Francis X. Casale, Jr., PLLC, Melville, N.Y., for appellants.

Lawrence and Walsh, P.C., Hempstead, N.Y. (Eric P. Wainer of counsel), for nonparty-respondent.

RUTH C. BALKIN, J.P., LEONARD B. AUSTIN, SHERI S. ROMAN, and HECTOR D. LaSALLE, JJ.

In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendants Michael Coletta and Susan A. Coletta, also known as Susan Coletta, appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Adams, J.), entered October 21, 2015, which denied their motion, inter alia, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 5015(a) to vacate a judgment of foreclosure and sale entered August 23, 2004, upon their failure to appear or answer the complaint and, upon vacatur, to dismiss the complaint pursuant to General Obligations Law § 5–501.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

CPLR 5015(a) authorizes a court to relieve a party from an order or judgment, on motion, based on the existence of specified grounds. These grounds include excusable default (see CPLR 5015[a][1] ); newly discovered evidence (see CPLR 5015[a][2] ); fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party (see CPLR 5015[a][3] ); lack of jurisdiction (see CPLR 5015[a][4] ); or upon the reversal, modification, or vacatur of a prior judgment or order upon which it is based (see CPLR 5015 [a][5] ).

Here, the appellants did not provide a reasonable excuse for their failure to answer the complaint (see CPLR 5015[a][1] ) or any other basis pursuant to CPLR 5015(a) for vacatur of the judgment of foreclosure and sale (see HSBC Bank USA v. Josephs–Byrd, 148 A.D.3d 788, 49 N.Y.S.3d 477 ; Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Hussain, 78 A.D.3d 989, 912 N.Y.S.2d 595 ). To the extent the appellants allege that the representations in the affirmation submitted by counsel for PE–NC, LLC, pursuant to Administrative Order 431/11 of the Chief Administrative Judge of the Courts amounted to fraud, the appellants were precluded from making a second motion to vacate their default based on the same grounds raised in a prior motion (see CPLR 5015[a][3] ; EMC Mtge. Corp. v. Asturizaga, 150 A.D.3d 824, 55 N.Y.S.3d 66 ). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the appellants' motion, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 5015(a) to vacate the judgment of foreclosure and sale (see HSBC Bank USA v. Josephs–Byrd, 148 A.D.3d at 788, 49 N.Y.S.3d 477; Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Hussain, 78 A.D.3d at 989, 912 N.Y.S.2d 595 ).

The appellants also failed to provide any evidence of fraud, mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect (see Matter of McKenna v. County of Nassau, Off. of County Attorney, 61 N.Y.2d 739, 472 N.Y.S.2d 913, 460 N.E.2d 1348 ) that would constitute a basis for vacatur of the judgment of foreclosure in the interests of substantial justice (see HSBC Bank USA v. Josephs–Byrd, 148 A.D.3d at 788, 49 N.Y.S.3d 477; 40 BP, LLC v. Katatikarn, 147 A.D.3d 710, 711, 46 N.Y.S.3d 217 ; cf. U.S. Bank N.A. v. Losner, 145 A.D.3d 935, 44 N.Y.S.3d 467 ; Hudson City Sav. Bank v. Cohen, 120 A.D.3d 1304, 993 N.Y.S.2d 66 ; Wells Fargo Bank v. Hodge, 92 A.D.3d 775, 939 N.Y.S.2d 98 ).

The appellants' contention that certain forbearance agreements into which they entered (see Eikenberry v. Adirondack Spring Water Co., 65 N.Y.2d 125, 127–128, 490 N.Y.S.2d 484, 480 N.E.2d 70 ) are usurious is without merit (see Freitas v. Geddes Sav. & Loan Assn., 63 N.Y.2d 254, 481 N.Y.S.2d 665, 471 N.E.2d 437 ; Giventer v. Arnow, 37 N.Y.2d 305, 372 N.Y.S.2d 63, 333 N.E.2d 366 ; Min Capital Corp. Retirement Trust v. Pavlin, 88 A.D.3d 666, 930 N.Y.S.2d 475 ; Steinberg v. Williams, 163 A.D.2d 516, 558 N.Y.S.2d 188 ; see also Abir v. Malky, Inc., 59 A.D.3d 646, 873 N.Y.S.2d 350 ; Dichter v. Viking Off. Prods., 119 A.D.2d 794, 795, 501 N.Y.S.2d 420 ; Stitz v. Stevens, 70 A.D.2d 588, 589, 416 N.Y.S.2d 66, affd. 48 N.Y.2d 957, 425 N.Y.S.2d 97, 401 N.E.2d 219 ).

The appellants' contention that alleged deficiencies in a certain Notice of Sale (see RPAPL 231 ) prejudiced their right of redemption (see RPAPL 1352 ) is academic, since the Supreme

Court stayed the foreclosure sale noticed therein (see Matter of Chase v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 135 A.D.3d 751, 24 N.Y.S.3d 673 ).

Contrary to the appellants' contention, the payoff letter submitted by PE–NC, LLC, was not inadequate (see Real Property Law § 274–a[1] ).

The appellants' remaining contentions are without merit.