence among the inmates or of violent propensities (or history of violence) of particular inmates does not supply an inference of deliberate indifference." Buckley v. Kowalski, 2015 WL 179385, at *4 (D.N.J. Jan. 14, 2015) (citing Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 371). In other words, a generalized, hypothetical "risk that an inmate with a history of violence might attack another inmate" is too "speculative" to support an Eighth Amendment violation. Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 371. In Bistrian, the Third Circuit used two incidents of inmate assault, each perpetuated against the same unfortunate inmate, to illustrate the "crucial distinction" between a scenario in which prison officials were actually aware of an excessive risk to inmate safety, and one in which the risk of harm to the inmate was merely speculative. See Buckley, 2015 WL 179385, at *4 (citing Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 371). In the first scenario, the inmate, Peter Bistrian, had been recruited by prison officials to assist the FBI with an investigation into a prison gang. Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 360. Bistrian, a prison orderly, had been engaged by several gang members to assist them by passing along written notes. Id. The FBI asked Bistrian to copy each note and provide the copy to prison officials before delivering the original to the intended recipient. Id. However, the sloppy nature of the operation alerted gang members to Bistrian's participation in the FBI investigation. Id. at 360-61. Several members of the gang began threatening to "seriously harm [Bistrian] if they were placed in the recreation yard with him at the same time." Id. at 361. Despite Bistrian's repeated pleas to prison officials for protection, he was placed in a locked recreation yard pen with those same gang members less than a month later. Id. They beat him savagely, resulting in "a dislocated left shoulder, broken teeth, and multiple contusions and lacerations to his head and face that required sutures." Id.
Four months later, Bistrian was placed in the recreation yard with an inmate who had a history of random and violent attacks on other inmates. Id. at 362. While Bistrian was in hand restraints, the other inmate attacked him with a "manufactured razor-blade style weapon, repeatedly slashing and cutting [his] face, arms, and legs." Id. Bistrian sued, alleging that prison officials had failed to protect him from either attack despite their subjective awareness of the risk of harm presented by each of the attackers.
Examining the two scenarios, the Third Circuit drew a line between the first attack, which "alleged a sufficiently plausible failure-to-protect claim," and the second attack, which was "based on a mere possibility of harm." Buckley, 2015 WL 179385, at *4 (discussing Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 369-71). Addressing the first attack, the Court held:
Bistrian [has] set[] out sufficient factual allegations, which we must accept as true, that make his repeated pleas radically different from an out-of-the-blue and unadorned "I'm-in-trouble" entreaty. The eight officials that Bistrian claims he "repeatedly advised (both verbally and in writing)" were the very officials that orchestrated the botched note-photocopying operation. Given their familiarity with the scheme and the
players involved, it is quite plausible that they knew Bistrian's cries for help were legitimate and that he faced a substantial risk of serious harm. After all, the genesis of the operation was a desire to assist an FBI investigation into violent criminal activity by [gang members] that included, among other things, substantial witness intimidation.Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 369-70 (citations omitted). In contrast, the Court held that Bistrian's allegations with respect to the second attack were too speculative to state a claim:
Bistrian does not allege that [the second attacker] had any connection to [the gang] or that [he] otherwise attacked him because he was an informant. Instead, Bistrian refers to [the second attacker's] "history of violent assaults against other inmates" . . . and generally creates the impression that [the] attack was unprovoked, inexplicable, and unrelated to his participation in the note-copying operation. Thus, according to Bistrian, the risk of the harm that occurred was the risk that an inmate with a history of violence might attack another inmate for an unknown reason. We cannot conclude on these allegations that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to such a speculative risk.Id. at 371 (citations omitted).
Williams' allegations regarding the May 26, 2016 assault fall into the latter category described in Bistrian. While the record supports Williams' contention that prison officials were aware of his general concerns regarding "SDU inmates" as a collective group, he failed to identify any particularized threat from a specific inmate or group of inmates. For example, he never informed prison officials that he had been targeted with an extortion request, identified the offending inmate, or explained why his own interactions with that inmate gave rise to a fear that he might be personally targeted for violence. Nor is there any evidence that the unidentified inmate who attacked Williams had a well-established and well-known history of attacking other inmates. Thus, rather than "advis[ing] prison officials of a specific violent threat made by an identified inmate," Fantauzzi v. Ferraci, 2019 WL 6468584, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 29, 2019), Williams' claim is based entirely on his general observation that inmates from the SDU had been harassing other inmates. This is precisely the type of speculative entreaty that the Third Circuit and other courts have routinely deemed inadequate to support an Eighth Amendment claim. Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 369-71 (rejecting an inference of deliberate indifference based solely on a prison official's awareness of a particular inmate's propensity for violence); Buoniconti v. City of Philadelphia, 148 F.Supp.3d 425 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (allegation that attackers had a history of "known prior violent acts and propensity for violence" insufficient to establish deliberate indifference); Williams v. Delaware County Board of Prison Inspectors, 2019 WL 2745759, at *9 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 2019) (general allegation that prison housed him with "violent prone inmates" insufficient to establish an Eighth Amendment claim). Because Williams' failed to adduce evidence that Defendants were aware of a specific threat of harm, summary judgment is warranted.
b. Failure to protect (post-assault) against Blicha, Perry, Oberlander, Overmeyer and Foulds
Williams next contends that "he should have been transferred to another prison after he was assaulted on May 26, 2016" and "the fact that the Defendants did not transfer him out of SCI-Forest . . . resulted in a failure to protect him." ECF No. 127 at 21. This claim fails for several reasons. First, the record is undisputed that Williams never suffered another attack while housed with SDU members on Unit C/A. The record also reflects that Defendants placed Williams in protective custody after the assault but could not process a separation from his attacker because Williams refused to identify him. Although Williams avers in his brief that he "did not know and still does not know the name of the individual who stabbed him," ECF No. 140 ¶ 3, this statement is refuted by his sworn deposition testimony that he knew the identity of his assailant but would not to provide it to the prison. ECF No. 103-1 at 11-12. More critically, Williams admits that he never again shared a housing unit with his attacker, undermining his suggestion that he remained "incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm." Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 397. Finally, when pressed by the PRC to identify his attacker, Williams assured prison officials that "there shouldn't be any more issues" with the assailant. ECF No. 103-1 at 67. Because Williams refused to assist prison officials in identifying his assailant, remained separated from the attacker, and reassured the PRC that he was no longer in danger, his post-attack failure to protect claim should be dismissed.
In his response brief, Williams implies that Defendants' failure to transfer him after the March 16, 2016 attack somehow amounted to a failure to protect him from the incident on February 28, 2017. ECF No. 127. The February 28 altercation occurred in a different housing unit, involved an unrelated group of inmates, and stemmed from an entirely distinct set of circumstances. There is no evidence of record to suggest any connection between the two events.
c. Retaliation
Williams next contends that Defendants failed to protect him from the March 26 assault in retaliation for his prior lawsuits and grievances. To prevail on his claim for unlawful retaliation, Williams must demonstrate that: (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (2) he suffered an adverse action at the hands of prison officials; and (3) his constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to take the adverse action. Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333-34 (3d Cir. 2001)). An "adverse action" is one that would "deter a person of ordinary firmness" from exercising his First Amendment rights. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Suppan v. Dadonna, 203 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2000)). Retaliatory motive can be inferred from either: (1) an unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity and the alleged retaliatory action; or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing that suggests a causal link. Id. (citing Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007)).
Williams' claim fails for several reasons. First, it does not appear that he ever presented his retaliation claim to the DOC in a properly filed grievance. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (the "PLRA"), requires a prisoner to exhaust any available administrative remedies before he may bring an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This exhaustion requirement applies to all claims relating to prison life which do not implicate the duration of the prisoner's sentence. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and proven by defendants. Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir. 2002).
The record contains only one grievance related to the March 26, 2016 attack: Grievance No. 630096. The only claim asserted in that grievance is Williams' allegation that several staff members were "informed . . . that [Williams] wanted to be moved off of C Block before [he] was placed in a situation" where he was forced to defend himself. ECF No. 103-1 at 69. The grievance does not contain any reference to unlawful retaliation. Consequently, while Williams is correct in his contention Grievance No. 630096 has been fully exhausted, his retaliation claim has not.
Even if his retaliation claim had been exhausted, Williams has failed to identify any evidence to support his claim. The Court has already rejected Williams' contention that prison officials failed to protect him from a known threat to his safety, negating the "adverse action" element of his retaliation claim. Nor has Williams identified any evidence linking his protected activity with Defendants' purported decision to look the other way while Williams was assaulted. For each of these reasons, summary judgment is appropriate.
d. Racial discrimination
Williams next invokes the equal protection clause, asserting that Defendants allowed him to be assaulted because of his race. See, e.g., Bacon v. Minner, 229 Fed. Appx. 96 (3d Cir. 2007); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). To prevail, he must establish "that he was treated differently than other similarly situated inmates, and that this different treatment was the result of intentional discrimination based on his membership in a protected class." Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286 (3d Cir 2016) (citing Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277, 294 (3d Cir. 2015)). Persons are similarly situated under the Equal Protection Clause when they are alike "in all relevant aspects." Startzell v. City of Phila., 533 F.3d 183, 203 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Hill v. City of Scranton, 411 F.3d 118, 125 (3d Cir. 2005)).
Initially, it does not appear that Williams asserted his racial discrimination claim in Grievance No. 630096 (or any other grievance of record). As such, his racial discrimination claim has not been exhausted. Williams has also failed to adduce any evidence to support his conclusory averment that Blicha, Perry, Oberlander and Overmeyer "discriminated against the plaintiff on the base of his race when they decided to move a number of caucasian inmates off of C Block and . . . forced the plaintiff to continue to live in fear on C Block with the prisoners who were in the step down unit." ECF No. 127 at 23-24. None of the "caucasian inmates" who allegedly requested and received transfers are identified in the record, and Williams has failed to articulate the circumstances that rendered those inmates similarly situated. In the absence of any such evidence, Williams' racial discrimination claim should be dismissed.
e. Conspiracy
Williams' final allegation regarding the March 26 assault is that Defendants "conspired to retaliate against him because [he] filed the grievances that he filed and because [he] sued a number of individuals who worked for the [DOC]." ECF No. 127 at 25. In order to state a conspiracy claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that two or more persons acting under color of state law conspired to deprive him of a constitutional right. Laurensau v. Romarowics, 528 Fed. Appx. 136, 140 (3d Cir. 2013). "[M]ere conclusory allegations of deprivations of constitutional rights are insufficient to state a conspiracy claim." Tindell v. Beard, 351 Fed. Appx. 591, 594 (3d Cir. 2009). Rather, the plaintiff "must provide some factual basis to support the existence of the elements of a conspiracy: agreement and concerted action." Capogrosso v. The Supreme Court of the State of New Jersey, 588 F.3d 180, 184-85 (3d Cir. 2009).
Williams has adduced no evidence in support of this claim. Although he cites several exhibits demonstrating that Defendants were generally aware of his request for a facility transfer, there is nothing in the record from which a reasonable factfinder might infer that Defendants formulated and executed an agreement to violate his constitutional rights. Carey v. Johnson, 2008 WL 724101, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2008). The law is clear: "bare allegations of wrongdoing by a Defendant, without any substantiating proof of an unlawful agreement, are insufficient to state a conspiracy claim." Id. (emphasis added). Such is the case here.
2. Claims related to the February 28, 2017 attack
a. Failure to protect claim against Brumagin
Turning to the events surrounding the February 28, 2017 altercation, Williams first alleges that Brumigan, the unit manager on Unit F/A, failed to protect him from Quigley, Miller and Booth by ignoring his request to be moved to another unit or facility. To prevail, Williams must establish that the injuries he suffered during that attack stemmed from Brumagin's deliberate indifference to a known risk of serious harm. Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 367.
According to Williams, he sent a request slip to Brumigan on February 17, 2017, asking to be moved from Unit F/A "because [he] didn't feel safe being over there with the racist gang members they had on the housing unit." ECF No. 103-1 at 31. Williams concedes that he did not identify any specific individuals or incidents in his communication with Brumigan, and there is no evidence that any "racist gang members" on the unit had their sights set on Williams. Id. Rather, his concerns arose from the general threat that he perceived from seeing other inmates on his housing unit threatened by the unidentified racists and gang members on his unit.
There appears to be a disputed issue of fact as to whether Williams actually supplied Brumigan with that warning. Brumigan denies any recollection of Williams' request to be moved from Unit F/A, and the request slip that Williams claims to have sent to Brumigan on February 17, 2017 does not appear in the record. This factual dispute is immaterial, however, in light of Williams' concession that the request slip, if indeed he sent one, contained only a vague complaint about unidentified "racist gang members."
To the contrary, Williams testified that the "extortion request" that spurred Quigley's attack occurred only 30 or 45 seconds prior to the altercation. ECF No. 103-1 at 23.
Looking once more to Bistrian for guidance, the Court again concludes that Williams failed to convey "a sufficiently plausible" risk of harm through his vague complaint to Brumigan that "racist gang members" were bothering other inmates in his unit. Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 369-71 (generalized, hypothetical "risk that an inmate with a history of violence might attack another inmate" is too "speculative" to support an Eighth Amendment violation); Buckley, 2015 WL 179385, at *4 (awareness "of overall violence among the inmates or of violent propensities (or history of violence) of particular inmates does not supply an inference of deliberate indifference"). In the absence of "sufficient factual allegations . . . that make his repeated pleas radically different from an out-of-the-blue and unadorned 'I'm-in-trouble' entreaty," Williams deliberate indifference claim fails. Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d at 125.
Defendants inaccurately state that Williams refused an order to move to a different unit the day before the attack, undermining his contention that he felt unsafe on Unit F/A. ECF No. 102 ¶¶ 19-20. As correctly noted by Williams, the exhibits cited by Defendants in support of this proposition relate to another inmate with the same last name. ECF No. 103-1 at 78 (citing an inmate named Mark Williams for failing to obey an order to move from Unit K/B to the SDU).
As an alternative and independent ground for dismissal, Williams also failed to exhaust this claim in a properly filed grievance. Although Williams asserted a failure to protect claim in Grievance No. 665622, his appeal to the Secretary's Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals (SOIGA) was rejected without a decision on the merits because Williams failed to provide the required documentation for proper review. See ECF No. 103-2 at 39-42. Courts have consistently held that an inmate's failure to satisfy SOIGA's procedural rules, including the documentation requirement, renders his claim unexhausted. See, e.g., Smith v. Secretary of Penn. Dept. of Corr., 2018 WL 279363, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2018) (noting that proper exhaustion requires an inmate to comply with the "agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules," including "provid[ing] the required documentation"); Estien v. Showalter, 2017 WL 4310188, at *17 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2017) (dismissing claim for failure to fully exhaust where inmate failed to provide SIOGA "the required documentation for proper review" and thus received no substantive decision on appeal). Summary judgment is warranted on this basis.
b. Excessive force against Miller
Williams next contends that Officer Miller used excessive force by deploying pepper spray to break up the February 28 altercation. In an excessive force claim, the "core judicial inquiry" is whether "force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). There are several factors that a court examines in determining whether a correctional officer has used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, including: "(1) 'the need for the application of force'; (2) 'the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used'; (3) 'the extent of injury inflicted'; (4) 'the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by responsible officials on the basis of the facts known to them'; and (5) 'any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.'" Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986)).
Where the events at issue have been captured on videotape, the court must consider the videotaped evidence in determining whether there is any genuine dispute as to material facts. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81 (2007). The court must view the facts in the light depicted by the videotape. See id. (relying on a videotape in assessing summary judgment evidence and admonishing that the lower court "should have viewed the facts in the light depicted by the videotape."). If a review of the videotape "refutes an inmate's claims that excessive force was used against him, and the video evidence does not permit an inference that prison officials acted maliciously and sadistically, summary judgment is entirely appropriate." Smalls v. Sassaman, 2019 WL 4194211, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Sep. 4, 2019) (citing Tindell v. Beard, 351 Fed. Appx. 591 (3d Cir. 2009)).
Before addressing the merits, the Court notes that Williams failed to properly exhaust this claim. Although he references Grievance No. 669476, arguing that he "appealed that matter all the way to the chief hearing examiner," ECF No. 127 at 31, that grievance does not mention excessive force or the use of pepper spray. ECF No. 102-2 at 13-19. Moreover, the record indicates that Williams again failed to submit the required documentation for proper review in connection with that grievance. ECF No. 102-2 at 13-19. As discussed above, proper exhaustion requires an inmate to comply with the agency's deadlines and procedural rules, including the documentation requirement. Smith, 2018 WL 279363, at *2; Estien, 2017 WL 4310188, at *17.
Alternatively, the videotape of the incident clearly refutes Williams' claims that excessive force was used against him. Smalls, 2019 WL 4194211, at *8. A careful review of the video footage supports the following version of events:
8:46:38 - Video starts.ECF No. 103-1, Ex. 9. Because it is clear that Officer Miller utilized some level of force in deploying pepper spray, the Court must consider the Whitley factors to determine whether that force "was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7.
8:48:08 - The camera pans quickly to capture the altercation.
8:48:13 - Williams, Quigley, and another inmate are fighting. Officer Miller intervenes by grabbing and attempting to secure the third inmate, falling to the ground in the process.
8:48:16 - Inmates Williams and Quigley remain engaged in an altercation on the ground. Williams is on top of Quigley, throwing punches.
8:48:18 - Officer Miller appears to deploy pepper spray. Williams remains on top of Quigley with both inmates throwing punches.
8:48:25 - Another inmate approaches and attempts to kick Williams. Officer Miller intervenes and subdues that inmate.
8:48:34 - Williams remains on top of Quigley, with both inmates throwing punches.
8:48:40 - Numerous officers arrive on the scene, deploy pepper spray, and subdue Williams and Quigley.
Regarding the first factor, it is evident that some use of force was necessary to curtail the altercation. Williams and Quigley were aggressively attacking one another, several other inmates were attempting to join the fray, and Officer Williams was the only correctional officer on the scene. For the safety of both the officer and the inmates involved, some form of forceful intervention was clearly required. This factor weighs in favor of summary judgment.
The second factor considers the relationship between the need for force and the amount of force used. The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be assessed "from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989). Given the violent nature of the altercation and the fact that several other inmates appeared poised to join in, Officer Miller's brief use of pepper spray represented the minimal intervention required to attempt to reassert control and discipline. This factor weighs in favor of summary judgment.
The third Whitley factor considers the extent of the injury inflicted. There is no evidence in the record to indicate that Williams sustained any serious injury from his brief exposure to pepper spray. This factor decidedly favors summary judgment.
The fourth factor the Court must consider is the extent of the threat and the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by the responsible officials based on the facts known to them. Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 326 (3d Cir. 2009). This factor weighs heavily in favor of summary judgment. As noted above, Officer Miller, without any support, was attempting to restore order during an ongoing brawl involving multiple inmates. He had already been forced to the ground once while attempting to intervene. The threat to both staff and inmates was apparent.
Finally, the Court considers whether Officer Miller made any efforts to temper the severity of the forceful response. Given the extremely brief and targeted use of pepper spray in this instance, it is unclear how Officer Miller's response could have been tempered. The Court also notes that Officer Miller gave a verbal command to Quigley and Williams to stop fighting before deploying pepper spray. This factor, like each of the others, weighs in favor of summary judgment.
In short, the video recording of the incident overwhelmingly supports a finding in Officer Miller's favor as to each of the Whitley factors. Summary judgment is warranted.
c. Falsifying a report claim against Miller and Hearing Examiner Williams
Following the February 28 incident, Miller charged Williams with fighting and disobeying an order in Misconduct Report No. B982130. See ECF No. 103-2 at 4. Miller stated that he "noticed Inmate Williams and Inmate Quigley swinging at each other with closed fists" and "gave a direct order for the inmates to stop fighting." Id. Upon reviewing the videotape of the incident, Hearing Examiner Williams upheld the misconduct and sentenced Williams to 30 days in administrative custody. Williams maintains that Miller and Hearing Examiner Williams "falsified" these reports to create the impression that Williams had been in a mutual altercation rather than the victim of an attack. ECF No. 127 at 34.
Williams devotes a significant portion of his brief to his contention that Hearing Examiner Williams violated his due process rights by refusing to call his witnesses. ECF No. 127 at 34. That claim has already been dismissed. See ECF No. 72 at 3 (adopting the undersigned's Report and Recommendation "as to the dismissal of the due process claims against [Hearing Examiner] Williams").
Williams has once more failed to properly exhaust his claim. In accordance with DOC Administrative Directive 801,
an inmate who has been found guilty on a misconduct charge may, within fifteen days of the hearing, file an appeal to the Program Review Committee ("PRC"). Within seven days of the PRC's decision, the inmate may file a second level appeal to the Superintendent. Finally, the inmate has one last avenue of appeal to the Chief Hearing Examiner.Hagan v. Chambers, 2010 WL 4812973, at *18 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2010). An inmate "is required to partake in this process prior to challenging any aspect of the misconduct in federal court." Id. See also Harris v. Lesinski, 2018 WL 2899692, at *3 (W.D. Pa. June 11, 2018) (granting summary judgment on exhaustion grounds where inmate failed to appeal misconduct to final review). Here, Williams appealed misconduct number B982130 to the PRC for intermediate review but did not appeal the PRC's decision to final review. ECF No. 103-2 at 11. This omission is fatal to his claim.
d. Retaliation
Williams next accuses Brumigan, Miller, and Hearing Examiner Williams of unlawful retaliation in connection with the February 28 incident and the ensuing misconduct report. According to Williams, Brumigan "failed to move the plaintiff off of F Block" because "Brumagin did not like the fact that the plaintiff sued [him] when the two of them were at SCI-Albion." ECF No. 127 at 35. He alleges that Miller and Hearing Examiner Williams falsely accused him of fighting "in retaliation for the plaintiff filing the grievances and the lawsuits that [he] filed in the past against some of the staff who worked for the [DOC]." Id.
Turning first to Brumigan, Williams' retaliation claim fails because he has not adduced any evidence that he suffered an adverse action. While Williams accuses Brumigan of "fail[ing] to move the plaintiff off of F Block after [receiving] the request slip that the plaintiff submitted to him," the Court has already determined that Williams' general complaints about "racist gang members" lacked the requisite detail to support a failure to protect claim. Moreover, it is well-settled that an inmate has no constitutional right to be confined in a preferred facility or housing unit. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221-22 (2005). In the absence of any evidence that Williams suffered an adverse action, his retaliation claim should be dismissed.
Williams fares no better with his contention that Miller and Hearing Examiner Williams issued and upheld a false misconduct because of the past grievances and lawsuits that Williams had filed against other DOC employees. ECF No. 127 at 35. Courts have consistently rejected retaliation claims "against one defendant based on [protected activity] against another [individual]" for lack of retaliatory motive. Victor v. Lawler, 2010 WL 5014555, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2010), aff'd, 565 Fed. Appx. 126 (3d Cir. 2014). As explained by one court, "there is no apparent reason why [the moving defendants] would want to retaliate against Plaintiff for filing a lawsuit against others." Evans v. Rozum, 2009 WL 5064490, at *22 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2009). See also Royster v. Beard, 308 Fed. Appx. 576, 579 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiff's claim that he was retaliated against by a defendant who was not the target of his protected activity); Horan v. Collins, 2016 WL 5030468, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2016) (drawing no inference of causation where plaintiff's protected activity was not directed at any defendant).
Furthermore, in retaliation cases involving prison disciplinary measures, the court must "evaluate 'the quantum of evidence'" in support of the misconduct "to determine whether the prison officials' decision to discipline an inmate for his violations of prison policy was within the broad discretion we must afford them." Watson, 834 F.3d at 426. In other words, if the evidence supporting the disciplinary offense is "clear and overt," the Court should conclude that prison officials would have imposed the disciplinary measure regardless of the inmate's protected activity. See, e.g., Fennell v. Horvath, 2020 WL 2556952, at *12-13 (E.D. Pa. May 20, 2020) (citing Watson, 834 F.3d at 426).
As discussed in greater detail above, the video footage of the February 28 incident clearly shows Williams actively fighting with Quigley. Even assuming the veracity of Williams' representation that Quigley attacked him first, there is no dispute that Williams' conduct prolonged the fight. The video depicts Williams straddling Quigley and throwing punches both before and after Officer Miller's verbal command to stop. Based on this quantum of evidence, the Court concludes that clear and overt grounds support the misconduct issued by Miller and upheld by Hearing Examiner Williams, aside from any theoretical retaliatory animus. Defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted.
e. Racial discrimination
Williams again maintains that Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by engaging in unlawful racial discrimination, this time in conjunction with the February 28 incident and aftermath. In support of this claim, Williams states only that his attackers were white and that he "is under the impression that the reason why Michael Brumigan failed to protect him was because [he] is black" and "is viewed as a king in the gay community." ECF No. 127 at 36. Williams has not, however, pointed to any evidence "that he was treated differently than other similarly situated inmates, and that this different treatment was the result of intentional discrimination based on his membership in a protected class." Mack, 839 F.3d at 286. In the absence of such evidence, Williams' racial discrimination claim fails.
f. Conditions of confinement
Williams contends that various prison officials violated the Eighth Amendment by allowing one of his fellow combatants, Boothe, to share the law library with Williams on several occasions. ECF No. 103-1 at 33. To state an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim, Williams must demonstrate that: (1) he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm; and (2) that prison officials had a "sufficiently culpable state of mind," meaning that they were deliberately indifferent to that risk. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Only extreme deprivations will suffice to meet this standard. Dockery v. Beard, 509 Fed. Appx. 107, 112 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).
Aside from exchanging words on one occasion, Williams concedes that nothing eventful transpired between him and Boothe on any of the occasions when they shared the law library. ECF No. 103-1. at 35. In the absence of any evidence suggesting a threat of further hostilities, no reasonable jury could conclude that Williams' mere proximity to Boothe, while under close supervision, created a substantial risk of serious harm. Moreover, because the only prison employee referenced in Williams' testimony in connection with this claim is an unidentified, non-defendant guard, Williams has also failed to demonstrate that any Defendant had a culpable state of mind. Id. at 33. See also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Summary judgment should be granted.
Williams later sent several request slips to various prison officials complaining of his proximity to Boothe. See ECF No. 136-1.
g. Retaliation/stolen legal papers
Williams next claims that a non-defendant, Ms. Blake, observed him drafting the civil complaint in this action and "notified staff." ECF No. 103-1 at 36. At some point thereafter, an unknown individual stole Williams' civil complaint while he was in the RHU. Id.
Although Williams filed Grievance No. 688231 regarding this matter, Williams did not properly appeal that grievance to final review. The record indicates that he attempted to do so but again failed to provide "a copy of the required documents as outlined in the DC ADM 804." ECF No. 103-2 at 58. Consequently, SOIGA rejected his appeal without a decision on the merits. Id. As explained above, an inmate's failure to satisfy SOIGA's procedural rules, including the documentation requirement, renders his claim unexhausted. Smith, 2018 WL 279363, at *2 Estien, 2017 WL 4310188, at *17. Moreover, Williams has failed to identify any record evidence connecting the dots between the alleged violation and the conduct of any Defendant. Each of these deficiencies is dispositive.
h. Retaliatory transfer
Williams asserts that Obermyer, Oberlander, Brumagin, and Kelly orchestrated a retaliatory transfer from SCI-Forest to SCI-Fayette in response to their discovery that Williams was preparing a civil lawsuit against them. ECF No. 140 ¶ 38. To survive summary judgment, Williams must point to evidence in the record that he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, suffered an adverse action at the hands of prison officials, and that his constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to take the adverse action. Watson, 834 F.3d at 422.
Williams' claim fails for several reasons. First, it does not appear that Williams properly exhausted this claim. The lone grievance referencing retaliation in conjunction with Williams' transfer to SCI-Fayette was denied for failure to provide the required documents for proper review. ECF No. 103-2 at 58. As noted above, a grievance denied on procedural grounds does not satisfy the exhaustion requirement.
Second, Williams cannot establish the "adverse action" element of his retaliation claim. Courts have acknowledged that, "under some circumstances, a prison transfer may constitute an adverse action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights." Chruby v. Bearjar, 2018 WL 4537404, at *12 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2018). A review of the caselaw suggests that such transfers typically involve an objectively punitive factor; for example, the loss of parole, displacement from loves ones, or financial penalty. See, e.g., Rauser, 241 F.3d at 333 (transfer caused inmate to be "denied parole, transferred to a distant prison where his family could not visit him regularly, and penalized financially"); Williams v. Wetzel, 2020 WL 583983, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2020) (prison transfer was adverse action where it "punitively detach[ed] Plaintiff from his loved ones and/or visitation" and affected his parole recommendation). In contrast, a transfer to a prison that is simply "more disagreeable," or has "more severe rules," does not ordinarily give rise to a constitutional violation. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976). Although Williams clearly does not like SCI-Fayette, there is no evidence that his transfer to that institution deprived him of a more favorable or preferred status. Moreover, the record indicates that Williams requested a transfer from SCI-Forest - the precise action that he now claims is adverse - on many occasions during the months leading up to his transfer to SCI-Fayette. See, e.g., ECF No. 103-2 at 51.
Finally, Williams has failed to allege a causal link between his protected activity and the purportedly retaliatory transfer. See Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 157 (3d Cir. 2017). According to Williams, prison officials discovered his civil complaint on July 5, 2017, but did not transfer him to SCI-Fayette until August 22, 2017, over six weeks later. ECF No. 103-2 at 62. The timing of this transfer is insufficient, on its own, to establish causation. See, e.g., Escanio v. United Parcel Serv., 538 Fed. Appx. 195, 200 (3d Cir. 2013) (period of roughly three weeks between protected activity and adverse action, without more, was not unduly suggestive of retaliatory motive); Thomas v. Town of Hammonton, 351 F.3d 108, 114 (3d Cir. 2003) (three week period between protected activity and adverse action was insufficient, without other evidence, to establish required causal link). See also Williams, 2020 WL 583983, at *9 (noting that periods of seventeen days, three weeks, seven weeks, and between one and three months had each been deemed insufficient to establish causation) (citing Burt v. Lane, 2017 WL 4681807, at *9-10 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 2017)). Nor is there any evidence to suggest that his transfer was otherwise motivated by retaliatory animus; to the contrary, the record reflects that Williams was moved because SCI-Fayette "was appropriate for Inmate Williams' needs and the DOC's institutional needs." ECF No. 103-2 at 47. For each of these reasons, Defendants should be granted summary judgment on Williams' retaliatory transfer claim.
i. Conspiracy
Finally, Williams tosses in another conspiracy claim, alleging that "the defendants had the plaintiff placed in their RHU on 7-5-17 so that they could conspire with their staff to have them steal the civil complaints and summons that the plaintiff typed up against them for the case at bar." EF No. 127 at 41. Even if Williams could adduce facts to support an underlying constitutional violation, he has again failed to "provide some factual basis to support the existence of the elements of a conspiracy: agreement and concerted action." Capogrosso, 588 F.3d at 184-85. See also Carey, 2008 WL 724101, at *10 ("[B]are allegations of wrongdoing by a Defendant, without any substantiating proof of an unlawful agreement, are insufficient to state a conspiracy claim."). Summary judgment is appropriate.
3. Claims related to damaged personal property
a. Retaliation against Reeher and Perry
Williams' final federal claim alleges that Perry and Reeher engaged in unlawful retaliation while responding to one of the grievances that he filed after discovering the damage to his typewriter and keyboard. In the pertinent grievance, Grievance No. 725977, Williams complained that staff at SCI-Forest had placed the typewriter and keyboard in the same box "knowing that they would be damaged." ECF No. 103-1 at 38. Williams also referenced a prior grievance that he attempted to file regarding the same issue but which Reeher allegedly "refused to process." ECF No. 103-2 at 65. Williams contends that Perry and Reeher each "falsified" their responses to Grievance No. 725977 to retaliate against him for prior grievances. ECF No. 127 at 51.
Turning first to Perry, Williams challenges Perry's statement in his initial review response that Williams "did not submit a grievance with any kind of documentation stating that [his] property was damaged." ECF No. 103-2 at 71. Although Williams maintains that this statement is inaccurate, he has failed to adduce any evidence to permit the inference that it was retaliatory. As an initial matter, there is nothing to indicate that Perry's mischaracterization would deter an inmate of ordinary firmness from pursuing his constitutional rights. Nor was Williams injured; to the contrary, he immediately appealed Perry's decision to Overmyer and obtained relief. ECF No. 103-2 (remanding to "address" the "property issue"). Finally, there is nothing in the record that might give rise to an inference that Williams' prior protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in Perry's decision to deny Williams' grievance. Williams' conclusory statement that Perry "did not like the fact that the Plaintiff intended on having the U.S. Marshals serve him and his coworkers a copy of [a] civil complaint and summons" is insufficient to create a triable dispute of material fact on this issue, particularly as the civil complaint in question was drafted almost a full year prior to Perry's allegedly adverse action.
As to Reeher, Williams states that she "falsified the report that she filed to make it seem as if the plaintiff told her that he would be willing to settle Grievance No. 725977 out of court for $500 when she knew that the plaintiff told her that he would be willing to settle . . . if Lisa Reeher agreed to deposit $500 into his prison acct. and purchase him a Yamaha PSR-S970 Arranger Workstation or a Yamaha PSR-S770 Arranger Workstation free of charge within seven (7) days." ECF No. 127 at 52. As noted above, Williams sent several letters to Reeher offering to settle his property dispute for various amounts. ECF No. 103-2 at 75-98. The final of these letters offered to settle Grievance No. 725977 for $500 cash and the purchase of a replacement Yamaha workstation. Id. at 98. Responding to that offer, Reeher noted, incorrectly, that "Mr. Williams . . . indicate[d] that he will settle grievance for the amount of $500.00." Id. Williams accuses Reeher of nefariously misrepresenting his offer in retaliation for his prior grievances.
Reeher is entitled to summary judgment for several reasons. First, Williams has not cited any caselaw for the proposition that an unsatisfactory settlement offer would "deter a person of ordinary firmness" from exercising his First Amendment rights. Allah, 229 F.3d at 225. The same is true of a prison official's decision to decline or counter an inmate's own settlement offer. And, even if Reeher's offer could somehow be characterized as an adverse action, Williams has failed to adduce any evidence connecting that action to his prior protected activity. Finally, the record supports Defendants' contention that Williams never exhausted this claim. Given these shortcomings, summary judgment is required.
b. Breach of contract
Williams' final claim alleges that Reeher "breached [a] contract that she entered into with the plaintiff to reimburse him $500 and a Yamaha workstation in response to Grievance No. 725977. ECF No. 127 at 44. As the undersigned has recommended dismissal of all of Williams' federal claims, the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this state law claim.
"Federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, and may only decide cases consistent with the authority afforded by the Constitution or statutes of the United States." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 378 (1994). Thus, "[w]hen the claims over which a district court has original jurisdiction are resolved before trial, the district court must decline to decide the pendent state claims unless considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for doing so." Neelu Pal v. Jersey City Med. Ctr., 658 Fed. Appx. 68, 75 n. 6 (3d Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Yue Yu v. McGrath, 597 Fed. Appx. 62, 68 (3d Cir. 2014) (affirming the district court's decision to dismiss "all of the remaining state and common law claims after awarding summary judgment to [d]efendants on all of the federal claims over which it had original jurisdiction"). "Importantly, pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not a plaintiff's right." Yue Yu, 597 Fed. Appx. at 68.
As Williams' breach of contract claim is entirely grounded in state law, the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over that claim. Id. at 68; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (permitting a district court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction where it has "dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction"). Consequently, it is recommended that Williams' breach of contract claim be dismissed, without prejudice to his refiling the same in state court. III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED. IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).
/s/_________
RICHARD A. LANZILLO
United States Magistrate Judge Dated: August 14, 2020