Opinion
Case Number CV-04-01792-JF, Doc. No. 24.
October 1, 2004
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS
I. INTRODUCTION
On May 4, 2004, Plaintiff Ezekial Van Wickler ("Plaintiff"), filed the present action alleging violations of his civil rights. Plaintiff's first claim alleges violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by four named officers (Defendants Eveleth, Northrup, Lindgren and Campbell) of the City of Santa Cruz Police Department. This claim alleges both unlawful arrest and excessive force. Plaintiff's second claim alleges violation of his Fourth Amendment rights by the City of Santa Cruz. This claim alleges that the City has a policy of encouraging and tolerating unlawful acts by its police officers, and that it is negligent in training, supervising and disciplining its police officers. Plaintiff's third claim alleges violation of Plaintiff's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by the County of Santa Cruz District Attorney's Office. This claim alleges improper prosecution of Plaintiff, as well as improper prosecution generally and as a matter of policy.
On June 28, 2004, the Santa Cruz County District Attorney's Office ("County Defendant") moved to dismiss Plaintiff's third claim pursuant to FED. R. CIV. PROC. 12(b)(6). On July 9, 2004, the City of Santa Cruz and the City of Santa Cruz Police Department ("City Defendants") moved to dismiss Plaintiff's claims of unlawful arrest as to the named police officers under FED. R. CIV. PROC. 12(b)(6). Both motions are now before the Court.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On April 10, 2003, Plaintiff was at Mitchell Cove, a public beach within the City of Santa Cruz. (Compl. 2:20-22). One or more officers of the Santa Cruz Police Department observed Plaintiff drinking a can of beer. (Compl. 2:23-28, 3:1). After some interaction, four police officers arrested Plaintiff and took him into custody. (Compl. 3:3-28, 4:1-14). The Santa Cruz District Attorney's Office charged him with violating CAL. PEN. C. § 148 (West 2000). (Compl. 4:19-20). The charge was dismissed two days before trial. (Compl. 5:2).
CAL. PEN. C. § 148(a)(1) provides in pertinent part: "Every person who wilfully resists, delays, or obstructs any . . . peace officer . . . in the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his or her office or employment, when no other punishment is prescribed, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, or by both that fine and imprisonment."
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for only two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing 2A J. MOORE, ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 12.08 at 2271 (2d ed. 1982)). "A court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Hishon v. King Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); see also Argabright v. United States, 35 F.3d 472, 474 (9th Cir. 1994). Motions to dismiss generally are viewed with disfavor under this liberal standard and are granted rarely. Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1997).
For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff's allegations are taken as true, and the Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969); Argabright, 35 F.3d at 474. However, the Court "is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged." Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994). The Court's review is limited to the face of the complaint, documents referenced by the complaint, and matters of which the court may take judicial notice. Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1991); In re Stac Elecs. Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d 1399, 1405 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1996).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Claim against County of Santa Cruz
The County asserts that Eleventh Amendment immunity bars suits against the Santa Cruz County District Attorney's Office because prosecutorial functions are state acts. Plaintiff concedes that the District Attorney's Office is immune from suits for damages, but contends that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits for injunctive relief. In the same opposition memorandum, Plaintiff "concedes that the County of Santa Cruz should not be a defendant in this action and agrees to dismiss the County with prejudice," yet "requests that the court deny defendants' motion to dismiss as to his actions for injunctive relief and attorneys fees." (Pl.'s Memo. of Ps As in Oppo. to County Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, 5:16-22). Plaintiff ostensibly maintains his request for injunctive relief and attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The question before this Court then is whether Plaintiff has stated or reasonably can state a claim for injunctive relief against the Santa Cruz District Attorney's Office.
It is well-settled that state officials sued in their official capacities are not "persons" who can be sued for damages under § 1983. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26-27 (1991); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); see also McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 786 (1997) (whether particular official is state or county official for purposes of § 1983 damages liability depends on actual official function involved as defined by state law); Pitts v. County of Kern, 17 Cal. 4th 340, 362-65 (1998) (California district attorney is not a county policymaker, but is a state official when prosecuting, or preparing to prosecute, criminal violations of state law, and when training and developing policy in these areas).
The Eleventh Amendment also bars claims in federal court against state official capacity defendants for violation of state law — whether for damages, injunction or declaratory relief — unless the state has waived immunity. Pennhurst State School Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. at 106, 121 (1984); Gamboa v. Rubin, 80 F.3d 1338, 1350 and n. 8 (9th Cir. 1996), vacated on other grounds, Gamboa v. Chandler, 101 F.3d 90 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Similarly, the Eleventh Amendment bars federal adjudication of past state violations of federal law. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 69 (1985). A federal court may grant prospective injunctive relief as to a named state official. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, fn. 14 (1986) (injunction proper where named state defendant had authority to grant the relief requested); see also Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157 (1908) (injunction proper where named state defendant was connected to the violation of federal law).
In his claim against the District Attorney's office, Plaintiff has not named any individual state official, nor has he sued any state official in his personal capacity. To the extent Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to prevent future constitutional violations, Eleventh Amendment immunity bars his claim.
Moreover, prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for conduct that is "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process." Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 270 (1993) citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976); Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997). Plaintiff's grievance against the District Attorney's Office is that "Plaintiff was made to return to the court fifteen times over a period of a year and the COUNTY did not dismiss the charges until two days before the scheduled trial." (Compl. 9:13-15). Plaintiff also complains, "the COUNTY prosecutor pleaded with plaintiff's defense attorney trying to get him to plead to even a minor infraction." (Compl. 9:20-22). Court appearances, pressing and dropping charges, and plea bargaining are within the protected scope of prosecutorial conduct. The complaint therefore is insufficient to state a cause of action under a cognizable legal theory, and the Court will grant the County's motion to dismiss.
B. Claims against City of Santa Cruz
Plaintiff does not dispute that he violated SANTA CRUZ, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE sections proscribing the public consumption of alcohol. Defendants assert that the Santa Cruz police were authorized to arrest Plaintiff for his infraction because they had probable cause, citing as authority Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). Defendants thus contend that Plaintiff can state no claim for unlawful arrest against them because Plaintiff, by his own pleading, establishes probable cause for his arrest. Defendants further assert that Plaintiff's excessive force claim is separate and distinct from his unlawful arrest claim, and Defendants direct their motion only to the unlawful arrest claim. (Defs.' Reply 3:17-21). The issue before the Court is whether Plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim for unlawful arrest.
Pursuant to Defendants' request (City Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss 3:2-3), the Court takes judicial notice of SANTA CRUZ, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 9.12.020, 9.12.020, 9.12.060 and 9.50.005.
Plaintiff contends that "the use of excessive force during the course of even a lawful arrest makes the arrest unlawful." (Pl.'s Oppo. to City Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss 5:16-17). As authority for this proposition, Plaintiff cites People v. White, 101 Cal. App.3d 161 (1980) (jury's finding that officers used excessive force negated the "lawful arrest" element of CAL. PEN. C. § 148 and jury should have been so instructed) and People v. Olguin, 119 Cal. App.3d 39 (1981) (officers' use of excessive force makes it impossible for a defendant to violate CAL. PEN. C. § 148). These cases are distinguishable from the instant case in that the White and Olguin defendants used reasonable force in resisting the officers' excessive force. Both defendants claimed self-defense, and both appellate courts determined that a jury should be fully instructed as to the legal effects of a self-defense claim. Plaintiff cites no authority holding or suggesting that the legal standard for negating the "lawful arrest" element of a § 148 criminal charge has any relevance to a civil plaintiff's burden of showing that an arrest was unlawful in the first instance. The adequacy of Plaintiff's allegation that the officers used excessive force is not challenged by the City and is separable from his claim of unlawful arrest. Accordingly the Court will grant the City Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's unlawful arrest claim.
V. ORDER
The County Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's third claim for relief and the City Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's unlawful arrest claim are GRANTED. Because the motions are directed to Plaintiff's initial pleading, leave to amend is granted. Any amended complaint must be filed within twenty (20) days.