Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 05-CV-01750.
September 7, 2006
MEMORANDUM
Presently before this Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants City of Philadelphia, Lt. Cathy Talmadge and Correctional Officer Gail Quartlebaum (Doc. No. 38) and Plaintiff's Response thereto (Doc. No. 39). For the reasons that follow, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Although plaintiff and the moving defendants agree on most of the material facts for purposes of this motion, see Defs' Memo. at 4-7; Pl's Opp. at 3-5, to the extent that plaintiff and the moving defendants do not agree, this Court makes all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff, the non-movant. See J.F. Feeser, Inc. v. Serv-A-Portion, Inc., 909 F.2d 1524, 1531 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 921 (1991).
On July 29, 2003, plaintiff was an inmate assigned to housing block C-1, Pod 2 at the Curran Fromhold Correctional Facility ("CFCF") in the Philadelphia system. At some point during the morning of July 29, 2003, plaintiff asked Correctional Officer ("C.O.") Saez to sign him up for bible study. According to plaintiff, C.O. Quartlebaum would not let him out of the sally port to go to bible study. Pl's Mot., Ex. A., Welch Depo. at 12. Even after plaintiff explained to C.O. Quartlebaum that he was the first one signed up for bible study, C.O. Quartlebaum told him to return to Pod 2. Id. at 12-13. On the way back to the housing block, plaintiff asked C.O. Saez why he could not attend bible study, but she did not respond.
C.O. Saez testified that bible study had already been "terminated," meaning that no more inmates could attend. Defs' Mot, Ex. D, Saez Depo. at 21, 24-25.
At this point, C.O. Brown entered the block. C.O. Quartlebaum entered and told C.O. Brown to "f*** [plaintiff's] white ass up and show him — teach him a lesson because he don't understand he don't got no win around here." C.O. Brown asked plaintiff if he had a problem with C.O. Quartlebaum, and plaintiff told him that he did not. When plaintiff was walking back to his cell, C.O. Brown called him back. When plaintiff returned, C.O. Brown punched him in the face. After the second punch, plaintiff fell to the ground, where he was punched repeatedly by C.O. Brown and C.O. Saez. Id. at 17. During the beating, plaintiff lost consciousness. According to plaintiff, at some point during the beating, he had a seizure. Id. at 18.
Plaintiff testified that he did not recall where C.O. Quartlebaum was while the beating was taking place. Id. He testified that when he came to after losing consciousness, "it was still C.O. Brown and C.O. Saez." Id. at 20. When asked if there was anyone else present, he testified that he saw C.O. Miller handcuff him at some point. Id. When plaintiff was picked up after being handcuffed, he remembers Lt. Talmadge telling him that he should have kept his mouth shut. Id. at 21. At this point, C.O. Miller walked plaintiff to medical.
Plaintiff had previously asked his parents to tell Lt. Talmadge that he was worried about his situation and that he would be willing to enter protective custody, if necessary. Id. at 34. On July 29, 2003, before the assault occurred, plaintiff told Lt. Talmadge about the problems he had with C.O. Quartlebaum. Lt. Talmadge told plaintiff that she would look into the matter.
On May 12, 2005, Plaintiff Christopher Welch filed a pro se complaint against Defendants Lieutenant Cathy Talmadge, C.O. Ed Brown, C.O. Trelita (Miller) Boynes, C.O. Elsa Saez and C.O. Gail Quartlebaum ("Defendant Correction Officers"), alleging violations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After obtaining counsel, plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint, in which the City of Philadelphia was added as a defendant. The Second Amended Complaint alleged violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution, Article I, Section 13 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 37 Pa. Code §§ 95.240, 95.251, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. See Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 27-57. Defendants City of Philadelphia, C.O. Quartlebaum and Lt. Talmadge ("moving defendants") have moved for summary judgment.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must determine whether "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986); Arnold Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 786 F.2d 564, 568 (3d Cir. 1986). All reasonable inferences from the record are drawn in favor of the non-movant. See J.F. Feeser, Inc. v. Serv-A-Portion, Inc., 909 F.2d 1524, 1531 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 921 (1991).
In a motion for summary judgment, "the burden on the moving party may be discharged by `showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). After a defendant properly supports its motion for summary judgment, the "plaintiff must produce affirmative evidence," which "must amount to more than a mere scintilla, but may amount to less (in the evaluation of the court) than a preponderance." Williams v. West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460-61 (3d Cir. 1989) (citations omitted); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (finding that a plaintiff must present competent evidence from which a jury could reasonably find in his favor).
III. DISCUSSION A. Section 1983 Claims Against Defendant City of Philadelphia
Section 1983 provides a remedy against any person who, under color of state law, deprives another of rights protected by the Constitution. Plaintiff claims that Defendant City of Philadelphia ("City") is liable under § 1983 because Defendant City has a "practice of acquiescence regarding correctional officers using excessive force against inmates" and because it inadequately supervises its employees. Pl's Opp. at 7; see also Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21, 23, 36-39.
Plaintiff brings his claims against Defendant City under a municipal liability theory. See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-95 (1978). A city cannot be held responsible under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employee; however, when the execution of a city's policy or custom inflicts a constitutional injury, a city can be held responsible under § 1983. Id. at 694. A course of conduct is considered to be a custom when, though not authorized by law, the "practices of state officials are so permanent and well-settled as to virtually constitute law." Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990)). Custom may be established by proof of knowledge and acquiescence. Fletcher v. O'Donnell, 867 F.2d 791, 793-94 (3d Cir. 1989). In addition, plaintiff must establish that there is a "direct causal link" between the custom and the resulting deprivation of rights. Board of the County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997).
Plaintiff challenges the City's "practice of acquiescence regarding correctional officers using excessive force against inmates." Pl's Opp. at 7. Plaintiff contends that Defendant City "had knowledge of correctional officers repeatedly using force against inmates, and nothing was done to prevent it." Id. The only evidentiary support that plaintiff presents for these allegations is the testimony of Defendant Brown. See Pl's Opp. at 7-8. Defendant Brown testified that, prior to the incident on July 29, 2003, he had used force on more than ten inmates; however, when asked whether he had used force on more than twenty inmates, he responded, "Couldn't tell you." Pl's Mot., Ex D, Brown Depo. at 13. Defendant Brown testified that he had never been the subject of an internal investigation regarding his use of force. Id. at 15-16. While Defendant Brown submitted a report about the incident with plaintiff to Defendant Talmadge, he never discussed the report with Defendant Talmadge. Id. at 68.
Plaintiff argues that the fact that Defendant Brown was not investigated or questioned regarding this incident demonstrates that Defendant City had a "widespread pattern of deliberate indifference toward excessive force." Pl's Opp. at 8. Proof of a single incident is insufficient to impose liability under Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy. See Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985). Plaintiff contends that the fact that Defendant Brown has never been investigated even though he has used force on at least ten inmates demonstrates that Defendant City had a policy of "deliberate indifference toward excessive force." Pl's Opp. at 7-8. However, plaintiff has not provided any evidence that the prior incidents where Defendant Brown used force should have been investigated. Based on the evidence presented by plaintiff, no reasonable jury could find that Defendant City has a "widespread pattern of deliberate indifference toward excessive force."
In addition, plaintiff "challenges the City's inadequacy in properly supervising [its] employees." Pl's Opp. at 7. Plaintiff's allegation that Defendant City has a policy or custom of inadequately supervising its employees has virtually no evidentiary support in the record. Defendant Brown's testimony that he did not discuss the incident with Defendant Talmadge and that he was not the subject of an internal investigation regarding his use of force does not provide sufficient proof of a custom or policy to satisfy the dictates of § 1983. See Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 637 (3d Cir. 1995). Based on the record presented by plaintiff, a reasonable jury could not find that Defendant City has a policy or custom of inadequate supervision which rises to the level of deliberate indifference required for § 1983 liability. See id. As a result, the moving defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to the § 1983 claims against Defendant City.
B. State Law Claims Against Defendant City of Philadelphia
C. Section 1983 Claims Against Defendant Quartlebaum and Defendant Talmadge
Jones v. City of Philadelphia890 A.2d 1188See Jones890 A.2d at 1216 See42 U.S.C. § 1983Kaucher v. County of Bucks 455 F.3d 418 See Baker v. McCollan443 U.S. 137140See Id Id
Defendant City also argues that its liability is limited by the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act. 42 U.S.C. § 8541 et seq. Defs' Memo. at 11-12. Plaintiff admits "the City's arguments regarding the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act." Pl's Opp. at 12 n. 1.
The parties do not dispute that the defendants were acting under color of state law.
Count II also alleges that Defendant Correction Officers "arbitrarily and unnecessarily beat and terroriz[ed] Plaintiff in violation of his right to equal protection under the law." Second Am. Compl. ¶ 35. Plaintiff has not argued that he can sustain an equal protection claim against Defendants Talmadge and Quartlebaum. See Pl's Opp. at 8-11.
1. Defendant Quartlebaum
For a convicted inmate, the Eighth Amendment serves as the primary source of substantive protection in cases where an inmates challenges a prison official's use of force as excessive.Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986)). In an excessive force claim, the central question is "whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Id. (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)). In the instant matter, plaintiff alleges that he was the victim of an unprovoked and unjustified beating by Defendants Brown and Saez. See Welch Depo. at 14-15.
Defendant Quartlebaum argues that she is not liable under § 1983 because she had no involvement in the physical confrontation. Defs' Memo. at 13-14. A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Personal involvement can be demonstrated through "personal direction" or "actual knowledge and acquiescence." Id. According to plaintiff's testimony, Defendant Quartlebaum came on the block and told Defendant Brown to "f*** [plaintiff's] white ass up and show him — teach him a lesson, because he don't understand he don't got no win around here." Welch Depo. at 14. When Defendant Brown asked plaintiff if he had a problem with Defendant Quartlebaum, plaintiff said no, then walked away mumbling. Id. After plaintiff walked about ten to fifteen feet, Defendant Brown called him back and punched him. Id. at 14-15. The physical confrontation ensued. Id. at 15. Plaintiff's testimony presents affirmative evidence that Defendant Quartlebaum directed Defendant Brown to assault plaintiff. If plaintiff's version of the facts is accepted as true, a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant Quartlebaum's direction to Defendant Brown constituted "personal involvement" in the physical confrontation. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207; see also Baker v. Monroe Township, 50 F.3d 1186, 1190 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that defendant can be personally liable under § 1983 if he directed others to violate plaintiff's rights). As a result, Defendant Quartlebaum's motion for summary judgment is denied.
Defendant Quartlebaum testified that she was in the control booth, not on the block, during the "scuffle." Pl's Mot., Ex. F, Quartlebaum Depo. at 22.
Plaintiff also claims that Defendant Quartlebaum "infringed on his religious rights." Pl's Opp. at 11. This claim will be addressed in Section III.D. Neither plaintiff nor Defendant Quartlebaum addressed plaintiff's failure to intervene claim, Count II.
2. Defendant Talmadge
Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Talmadge took part in the beating; rather, plaintiff claims that Defendant Talmadge witnessed the beating, but failed to intervene. Pl's Opp. at 8-9. If an officer "fails or refuses to intervene when a constitutional violation such as an unprovoked beating takes place in his presence, the officer is directly liable under Section 1983." Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Byrd v. Clark, 783 F.2d 1002, 1007 (11th Cir. 1986)). However, an officer is only liable if there is a realistic and reasonable opportunity to intervene. Id. at 651.
Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Talmadge fall under Count II in the Second Amended Complaint. See Pl's Opp. at 8-10 (alleging Defendant Talmadge failed to protect him). Since plaintiff has not presented any evidence that would support an excessive force claim against Defendant Talmadge, Defendant Talmadge's motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to Count I.
In the instant matter, Defendant Talmadge testified that she did not arrive at the scene until after the physical confrontation was over. Pl's Mot., Ex. E, Talmadge Depo. at 39; see also Pl's Opp. at 8-9; Defs' Memo. at 14. When she arrived, she "immediately walked over and handcuffed the inmate." Talmadge Depo. at 39. Defendant Saez testified that Defendant Talmadge came onto the pod after "not even a few seconds . . . a couple of minutes, maybe." Pl's Mot., Ex. C, Saez Depo. at 51. She testified that when Defendant Talmadge came onto the pod, plaintiff was "still resisting, and [Defendant Talmadge] handcuffed him." Id. Plaintiff testified that Defendant Miller handcuffed him when he was on the ground, and when he was picked up, he heard Defendant Talmadge tell him that he should have kept his mouth shut. Welch Depo. at 20-21. Plaintiff had not seen Defendant Talmadge before that point. See Pl's Opp. at 9. Based on the testimony presented, there is absolutely no evidence that Defendant Talmadge witnessed the attack and failed to intervene. Rather, the testimony indicates that Defendant Talmadge either assisted with handcuffing plaintiff or was present when plaintiff was handcuffed after the altercation. There is no evidence that she arrived earlier and had an opportunity to intervene, but did not.
Plaintiff also claims that Defendant Talmadge failed to protect him through "her failure to adequately deal with Plaintiff's complaints and his problems with C.O. Quartlebaum." Pl's Opp. at 9-10. In order to succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim of failure to protect, a plaintiff must prove deliberate indifference on the part of the prison officials. Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 131 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). Under this standard, a prison official cannot be held liable unless the official "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety." Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
Plaintiff testified that he had prior problems with Defendant Quartlebaum. Welch Depo. at 28, 29. When asked what kind of problems he had, plaintiff stated that "she always had something smart to say to me." Id. at 29. For instance, she told plaintiff that he "asked too many questions" and that he needed "to learn to be like other inmates and go watch TV." Id. In addition, plaintiff had "seen her pay other inmates to beat another inmate up." Id. at 30. Plaintiff asked his parents to tell Defendant Talmadge that he was worried about his situation and that he would be willing to enter protective custody, if necessary. Id. at 34. When plaintiff spoke to his mother on July 29, 2003, she told him that Defendant Talmadge had agreed to look into the matter. Id. Later on July 29, 2003, before the assault occurred, Defendant Talmadge called plaintiff to her office and asked him about his problems with Defendant Quartlebaum. Id. at 21, 34. Defendant Talmadge told plaintiff that she was "going to look into the problems" and talk to Defendant Quartlebaum. Id. at 32.
To survive summary judgment, plaintiff must provide evidence from which it can be inferred that there was an "excessive risk" to his safety that Defendant Talmadge knew of, but disregarded. An excessive risk is an "objectively intolerable risk of harm."Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d at 132 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 846). Based on the evidence summarized above, no reasonable jury could find that an "objectively intolerable risk of harm" existed. Defendant Quartlebaum's "smart comments" to plaintiff do not create an objectively intolerable risk of harm. Although Defendant Quartlebaum had paid inmates to beat another inmate up, there is no evidence that plaintiff was in danger of a similar attack. While plaintiff had sought Defendant Talmadge's assistance, there is no evidence that he articulated any information that would have led Defendant Talmadge to believe that plaintiff was being exposed to an "objectively intolerable risk of harm." See Jones v. Beard, 145 Fed. Appx. 743, 746 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that plaintiff did not articulate specific threats of harm).
Plaintiff stated that Defendant Quartlebaum threatened him, i.e. she told him that he would not learn until he got "f***ed up." Pl's Opp. at 9 (citing Welch Depo. at 14). However, according to plaintiff's testimony, this statement was made moments before the assault occurred. See Welch Depo. at 14. There is no evidence that Defendant Talmadge knew of the threat.
Since plaintiff has not provided sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Defendant Talmadge knew of an excessive risk of harm to plaintiff or that Defendant Talmadge witnessed the attack and failed to intervene, this Court grants the moving defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to the § 1983 claims against Defendant Talmadge.
D. Religious Freedom Restoration Act Claim
Plaintiff claims that his right to freely exercise his religious beliefs has been impaired in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq. See Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 54-56. The Supreme Court held that the RFRA was unconstitutional as it applies to the states and their subdivisions because it exceeded Congress' powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Therefore, the RFRA does not apply to the states or state actors. However, in response to City of Boerne, Congress enacted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et seq. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 715 (2005). The RLUIPA applies to the states. See id. at 712-26. Since plaintiff's claim involves the City of Philadelphia and the employees of a correctional facility in the Philadelphia System, plaintiff's claim should have been brought under the RLUIPA, rather than the RFRA.
The RLUIPA provides, in pertinent part, that "no [state or local] government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution," unless the government shows that the burden furthers "a compelling government interest" and does so by "the least restrictive means." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a); see also Cutter, 544 U.S. at 715. Initially, plaintiff bears the burden of providing evidence to demonstrate a prima facie claim that the government practice complained of substantially burdens his exercise of religion. See Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b)). A substantial burden is one that "necessarily bears direct, primary and fundamental responsibility for rendering religious exercise . . . effectively impracticable." Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism v. City of Long Branch, 100 Fed. Appx. 70, 77 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting C.L.U.B. v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003)). In the instant matter, plaintiff is unable to meet his initial burden. Plaintiff argues that, on one occasion, Defendant Quartlebaum did not allow him to attend bible study, even though he was the first inmate to sign up on the bible study list. Pl's Opp. at 11-12. The inability to attend bible study on one occasion does not constitute a substantial burden on plaintiff's exercise of his religion. Therefore, defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to plaintiff's RLUIPA claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, this Court grants in part and denies in part the moving defendants' motion for summary judgment. Specifically, this Court grants the moving defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to the § 1983 claims and the claims arising under the Pennsylvania Constitution against Defendant City, the § 1983 claims against Defendant Talmadge, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act claims. An appropriate order follows.