Opinion
Civ. No. 99-2342 (WGB)
June 27, 2002
Robert B. Hille, Esq., Suzanne J. Ruderman, Esq., CONTANT, ATKINS, ROGERS, FEDE HILLE, L.L.C., Hackensack, New Jersey, Attorneys for Plaintiff.
John L. Shahdanian II, Esq., CHASAN, LEYNER, BARISO LAMPARELLO, P.C., Secaucus, New Jersey, Attorneys for Defendants City of Paterson and the improperly pled Paterson Police Department.
OPINION
Plaintiff Gregory Linden has brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants City of Paterson and the Paterson Police Department (collectively "Defendants" or "Paterson") are responsible for violations of his civil rights. Defendants have moved for Summary Judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 1332 and 1367. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is granted.
Plaintiff has also brought a number of tort claims under New Jersey law.
I. BACKGROUND
It is undisputed that at approximately 1:35 PM on May 24, 1997, officers of the Paterson Police Department responded to a complaint of domestic violence at 113 Montgomery Street, the residence of Plaintiff, his estranged wife, and their two children. According to the Police, Plaintiff's wife reported that Plaintiff had become verbally abusive towards her and that she was frightened of him. After the Police arrived, Plaintiff agreed to leave the premises.
Approximately two hours later, the Paterson Police were again summoned to the residence. Plaintiff's wife alleged that Plaintiff had returned to the residence and had been "bothering her." The parties agree that Plaintiff was not present at the residence during the second visit by Police.
Plaintiff claims that at the time of the second alleged incident, he was taking a nap at another home he owned.
Later the same day, at approximately 4:51 P.M., Defendant Officers Miguel Oquendo and Louis Spagnola (collectively the "Defendant Officers") were called to the Linden residence on the report of yet another domestic violence dispute. The parties are in fundamental disagreement as to what transpired when Oquendo and Spagnola arrived on the scene for the third domestic violence call. For purposes of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment only, the Court will rely on Plaintiff's version of the events that followed.
According to Plaintiff, sometime after the first two visits by the Police, he returned to the family residence and began clearing debris in the back yard. As he worked in the back yard, his wife would periodically come out of the house and curse and scream at him. Shortly thereafter, while raking leaves, he saw the two Defendant Officers running toward him from the side yard of his residence, approximately 10 feet away. The Defendant Officers did not identify themselves as Police, but instead said "there he goes, lets get him."
Despite the fact that the officers did not identify themselves, Plaintiff conceded that he knew they were police officers, because they were in uniform.
Plaintiff initially froze, but after observing the officers reach for their batons, he ran into his house to seek refuge. Plaintiff claims that he feared for his life and ran from the charging officers. It is undisputed that he ran through his house, into his basement, and back out into his yard via the basement door. Once in the yard, he ran towards an adjacent backyard and scaled the adjoining chain-link fence. It is undisputed that with the officers in pursuit, Plaintiff scaled several other chain-link fences, including one topped with barbed wire.
Plaintiff next claims that the Defendant Officers stopped at the barbed wire fence and shot a metallic canister in his direction. The canister released a chemical that caused him to become lightheaded, queasy, docile and sluggish. (See Linden Tr. 87:18-88:21.) In this altered state, Plaintiff admits that he scaled an adjoining wall and entered the open basement of a nearby house. After entering the basement Plaintiff may have shut the door behind him, and not finding anywhere to hide, stood up on one of the basement walls.
According to Mr. Linden, Officer Spagnola entered the basement after him. Officer Spagnola allegedly pointed his gun at Plaintiff and ordered him to get down from the wall and lay face down, on the floor, with his hands behind his back. Plaintiff claims he complied with Officer Spagnola's instructions.
After Plaintiff got on the floor, two or three Paterson Police officers entered the basement. Plaintiff alleges that one of the officers raised his knee up and stomped on the back of his head, forcing his face to hit the cement floor. Plaintiff further claims that all of the officers then kicked him about the face, head, shoulders and body. Because his head was pressed to the floor, Plaintiff is unsure of which officers assaulted him. After receiving his alleged beating, Plaintiff was taken from the basement, thrown into a patrol car, and driven to Barnert Hospital.
Plaintiff was treated at the hospital for various injuries to his jaw and mouth. He suffered multiple fractures to his jaw, numerous lacerations to his head, face, shoulders, and forearm; an avulsed tooth; and multiple contusions to his head, face, shoulders and back. Mr. Linden was also found to have dirt ground into the skin and hair on the front of his body (but not on the back of his body). Plaintiff ultimately required surgery for his injuries.
Defendant Officers Spagnola and Oquendo, as well as Mrs. Linden, were transported to St. Joseph's Hospital, where they were treated and released for injuries allegedly sustained during the course of the third incident. Plaintiff was charged with various criminal acts including assaulting a police officer, but was ultimately acquitted following a jury trial.
Following the May 24th, 1997 incident, Mr. Linden purportedly filed Notices of Tort Claim on August 7, 1997 and October 23, 1997. Plaintiff also claims that he and his attorney went to the Paterson Police Department to file an Internal Affairs complaint against the officers who assaulted him, but ended up not doing so. Although Plaintiff claims in his Counterstatement of Facts that he was "prohibited from [filing an Internal Affairs complaint] by several officers," (Plaintiff's Counterstatement of Facts, p. 10), that claim is not supported by the relevant portion of Mr. Linden's deposition transcript.
The first Notice of Claim was served by Plaintiff, through his counsel, upon the City of Paterson, the Paterson Police Department, the Commissioner of Police for the City of Paterson, and Defendants Spagnola and Oquendo. The second Notice of Claim was served upon the foregoing individuals and entities, but was made using the City's prescribed Notice of Claim form.
At Plaintiff's deposition, he indicated that he did not file an Internal Affairs complaint because he "was treated with a negative reaction. The officers didn't want to properly assist [him]." (Linden Tr. 160:7-13). Plaintiff initially claimed that the Internal Affairs officers would not assist him in determining the identity of the unknown officers who assaulted him. (Linden Tr. 160:16-21.) Although he already knew the identities of Officers Spagnola and Oquendo at the time he visited the Internal Affairs Office, he did not file an Internal Affairs complaint against either of the Defendant Officers during his visit.
When asked why he had not filed an Internal Affairs complaint against the Defendant Officers, he stated "they weren't receptive to me in Internal Affairs and I felt like they were brushing me off and they didn't cooperate with me." (Linden Tr. 162:6-8). The following colloquy about Mr. Linden's visit to Internal Affairs then took place at his deposition:
Q: Did they give you a complaint form?
Linden: No, they didn't.
Q: Did you ask for a complaint form?
Linden: Yes, we did.
Q: Who we?
Linden: I said I wanted to file a complaint.
Q: Who is we, you said we?
Linden: [My attorney] accompanied me.
. . .
Q: and your counsel asked someone in internal affairs for a complaint form?
Linden: We asked for help.
Q: You asked for help or you asked for a complaint form?
Linden: we asked for help. We said we wanted to file a complaint on some officers.
Q: and how many officers in Internal Affairs did you talk to?
Linden: Basically two officers. We were speaking to an initial officer, then another officer intervened in the conversation and two other officers just looked at us and it was like, you know, it wasn't receptive.
. . .
Q: Did [your attorney] say anything to the police officers?
Linden: Yes, he spoke, he spoke also.
Q: What did he say?
Linden: what exactly what he said, I'd be guessing . . .
Q: Well do you remember if he argued that he should be, you should be given a complaint form or you should be allowed to file a complaint?
Linden: He initially requested that we wanted to file a complaint on some police officers.
Q: and, you were with your attorney and the officers in Internal Affairs declined to give you, declined to give you assistance?
Linden: Yes, they didn't give us any assistance.
Q: Did they say we're not going to help you?
Linden: No, the best one officer said, we'll get you a book and you could look at the book for pictures, that's about it.
Q: Did you do that?
Linden: No.
Q: How come?
Linden: Because of because the atmosphere and the type of vibes I was getting from the Internal Affairs officer led me to believe that they didn't want me there.
. . .
Q: Mr. Linden, you said before that you get a vibe. What is a vibe?
Linden: The way and manners that the officers in internal Affairs were giving off the way they were talking to me and [my attorney], the way that no one moved to get any paperwork and the attitude one officer said well, the best I could do is let you look at a book so the attitude they weren't responsive so I said they're not going to cooperate with us and, so, I think me and [my attorney] decide that we would go upstairs and fill out the appropriate forms upstairs.
Q: Go ahead. Finish.
Linden: they — that they weren't going to help us in Internal Affairs.
Q: So that was your own decision, yours and [your attorney]?
Linden: Yes.
Q: And you voluntarily left the Internal Affairs unit?
Linden: Yes.
Q: You weren't forced to leave that unit?
Linden: No.
Q: You didn't press the issue with anyone in Internal Affairs?
Linden: No.
Q: And you never looked at the book that they offered to show you?
Linden: The Book? No.
. . .
Q: And then you went upstairs to file a [criminal] complaint?
Linden: Yes.
(Linden Tr. 162:9-167:15)
Although an Internal Affairs complaint would have triggered a Police investigation of the incident, no such complaint was filed. Although Plaintiff did file a criminal complaint against the Defendant Officers, a matter of practice in Paterson the filing of criminal complaints against officers did not trigger internal investigations. Accordingly, no Police investigation of the May 24th, 1997 incident ever took place.
At the time of the incident, both Oquendo and Spagnola had been Paterson Police officers for less than one year. Both had graduated from the City of Paterson's Police academy in 1996, where they had both been trained pursuant to the guidelines promulgated by the Office of the Attorney General for the State of New Jersey. Plaintiff concedes that as part of the training provided within the State of New Jersey Basic Course for Police Officers, both Officers had received training in lawful arrests, the use of force and handling domestic violence calls.
Defendants submitted several hundred pages of guidelines, training manuals, directives, letters, and other documents purportedly related to the Basic Course for Police Officers. (Shahdanian Cert. Ex. H). Plaintiff rightly notes that there is no evidence Officers Spagnola and Oquendo ever received these documents.
In his career as a Paterson Police officer, Defendant Oquendo has been the subject of only one Internal Affairs complaint. That complaint was filed on March 29, 1998, almost one year after the incident involving Plaintiff. That complaint was filed by the mother of a high school student, whose son was allegedly assaulted by Oquendo after being ejected from a high school dance. Because the mother changed her story and refused to cooperate with the investigation, the charges against Officer Oquendo were not sustained.
Defendant Spagnola has been the subject of three Internal Affairs Complaints, all of which were filed after the alleged incident involving Plaintiff. On July 28, 1997, Spagnola was one of seven officers who allegedly used excessive force in quelling a riot at a Peruvian Day parade. On December 8, 1998, Spagnola allegedly used excessive force in subduing a burglar who assaulted officers after they tried to arrest him. On December 25, 1998 Spagnola was investigated sua sponte by the Department for accidentally discharging his weapon during a foot chase with a suspect. No one was injured during the foot chase. Defendant Spagnola was not found to be culpable for the conduct alleged in any of the complaints.
Defendants claim that Spagnola was exonerated in each incident, but note that the Peruvian Day riot incident is still officially an open investigation. While that may be the case, Plaintiff rightly notes that Defendants have failed to present any evidence surrounding the outcome of these three investigations.
On May 21, 1999, Plaintiff filed a thirteen count Complaint with this Court. The Complaint alleges that Defendant Officers Spagnola and Oquendo, an unnamed John Doe Defendant Police Officer, the City of Paterson, and the City of Paterson Police Department violated his Constitutional rights and committed various common law torts against him. The Paterson Police Department and City of Paterson were named in all of the Complaint's Counts with the exception of Counts One (unlawful arrest/excessive force by Spagnola and Oquendo) and Count Seven (general tort claim directed to Spagnola and Oquendo in their individual capacity). Counts Two through Five, Nine and Ten assert a panoply of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against all of the Defendants for:
a) Paterson's failure to properly train, supervise, and direct the defendant officers as to unlawful arrests and seizures, and the use of excessive force;
b) Paterson's institution and maintenance of policies that encouraged unlawful arrests and seizures and excessive force;
c) in the alternative, Paterson's failure to establish policies to prevent unlawful arrests, seizures, and excessive force;
d) the officers' deprivation of Plaintiff's rights to due process and equal protection, because of:
I) their arrest and seizure of plaintiff using excessive force without probable cause;
ii) their unlawful entry into his home, and seizure of his person and property;
e) the officers' unlawful entry on Plaintiff's property and unlawful seizure, in violation of Plaintiff's right to assemble and to freedom of speech under the First Amendment;
f) conspiracy to subject Plaintiff to malicious prosecution and abuse of process, and for actually subjecting Plaintiff to same; and
g) Paterson's public officials' acquiescence in or ratification of all of the preceding violations of Plaintiff's constitutional rights.
Counts Six, Eight, and Eleven through Thirteen assert a number of state law tort claims against all Defendants, for:
a) Paterson's negligent/"palpably unreasonable" failure to supervise, train, monitor, oversee, and discipline the Department's officers;
Counts Eight and Twelve both assert substantively identical claims for false arrest against all Defendants.
None of the state law Counts appear to include a malicious prosecution claim, although Count Nine does include a § 1983 claim predicated on malicious prosecution. Because the parties have proceeded as if a malicious prosecution tort claim had been pled, however, for purposes of this motion the Court will proceed under the assumption that Plaintiff intended to include a state law malicious prosecution claim. If Plaintiff wishes to correct the error, he should seek leave of the Court to Amend the Complaint in accordance with the Rules of Procedure.
d) assault and battery;
e) conversion.
Each Count of Plaintiff's complaint seeks recovery of compensatory damages, punitive damages, interest, costs of suit, attorney's fees, and any other relief the Court may deem just and proper.
Defendants City of Paterson and Paterson Police Department subsequently brought this motion for summary judgment. As of the time this Opinion was issued, none of the other parties to the action had moved for summary judgment.
II. DISCUSSION Summary Judgment Standard
The standard for granting summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is a stringent one. Summary judgment is appropriate only if all the probative materials in the record "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Hersh v. Allen Prods. Co., 789 F.2d 230, 232 (3d Cir. 1986); Lang v. New York Life Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 118, 119 (3d Cir. 1983). An issue involving a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Healy v. New York Life Ins. Co., 860 F.2d 1209, 1219 n. 3 (3d Cir. 1988).
The court must resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the nonmoving party when determining whether any genuine issues of material fact exist.Meyer v. Riegel Prods. Corp., 720 F.2d 303, 307 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1983);Smith v. Pittsburgh Gage Supply Co., 464 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1972). Even though a court must resolve reasonable doubts in favor of the nonmoving party, because a motion for summary judgment is designed to go beyond the pleadings, factual specificity is required of a party who opposes such a motion. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Accordingly, in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment, a party may not merely restate the allegations of its pleadings, or rely upon self-serving conclusions, unsupported by specific facts in the record. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; Farmer v. Carlson, 685 F. Supp. 1335, 1339 (M.D.Pa. 1988). A non-moving party must point to concrete evidence in the record which supports each essential element of its case. Id. If the party fails to provide such evidence, then it is not entitled to a trial and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
B. Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims 1. Liability of the Police Department vs. Liability of the City
As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff has sued both the City of Paterson and the City of Paterson Police Department. In his Complaint, Plaintiff stated that the Police Department is "a municipal law enforcement agency under the direction, control and supervision of the defendant City." (Complaint, ¶ 6. Numerous courts have held that "in Section 1983 actions, police departments cannot be sued in conjunction with municipalities, because the police department is merely an administrative arm of the local municipality, and is not a separate judicial entity." See DeBellis v. Kulp, 166 F. Supp.2d 255, 264 (E.D.Pa. 2001) (collecting cases). Accordingly, Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the City of Paterson Police Department is granted for all of Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. The remainder of the Court's § 1983 inquiry will focus on whether, based on Plaintiff's version of the facts, the City of Paterson itself can be held liable for the conduct of its Police Department and police officers.
2. Agency Liability
As previously indicated, Plaintiff's Complaint asserts a wide range of claims against all of the Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides for a cause of action against:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws . . .42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 "`is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides `a method for vindicating Federal rights already conferred.'" Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989).
Although § 1983 may be used to obtain recovery from a municipality for constitutional injuries, "Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort." Monell v. New York City Dept. Of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). In keeping with Congressional intent, in Monell the Supreme Court absolutely foreclosed municipal § 1983 liability on the basis of respondeat superior. Id. Instead, Monell and its progeny direct that a municipality may be held liable only for acts or failures of the municipality itself, and not for the acts or failures of its employees; this ensures that municipal liability is "limited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible." Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986).
To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to recover against Paterson pursuant to § 1983 for the conduct of the Defendant Officers alone, Plaintiff's claims against Paterson must be dismissed as a matter of law. Accordingly, pursuant to Monell and Pembaur, the Court will dismiss all of Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against Paterson that rest upon the doctrine of respondeat superior.
3. Direct Municipal Liability
Even though respondeat superior liability in § 1983 actions has been foreclosed by the Supreme Court, a plaintiff may still recover against a municipality for constitutional violations that occur at the hands of municipal employees, provided that some link exists between the conduct and the municipality. Plaintiff contends that such a link exists for a variety of reasons.
According to Plaintiff there is sufficient evidence in the record to demonstrate that, both before and after it was presented with information about the officers' alleged misconduct, the City of Paterson failed to train, supervise and discipline its police officers, and to investigate incidents. In addition, Plaintiff claims that the conduct by officials in authority shows acquiescence to the Defendant Officers' unconstitutional conduct and procedures. Finally, Plaintiff claims that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the City of Paterson has established a policy or procedure of acquiescing in the Defendant Officers' allegedly unconstitutional conduct.
In support of his contentions, Plaintiff relies on a few discrete pieces of evidence. He claims first that the deposition of Chief of Police Lawrence Spagnola, Sr. clearly establishes that the City of Paterson has failed to properly supervise, train, and discipline the conduct of its officers. In addition, he claims that the evidence shows that the City of Paterson has failed to implement and monitor internal procedures to investigate claims of excessive force against its officers. Plaintiff claims that the absence of such an inquiry and/or internal investigation into the incident in question amounts to the City's deliberate indifference to civilian's rights.
Plaintiff also claims that "in their answers to interrogatories, the City certified that the plaintiff `was not deprived of any right, privilege, or immunity secured to him by the United States or by the Constitution of the laws of the State of New Jersey.' (Ruderman Cert., Ex. G)." (Plaintiff's Opposition Brief, p. 16.) The Court finds two problems with Plaintiff's attempted use of Defendant's alleged admission in opposition to summary judgment. The first problem is that the "interrogatory answer" quoted by Plaintiff does not appear anywhere in Exhibit G to the Ruderman Certification. In fact, Paterson denies ever having provided the preceding answer to an interrogatory; instead, Paterson notes that the language quoted by Plaintiff resembles an amalgamation of a pair of Paterson's Affirmative Defenses in its Answer.
The second problem is that Plaintiff seeks to have the statement considered in light of his version of the events of May 24th, 1997. Essentially, given his claims of abuse, Plaintiff asks the Court to find that the statement constitutes an admission by Defendant that it tolerated constitutional abuses of the sort suffered by him. Plaintiff's request defies logic, however, because the statement is meaningless unless it is considered it in the context in which it was allegedly made, namely in support of Defendants' theory of the case.
At trial, Defendants are prepared to argue that on May 24th the Defendant Officers entered the Linden residence and observed Plaintiff in the act of strangling his wife. Upon seeing the officers, Defendants claim that Plaintiff attempted to flee, but was ultimately cornered by officers in a neighbor's basement. At that time Defendants claim Linden violently resisted arrest, injuring both Spagnola and Oquendo. Defendants will argue that Plaintiff was also injured in the process. If the Defendants' version events proves true, then it would be entirely appropriate for them to say that Plaintiff `was not deprived of any right, privilege, or immunity secured to him by the United States or by the Constitution or the laws of the State of New Jersey.' Such a conclusion would also make it plain that the statement was anything but an admission by Paterson that it tolerated rights abuses.
While the Court must consider all of the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff when reviewing Defendants' motion for summary judgment, the Court is under no obligation to distort unambiguous statements in Plaintiff's favor, as Plaintiff requests. The same is true of the Defendant Officers' interrogatory answers to the effect that their conduct on May 24th, 1997 was in accordance with Paterson's Policies and Procedures. Although Plaintiff attempts to twist those answers into another "admission" by Paterson that it tolerated the alleged rights abuses, for the same reasons it would be inappropriate for a trier of fact to consider the statements outside of their proper context.
In general terms, to recover from a municipality via § 1983 a plaintiff must demonstrate a direct causal link between their injury and the municipality by demonstrating that the violation of their constitutional rights was caused by either a policy or custom of the municipality. Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 275 (3d Cir. 2000), citing Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996). "Policy is made when a decisionmaker possessing final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action issues an official proclamation, policy or edict. Customs are practices of state officials so permanent and well settled as to virtually constitute law."Berg, 219 F.3d at 275 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
To determine whether an act is properly attributable to the municipality, instead of attributable to one of its employees, the Supreme Court has guided that "municipal liability attaches only where the decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered." Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481. More specifically, "municipal liability under § 1983 attaches where — and only where — a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question." Id. at 483.
Plaintiff has not pointed to any official proclamations, policies or edicts issued by Paterson officials that led to the alleged deprivation of his rights. Although Plaintiff refers in general terms to Paterson's "policies," it is clear that his allegations do not fit within the definition of a municipal "policy" as defined by the Third Circuit inBerg. Instead, his allegations are more in line with alleged unconstitutional municipal "customs;" the Court will address Plaintiff's allegations accordingly.
At the core of Plaintiff's allegations are four related municipal customs; failure to train, supervise, investigate, and discipline. Having identified these allegedly impermissible municipal customs, Plaintiff must "demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the `moving force' behind the injury alleged." Berg, 219 F.3d at 276, quoting Board of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). Because municipal customs of failing to train, supervise, investigate or discipline employees do not violate federal law in and of themselves, Plaintiff can only succeed "by `demonstrating that the municipal action was taken with `deliberate indifference' as to its known or obvious consequences. A showing of simple or even heightened negligence will not suffice." Id.
The `deliberate indifference' standard was articulated by the Supreme Court in City of Canton v. Harris, where the Court was confronted with the question of whether a municipality could be held liable for a "concededly valid policy" that was "unconstitutionally applied by a municipal employee . . . if the employee has not been adequately trained and the constitutional wrong has been caused by that failure to train." 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). The Supreme Court agreed with a number of the Courts of Appeals and concluded that "there are limited circumstances in which an allegation of a `failure to train' can be the basis for liability under § 1983." Id. Those circumstances are narrowly confined to instances where "the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact." Id.
It is not sufficient to demonstrate "that an injury or accident could have been avoided if an officer had had better or more training," because "in virtually every instance where a person has had [her] constitutional rights violated by a city employee, a § 1983 plaintiff will be able to point to something the city `could have done' to prevent the unfortunate incident." Canton, 489 U.S. at 391-92. Instead, § 1983 claims against municipalities "can only yield liability against a municipality where that city's failure to train reflects deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of its inhabitants." Id.
The Third Circuit has held that "a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be attributed to a municipal policymaker." Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 f.3d 628, 637 (3d Cir. 1995), quoting Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985). Mindful of the foregoing standard, the Third Circuit has subsequently embraced a three-part test to determine whether a municipality's failure to train or supervise amounts to deliberate indifference. A plaintiff must show that "(1) municipal policymakers know that employees will confront a particular situation; (2) the situation involves a difficult choice or a history of employees mishandling; and (3) the wrong choice by an employee will frequently cause deprivation of constitutional rights." Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir. 1999) (footnote omitted).
The standards for failure to train and supervise have also been extended to failures to discipline and investigate. See, e.g., Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 637 (3d Cir. 1995).
As in Carter, Plaintiff has arguably met the first and third elements; the City must have known its officers would be presented with domestic violence situations, and must have known that failure to handle them properly would frequently cause deprivation of constitutional rights. Even so, and also as in Carter, it is much less clear if Plaintiff has met the second element, namely whether the "situation [that led to the constitutional violation] involve[d] a difficult choice or a history of employee mishandling." Id.
While a pattern of constitutional violations is often sufficient to demonstrate the "history of employee mishandling" necessary to establish deliberate indifference, a necessary element to establish liability is that the municipality be actually or constructively aware of the violations. As the Third Circuit guided, causation can be shown by a "municipality's failure to act, once it was on notice that its procedures were constitutionally deficient." Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 851 (3d Cir. 1990) (empahsis added). Although a "plaintiff does not have the burden of identifying a single individual who established a given policy, he or she must identify a particular practices that is "so permanent ans well settled as to have the force of law." Turner v. City of Philadelphia, 22 F. Supp.2d 434, 437 (E.D.Pa. 1998), quoting Bielevicz, 915 F.2d at 850.
A municipality may be liable in such a circumstance because "it is logical to assume that continued official tolerance of repeated misconduct facilitates similar unlawful actions in the future."Bielevicz, 915 F.2d at 851. In essence, "a municipal custom may be established by proof that officials with policymaking responsibility knew of and acquiesced in an unlawful course of conduct," Id. at 854, and that "this failure led to [the] injury." Id. at 851.
Given the preceding legal standards, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to find in his favor, even if all of the evidence is taken in a light most favorable to him. The Court reaches this conclusion for all of the reasons to follow.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff has conceded that both Defendant Officers graduated from the City of Paterson's Police academy in 1996, where they both were trained pursuant to the guidelines promulgated by the Office of the Attorney General for the State of New Jersey. Plaintiff has further conceded that as part of the training provided within the State of New Jersey Basic Course for Police Officers, both Defendant Officers received training in lawful arrests, the use of force and handling domestic violence calls.
Not only has Plaintiff conceded that the Defendant Officers received relevant training, but he has conceded that "the City of Paterson has established policies and procedures as to when the use of force is appropriate. (Ruderman Cert., Ex. I.)" (Opposition Brief. pp. 19-20). Plaintiff has also conceded that "under no circumstances was the use of force by the defendant police officers on May 24, 1997 in conformance with such written guidelines." (Id.)
Given the foregoing facts, Plaintiff has attempted to bootstrap his way to a § 1983 claim against the municipality. Plaintiff claims that because he was so completely mistreated by the Defendant Officers in contravention of the City's force policies, the City has demonstrated its deliberate indifference to his rights by not permitting him to file a complaint with Internal Affairs, and by failing to fully and formally investigate the incident. Plaintiff claims that this is further evidenced by the fact that three years after the incident, the Chief of Police was still unaware of whether an investigation had occurred. Relatedly, Plaintiff claims that the four Internal Affairs investigations that were commenced against Spagnola and Oquendo are evidence of a pattern of unchecked excessive force by police, sufficient to support a finding of deliberate indifference and a custom of tolerating unconstitutional police actions.
The Court disagrees. Even taking all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, he can not prevail. It is important to note that none of the other incidents occurred prior to May 24, 1997, the date Mr. Linden was allegedly assaulted. It is also important to note that the four incidents represent the sum total of all Complaints filed against the two Defendant Officers over a five year period. Most tellingly of all, not one of the investigations resulted in a finding of culpability on the part of the Defendant Officer.
While Plaintiff could potentially argue that the lack of findings of culpability is evidence of sham investigations, Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence that the officers were in fact culpable in these other incidents, evidence as to how often officers are found culpable by Internal Affairs, or evidence that Complaints that were actually filed were never investigated.
Base on the lack of an existing pattern of violations alone, Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence that would support a finding of deliberate indifference by the City of Paterson. While Plaintiff has presented evidence that he was injured by police officers, he has not presented any evidence to tie this injury to the City via municipal custom that was so "well settled as to virtually constitute law." Berg, 219 F.3d at 275.
Even assuming Plaintiff had been able to show that the municipality was deliberately indifferent in failing to train and supervise its officers, Plaintiff would still have had to show that this failure in training and supervision "actually caused" Officers Spagnola and Oquendo to injure him. See Carter, 181 F.3d at 357 n. 60, citing Canton, 489 U.S. at 391 (requiring plaintiff to prove his injury "resulted from" the failure to adopt a policy). Such a showing is made by demonstrating that "the injury would have been avoided had the employee been trained under a program that was not deficient in the identified respect." Id.
Although Plaintiff may have made an adequate showing for summary judgment purposes that his rights were violated by the Defendant Officers, he has failed to demonstrate that the violations would have been averted had a different training or supervisory regimen been implemented. Although Plaintiff has conceded that the Defendant Officers received training at the Police academy less than a year before the incident and that the Department had a written use of force protocol in place, Plaintiff has failed to submit any evidence as to which portions of that training he believes to be deficient, or provided any evidence about what modifications would have prevented his constitutional injury. Without evidence to consider about the manner in which the City of Paterson trained its officers, no reasonable jury could make a determination that the training was somehow deficient, let alone that it was the proximate cause of Plaintiff's injury.
The Court is mindful that in determining whether a failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference, "the focus . . . is on the adequacy of the training program in relation to the tasks the particular officers must perform and the connection between the identified deficiency in the . . . training program and the ultimate injury." Reitz v. County of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 1997.) Because Plaintiff has not placed any facts relevant to that inquiry before the Court, he cannot hope to recover on his failure to train claims.
Similarly, Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden with regard to his related failure to supervise, investigate, and discipline claims. Although Plaintiff did depose Paterson's Chief of Police, Lawrence Spagnola, Sr., as a representative of the City and the Paterson Police Department, that deposition did not yield a great deal of relevant information. Based on the Chief's deposition testimony, Plaintiff has made a number of broad assertions about the significance of the Chief's actions. Upon careful examination of the Chief's testimony, however, many of those assertions appear to overreach their factual foundations.
For example, Plaintiff has asserted that "at his deposition, Chief Spagnola stated that as Chief of Police, he is responsible for the education and supervision of all officers." (Opposition Brief, p. 18). Given that alleged statement Plaintiff makes much of the fact that, despite the seriousness of Plaintiff's allegations, Chief Spagnola never spoke with the division commander in regard to the incident, never spoke with anyone but counsel about the incident, and was unsure as to whether or not an Internal Affairs investigation was ever conducted.
When asked whether he was responsible for the education and supervision of officers, Chief Spagnola responded, "Specific officers, no, but overall I believe I am." (Chief Spagnola Tr. 10:8-9). When asked who would be responsible for specific officers, he stated that "their immediate supervisors in different divisions [would be]. It would be different people." (Id., 10:12-13). Although he did state that he made no inquiry into this particular case, he also stated of individual cases that
Well, really me, personally speaking to a policeman is, from time to time, I would go to roll calls or I would walk into a roll call and I'd say, fellows, how are you doing and I would solicit information in that respect but, on a case to case basis, it's, it's very rarely unless I speak to my division commanders in regards to certain incidents that had occurred.
It bears mentioning that Plaintiff has only provided the Court will pages 1, 10, 24, 31-32, 40, 45-48 of the Chief's deposition testimony. In several instances what seem to be relevant lines of questioning either begin on pages that were not provided to the Court or continued onto pages that were not provided to the Court. In the Court's estimation, a juror would be hard pressed to place the highly excerpted comments of the Chief into their proper context, given the potentially relevant information that seems to be missing.
The mere fact that an incident occurred of which the Chief of Police was not aware is not sufficient to establish deliberately indifferent supervision, absent something more. While it is true that he was responsible for supervising officers generally, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate why it is the Chief should have been aware of this incident (conclusory allegations about the incident's severity aside). Plaintiff has also failed to demonstrate how different or better supervision by the Chief might have prevented the incident from occurring. These failures further preclude a showing of municipal liability on Plaintiff's failure to supervise claim.
Plaintiff's failure to discipline claim is similarly conclusory. Plaintiff alleges that because Patterson did not discipline the officers for the incident involving him, they must be deliberately indifferent to citizens' rights. As evidence, Plaintiff again points to the severity of his beating, and to the four Internal Affairs complaints involving the Defendant Officers. He essentially claims that these incidents have come about because the officers involved have not been disciplined for their excessive use of force.
The problem with Plaintiff's argument is that with the exception of the incident involving him, there is not sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that excessive force was used in any of the incidents. Quite obviously, disciplining the Defendant Officers after-the-fact for beating him will not undue the fact that he was beaten; therefore the mere fact that he was involved in an incident where alleged excessive force went undisciplined is not sufficient in-and-of itself to make out a claim for municipal liability for failure to discipline.
Finally, Plaintiff has brought a claim for Paterson's alleged failure to investigate. The entirety of Plaintiff's failure to investigate claim is based on his deposition of the Chief of Police, his visit to Internal Affairs, and the fact that an investigation did not take place in his case. This evidence is not sufficient to sustain his claim, for the following reasons.
The Chief was asked how Internal Affairs investigations were traditionally initiated. He responded:
that could be a number of different ways. It would be, in most cases, an individual would come in and complain. We would have a complaint. Some cases it would be physical or verbal whereas the person actually comes in, a person could call up on the phone and speak to one of the officers. In turn, what we've done, on a number of occasions, gone out to homes and met with people in order to investigate a complaint. And, also, on more, on more than one occasion, we've investigated anonymous letters that we've received.
(Chief Spagnola Tr. 45:21-46:6.) Asked what events would automatically trigger an Internal Affairs investigation, Chief Spagnola stated:
Well, I could give you a few of them. I wouldn't be able to fall within the entire scope. I don't know. Let me see now. A complaint from an outside agency that perhaps one of my officers was doing something wrong, a complaint from one of the supervisors, a complaint from one of the, from the public, a specific complaint where a complainant comes in, sits down, speaks, makes a statement and then goes from there, that would be automatic, an investigation would ensue from that. That would be — there's possibly others but, at this time, you know, it escapes me.
(Chief Spagnola Tr. 47:17-48:3.) The filing of a criminal complaint against an officer, however, would not lead to an automatic investigation by Internal Affairs. (Chief Spagnola Tr. 48:12-15.)
Plaintiff does not dispute that he did not file the Internal Affairs Complaint that would have triggered an investigation. Instead, he makes much of what occurred when he visited the Internal Affairs office intent on filing that Internal Affairs complaint. Plaintiff claims that he requested the complaint form and was not provided it, claims that it was made clear to him that assistance would not be provided, and claims that because of the officers' obvious non-cooperation, he did not file an Internal Affairs complaint, but instead, left the Internal Affairs unit, and filed criminal charges against the Defendant Officers. According to Plaintiff, the preceding events clearly demonstrate that "the officers' conduct in the Internal Affairs unit demonstrates a department-wide policy of depriving citizens of their constitutional rights." (Opposition Brief, p. 19).
Plaintiff's own words at his deposition, however, undermine his argument. While he initially stated that his attorney requested a form and was not provided it, after being asked to clarify his answer he indicated that his attorney had asked for "help" and was not provided it. Similarly, while he claims that the officers were "non-cooperative," by his own testimony he concedes that the officers offered to let him look through a face book of the department's officers to determine who might have been present on the day he was allegedly assaulted, but that he voluntarily elected not to review it.
Similarly, Plaintiff attempts to bolster his failure to investigate argument by noting that although he filed a Notice of Claim upon all of the Defendants, no Internal Affairs investigation was conducted. The failure occurred despite the fact that "according to the City's procedure as confirmed by the Chief of Police, the filing of said Notice should have automatically triggered an Internal Affairs investigation." (Opposition Brief, p. 19.) Based on this failure, he contends that a reasonable jury may infer that the reason said investigation was not conducted was due to the City's implicit authorization, approval and/or acquiescence to its officers' unconstitutional conduct." (Id.)
Mindful of the answers of the Chief of Police previously quoted in this Opinion as to what would automatically trigger an investigation, however, there is absolutely no evidence to support Plaintiff's claim that a Notice of Tort Claim should have triggered an Internal Affairs investigation in this case. Although the evidence might have been beneficial, the Court notes that Plaintiff has not provided the Court with copies of either Paterson's written Internal Affairs policy as to when investigations should be commenced, or the depositions of anyone specifically familiar with Internal Affairs procedures.
While Plaintiff was content to rely on the testimony of the Chief of Police, he himself said that he was not knowledgeable as to all of the investigation commencement procedures. Given the scant evidence provided to the Court, a reasonable juror could at best find that Plaintiff was made uncomfortable by the Internal Affairs officers when he went to file his Complaint. Being made uncomfortable does not make for a constitutional violation, however, absent evidence that a pattern of such behavior designed to keep people from filing Internal Affairs Complaints existed.
Plaintiff's entire case against Paterson is a house of cards built on the fact that he was allegedly beaten by Paterson's police officers. The specifics of the incident involving him permeate every facet of his case, which is otherwise devoid of any independent factual evidence of municipal liability that is normally seen in successful § 1983 actions against municipalities. Given Plaintiff's absolute failure to demonstrate the manner in which departmental policy was deficient, or to show how there were any municipal customs that led to his being injured on May 24, 1997, Plaintiff can not prevail. Mindful that a pattern may not be established on the basis of a single incident, Plaintiff has utterly and completely failed to meet his burden of showing that Paterson was somehow deliberately indifferent in regard to the May 24, 1997 incident. Accordingly, for all of the preceding reasons Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted in its entirety as to Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the City of Paterson.
C. Plaintiff's Tort Claims
Plaintiff has put forth five tort claims against Paterson. Those claims are negligent supervision and training, false arrest, malicious prosecution, assault battery, and conversion. Defendant has argued that as a matter of law, it cannot be held liable in tort for the Defendant Officers' alleged misconduct. Plaintiff has not responded to Defendant's immunity argument, nor presented particularized factual support for its tort claims against Paterson. Plaintiff's only response to Defendant's motion has been to make generalized assertions that Plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of malicious prosecution, and that summary judgment is inappropriate.
As Defendant rightly notes, N.J.S.A. 59:2-10 creates municipal immunity for intentional public employee misconduct. Specifically, it holds that "a public entity is not liable for the acts or omissions of a public employee constituting a crime, actual fraud, actual malice, or willful misconduct." N.J.S.A. 59:2-10. Courts have extended the preceding immunity provision to certain negligence claims against municipalities. For example, if an officer commits an intentional tort because of some "policies and customs established or permitted to exist in the police department," the municipality is immune from subsequent negligence suits premised on those polices and customs. McDonough v. Jorda, 214 N.J. Super. 338, 349 (App.Div. 1986), cert. denied, 110 N.J. 302 (1988).
Based on Plaintiff's version of the facts, with the exception of Plaintiff's negligent training/supervision claim all of Plaintiff's tort claims require some initial finding that Officers Spagnola and Oquendo acted either criminally, maliciously, or that they committed willful misconduct. As a result, Defendant Paterson is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's false arrest, malicious prosecution, assault battery, and conversion tort claims, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:2-10.
Similarly, by virtue of the McDonough decision (which the court finds persuasive), on the facts of this case Plaintiff can not prevail against Paterson on his negligent training and supervision claims. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendant Paterson's motion for summary judgment as to all of the tort claims against it.
Because Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that his tort claims against Paterson can succeed as either a matter of fact or as a matter of law, the Court need not reach the merits of Defendants' argument that Plaintiff's Notices of Tort Claim were untimely pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:8-1 et seq.
III. CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, Defendant City of Paterson and Defendant City of Paterson Police Department's motion for summary judgment is granted in its entirety. Because the Paterson municipal Defendants have been granted summary judgment on all of the claims against them, they are hereby dismissed from this action.An appropriate Order follows this Opinion.