Opinion
Owner of copyrights for porcelain figurines brought copyright infringement action against resaler of figurines and two of its corporate officers. Importer and distributor which allegedly owned United States trademark rights and registration for figurines filed suit against same defendants claiming trademark violations. Cases were consolidated. Defendants counterclaimed for unlawful restriction of trade. On defendant's motion to compel discovery, the District Court, Shira A. Scheindlin, United States Magistrate, held that: (1) communications between three corporations named as codefendants and coconspirators in antitrust counterclaim for privileged under " common defense" rule and " community of interest" rule, and (2) work-product privilege regarding patent prosecutions applied only to those documents which exhibited and attorney's concern with possible future litigation.
So ordered.
David Brown, Garden City, N.Y., Frederick G. Michaud, Jr., Eric H. Weisblatt, Burns, Doane, Swecker & Mathis, Alexandria, Va., for defendant Edward Work, et al. and for counterclaim plaintiff Karen-Leslie Co., Inc.
Anthony F. LoCicero, Amster, Rothstein & Engelberg, New York City, Bernard R. Gans, Poms, Smith, Lande & Rose, Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff Weil Ceramics and for counterclaim defendants Disenos Artisticos E Industriales, S.A.
SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN, United States Magistrate.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Lladro S.A. is a Spanish corporation, which manufactures porcelain products, including porcelain figurines. The figurines are manufactured in accordance with designs prepared by Disenos Artisticos E Industriales S.A. (" DAISA" ), another Spanish corporation. DAISA owns copyrights, both U.S. and foreign, on many of the Lladro figurines. Weil Ceramic & Glass, Inc. (" Weil" ), a New Jersey corporation, imports and distributes these figurines in the United States and allegedly owns the United States trademark rights and the registration for the Lladro trademark. These three corporations are related. Each is wholly owned by Sodigei, S.A., a Spanish corporation, which, in turn, is owned by the Lladro brothers. Karen-Leslie Co., Inc., (" Karen-Leslie" ) a New York corporation, is engaged in the acquisition and resale of hard goods, including Lladro porcelain figurines. Defendants Edward and Dolores Work are officers of Karen-Leslie.
On September 19, 1983, DAISA filed suit against Karen-Leslie, and Edward and Dolores Work, charging copyright infringement. On May 3, 1984, Weil also filed suit against the same defendants claiming trademark violations. Plaintiffs allege that defendants have violated plaintiffs' copyrights to Lladro figurines by importing these figurines into the United States from abroad for the purpose of resale, without the authority of the copyright owner. Plaintiffs similarly allege that their trademark rights are infringed by the importation of the Lladro figurines without the authority of the owner of the United States trademark. See Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 1-2. In both cases, which have now been consolidated, defendants have denied the infringement charges and have asserted a counterclaim accusing plaintiffs of violating the antitrust laws by unlawfully restricting the trade in Lladro figurines.
Four dispositive motions have already been made in this extended and taxing litigation. Plaintiffs moved under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and 56 to dismiss the antitrust counterclaim. Both motions were denied. Plaintiffs then unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment on their trademark infringement claims. Finally, defendants have moved for summary judgment on both the copyright and trademark infringement claims. The last two motions for summary judgment are awaiting decision.
A great deal of discovery has taken place by all parties during the pendency of these lawsuits. In the course of producing documents, plaintiffs DAISA and Weil have refused to produce a number of documents asserting either the attorney-client privilege and/or the attorney work product doctrine. At defendants' request, this court conducted in camera review of close to 200 documents as to which plaintiffs claim a privilege.
I have adopted the same document classification system employed by defendants, in its letter listing the documents produced, but have numbered the documents within each category.
I. Communications between Attorney and Clients
According to plaintiffs, documents in this category include " communications directly between plaintiffs, corporate clients, and their attorneys acting in their professional capacity and concern the seeking or provision of legal advice ..."
II. Communications Protected by Work-Product Privilege
As to this category of documents, plaintiffs argue that " defendant has not made any showing of substantial need and undue prejudice to justify their production...."
III. Privileged Communications of Questioned or Tangential Relevance
Plaintiffs question the relevance of these documents but do not assert that they are privileged. Rather they appear concerned that production of these documents might result in an inadvertent waiver of the privilege to other documents.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Commonality of Interest Among Plaintiffs and Counterclaim Defendants
One issue must be addressed at the outset. Many of the documents reveal correspondence between Lladro and DAISA or DAISA and Weil. Often counsel for one corporation wrote to counsel for another. In order for these communications to be privileged, there must be a " community of interest" between the parties asserting the privilege. A community of interest exists where persons or corporations have an identical legal interest with respect to the subject matter of a communication between an attorney and a client. Duplan Corporation v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F.Supp. 1146, 1172 (D.S.C.1975).
In Duplan, the court gave extensive treatment to the issue of waiver of both the attorney-client and work-product privileges in the context of sharing materials covered by these privileges among a number of separate corporations, both parties and non-parties. The situation with regard to work product material appears to be well-settled. " The sharing of information between counsel for parties having common interests does not destroy the work product privlege, during the course of the litigation." Id. at 1172 (citing Transmirra Products Corp. v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 26 F.R.D. 572, 578 (S.D.N.Y.1960).
The attorney-client privilege is a narrower privilege precisely because its protection is absolute. Any breach of confidentiality between attorney and client, with limited exceptions, constitutes a waiver. One recognized exception to this rule is the " common-defense rule" which allows counsel for co-defendants to share privileged information without fear of waiver. See United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1336 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833, 100 S.Ct. 65, 62 L.Ed.2d 43 (1979) (cases cited therein). Another exception is the " community of interest" rule which might extend to non-parties. This latter rule is limited to those situations involving either the legal duty to defend another entity or the common interest arising from a client transaction between two separate entities which are represented by the same attorney. Thus, in Duplan, one corporation which was not a party was covered by the community of interest rule because it was required to act as legal patent advisors to two of the parties. Id. at 1175. Thus, communications to or from that corporation were privileged.
Another non-party, in Duplan, the exclusive U.S. licensee under the patents in suit was not found to be party to the " community of interest" . Although one of the parties did have a duty to defend this corporation, the duty was not exercised because the corporation was not sued. Thus, communications of privileged material to that corporation constituted a waiver.
Here, communications between Lladro, DAISA and Weil are privileged both as a legal matter and a formal matter. All three of these corporations are named as co-defendants and co-conspirators in an antitrust counterclaim asserted against them by Karen-Leslie. Thus the " common-defense" rule allows a free exchange of privileged matter between these parties. Secondly, the " community of interest" rule also applies. Although Lladro is not a party-plaintiff in these consolidated actions, it is joined with DAISA and Weil, as a counterclaim-defendant in both actions. Thus, all share an identical legal interest in the outcome of the action.
Finally, as a factual matter, the three corporations among whom documents were freely exchanged, are related companies, sharing a single grandparent, SODIGEI, S.A. In United States v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 86 F.R.D. 603, 616 (D.D.C.1979), the court directed that the attorney-client protection provided for corporate clients includes, the corporation who retained an attorney, its parent, and its wholly-owned and majority-owned subsidiaries considered collectively. See also United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F.Supp. 357, 359 (D.Mass.1950). Following these authorities, this court concludes that the attorney-client privilege protects disclosures between these corporations and their attorneys.
B. Attorney-Client Privilege
1. In General
The attorney-client privilege promotes complete disclosure between attorney and client and protects confidential communications between them. 8 Wigmore Evidence § 2291 (McNaughton Rev.1961); see also Burlington Industries v. Exxon Corporation, 65 F.R.D. 26, 32 (D.Md.1974). To establish a claim of attorney-client privilege, the following conditions must be met:
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F.Supp. at 358-359.
The privilege " will not conceal everything said and done in connection with an attorney's legal representation of a client in a matter." Matter of Fischel, 557 F.2d 209, 212 (9th Cir.1977). The privilege also does not allow business affairs to be conducted in secret. Id. at 211. Rather, the attorney-client privilege is narrowly construed as an exception to the basic discovery rule which favors disclosure. The court must, on a case-by-case basis, weigh the general purpose of the privilege-to protect the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship-against the truth-seeking role of discovery.
Discovery's truth-seeking function has its roots in the fundamental principle " that the public has a claim to every man's evidence." 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2192 at 71 (McNaughton Rev.1961). Congress intended that discovery in federal courts be broad and liberal to adequately inform litigants before trial. See Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 114-115, 85 S.Ct. 234, 240-241, 13 L.Ed.2d 152 (1964). Discovery's truth-seeking functions are rarely outweighed by considerations of confidentiality or privacy. Thus, in an in camera review of documents, the party asserting the privilege bears the burden of proof. Duplan, 397 F.Supp. at 1161.
2. Patent Cases
Courts formerly did not apply the attorney-client privilege to patent cases because they viewed a lawyer's role in patent matters as solely of a business or technical nature. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F.Supp. 792, 793-794 (D.Del 1954). However, in Sperry v. State of Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 383, 83 S.Ct. 1322, 1324, 10 L.Ed.2d 428 (1963), the Supreme Court held that preparing and prosecuting patent applications involves the practice of law. Thus, cases following Sperry have held that communications between an attorney and client in patent cases may be protected. See, e.g., Status Time Corporation v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 95 F.R.D. 27, 30 (S.D.N.Y.1982); Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F.Supp. 136, 147 (D.Del.1977); Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F.Supp. 515, 519 (S.D.Cal.1963).
Courts have remained firm, however, in denying privileged status to documents that contain essentially technical or business data and are not primarily legal in nature. The party claiming the privilege must clearly show that a document renders legal advice and does not, for example, merely contain facts later disclosed in a patent or trademark application. Burlington Industries v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 39 (D.Md.1974); see also Hercules, 434 F.Supp. at 147; SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 515 (D.Conn.1976) (" legal departments are not citadels in which public, business or technical information may be placed to defeat discovery and thereby ensure confidentiality." ); Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., Inc., 54 F.R.D. 44, 47 (N.D.Cal.1971); cf. Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 638 (2d Cir.1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951, 83 S.Ct. 505, 9 L.Ed.2d 499 (1963). Therefore, communications to an attorney who is merely a conduit for information that eventually finds its way to the Patent Office or to a third party, are not privileged because they lack confidentiality. Duplan, 397 F.Supp. at 1168; Hercules, 434 F.Supp. at 143, 148; see also Jack Winter, Inc., 54 F.R.D. at 47.
C. Work Product Privilege
Plaintiffs claim that many of the withheld documents fall within the qualified privilege accorded to an attorney's work product. Developed in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947) and codified in Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(3), the work product doctrine protects an attorney's private files from disclosure to opposing counsel absent a showing of necessity or justification for disclosure by the party seeking the documents. See In Re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504, 512 (2d Cir.1979).
... a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative ... only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials....
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(3), (emphasis added).
The protection offered by Rule 26(b)(3) is limited. Work product immunity does not shield all materials prepared by a lawyer. It applies only to documents such as memoranda, preliminary drafts of documents, recorded mental impressions, opinions, or conclusions of an attorney that were prepared with an eye towards litigation. It does not apply to " [m]aterials assembled in the ordinary course of business, or pursuant to public requirements unrelated to litigation ..." or for other nonlitigation purposes. United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 542 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 944, 104 S.Ct. 1927, 80 L.Ed.2d 473 (1984) (citing Advisory Committee's notes to Rule 26(b)(3)). Furthermore, the prospect of litigation may not be so remote as to be a " mere possibility." See Burlington, 65 F.R.D. at 43; Garfinkle v. Arcata National Corporation, 64 F.R.D. 688, 690 (S.D.N.Y.1974).
To determine when the shift from ordinary business to anticipation of litigation has occurred, the court must look at the facts of each case and determine whether the attorney reasonably concluded, at the time the documents was prepared, that a substantial probability of litigation existed. See Westhemeco Ltd. v. New Hampshire Insurance Co., 82 F.R.D. 702, 708 (S.D.N.Y.1979) modified on other grounds sub nom, 484 F.Supp. 1153 (1980); Stix Products Inc. v. United Merchants and Manufacturers, Inc., 47 F.R.D. 334, 337 (S.D.N.Y.1969) (" If the prospect of litigation is identifiable because of specific claims that have already arisen, the fact that, at the time the document is prepared, litigation is still a contingency has not been held to render the privilege inapplicable." ).
Application of the work product doctrine to patent cases had been challenged on the grounds that much of the information used by patent attorneys is public, and that the patent attorney's role is mainly in the business and technical, not the legal, sphere. See Burlington, 65 F.R.D. at 35. Most recent cases concerning patents and trademarks, however, have held that documents containing an attorney's comments on technical information, legal advice, or preparation in anticipation of administrative proceedings, may be privileged under the work product doctrine. See e.g., Natta v. Zletz, 418 F.2d 633, 636-637 (7th Cir.1969); Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 691 (10th Cir.1968); In re Natta, 410 F.2d 187, 192 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom, 396 U.S. 836, 90 S.Ct. 95, 24 L.Ed.2d 87 (1969). Judge Layton, in In re Natta, 48 F.R.D. 319 (D.Del.1969), held that " documentary material relating both to ex parte applications for a patent, as well as patent interference proceedings, were subject to a claim of privilege." Id. at 321. Thus, the work product privilege does apply to ex parte patent prosecutions, but only as to those documents which exhibit an attorney's concern with possible future litigation. See Hercules, 434 F.Supp. at 151-152.
III. RULINGS
Listed below are rulings as to each document reviewed in camera. Documents classified as " not privileged" failed to meet the requirements of privilege for one of the following reasons.
(1) document is not an attorney-client communication.
(2) document is primarily concerned with technical or business information.
(3) document did not seek or give legal advice.
(4) document was not prepared in anticipation of litigation.
The plaintiff and counterclaim-defendants are required to produce the documents designated as Not Privileged (unless found to be irrelevant) within ten (10) days of such time as this order becomes final.
SO ORDERED.
GROUP A: Communications Between Attorney and Client
NUMBER
RULING
REASON
Doc. 1
PRIVILEGED
seeks legal assistance
Doc. 2
PRIVILEGED
gives legal advice
Doc. 3
PRIVILEGED
gives legal advice
Doc. 4
NOT PRIVILEGED
not attorney-client communication
Doc. 5
Spanish
Doc. 6
NOT PRIVILEGED
not attorney-client communication
Doc. 7
NOT PRIVILEGED
not attorney-client communication
Doc. 8=16
PRIVILEGED
gives legal advice
Doc. 9=17
PRIVILEGED
gives legal advice
Doc. 10
NOT PRIVILEGED
not attorney-client communication
Doc. 11
NOT PRIVILEGED
not attorney-client communication
Doc. 12
NOT PRIVILEGED
not attorney-client communication
Doc. 13
PRIVILEGED
gives legal advice
Doc. 14
NOT PRIVILEGED
not attorney-client communication
(pictures)
Doc. 15
NOT PRIVILEGED
not attorney-client communication
(catalog)
Doc. 16=8
Doc. 17=9
Doc. 18
PRIVILEGED
seeks legal advice
Doc. 19
PRIVILEGED
providing facts to attorney in order to
seek legal advice
Doc. 20
PRIVILEGED
providing facts to attorney in order to
seek legal advice
Doc. 21
PRIVILEGED
providing facts to attorney in order to
seek legal advice
Doc. 22
NOT PRIVILEGED
business advice not legal advice
Doc. 23
PRIVILEGED
gives and seeks legal advice and facts
Doc. 24
PRIVILEGED
providing facts to attorney in order to
seek legal advice
Doc. 25
NOT PRIVILEGED
transmittal letter
Doc. 26
PRIVILEGED
providing facts to attorney in order to
seek legal advice
Doc. 27
NOT PRIVILEGED
transmittal letter
Doc. 28
PRIVILEGED
providing facts to attorney in order to
seek legal advice
Doc. 29
NOT PRIVILEGED
not privileged communication
Doc. 30
PRIVILEGED
providing facts to attorney in order to
seek legal advice, seeks legal advice
Doc. 31
NOT PRIVILEGED
transmittal letter
Doc. 32
PRIVILEGED
attorney-client communication
Doc. 33
PRIVILEGED
seeks legal advice and transmits facts
Doc. 34
PRIVILEGED
seeks legal advice
Doc. 35
PRIVILEGED
seeks legal advice and transmits facts
Doc. 36
PRIVILEGED
seeks legal advice and transmits facts
Doc. 37
PRIVILEGED
seeks legal advice and transmits facts
Doc. 38
PRIVILEGED
seeks legal advice and transmits facts
Doc. 39
PRIVILEGED
seeks legal advice and transmits facts
Doc. 40
PRIVILEGED
seeks legal advice and transmits facts
Doc. 41
PRIVILEGED
seeks legal advice
Doc. 42
PRIVILEGED
providing facts to attorney in order to
seek legal advice
Doc. 43
PRIVILEGED
providing facts to attorney in order to
seek legal advice
Doc. 44
PRIVILEGED
seeks legal advice
Doc. 45
PRIVILEGED
gives legal advice
Doc. 46
PRIVILEGED
providing facts to attorney in order to
seek legal advice
Doc. 47
PRIVILEGED
seeks legal advice
Doc. 48
PRIVILEGED
gives legal advice
Doc. 49
PRIVILEGED
seeks legal advice
Doc. 50
PRIVILEGED
providing facts to attorney in order to
seek legal advice
Doc. 51
PRIVILEGED
gives legal advice
Doc. 52
PRIVILEGED
providing facts to attorney in order to
seek legal advice
Doc. 53
NOT PRIVILEGED
transmittal letter
Doc. 54
PRIVILEGED
seeks legal advice
Doc. 55
PRIVILEGED
providing facts to attorney in order to
seek legal advice
Doc. 56
PRIVILEGED
seeks legal advice
Doc. 57
PRIVILEGED
seeks legal advice
Doc. 58
PRIVILEGED
seeks legal advice
Doc. 59
PRIVILEGED
providing facts to attorney in order to
seek legal advice
Doc. 60
NOT PRIVILEGED
content
Doc. 61
NOT PRIVILEGED
content
Doc. 62
NOT PRIVILEGED
content
Doc. 63
NOT PRIVILEGED
content
Doc. 64
NOT PRIVILEGED
content
Doc. 65
NOT PRIVILEGED
content
Doc. 66
PRIVILEGED
providing facts to attorney in order to
seek legal advice
Doc. 67
PRIVILEGED
gives legal advice
Doc. 68
PRIVILEGED
gives legal advice
Doc. 69
PRIVILEGED
providing facts to attorney in order to
seek legal advice
Doc. 70
PRIVILEGED
providing facts to attorney in order to
seek legal advice
Doc. 71
NOT PRIVILEGED
content
Doc. 72
PRIVILEGED
gives legal advice
Doc. 73
PRIVILEGED
gives legal advice
Doc. 74
PRIVILEGED
providing facts to attorney in order to
seek legal advice
Doc. 75
PRIVILEGED
providing facts to attorney in order to
seek legal advice
GROUP B:
Work-Product Privilege (" WP" )
NUMBER
RULING
REASON
Doc. 1
PRIVILEGED
attorney-client seeks information in order to
provide legal advice
Doc. 2
PRIVILEGED
attorney-client WP--seeks facts, provides
facts all related to litigation
Doc. 3
PRIVILEGED
WP--discuss pending case litigation strategy
Doc. 4
PRIVILEGED
WP and attorney-client--litigation-strategy
give and receive legal advice
Doc. 5
PRIVILEGED
attorney-client, WP
Doc. 6
PRIVILEGED
WP and attorney-client--legal advice;
attorney-client and strategy
Doc. 7
PRIVILEGED
WP--litigation strategy
Doc. 8
PRIVILEGED
attorney-client and WP
Doc. 9
PRIVILEGED
attorney-client--give legal advice
Doc. 10
PRIVILEGED
WP--litigation strategy
Doc. 11
PRIVILEGED
WP--strategy
Doc. 12
PRIVILEGED
attorney-client--gives legal advice
Doc. 13
NOT PRIVILEGED
transmittal of an assignment
Doc. 14
PRIVILEGED
WP--litigation strategy
Doc. 15
PRIVILEGED
attorney-client--gives legal advice
Doc. 16
PRIVILEGED
attorney-client--gives legal advice
Doc. 17
NOT PRIVILEGED
content
Doc. 18
NOT PRIVILEGED
content, attorney seeks business information
re: filing of copyrights
Doc. 19
NOT PRIVILEGED
content, re: copyright application
Doc. 20
NOT PRIVILEGED
content, re: copyright application
Doc. 21
PRIVILEGED
attorney-client--legal advice given and
strategy
Doc. 22
NOT PRIVILEGED
transmittal
Doc. 23
PRIVILEGED
attorney-client and WP--strategy
Doc. 24
PRIVILEGED
attorney-client
Doc. 25
PRIVILEGED
attorney-client seeks information in order to
conduct litigation
Doc. 26
PRIVILEGED
attorney-client seeks information in order to
conduct litigation
Doc. 27
PRIVILEGED
WP legal strategy
Doc. 28
PRIVILEGED
WP
Doc. 29
NOT PRIVILEGED
content
Doc. 30
NOT PRIVILEGED
content
Doc. 31
NOT PRIVILEGED
not relevant
Doc. 32
NOT PRIVILEGED
not relevant
Doc. 33
NOT PRIVILEGED
not in preparation for litigation
Doc. 34
PRIVILEGED
attorney-client and WP
Doc. 35
PRIVILEGED
WP
Doc. 36
NOT PRIVILEGED
not in preparation for litigation
Doc. 37
NOT PRIVILEGED
not in preparation for litigation
Doc. 38
NOT PRIVILEGED
not in preparation for litigation
Doc. 39
PRIVILEGED
attorney-client communication
Doc. 40
PRIVILEGED
attorney-client communication
Doc. 41
PRIVILEGED
attorney-client communication
Doc. 42
PRIVILEGED
attorney-client communication
Doc. 43
NOT PRIVILEGED
not in preparation for litigation
Doc. 44
PRIVILEGED
attorney-client giving legal advice
Doc. 45
PRIVILEGED
preparation for litigation and attorney-client
Doc. 46
PRIVILEGED
WP
Doc. 47
PRIVILEGED
seeks legal advice
Doc. 48
PRIVILEGED
WP--anticipation of litigation
Doc. 49
PRIVILEGED
provides legal advice
Doc. 50
PRIVILEGED
provides legal advice
Doc. 51
NOT PRIVILEGED
transmittal
Doc. 52
NOT PRIVILEGED
not trial preparation material
Doc. 53
NOT PRIVILEGED
transmittal
Doc. 54
PRIVILEGED
gives legal advice
Doc. 55
PRIVILEGED
gives legal advice
Doc. 56
PRIVILEGED
gives legal advice
Doc. 57
PRIVILEGED
provides legal advice
Doc. 58
PRIVILEGED
provides legal advice
Doc. 59
PRIVILEGED
provides legal advice
Doc. 60 & 60A
PRIVILEGED
provides legal advice
Doc. 61
PRIVILEGED
provides legal advice
Doc. 62
PRIVILEGED
provides legal advice
Doc. 63
Who is DEYGESA?
Doc. 64
NOT PRIVILEGED
not attorney-client communication
Doc. 65
NOT PRIVILEGED
not attorney-client communication
Doc. 66
NOT PRIVILEGED
not attorney-client communication
Doc. 67
NOT PRIVILEGED
not attorney-client communication
Doc. 68
NOT PRIVILEGED
not attorney-client communication
Doc. 69
NOT PRIVILEGED
not attorney-client communication
Doc. 70
NOT PRIVILEGED
not attorney-client communication
Doc. 71
NOT PRIVILEGED
content
Doc. 72
NOT PRIVILEGED
business information re: copyrights
Doc. 73
NOT PRIVILEGED
business information, not legal advice
Doc. 74
NOT PRIVILEGED
no legal advice, irrelevant
Doc. 75
NOT PRIVILEGED
content irrelevant
Doc. 76
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice
Doc. 77
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice, irrelevant
Doc. 78
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice, irrelevant
Doc. 79
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice
Doc. 80
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice, irrelevant
Doc. 81
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice, irrelevant
Doc. 82
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice, irrelevant
Doc. 83
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice, irrelevant
Doc. 84
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice, irrelevant
Doc. 85
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice, irrelevant
Doc. 86
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice, irrelevant
Doc. 87
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice, irrelevant
Doc. 88
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice
Doc. 89
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice, irrelevant
Doc. 90
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice, irrelevant
Doc. 91
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice, irrelevant
Doc. 92
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice, irrelevant
Doc. 93
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice, irrelevant
Doc. 94
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice
Doc. 95
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice
Doc. 96
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice
Doc. 97
ILLEGIBLE
Doc. 98
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice
Doc. 99
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice
Doc. 100
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice
Doc. 101
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice
Doc. 102
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice
Doc. 103
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice
Doc. 104
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice
Doc. 105
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice
Doc. 106
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice
Doc. 107
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice
Doc. 108
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice
Doc. 109
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice
and transmittal
Doc. 110
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice
Doc. 111
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice
Doc. 112
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice
Doc. 113
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice
Doc. 114
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice, irrelevant
Doc. 115
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice, irrelevant
Doc. 116
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice
Doc. 117
NOT PRIVILEGED
does not provide legal advice
Doc. 118
NOT PRIVILEGED
neither gives nor seeks legal advice
Doc. 119
NOT PRIVILEGED
neither gives nor seeks legal advice
Doc. 120
NOT PRIVILEGED
neither gives nor seeks legal advice
Doc. 121
NOT PRIVILEGED
neither gives nor seeks legal advice
Doc. 122
NOT PRIVILEGED
not privileged advice and transmittal
Doc. 123
PRIVILEGED
provides legal advice
Doc. 124
NOT PRIVILEGED
not attorney-client communication
Doc. 125
NOT PRIVILEGED
transmittal
Doc. 126
NOT PRIVILEGED
transmittal
Doc. 127
NOT PRIVILEGED
not attorney-client communication
Doc. 128
NOT PRIVILEGED
transmittal
Doc. 129
NOT PRIVILEGED
transmittal
Doc. 130
NOT PRIVILEGED
transmittal
Doc. 131
NOT PRIVILEGED
transmittal irrelevant
Doc. 132
PRIVILEGED
seeks legal advice
Doc. 133
NOT PRIVILEGED
not attorney-client communication
Doc. 134=133
Doc. 135
NOT PRIVILEGED
not attorney-client communication
Doc. 136
NOT PRIVILEGED
not attorney-client communication
Doc. 137
NOT PRIVILEGED
not attorney-client communication
Doc. 138
NOT PRIVILEGED
not attorney-client communication
Doc. 139
NOT PRIVILEGED
invoice, irrelevant
Doc. 140
NOT PRIVILEGED
invoice, irrelevant
Doc. 141
NOT PRIVILEGED
invoice, irrelevant
Doc. 142
NOT PRIVILEGED
content, copyright applications, irrelevant,
transmittal
Doc. 143
NOT PRIVILEGED
privilege waived--cc to third party
Doc. 144
NOT PRIVILEGED
not attorney-client communication
Doc. 145
PRIVILEGED
seeks legal advice
Doc. 146
NOT PRIVILEGED
not attorney-client communication
Doc. 147
NOT PRIVILEGED
not attorney-client communication
Doc. 148
NOT PRIVILEGED
not attorney-client communication
Doc. 149
NOT PRIVILEGED
transmittal
Doc. 150
NOT PRIVILEGED
business advice not legal
151=147
Doc. 152
NOT PRIVILEGED
business advice, not legal
Doc. 153
WHO IS DEYGASA and ALBERTO RAMON?
Doc. 154
PRIVILEGED
seeks legal advice
Doc. 155
NOT PRIVILEGED
not attorney-client communication
Doc. 156
NOT PRIVILEGED
not attorney-client communication
Doc. 157
NOT PRIVILEGED
transmittal
Doc. 158
NOT PRIVILEGED
transmittal
Doc. 159
NOT PRIVILEGED
transmittal
Doc. 160
NOT PRIVILEGED
transmittal
Doc. 161
PRIVILEGED
provides information for purpose of giving
legal advice
Doc. 162
NOT PRIVILEGED
business advice, not legal and transmittal
confidential customer list?
Doc. 164
PRIVILEGED
transmit information in order to get legal
advice
Doc. 165
NOT PRIVILEGED
transmittal
Doc. 166
NOT PRIVILEGED
not attorney-client communication
Doc. 167
PRIVILEGED
provides legal advice
Doc. 168
PRIVILEGED
provides legal advice
Doc. 169
PRIVILEGED
provides legal advice
Doc. 170
PRIVILEGED
provides legal advice
Doc. 171
PRIVILEGED
transmittal, enclosure privileged provides
legal advice
GROUP D:
Late Submissions, Miscellaneous
NUMBER
RULING
REASON
Doc. 172(c)
NOT PRIVILEGED
not attorney-client communication
Doc. 173(c)
NOT PRIVILEGED
content--irrelevant
Doc. 174(c)
NOT PRIVILEGED
not attorney-client communication
Doc. 175(a)
PRIVILEGED
gives legal advice