Opinion
C. A. 21-98-MGL-SVH
06-08-2022
Eddie Washington, Plaintiff, v. York County Sheriff's Office and Sergeant Nicholas Schifferle as an employee of York County Sheriff's Office, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Shiva V. Hodges United States Magistrate Judge
A driver was stopped for failing to use headlights when required, had $66,680 seized by law enforcement during the stop, and seeks recovery of this amount in addition to other damages.
Eddie Washington (“Plaintiff”) filed this suit on January 11, 2021, against multiple individuals and groups, including York County Sheriff's Office (“YCSO”) and YCSO employee Sergeant Nicholas Schifferle (“Schifferle”). In his amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts eleven causes of action that can be divided into three groups: (1) claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his constitutional rights (first, second, fourth, sixth, and eighth causes of action), (2) claims for violations of the South Carolina Constitution (third, fifth, seventh, and ninth causes of action), and (3) state-law claims for civil conspiracy (tenth cause of action) and conversion/claim and delivery (eleventh cause of action).
Currently, Plaintiff asserts all causes of action against Schifferle and a claim for conversion against YCSO. This matter comes before the court on motion for summary judgment filed by YCSO and Schifferle (collectively “Defendants”). [ECF No. 55]. Defendants' motion for summary judgment having been fully briefed [ECF Nos. 58, 60], it is ripe for disposition.
The court has addressed (1) a motion to dismiss filed by YCSO and York County, resulting in the dismissal of York County and the dismissal of all claims against YCSO except the conversion claim and (2) a motion to dismiss filed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Alejandro Mayorkas in his official capacity, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Tae D. Johnson in his official capacity, and the Attorney General (“Federal Defendants”), resulting in the dismissal of the Federal Defendants. [See ECF Nos. 25, 33, 35, 40].
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(f) (D.S.C.), this case has been assigned to the undersigned for all pretrial proceedings. Having carefully considered the parties' submissions and the record in this case, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
I. Factual Background
On July 16, 2020, Schifferle initiated a traffic stop on I-77 in York County after witnessing Plaintiff driving in the rain while using windshield wipers but without using headlights. [ECF No. 55-2; ECF No. 55-3 at 1:58- 4:08 (Schifferle dash cam); ECF No. 55-4 at 0:00-1:23 (Schifferle dash cam); ECF No. 55-5 at 1:00-1:45 (Schifferle body cam)]. The traffic stop was initiated after Schifferle followed Plaintiff for several minutes and while Schifferle communicated via radio with others concerning Plaintiff and his vehicle. [See, e.g., ECF No. 55-3 at 0:50 (person on radio stating “the vehicle should have money in it, not sure about dope”)].
The summary of the facts above is based on evidence submitted by Defendants, taken in light most favorable to Plaintiff, where Plaintiff has submitted no evidence in support of his opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment. [See ECF No. 58].
After Schifferle spoke with the occupants of the vehicle and obtained Plaintiff's identification, an officer with the Rock Hill City Police Department (“RHPD”) arrived at the scene. [ECF No. 55-2; ECF No. 55-4 at 1:32-4:55; ECF No. 55-5 at 1:56]. The RHPD officer noted extreme nervousness of the passenger of the vehicle. [See ECF No. 55-2; ECF No. 55-4 at 4:55-5:30 (“passenger . . . his chest is raising a mile a minute”)]. The RHCPD officer stated to Schifferle, “[t]hey just trying to ID him, what are they trying to do, ” to which Schifferle responded, “I think they just want to try to develop a case . . . .” [ECF No. 55-5 at 5:30-5:45]. The RHCPD officer attempted to get consent for a vehicle search, but consent was denied. See Id. at 6:40.
During this time, Schifferle requested a Police K-9. [ECF No. 55-2, ECF No. 55-5 at 6:50-7:25]. Roughly 8 minutes after Plaintiff was originally pulled over, members of the York County Multi-Jurisdictional Drug Enforcement Unit (“MJDEU”) arrived at the scene. [ECF No. 55-4 at 9:09; ECF No. 55-6]. Schifferle and the RHPD officer then asked Plaintiff and the passenger to step outside of the vehicle and secured them beside the road. [ECF No. 55-4 at 11:42-12:12; ECF No. 55-5 at 11:16-12:17].
The MJDEU officer walked a Police K-9 around the vehicle, and two MJDEU officers conducted a search of the vehicle after the dog alerted. [ECF No. 55-2; ECF No. 55-4 at 12:40-38:35; ECF No. 55-5]. The MJDEU officers located $66,680 in U.S. currency in a recessed spare-tire area of the trunk. [ECF No. 55-6]. The MJDEU officers seized the currency and transferred it to Homeland Security Investigations. Id. Schifferle never had possession of the currency and did not seize it. [See ECF No. 55-4; ECF No. 55-5]. Schifferle issued Plaintiff a ticket for failing to use headlights when required and Plaintiff was released. [ECF No. 55-2]. Plaintiff thereafter pled guilty to the charge. [ECF No. 55-7].
Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that Defendants violated his federal and state constitutional rights, a permanent injunction compelling Defendants to return the currency to him, monetary damages, and attorney's fees and costs. [ECF No. 12].
The court has denied Plaintiff's claim for declaratory relief as to YCSO as it relates to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and violations of the South Carolina Constitution. [See ECF No. 33].
On August 3, 2021, Defendants served requests for admission on Plaintiff. [ECF No. 55-8]. Plaintiff did not answer within the thirty-day timeframe required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(a)(3). As discussed more below, Plaintiff therefore has admitted the following facts:
1. [Schifferle] of the [YCSO] initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle [Plaintiff was] operating on July 16, 2020.
2. [Schifferle] of the [YCSO] charged [Plaintiff] with Failing to Use Headlights When Required, in violation of South Carolina Code.
3. [Plaintiff] pled guilty of the charge made against [him] by [Schifferle].
4. [T]he charge . . . was disposed on, or about, November 24, 2020, with the entry of a finding of guilt against [Plaintiff].
5. [Schifferle] had probable cause to detain [Plaintiff] and charge [him] with Failure to Use Headlights When Required on July 16, 2020.
6. [Schifferle] did not seize any money, currency, or other property from [Plaintiff].
7. No. one from [YCSO] seized any money, currency, or other property from [Plaintiff].
8. [Plaintiff has] no evidence to support [his] contention that [Schifferle] or any other member of [YCSO] seized any money, currency, or other property from [Plaintiff].
9. [Schifferle] nor [YCSO] has possession of the money [Plaintiff alleges] was confiscated from [him].
10. [Schifferle] did not perform a search of [Plaintiff's] person and/or [his] vehicle on July 16, 2020.
11. [N]o one from [YCSO] performed any search of [Plaintiff] and/or [his] vehicle on July 16, 2020.
[ECF Nos. 55-8, 55-9].
II. Discussion
A. Standard on Summary Judgment
The court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is appropriate; if the movant carries its burden, then the burden shifts to the non-movant to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). If a movant asserts that a fact cannot be disputed, it must support that assertion either by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials;” or “showing . . . that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248.
B. Analysis
As a preliminary matter, the court addresses the parties' argument concerning the requests for admissions submitted to Plaintiff on August 3, 2021, and not answered by Plaintiff in a timely manner. [See ECF Nos. 55-8, 55-9].
Although Plaintiff did attempt to answer the requests for admission on October 26, 2021, his answers were due by September 3, 2021. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3) (“A matter is admitted unless, within 30 days after being served, the party to whom the request is directed serves on the requesting party a written answer or objection addressed to the matter and signed by the party or its attorney.”); Legette v. Rollins, C/A No. 3:20-2439-JMC-PJG, 2021 WL 4926074, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 20, 2021) (“Here, Legette failed to timely respond to Defendant Rollins's requests for admission. Therefore, they are deemed admitted under Rule 36(a)(4).”).
Plaintiff cannot cure these admissions without an order of the court allowing him to amend or withdraw the admissions. Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(b) (“A matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the court, on motion, permits the admission to be withdrawn or amended.”). Plaintiff never made such a motion.
In briefing, Plaintiff addresses this issue in full as follows:
Defendants rely heavily on requests to admit by Plaintiff. Plaintiff would present to this Court, those requests to admit do not completely encompass the issues presented in this matter. Plaintiff would further ask this Court to take into consideration the substantial delays caused by the COVID health pandemic.
[ECF No. 58 at 13].
Because Plaintiff did not seek additional time from Defendants, or the court, when responding to the requests, did not respond timely to the requests, and did not file a motion to amend or withdraw the admissions, the requests for admission are deemed admitted.
1. Claims Brought Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Plaintiff alleges Schifferle violated his Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. However, the primary thrust of Plaintiff's argument is that Schifferle, under the Fourth Amendment, did not have probable cause to search his vehicle and seize his property. As noted above, Schifferle did not search Plaintiff's car or seize his property, MJDEU officers did.
Only the Fourth Amendment is referenced in Plaintiff's opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment. [See ECF No. 58].
Turning to what Schifferle did do, the parties agree that Plaintiff was stopped for violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-4450, to which Plaintiff later pled guilty, that provides as follows:
(A) Every vehicle upon a street or highway within this State shall display lighted lamps and illuminating devices, excluding parking lights, from a half hour after sunset to a half hour before sunrise, and at any other time when windshield wipers are in use as a result of rain, sleet, or snow, or when inclement weather or environmental factors severely reduce the ability to clearly discern persons and vehicles on the street or highway at a distance of five hundred feet ahead as required in this article for different classes of vehicles, subject to exceptions with respect to parked vehicles as provided in this article; provided, however, the provisions of this section requiring use of lights in conjunction with the use of windshield wipers shall not apply to instances when windshield wipers are used intermittently in misting rain, sleet, or snow.
(B) Any person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, may be fined up to twenty-five dollars.
Here, Plaintiff does not argue-nor can he as it has been admitted- that Schifferle lacked justification for initiating the traffic stop after witnessing Plaintiff commit a traffic violation. Plaintiff does argue, however, that Schifferle had additional motivations in pulling him over. [See, e.g., ECF No. 58 at 6].
The Fourth Circuit has adopted an objective test for assessing whether a vehicle stop for a minor traffic violation was pretextual:
We utilize an objective test for assessing whether a vehicle stop for a minor traffic violation was pretextual. See United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir.1993). Under this test, “if an officer has probable cause or a reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle, there is no intrusion upon the Fourth Amendment. That is so regardless of the fact that the officer would not have made the stop but for some hunch or inarticulable suspicion of other criminal activity.” Id.
Put simply, the district court did not err in ruling that [an officer's] stop of [a plaintiff's] vehicle was constitutional, predicated on a reasonable suspicion of unlawful conduct. It was uncontroverted-and the court so found-that [the plaintiff] had crossed the double center line, a violation of Virginia law. See Va.Code Ann. § 46.2-804; see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (concluding that officer who observes traffic violation may stop vehicle without violating Fourth Amendment).United States v. Ke lam, 568 F.3d 125, 136 (4th Cir. 2009).
Here, too, Plaintiff has admitted that Schifferle had sufficient justification for initiating the traffic stop after witnessing Plaintiff commit a traffic violation. Therefore, any additional motivations Schifferle may have had in conducting the traffic stop are irrelevant.
After Schifferle stopped Plaintiff, another officer sought consent to search Plaintiff's vehicle, which was denied, and Schifferle called the Police K-9. As held by the Supreme Court:
[T]he use of a well-trained narcotics-detection dog-one that ‘does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view,' . . . -during a lawful traffic stop, generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests. In this case, the dog sniff was performed on the exterior of respondent's car while he was lawfully seized for a traffic violation. Any intrusion on respondent's privacy expectations does not rise to the level of a constitutionally cognizable infringement ..... A dog sniff conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than the location of a substance that no individual has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment.Illinois v. Caba les, 543 U.S. 405, 409-10 (2005) (citing U.S. v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)); see also, e.g., Varner v. Roane, 981 F.3d 288, 294 (4th Cir. 2020) (“Both parties acknowledge that the police can have a drug-sniffing dog circle a vehicle without individualized suspicion or a warrant.”) (citing United States v. Jeffus, 22 F.3d 554, 557 (4th Cir. 1994) (“Having the trained dog sniff the perimeter of Jeffus' vehicle, which had been lawfully stopped in a public place, did not of itself constitute a search.”)).
Thereafter, the Police K-9 alerted, and although Plaintiff argues the search that followed was unlawful in that “the erratic behavior of the canine coupled with studies showing that 92% of U.S. Currency contains traces of cocaine is not sufficient” [ECF No. 58 at 8], Plaintiff fails to offer evidence or argument in support of the position that an alerting Police K-9, as found in this instance, did not provide sufficient justification for the search of
Plaintiff's car. As stated by the Fourth Circuit:
And both parties agree that the police had probable cause to search Varner's car based on Zeke's positive alert . . . . This concession is sensible because the Supreme Court has explained that “[i]f a bona fide organization has certified a dog after testing his reliability in a controlled setting, a court can presume . . . that the dog's alert provides probable cause to search.”Varner, 981 F.3d at 294 (citing Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 246-47 (2013)); see also, e.g., Jeffus, 22 F.3d at 557 (“When the dog ‘alerted positive' for the presence of drugs, the officer was given probable cause for the search that followed.”).
Plaintiff offers no evidence or argument that the Police K-9 alert was somehow unreliable.
Plaintiff also argues that the traffic stop was extended in violation of his rights. [See ECF No. 58 at 6]. Indeed, “[a] seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission.” Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407. Here, however, Plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence or case law that the amount of time that elapsed between being pulled over and the Police K-9 alert unreasonably prolonged the time it took for Schifferle to complete the mission of issuing Plaintiff a ticket. Instead, the evidence offered by Defendants is that roughly 12 minutes elapsed from the time Plaintiff was pulled over until the time that the Police K-9 alerted, and during that time, Schifferle took actions to issue Plaintiff a ticket, including, for example, running Plaintiff's and the passenger's licenses. [See ECF No. 55-5 at 1:00-12:50]; see also, e.g., United States v. Hill, 849 F.3d 195, 198, 201 (4th Cir. 2017) (upholding as reasonable the 17 minutes that elapsed from stop to issuing warning ticket, noting “[w]e had previously upheld similar stops as reasonable where, despite multitasking, the officer continued to pursue the initial purpose for conducting the stop.”).
Although Plaintiff also takes issue with how long Schifferle followed him prior to pulling him over [ECF No. 58 at 6-7], Plaintiff cites to no authority indicating that Schifferle's actions in this regard violated Plaintiff's rights.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that Schifferle's seizure of his property violated his rights in that “Schifferle is involved from the beginning” and his “actions led to the unlawful seizure of Plaintiff's property and the deprivation of his rights.” [ECF No. 58 at 8]. Notwithstanding any involvement Schifferle may have had in the events that ended with the seizure of Plaintiff's property, Plaintiff has failed to submit any evidence substantiating a claim that Schifferle himself violated Plaintiff's rights. As explained by the Supreme Court, “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Although Plaintiff offers multiple reasons why his money should not have been seized [see ECF No. 58 at 3-6], he has offered no reason how or why Schifferle could be held responsible for the actions of other officers involved in the incident.
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's federal claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Schifferle for monetary damages.
Given the recommendation above, it is unnecessary to address Defendants' additional argument that Schifferle is entitled to qualified immunity.
2. South Carolina Constitutional Claims
Defendants argue that South Carolina has not adopted an equivalent to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and therefore there is no private right of action for money damages for alleged violations of the South Carolina Constitution. [ECF No. 55-1 at 14]. In response, Plaintiff points to no constitutional provision or enabling statue allowing for civil damages for the violations of the South Carolina Constitution he has alleged. [See ECF No. 12 ¶¶ 32-36 (excessive fines), 41-43 (due process), 49-53 (institutionally incentivize forfeiture officials), 61-67 (failure to provide judicial review or judicial authorization); see also ECF No. 58 at 10]. As this court has stated, “South Carolina does not recognize a cause of action for monetary damages for constitutional violations.” Shuler v. N. Charleston Police Dep't, C/A No. 2:19-1013-MGL-PJG, 2020 WL 1322870, at *5 n.7 (D.S.C. Mar. 19, 2020) (citing Palmer v. State, 829 S.E.2d 255, 261 (S.C. Ct. App. 2019)), report and recommendation adopted, C/A No. 2:19-1013-MGL-PJG, 2020 WL 1892216 (D.S.C. Apr. 16, 2020).
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends granting Defendants' motion to dismiss as to claims for violations of the South Carolina Constitution.
The undersigned further recommends that Plaintiff's request for declaratory relief be denied as to Defendants, where the request is grounded in Plaintiff's claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for violations of the South Carolina Constitution. [See ECF No. 12 at 13].
3. State-Law Claims
The South Carolina Tort Claims Act, SC Code Ann. § 15-78-70 et seq. (“SCTCA”), is “the exclusive remedy for any tort committed by an employee of a governmental entity.” S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-70(a). “The State, an agency, a political subdivision, and a governmental entity are liable for their torts in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, subject to the limitations upon liability and damages, and exemptions from liability and damages, contained” within the SCTCA. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-40.
Plaintiff brings claims for civil conspiracy and conversion. First, under South Carolina law, “a plaintiff asserting a civil conspiracy claim must establish (1) the combination or agreement of two or more persons, (2) to commit an unlawful act or a lawful act by unlawful means, (3) together with the commission of an overt act in furtherance of the agreement, and (4) damages proximately resulting to the plaintiff.” Paradis v. Charleston Cty. Sch. Dist., 861 S.E.2d 774, 780 (S.C. 2021) (overruling prior case law that imposed a requirement of pleading (and proving) special damages for a conspiracy claim). Plaintiff's claim is that law enforcement officers conspired to seize Plaintiff's $66,680. [See, e.g., ECF No. 58 at 9-10 (“The case at bar is a prime example of agents and officers working together to deprive individuals of their conditional rights, both state and federal, and circumvent potential issues that my be face[d] on a state level in seizing property.”)].
Plaintiff has failed to submit evidence establishing that Schifferle agreed with others, including federal agents, to unlawfully seize Plaintiff's money. Although the record, taken in light most favorable to Plaintiff, indicates Schifferle was working with others to detain Plaintiff, there is no evidence in record that Plaintiff's detention was unlawful, as discussed above, or that Plaintiff was lawfully detained in order for law enforcement officers to unlawfully seize Plaintiff's money.
Although Plaintiff argues that his money was unlawfully seized, in that, for example, “there was no nexus between the money and any criminal activity, ” [ECF No. 58 at 5], he has offered no evidence in support of his argument. The record currently before the court is silent as to why the money was seized, and, as such, does not support a claim that the money was seized unlawfully, much less that Defendants entered into a common design to seize the money unlawfully. See, e.g., Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F.Supp. 1004, 1012 (D.S.C. 1981) (“Plaintiff cannot recover from defendants if the agreement (if any) ‘was to do a lawful act . . . regardless of the motives of the parties.'”) (citing Evans v. Star GMC Sales & Serv., Inc., 151 S.E.2d 69, 71 (N.C. 1966); Ross v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 259 S.E.2d 814 (S.C. 1979)); see also, e.g., Cricket Cove Ventures, LLC v. Gilland, 701 S.E.2d 39, 46 (S.C. Ct. App. 2010) (“The gravamen of the tort of civil conspiracy is the damage resulting to the plaintiff from an overt act done pursuant to a common design.”) (citing Vaught v. Waites, 387 S.E.2d 91, 95 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989) (overruled on other grounds by Paradis, 861 S.E.2d at 779)).
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's conspiracy claim.
Second, under South Carolina law, a plaintiff asserting the tort of conversion must show that the defendant, without authorization, assumed and exercised the right of ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging to another to the exclusion of the plaintiff's rights. Moore v. Weinberg, 681 S.E.2d 875, 878 (S.C. 2009) (citing SSI Med. Servs., Inc. v. Cox, 392 S.E.2d 789, 792 (S.C. 1990)). The plaintiff must establish either title to or right to the possession of the personal property. Moseley v. Oswald, 656 S.E.2d 380, 382 (S.C. 2008) (citing Crane v. Citicorp Nat'l Servs., Inc., 437 S.E.2d 50, 52 (S.C. 1993)). Money may be the subject of a conversion claim if the money is capable of being identified. Moore, 681 S.E.2d at 878.
Here, as with his claim for conspiracy, Plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence in support of this claim or in response to Defendants' argument, and evidence submitted in support, that “Plaintiff's claim for conversion against Defendant Schifferle and YCSO fails as a matter of law because Defendants never assumed or exercised control over Plaintiff's property.” [ECF No. 55-1 at 16].
In response, Plaintiff only offers as follows:
Ownership of the seized property is Plaintiffs. There has been no argument adverse to this. Plaintiff had a right to possess this personal property. The Defendants' illegally detained Plaintiff's property in seizing said property. Further, Plaintiff made a demand for the return of the seized property and was denied the return. Defendant Schifferle initiated the stop, engaged in
furtherance of the unlawful acts and fully assisted in the seizure of Plaintiffs property. It would be unjust to allow Defendants to succeed on an argument that relies on a belief that ‘if I didn't touch it, I didn't do it.
[ECF No. 58 at 12-13]. Plaintiff also indicates that “the parties' version of events differs substantially, ” id. at 13, but, again, Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence. Based on evidence submitted by Defendants, taken in light most favorable to Plaintiff, there are no triable issues of fact as to Plaintiffs claim for conversion or his other claims.
Based on the above recommendation, the undersigned further recommends that Plaintiffs request for “permanent injunction compelling Defendants to return Plaintiffs property to Plaintiff be denied. [See ECF No. 12 at 13].
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment. [ECF No. 55].
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.