Opinion
Civil No. 00-2902 (JBS).
March 6, 2003
Charles N. Riley, Esquire, Daniel C. Deitch, Esquire, Riley Sandilos, Cherry Hill, NJ, Attorney for Plaintiff.
John C. Eastlack, Jr., Esquire, Cheryl L. Cooper, Esquire, Poplar Eastlack, PC, Turnersville, NJ, Attorney for Defendants.
OPINION
Plaintiff Neil Williams brings this civil rights action for injuries arising out of an altercation that occurred during a traffic stop in Camden on or about Thanksgiving day, November 25, 1999. Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that Patrolman Christopher Revelli illegally searched, handcuffed and assaulted him during the traffic stop in violation of state law and his constitutional rights. Plaintiff also alleges that the City of Camden engaged in a pattern and practice of failing to investigate citizen complaints of excessive force, of exonerating officers of wrongdoing, and failing to properly train and supervise police officers.
Presently before the Court is a partial summary judgment motion brought by defendants Patrolman Revelli and the City of Camden. Defendants Revelli and City of Camden seek summary judgment on all claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982 and 1988 in Count I, and all pendant state claims in Count II. Defendant City of Camden further moves for summary judgment only as to plaintiff's § 1983 claim against City of Camden in Count III of the Complaint. For the reasons stated herein, defendants' motion for partial summary judgment will be granted in part and denied in part.
I. BACKGROUND
On or about November 25, 1999, at approximately 10:00 p.m., plaintiff Neil Williams left his mother's house on the 900 block of Princess Avenue in Camden, having spent Thanksgiving dinner there, to return to his home in Sicklerville, New Jersey. (Compl. ¶ 13; Williams Depo. Tr. 1/31/01, Pl.'s Ex. A, at 42.) Plaintiff's wife and four children had left in another car a few minutes earlier. (G. Williams Aff. ¶ 2.) From Princess Avenue, plaintiff made a left onto Walnut, and then another left onto Haddon Avenue. (Williams Depo. Tr. 1/31/01, Pl.'s Ex. A, at 42.) Just past the intersection of Haddon Avenue and Park Boulevard, plaintiff was pulled over by Patrolman Revelli. (Id. at 43.) Through the rear-view mirror, plaintiff saw Patrolman Revelli approach plaintiff's car with his weapon drawn. (Id. at 44.) Plaintiff lowered his driver's side window and asked Patrolman Revelli why he had his weapon drawn. (Id.) Patrolman Revelli told plaintiff to "shut the F up before I blow your F'ing head off." (Id.) Plaintiff complied, with his hands raised, and placed his wallet on the roof of the car. (Id.) Patrolman Revelli told plaintiff to put his hands behind his back, with which plaintiff complied. (Id. at 45.) After plaintiff repeatedly asked, "What did I do?" Patrolman Revelli told him to "shut the F up" and hit plaintiff in his left rib cage area. (Id. at 45, 49.)
After explaining that he had just come from his mother's house around the corner and suggesting to the officer that they could go there, Patrolman Revelli placed handcuffs on plaintiff, at which time a young man named William, passing by, asked the officer, "What are you doing that to him for?" (Id.) Patrolman Revelli stated "Shut the [expletive] up before I lock you up." (Id.) At that time, plaintiff noticed another officer approaching the vehicle. (Id.) Patrolman Revelli saluted the officer and stated to him, "Sarg, search his car, rip his [expletive] out." (Id.) Officer Revelli then put plaintiff into the backseat of the patrol car head first. (Id. at 48.) Additional officers arrived on the scene, and with the sergeant, conducted a search of plaintiff's vehicle. (Internal Affairs Complaint, Pl.'s Ex. D.) Plaintiff's mother Geneva Williams thereafter arrived on the scene after a neighbor Eugene Robinson had notified her of the incident. (G. Williams Aff. ¶ 2, Pl.'s Ex. B.) Ms. Williams approached Patrolman Revelli to find out what her son had done, and he replied, "[D]o not try to make excuses for him." (Id. ¶ 10.) Ms. Williams then approached Officer Vaultier, an officer who had arrived at the scene, who stated that plaintiff had made an illegal U-turn. (Id. ¶ 12.) After Ms. Williams informed Officer Vaultier that one of her other sons, Eric Williams, was a corrections officer at the Riverfront Prison in Camden whom Officer Vaultier knew, Officer Vaultier spoke with Officer Revelli. (Id. ¶¶ 13-15.) Officer Revelli then informed Officer Vaultier that he was checking for outstanding warrants on Neil Williams. (Id. ¶ 16.) After more time had passed, Officer Revelli took plaintiff out of the car and released him, stating, "[N]ext time I tell you to shut up, you shut the [expletive] up." (Id. ¶¶ 17-18.)
At some point during this incident, Officer Revelli informed plaintiff that the reason for the stop was that plaintiff had made an illegal U-turn. (Internal Affairs Complaint, Pl.'s Ex. D.) Patrolman Revelli contends that he and plaintiff were on Haddon Avenue heading toward Pine Street Avenue when he saw plaintiff make a U-turn heading toward Kaighn Avenue in his rear-view mirror. (Revelli Depo. Tr. 1/18/01, Def.'s Reply Br. Ex. A, at 127.)
Plaintiff Neil Williams first filed a complaint with the City of Camden Police Department Internal Affairs Unit (also referred to herein as "IAU") on November 29, 1999, stating that he was assaulted during the incident on Thanksgiving night, and that defendants subjected him to verbal assaults and publicly humiliated him. (Internal Affairs Complaint, Pl.'s Ex. D.) Plaintiff also stated that no motor vehicle violations were ultimately issued nor were any criminal complaints initiated. (Id.)
Plaintiff Neil Williams and his mother Geneva Williams filed this civil rights complaint on June 15, 2000, alleging violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1988 and 1983, and state law claims. (Compl.) A stipulation of dismissal with prejudice was entered as to plaintiff Geneva Williams only on November 5, 2001. (Order, 11/5/01.) Plaintiff Neil Williams, in his complaint, alleges that Patrolman Revelli had no justifiable cause for stopping, arresting, or handcuffing plaintiff and as a result, plaintiff was deprived of his constitutional rights in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1983 and 1988 (Count I); that defendants Revelli and City of Camden engaged in assault and battery, false arrest, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence under state law (Count II); and that defendant City of Camden and John Does 1-16,inter alia, failed to properly discipline and train Revelli, permitted him to make illegal stops and to use excessive force, and failed to investigate complaints of citizens, in deliberate indifference to plaintiff's constitutional rights in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1983 and 1988 (Count III). (Compl.)
On October 4, 2002, defendants Revelli and City of Camden filed this motion for partial summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P., claiming that 42 U.S.C. § 1988 does not permit a separate cause of action, § 1982 is not applicable in the matter, and that plaintiff's injuries do not rise to the level of "permanent loss of bodily function" to recover for state law violations. Defendant City of Camden additionally moves for summary judgment on only Count III, asserting that it did not ignore claims of constitutional violations by citizens, and that it disciplined Revelli when warranted. Plaintiff, in his opposition brief, "concedes that his injuries do not rise to the level of `permanent loss of bodily function' as required by this state's Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d) . . . [and] does not contest the defendants' position with respect to this particular Act." (Pl.'s Opp. Br. at 4 n. 3.) Thus, summary judgment will be awarded to defendants on plaintiff's state law claims, and, for purposes of this motion, only plaintiff's federal claims will be examined below.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard for Summary Judgment
Defendants Revelli and City of Camden move for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. A court may grant summary judgment when the materials of record "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Lang v. New York Life Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 118, 119 (3d Cir. 1983). A dispute is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
In deciding whether there is a disputed issue of material fact, the court must view the evidence in favor of the non-moving party by extending any reasonable favorable inference to that party.See Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1080-81 (3d Cir. 1996). Once the moving party has carried its initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party must do more than rely only "upon bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions."Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 341 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1010 (1985) (citation omitted). If the non-movant's evidence is merely "colorable" or is "not significantly probative," the court may grant summary judgment.Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50.
B. Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Defendants contend that summary judgment should be granted in their favor because § 1988 does not permit a separate cause of action, § 1982 is inapplicable in this matter, and, with respect to plaintiff's § 1983 claims against City of Camden in Count III, the City of Camden did not engage in conduct that was deliberately indifferent to the constitutional rights of plaintiff.
1. Plaintiff's Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988
Defendant moves for summary judgment to the extent that plaintiff seeks attorneys' fees under § 1988 because § 1988 does not permit a separate cause of action, punitive damages are not available under the language of § 1988, and the statute only permits an award of fees and costs to the prevailing party and at this point in the litigation, plaintiff is not a prevailing party. Def.'s Br. at 11. Plaintiff contends that he is not asserting a "separate cause of action" under § 1988, but is merely seeking additional monetary relief in the form of attorneys' fees and costs. Pl.'s Opp. Br. at 4 n. 2.
Section 1988 provides the following:
[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity such officer shall not be held liable for any costs, including attorney's fees, unless such action was clearly in excess of such officer's jurisdiction.42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Subsection (c) provides that in awarding an attorney's fee under subsection (b), "the court, in its discretion, may include expert fees as part of the attorney's fee." 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c). As the Third Circuit has stated, "[a] prevailing party in a § 1983 action is entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988." Planned Parenthood of Cent. New Jersey v. Attorney General of State of New Jersey, 297 F.3d 253, 265 n. 5 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing PIRG v. Windall, 51 F.3d 1179, 1185 (3d Cir. 1995)). Here, where plaintiff indeed seeks reasonable attorneys' fees should he prevail on his § 1983 cause of action, plaintiff's claim for attorneys' fees is entirely applicable to and appropriate in the instant matter. Contrary to defendants' assertion, plaintiff is not asserting a separate cause of action. On this basis, defendants' motion for partial summary judgment will be denied as to plaintiff's claim for attorneys' fees under § 1988.
2. Plaintiff's Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1982
Defendants move for summary judgment to the extent that plaintiff asserts that defendants Revelli and City of Camden violated his rights under § 1982 on grounds that the statute is inapplicable to the instant matter. Section 1982 provides that "[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." 42 U.S.C. § 1982. The § 1982 statute "prohibits racial discrimination in transactions relating to real and personal property," and is "a Reconstruction statute enacted to effectuate the aims of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution." Brown v. Philip Morris, Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Saunders v. Gen. Servs. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1042, 1063 (E.D. Va. 1987)).
In this case, there is no allegation regarding any transaction of personal or real property involving plaintiff and defendant Revelli or defendant City of Camden. Plaintiff in his opposition brief does not dispute the fact that the § 1982 statute is inapplicable to his cause of action. Accordingly, defendants' motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff's claim under § 1982 will be granted.
3. Plaintiff's Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Against City of Camden
Defendant City of Camden argues that plaintiff's § 1983 claims against it in Count III must be dismissed because a municipality cannot be liable on the theory of respondeat superior for the constitutional torts of its employees, and the actions of the Camden City Police Department did not constitute a policy or custom that was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's civil rights. Furthermore, defendant argues that plaintiff fails to demonstrate a causal nexus between the alleged governmental policy and the injuries plaintiff claimed to have sustained, and thus the City's actions were not a "moving force" behind the injuries alleged.
Plaintiff alleges in Count III that defendant City of Camden is liable for failure to exercise due care under the circumstances; permitting officers to make illegal stops, conduct illegal searches, and use excessive force; failure to properly discipline, restrain and control employees or agents known to be dangerous to citizens of the community; failure to take adequate precautions in hiring, retention and training of officers; and failure to investigate complaints of citizens who are subjected to illegal arrest, illegal searches, and use of excessive force by its officers. See Compl. ¶ 30.
Section 1983 provides a remedy for individuals whose Federal Constitutional rights have been violated by persons acting under color of state law. See, e.g., McCullough v. City of Atlantic City, 137 F. Supp. 2d 557, 564 (D.N.J. 2001) (citing McCusker v. City of Atlantic City, 959 F. Supp. 669, 671 (D.N.J. 1996)). To prevail under § 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) a violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court in Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 689 (1978), held that municipalities and other local governmental bodies are "persons" within the meaning of § 1983, and that a municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 solely because it employs a tortfeasor under a respondeat superior theory. Monell, 436 U.S. at 689; see also Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown, 502 U.S. 397 (1997). As the Third Circuit explained, "[w]hen a suit against a municipality is based on § 1983, the municipality can only be liable when the alleged constitutional transgression implements or executes a policy, regulation or decision official adopted by the governing body or informally adopted by custom." Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996) (citingMonell, 436 U.S. at 694), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1151 (1997). Thus, although a municipality cannot be liable for a constitutional tort on the theory of vicarious liability, it can be held liable under § 1983 when the injury inflicted is permitted under its adopted policy or custom. Beck, 89 F.3d at 971 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). To the extent that plaintiff seeks § 1983 damages from City of Camden under respondeat superior liability, that claim must fail.
The Third Circuit reiterated the two-path track to municipal liability under § 1983:
A government policy or custom can be established in two ways. Policy is made when a "decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action" issues an official proclamation, policy or edict. A course of conduct is considered to be "custom" when, though not authorized by law, "such practices of state officials [are] so permanent and well-settled" as to virtually constitute law.Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990). Custom "may also be established by evidence of knowledge and acquiescence." Beck, 89 F.3d at 971 (citing Fletcher v. O'Donnell, 867 F.2d 791, 793 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 919 (1989)).
The Supreme Court in City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), held that the inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis of § 1983 liability "only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact." Id. at 388. Although the Supreme Court in City of Canton involved a municipality's alleged failure to train its officers, this "deliberate indifference" standard has been adopted in other policy and custom contexts. Beck, 89 F.3d at 972 (citations omitted). A failure to train, discipline or control can form the basis for § 1983 municipal liability if the plaintiff can show deliberate indifference in the form of "contemporaneous knowledge of the offending incident or knowledge of a prior pattern of similar incidents and circumstances under which the supervisor's actions or inaction could be found to have communicated a message of approval to the offending subordinate." Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 127 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Bonenberger v. Plymouth Township, 132 F.3d 20, 25 (3d Cir. 1997)). The Supreme Court remarked on this level of culpability:
[I]t is not enough for a § 1983 plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly attributable to the municipality. The plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the "moving force" behind the injury alleged. That is, a plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.Bryan County, 502 U.S. at 404 (emphasis in original). A showing that a municipality engaged in "simple or even heightened negligence will not suffice." Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 276 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Bryan County, 520 U.S. at 404), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1072 (2001).
The Third Circuit decision in Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, supra, provides a useful analogy to the instant matter. InBeck, plaintiff brought a civil rights action against the city alleging that the municipality adopted a custom of permitting its police officers to use excessive force in carrying out their duties. Plaintiff claimed he had been pulled over by an officer who struck him in the face with a gun six to eight times, forced him to the ground, and kicked him in the ribs. The officer subsequently charged plaintiff with "driving under the influence" and reckless driving. The Third Circuit, considering the district court's granting of defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law, determined that the chief of police as the policymaker had knowledge of plaintiff's evidence of five written civilian complaints regarding the offending officer's use of excessive force and verbal abuse, that the city's complaint department was structured to curtail disciplinary action and stifle investigations, and that the year-end report of the complaint department brought to light the police department's problem with officers' use of excessive force. While drawing no conclusion as to whether the evidence supported a determination that the municipal policymakers knew about and acquiesced in a custom that tolerated the use of excessive force by its officers, the Third Circuit nevertheless found that a reasonable jury could have inferred that the chief of police, as the policymaker, knew or should have known of the officer's propensity for violence when making arrests, and that the district court erred in granting judgment as a matter of law to the defendant.
The Third Circuit in Beck cited approvingly to Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042 (3d Cir. 1991) (§ 1983 claim alleging City's failure to properly train employees in prevention of suicides of detainees), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 985 (1992), and Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845 (3d Cir. 1990) (§ 1983 claim alleging custom of police officers of making illegal arrests for intoxication). The Third Circuit in those cases determined that plaintiff could sustain his § 1983 claim by demonstrating that policymakers were aware of the unlawful conduct in the past but failed to take precautions against future violations which led to the unconstitutional injury, see Beck, 89 F.3d at 972 (citing Bielevicz, 915 F.2d at 851), or deliberately chose not to pursue alternatives for preventing unlawful action or acquiesced in a long-standing policy or custom of inaction, see Beck, 89 F.3d at 972 (citing Simmons, 947 F.2d at 1064).
In support of his § 1983 claim against the City of Camden, plaintiff similarly provides evidence of four (4) excessive force or physical assault complaints against Officer Revelli that were brought to the attention of the Internal Affairs office, the office that handles and investigates complaints brought against Camden City police officers, prior to the November 25, 1999 date of the incident. In the first incident, the Internal Affairs office issued a memorandum on October 19, 1998 regarding a complaint brought on July 12, 1998, by Mr. William Strazzullo, who claimed that he was assaulted by Officer Revelli during an off-duty incident which occurred on Saturday, July 11, 1998.See IAU Report, 10/19/98, Pl.'s Ex. G. Although Officer Revelli was apparently off-duty, he identified himself as a police officer to Mr. Strazzullo and pulled him over for a traffic stop.See id. The Internal Affairs investigator concluded that Revelli committed an assault, and recommended that he be cited with a violation of the Camden City Police Officer's Manual.Id. The final disciplinary action issued against Revelli was a suspension for 5 days without pay. See Final Notice of Disciplinary Action, 11/16/98, Pl.'s Br. Ex. Q.
As the Third Circuit noted, "Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), evidence of other wrongs or acts, although not admissible to prove the character of a person, are admissible for other purposes, such as proof of knowledge." Beck, 89 F.3d at 973. These prior acts are admissible to prove the City of Camden's knowledge of its officer's alleged assaultive propensities when dealing with the public.
In the second incident, Celena Perez, Revelli's girlfriend at the time, filed a police report on September 12, 1998, in which she claims that Revelli grabbed her arms and neck and knocked her to the ground. See Report, 9/12/98, Pl.'s Br. Ex. U. The Internal Affairs Unit conducted an investigation into the matter, and because the complainant indicated that she did not want to file a domestic abuse complaint and refused to fully cooperate with the investigation by agreeing to an interview, the Internal Affairs office closed and filed the case as "NOT SUSTAINED."Id. Because the allegation involved domestic abuse, the City of Camden confiscated Revelli's weapon for a period of time, id., and although Perez did not file a domestic abuse complaint or initiate a temporary restraining order, the City further required that Revelli undergo a fitness-for-duty examination with Dr. Robert L. Tannenbaum, see Tannenbaum Report, 10/8/98, Pl.'s Br. Ex. X, who found Revelli to be "fit for duty." Id.
Third, the City of Camden received an initial notice of claim for damages, dated May 4, 1999, from a Ms. Barbara Belk regarding an incident that occurred on or about March 9, 1999. See Initial Notice of Claim, 5/4/99, Pl.'s Br. Ex. Z. Ms. Belk sought damages for being pulled over for a traffic stop by Officer Revelli, who allegedly approached her driver side window with his gun drawn, handcuffed her and placed her in the back of the police car for approximately an hour. Id. The City of Camden Office of the City Attorney issued an Interrogatories and Document Request form to Belk after she filed her Notice of Tort Claim with the City, and Belk, in that form, states that she filed a complaint with the Internal Affairs Unit on March 10, 1999, at approximately 12:30-1:00 a.m. See Interrogatories Document Request, at 6, Pl.'s Br. Ex. 1.
In the fourth incident, the Internal Affairs office issued a memorandum on July 6, 1999, regarding a complaint brought by Mr. James D. Williams on March 12, 1999, for having been thrown against a patrol car when he was being arrested by Officer Revelli on March 10, 1999. See Internal Affairs Memo., Pl.'s Br. Ex. 4. The investigation noted that Mr. Williams did not wish to initiate a complaint but merely wished his property returned, and also that Mr. Williams called Sergeant Turner to inform him that a friend had returned the property. The case was then closed and marked "UNFOUNDED." Id.
Plaintiff additionally refers to three other incidents without citation to any part of the record, as well as the investigation of the instant matter, to support his excessive force theory. One incident occurred on November 4, 1999, and involved Angelo Rodriguez being pulled over and allegedly being assaulted by Officer Revelli. Mr. Rodriguez apparently filed a complaint with Internal Affairs on December 3, 1999, occurring after the date of the instant matter, but the investigation was closed on January 17, 2001, as "NOT SUSTAINED" without having interviewed Mr. Rodriguez. Plaintiff submits that the Camden County Prosecutor's Office opened the matter as a criminal investigation after being contacted by Mr. Rodriguez's private attorney. Pl.'s Opp. Br. at 27. Plaintiff also submits that Ms. Janet Robinson lodged a complaint with Internal Affairs on July 18, 2000 regarding a July 17, 2000 incident involving Officer Revelli and several other Camden police officers. Id. Robinson alleged that Officer Revelli pulled her from a vehicle, threw her to the ground, placed a knee in her back, and handcuffed her. Plaintiff submits that no interviews of the complainant or witnesses are contained in the Internal Affairs file on Ms. Robinson, and alleges that the existence of a "peddling" warning issued to Robinson by a Camden City license inspector is "calculated" to discredit Robinson's version of events. Id. at 28. Plaintiff also submits the incident involving Isaac Dean, which occurred on October 20, 2000. Id. In that incident, Officer Revelli recognized complainant in a Camden bar and escorted him outside in the belief that there was an outstanding warrant on him. Dean alleges that Revelli twisted his arm and when Dean asked why he was doing this, Revelli promised to slam his face into the concrete if he did not shut up. Id. Dean then filed a complaint with the Internal Affairs on October 23, 2000. Plaintiff submits that the Internal Affairs file on Dean includes a copy of an aggravated assault warrant issued to Dean on October 2, 2000. Based on this, plaintiff asserts that it is clear that the City is focusing its internal investigation not on the officer's conduct, but "on the credibility of the complainant exclusively." Id. at 29.
These last three incidents, unsupported by evidence in the record, and each occurring after the date of Williams' encounter with Revelli, cannot substantiate plaintiff's claim. Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P., provides, in part:
[A]n adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.
Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P. Furthermore, even if these incidents were substantiated, notice to the police occurred after plaintiff's incident in this case. Likewise, the handling of plaintiff's own administrative investigation, which allegedly remains open, does not give notice to defendant City of Camden of Revelli's alleged pattern of use of excessive force prior to plaintiff's incident with Revelli on Thanksgiving Day 1999.
Although plaintiff argues that these four incidents would have put City of Camden on notice of Officer Revelli's propensity for violence prior to the incident at issue in plaintiff's complaint and therefore constitute sufficient proofs regarding the existence of a municipal custom or policy under Beck, defendant asserts that the evidence does not demonstrate that the policymakers acquiesced to Officer Revelli's conduct, citingBrown v. Easton, No. Civ. A. 99-4294, 2001 WL 722144 (E.D. Pa. 2001), and Linden v. Spagnola, Civ. No. 99-2342, 2002 WL 1625414 (D.N.J. June 27, 2002). In Easton, the district court considered plaintiff's submission of evidence of four incidents demonstrating the municipality's alleged tolerance of use of excessive force, two of which had occurred prior to the offending officer's employment at the municipality and which had ended in a settlement. The third, involving a firearm, resulted in remedial training on the use of force. The fourth incident, involving a domestic abuse report to the municipality by the officer's girlfriend, required the officer to undergo psychological evaluation and suspension without pay for seven weeks, with reinstatement contingent on ending all contact with his former girlfriend. After the officer began seeing his ex-girlfriend again, and after the girlfriend visited the municipality director to report physical abuse by him, the officer was suspended for an additional five weeks. The district court granted the municipality's motion for summary judgment, specifically distinguishing itself from Beck, where "all five filed complaints were related to the police officer's use of excessive force while arresting civilians, all five complaints occurred during a period of three years and three months, and none of the complaints resulted in disciplinary action." Easton, 2001 WL 722144, at *5 (citing Beck, 89 F.3d at 966). The Easton court placed emphasis on the fact that only one incident raised by plaintiff involved the officer in his on-duty capacity, that the incidents involving the girlfriend were off-duty, and that the other two did not result in complaints against the officer and occurred over six years prior to the instant complaint. Thus, in light of the lack of formal written complaints, the low number of allegations, the long time period involved, that most of the events occurred in the officer's off-duty capacity, and that disciplinary action was indeed taken against the officer, Easton could not establish deliberate indifference to his constitutional rights.
In Linden v. Spagnola, the district court similarly considered the municipality's motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff's § 1983 claims against it for failure to train and failure to supervise, investigate and discipline. In that case, plaintiff presented evidence of three Internal Affairs complaints filed after the incident at issue in the lawsuit, which represented the sum total of all Internal Affairs complaints filed against the two offending officers in five years, none of which resulted in a finding of culpability on the part of the offending officer. Based on this lack of existing pattern of violations, the court concluded that this did not support a finding of deliberate indifference by the municipality. Id. at *10. Furthermore, because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that certain portions of the training were deficient or that the violations would have been averted had a different training or supervisory regimen been implemented, the court determined that no jury could conclude that the training was deficient or that it was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. The court then considered plaintiff's failure to supervise, investigate, and discipline claims. The court noted that evidence of the mere fact that the police chief was not aware of plaintiff's incident with defendant was not enough to establish deliberately indifferent supervision, and that the lack of submission of the municipality's written Internal Affairs policy as to when investigations should be commenced did not support his claim that a Notice of Tort Claim should have triggered an Internal Affairs investigation in his case. Thus, the district court granted the municipality's motion for summary judgment as to all § 1983 claims asserted against it.
In this case, plaintiff presents evidence of four Internal Affairs complaints instituted against Officer Revelli prior to the incident which is the subject of this case. The incident involving William Strazzullo occurred while Officer Revelli was off-duty but where he nevertheless identified himself as a police officer in conducting a traffic stop. As a result of that incident, Revelli was disciplined with a suspension for five days without pay. The incident involving Ms. Perez consisted of events that occurred off-duty, and the Internal Affairs Unit did investigate her complaint but could not go forward due to her refusal to cooperate. Nevertheless, the City of Camden required Revelli to turn in his firearm temporarily and to undergo a fitness-for-duty examination, which concluded that he was deemed fit for service. The Internal Affairs office likewise investigated Mr. James Williams's complaint regarding an incident with Revelli, though Williams sought only the return of his property. See Internal Affairs Report, 6/3/99, Def.'s Br. Ex. 8. After Internal Affairs sent Mr. Williams a contact letter on June 3, 1999, Mr. Williams did not respond. Accordingly, the Internal Affairs investigation was closed and filed "UNFOUNDED."Id. As for the incident involving Ms. Belk, her Notice of Tort Claim was sent to the City of Camden and then referred to the City Attorney's Office for legal defense. The City Attorney's Office then issued an Interrogatories and Document Request form to Belk, who responded that she indeed filed an Internal Affairs complaint on March 10, 1999, at 12:30-1:00 a.m.
Once the municipality received notice of three of these complaints, the Internal Affairs Unit conducted investigations, two of which resulted in Internal Affairs office conclusions of "UNFOUNDED" and "NOT SUSTAINED," while the third complaint resulted in disciplinary action of five days suspension without pay. Additionally, the other three complaints alleged by plaintiff occurred after the incident at issue here, and are not substantiated by admissible evidence but are based on plaintiff's assertions in his brief. The relevant incidents in this case did not all occur after plaintiff's alleged assault as in Linden, but are more similar to Brown v. Easton, where the two off-duty incidents pre-employment did not result in formal complaints and the officer was disciplined for an on-duty assault. Here, only one of the three IAU complaints, which occurred while Revelli was off-duty, resulted in a finding of Revelli's culpability and disciplinary action, unlike Beck, where the offending officer was never disciplined. Revelli's firearm was confiscated for a period of time, and he was also ordered to undergo a fitness-for-duty exam after the report of a domestic violence situation with his former girlfriend.
The fourth incident, however, involving Barbara Belk, indicates that she filed her complaint in March 1999 regarding Revelli with the Internal Affairs Unit, which at that point became aware of her incident with Revelli and his alleged use of unwarranted force. Defendant City of Camden argues that Chief Allenbach was unaware of such a complaint having been filed, citing to his deposition transcript, Def.'s Reply Br. Ex. U, at 120:1-22. There is nothing in the record indicating that the City of Camden did anything to investigate the situation, to place him in alternative duties pending an investigation, or to discipline Revelli for his conduct.
Although the defendant municipality did not sit on its hand upon notice of Revelli's actions with respect to three of the above incidents, there is a question as to whether it attempted any investigation into the Belk case once she filed her complaint with the IAU, which occurred only eight months before plaintiff's incident. Here, based on this evidence, a reasonable factfinder could find that the municipality "communicated a message of approval" to the offending officer upon learning of Belk's IAU complaint asserted against him, Montgomery, 159 F.3d at 127, yet did nothing to investigate these significant allegations of misconduct within the Police Department. Belk's allegations are also quite parallel to plaintiff's in the present case. Thus, there is a question of fact as to whether the City of Camden was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's rights by engaging in a custom of tolerance of use of excessive force. Plaintiff's claim of municipal liability based upon the City of Camden's failure to adequately supervise Officer Revelli with respect to proper use of force in making arrests must be decided by a jury.
Turning from failure to supervise to failure to train, the Court finds that plaintiff fails to show that the municipality's failure to train Revelli "actually caused" his injury. See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 391 (requiring plaintiff to demonstrate that injury "resulted from" the municipality's failure). As defendant points out, plaintiff has conceded that Officer Revelli attended and completed the Camden County Police Academy, Pl.'s Response to Def.'s St. of Material Facts, ¶ 21, that the curriculum included classes on the use of force, id. ¶ 22, that Officer Revelli received use of force training at the Academy in 1997 and scored an 88 and 97.2 out of a possible score of 100, id. ¶ 23. Plaintiff also concedes that Officer Revelli received on-the-job training, whether one-on-one or group setting, in all areas of police work at the City of Camden Police Department, id. ¶ 24, and that plaintiff participated in and satisfactorily completed Chief Allenbach's requirement of a 40-hour training program in all phases of police work, id. ¶¶ 25-26.
Here, as in Linden, plaintiff does not demonstrate that the alleged constitutional violations would have been averted had a different officer training regimen been implemented. Plaintiff submits no evidence regarding which portions of Revelli's training were inadequate, or what modifications would have prevented his alleged constitutional injury. Like Linden, in this case, no reasonable juror could conclude that the City of Camden's training of Officer Revelli was deficient or that it was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury.
The bulk of plaintiff's argument lies in his claim for failure to investigate, discipline and supervise claims, claiming that the focus of the Internal Affairs investigations was on assailing the credibility of each of the complainants, in violation of the New Jersey Attorney General's guidelines for Internal Affairs policy and procedures, see Pl.'s Br. Ex. 16, and the General Order #96-8 governing Camden City Police Department Internal Affairs Unit procedures, id. Ex. 17. This failure to investigate according to procedure, plaintiff asserts, allowed Camden's police officers to engage, unchecked, in a custom of deliberate indifference to plaintiff's constitutional rights.
With respect to complainant Strazzullo, plaintiff argues that neither Thomas Revelli, Dennis Revelli, nor Celena Perez were interviewed for the investigation even though they were listed as witnesses by Revelli, while two individuals who did not witness the incident were nonetheless interviewed in order to "discredit" Strazzullo. Pl.'s Opp. Br. at 17. The Internal Affairs investigation memorandum indicates that the investigator had instructed Officer Revelli to notify his three witnesses to contact him, though only Mrs. Revelli responded by telephone. During that call, the interviewer advised Mrs. Revelli that it was critical for her son Thomas Revelli to contact the office, though no contact was made. Furthermore, contrary to plaintiff's assertion that the investigator used witness Joseph Cox's information to "contradict" the complainant, the information from Cox, who witnessed the incident from a neighboring house, actually served to "confirm" Strazzullo's story, except that Cox did not witness Mr. Strazzullo exiting the truck to retrieve his keys in order to leave. Internal Affairs Report, Pl.'s Br. Ex. G. The investigator found that the information gained from Mr. Henry Sanchez, likewise, "basically reiterates and confirms the statement put forth by Mr. Cox confirming the statement of Mr. Strazzullo." Id. at 4. Plaintiff fails to demonstrate how these witnesses' testimony "contradicted" complainant or how the investigator questioned them for the "exclusive purpose of assailing Strazzullo's credibility," Pl.'s Br. at 17. In addition, although plaintiff argues that Ms. Perez witnessed the incident involving Strazzullo and Revelli, see Perez Cert., Pl.'s Br. Ex. M, neither Officer Revelli nor Strazzullo named Perez as a witness, and thus the investigator's oversight of Perez can hardly be seen as deliberately indifferent to or in reckless disregard of the complainant's rights.
While the investigation report indicates that the testimony of Lorraine Clark and Rick Dougherty did provide information that Strazzullo was intoxicated and handling a city vehicle during the incident, plaintiff does not demonstrate how any of this testimony hurt, or even influenced, the investigator's ultimate conclusion that "Mr. William Strazzullo was assaulted without just cause by Officer Chris Revelli," or the recommendation that Officer Revelli be cited for violations of the Police Officers' Manual. See Internal Affairs Report, Pl.'s Br. Ex. G.
Although plaintiff further asserts that the Internal Affairs Unit disregarded the requirement that the matter should have been reported to the County Prosecutor's office for investigation, the complaint did not rise to the level of seriousness required for such a referral to occur. The Internal Affairs Policy and Procedure provides, in part:
Where preliminary investigative data indicates the possibility of a criminal act on the part of the accused officer, or the investigation involves the use of force by the officer which results in serious bodily injury or death, the county prosecutor shall be notified immediately. No further action shall be taken, including the filing of charges against the officer, until directed by the county prosecutor.
Internal Affairs Policy Procedures, Pl.'s Br. Ex. 17, at 10. Because there was no indication of serious bodily injury in this case, the decision not to refer the matter to the County Prosecutor was sound.
Even though plaintiff makes issue of the contention that the Strazzullo investigation did not focus on the alleged crimes of Officer Revelli in committing a violent assault in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1, making terroristic threats in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3, and engaging in misconduct in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2(a), here, the Internal Affairs investigator made the determination that Revelli assaulted Strazzullo and threatened two individuals who assisted Strazzullo. In this case, where Strazzullo was free to raise such claims by filing a civil or criminal complaint against Revelli but did not do so, the Internal Affairs investigator was well within his discretion in determining that Revelli had violated the Camden City Police Officer's Manual, Disciplinary Code, Rule 8.1.6, Causes for Removal, and in recommending that he be suspended for five days without pay. See Internal Affairs Report, Pl.'s Br. Ex. G. Such a punishment for an officer's first offense does not bespeak municipal indifference to supervising and disciplining Revelli.
Plaintiff also claims that the Internal Affairs Unit violated General Order 96-8 by sending a letter to Strazzullo's employer, Roberto Feliz of the Department of Public Works, informing him that allegations were made regarding Strazzullo's intoxication while driving a city vehicle at the time of his incident with Revelli. See Richardson Letter, 8/7/98, Pl.'s Br. Ex. P. The investigator stated that "[t]he information regarding Mr. Strazzullo is not the subject of the Internal Affairs investigation and is provided to you in order to make you aware of these allegations, for what ever action you deem appropriate." Id. Even if the investigator did violate any confidentiality provision contained in the General Order (and plaintiff fails to cite to any relevant provision) he does not demonstrate how this communication to the complainant's employer affects the ultimate issue of whether the Internal Affairs Unit's procedures in investigating complaints were so egregious as to amount to deliberate indifference to his rights.
As for the incident involving Celena Perez, plaintiff asserts that Perez was not provided with a copy of the complaint against Officer Revelli in violation of General Order 96-8 § III.C.5, which provides that the officer receiving the complaint shall "[p]rovide the person making the complaint with a Citizen Complaint Information Form which explains the department's disciplinary procedures and advise the complainant that they will be kept informed of the status of the complaint and its ultimate disposition." Gen. Order 96-8, III.C.5, Pl.'s Br. Ex. 16. Plaintiff further alleges that the investigation was not thorough in that "no other avenues of investigation were pursued." Pl.'s Br. at 20. The investigation report indicates that Perez spoke to the investigator over the phone, stated that she would not grant a formal interview, and had since moved from her home shared with Revelli and refused to give a forwarding address or current telephone number. Internal Affairs Report, Pl.'s Br. Ex. V. The report further indicates that Perez was twice advised of the complaint and temporary restraining order procedure, yet refused to sign a complaint or initiate a temporary restraining order. Id. There is nothing in the record demonstrating that Perez did not receive a copy of the Internal Affairs complaint. Furthermore, the report indicates that Perez refused to cooperate with the investigation of the complaint. Plaintiff's assertions regarding the Internal Affairs' policy and procedures are thus unfounded.
Moreover, contrary to plaintiff's argument, Revelli did face certain consequences as a result of this initial complaint. He was required to undergo a psychological evaluation, and his firearm was taken away from him for a period of time. See Internal Affairs Report, Pl.'s Br. Ex. V, at 2, 4. Based on this, the Internal Affairs investigation procedures do not demonstrate that the Internal Affairs office resolves complaints against its officers by disposing of them unfavorably for the complaining citizen. In this case, Perez was given multiple opportunities to provide information regarding allegations against Officer Revelli, but specifically refrained from participating, refused to provide her new address or home number, and refused to give a formal interview. There is no evidence that Perez declined to participate due to fear or intimidation. That such failure to cooperate or proceed resulted in a "NOT SUSTAINED" conclusion is not surprising.
Plaintiff also argues that the failure to mention the Strazzullo matter in the context of the Perez incident demonstrates that the Internal Affairs Unit investigates in a vacuum without properly considering prior complaints. The fact that a single incident had occurred previously while Revelli was off-duty does not provide significant information of a practice of egregious conduct that would warrant being included in the context of a domestic matter involving Revelli. The complaint involving Strazzullo involves an incident that occurred in Revelli's off-duty hours, but while utilizing the power and authority of his police badge to make a traffic stop, while his alleged abuse of his girlfriend did not involve his police authority. The parallels between the Strazzullo and Perez incidents are not so evident that failure to mention the Strazzullo matter in the context of the Perez investigation was unreasonable.
Plaintiff additionally argues that James Williams's complaint with Internal Affairs was defective in that the Internal Affairs Unit failed to complete a thorough investigation of the complaint in violation of General Order 96-8, III.G.3 and .5, and that the Unit allowed a municipal court disposition of Williams's civil complaint to affect the disposition of the Internal Affairs complaint in violation of Paragraph 7 of the Consent Decree entered in the Clemente class action. Even assuming the Consent Decree applies in this case, plaintiff's argument fails. Here, the Internal Affairs memorandum indicates that Williams "reported that he did not want to initiate the complaint, reporting that he only wanted his property returned." Internal Affairs Report, Pl.'s Br. Ex. 4. Mr. Williams specifically sought the return of a radio that was "possibly taken by police." Id. Here, Mr. Williams notified Sergeant Turner of the Police Department on March 23, 1999, that "a friend had returned the radio." Id. Furthermore, the Internal Affairs Unit sent a contact letter on June 3, 1999 to Mr. Williams, who did not respond. The Internal Affairs Unit thus did not wait until the disposition of Mr. Williams's municipal court complaint which culminated in dismissal of the complaint on June 18, 1999, to conclude that plaintiff indeed only wished return of his property by lodging his complaint, which he indicated upon making the complaint and relayed to Sergeant Turner as he advised him of the property's return.
That provision is as follows:
A determination of a Court (including the Camden Municipal Court) dismissing a related proceeding against an officer alleged to have committed an act of police misconduct shall not affect the Police Department's obligations hereunder, i.e., the Internal Affairs investigation of a matter shall be pursued, as appropriate, without regard to any dismissal of related charges by a Court, and if feasible without waiting for the disposition. If, after ninety (90) days, the investigation of the Internal Affairs Division (hereinafter referred to as "IAD") is still open, IAD shall notify the Chief of Police of the reasons therefor. IAD shall receive the Chief's approval for any extensions of time to complete said investigation.Clemente Consent Decree, Pl.'s Br. Ex. 15. Plaintiff further contends that significant requirements set forth in the Consent Decree have been violated, without citation to any record support. Pl.'s Br. at 31-33. Plaintiff's arguments are directed not to plaintiff's allegations, but rather to the efficacy of the Consent Decree entered into in another civil action, and these arguments appear better addressed in such a context.
As for Barbara Belk, however, plaintiff alleges that the Camden City Police Department failed to take Ms. Belk's complaint, instead directing her to try back the next day, in contravention of General Order 96-8, III.C.1 and Attorney General Guidelines 11-16. There is evidence in the record that Belk filed an Internal Affairs complaint on March 10, 1999. See Interrogatories Document Request Form, Pl.'s Br. Ex. 1. Plaintiff asserts that Belk sent a letter via certified mail to Chief of Police Allenbach detailing Revelli's use of excessive force and her arrest. Defendant counters that the "letter" sent to Chief Allenbach was actually the Notice of Tort Claim, which notified the municipality of the civil complaint that Ms. Belk had filed.
Even though the evidence indicates that Belk indeed sent a Notice of Tort Claim to Chief Allenbach by certified mail dated May 7, 1999, see Pl.'s Br. Ex. Z, the fact that Belk filed an Internal Affairs complaint, and defendant presenting no evidence that this IAU complaint was ever investigated, raises a genuine issue of material fact whether the City of Camden failed to investigate and supervise. Even if the complaint was, as a matter of course, sent to the City Attorney's Office due to Belk filing a notice of tort claim, such procedures may be reasonably found to demonstrate a lack of concern of Officer Revelli's alleged use of excessive force, and are further inadequate to ensure that the rights of citizens who come in contact with Revelli are respected. If the City determined to conduct no internal affairs investigation within the Police Department merely because the complainant also filed a tort claim notice, such a municipal policy may be found to demonstrate an indifference to the civil rights of persons who are allegedly victims of use of excessive force. Since investigation into defendant Revelli's conduct in the Belk incident which occurred only eight months prior to plaintiff Williams's incident, combined with the knowledge of the other three preceding incidents, could have led to disciplinary or preemptive action, such as desk work or other alternative duties, the City of Camden's failure to investigate Belk's complaint, leading to a failure to discipline Revelli, could have actually caused plaintiff's alleged injury.
Considering the above incidents, plaintiff's arguments that the Internal Affairs Unit failed to thoroughly conduct investigations of Revelli's alleged misconduct is based largely upon several of the complainants' personal preferences to not go through with the complaints after having filed them. Perez and Williams, of their own accord, failed to contact the Internal Affairs Unit to provide more information. While Mr. Strazzullo's complaint resulted in the significant discipline of a five day suspension of Revelli without pay. there is sufficient evidence that Barbara Belk reported her complaint to the Internal Affairs Unit, and that the City of Camden never made the Chief of Police aware of the complaint or conduct an investigation. This therefore raises a question of fact whether the City of Camden allowed Officer Revelli to continue his duties, up through the time of the present incident in November, 1999, knowing that he had a propensity for violence. Although substantial evidence demonstrates that there is a complaint procedure in place at the Internal Affairs Unit of the City of Camden Police Department, involving interviewing of witnesses, complainant, and the alleged offending officer as appropriate, and that these guidelines were followed in three investigations of complaints involving Revelli prior to plaintiff's incident on November 25, 1999, no evidence has been submitted by defendant City of Camden that it responded to or investigated Belk's complaint. Based on the above evidence, a reasonable juror could conclude that the municipality's procedures for investigating and supervising excessive force complaints resulted in the municipality's deliberate indifference to plaintiff's constitutional rights. Where plaintiff must show that "through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the `moving force' behind the injury alleged," Bryan County, 502 U.S. at 104 (emphasis in original), a reasonable juror could conclude that the City of Camden "deliberately" acted, or failed to act through deliberate indifference, to cause plaintiff's alleged constitutional injury.
Plaintiff also argues that the "45-day rule" requiring disciplinary charges to be filed within 45 days of the complaint date is routinely disregarded, providing that if charges are not filed within such time, then the charges shall be dismissed under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147. While, if true, this may demonstrate that the average investigatory timeframe is longer than provided by statute, plaintiff makes no contention that any complaints as to Revelli were filed and dismissed in this matter due to failure to adhere to the 45-day rule, nor does the evidence demonstrate that the Internal Affairs Unit dismissed any complaint for any other reason in this case.
Plaintiff also provides statistical reports indicating the number of excessive force complaints (78) with the Department during 1997, 1998, and 1999, alleging that such statistics demonstrate "an acute problem with the IAU and the deliberate indifference shown by the City." Pl.'s Br. at 35. Absent any comparison to statistics of other police departments, which could show that these numbers are comparatively normal or abnormal, any guidance drawn from these numbers amounts to very little for purposes of this motion.
In light of the foregoing, defendant City of Camden's motion for summary judgment as to the § 1983 claims against it in Count III will be granted with respect to plaintiff's claims for failure to train, and denied with respect to plaintiff's claims for failure to investigate, supervise and discipline.
III. CONCLUSION
As discussed above, defendant City of Camden and Revelli's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982 and 1988 will be granted with respect to plaintiff's claims under § 1982, and denied with respect to plaintiff's claims under § 1988. Because plaintiff concedes that his injuries do not meet the threshold under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, summary judgment will be granted with respect to all pendant state claims in Count II. Defendant City of Camden's summary judgment motion will be granted as to plaintiff's § 1983 claims for failure to train against City of Camden in Count III, and denied with respect to plaintiff's § 1983 claims for failure to investigate, supervise and discipline. The accompanying Order will be entered.
ORDER
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon defendants Christopher Revelli and City of Camden's motion for partial summary judgment on all claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982 and 1988, all state law claims, and § 1983 claims brought against City of Camden; and the Court having considered the parties' submissions; and for the reasons expressed in the Opinion of today's date; and for good cause shown;IT IS on this day of March, 2003, hereby
ORDERED that defendants' motion for partial summary judgment [Docket Item 23-1] be, and hereby is: GRANTED in part with respect to claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1982, and those claims shall be DISMISSED ; DENIED in part with respect to claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and those claims shall remain; GRANTED in part with respect to plaintiff's state law claims in Count II, and those claims shall be DISMISSED ; and GRANTED in part with respect to plaintiff's § 1983 claim for failure to train against City of Camden in Count III, and DENIED in part with respect to plaintiff's § 1983 claims for failure to investigate, supervise and discipline asserted against City of Camden in Count III.