Opinion
3:21-CV-01032-YY
07-13-2022
WILMORE L. WASHINGTON, III, Plaintiff, v. FARMINGTON ESTATES OWNERS ASSOCIATION; NORTHWEST COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT, LLC; SARA BERG; MICHAEL ORRANTIA; KATIE PATTERSON; BRIAN HESS; and JENNIFER LAYTON, Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
YOULEE YIM YOU, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
FINDINGS
Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss (ECF 50) plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (ECF 48) for failing to state a claim under relevant sections of the federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6304(b) and 6317. Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, owned a condominium in a community governed by defendant Farmington Estates Owners Association (“HOA”) and the individual defendants who served on the association's board of directors, and managed by defendant Northwest Community Management, LLC. Plaintiff alleges that defendants racially discriminated against him by failing to respond to his complaints about violations of the community's rules and regulations in the same way they responded to white homeowners' complaints, preventing him from taking actions that could have reduced the problems he experienced with his neighbors, and using racially derogatory language in verbal exchanges regarding plaintiff's complaints. Plaintiff also alleges that defendants retaliated against him for filing this lawsuit by stripping him of his treasurer position on the association's board, restricting his access to the board's financial documents, which were relevant to plaintiff's claims of discrimination, and directing him to stop making complaints. Those factual allegations, especially considering the liberal reading required for pro se complaints, are sufficient to state claims for discrimination, hostile housing environment, and retaliation under the Fair Housing Act, and therefore defendant's motion should be denied as to those claims against the named defendants. Defendants' motion should be granted, however, to extent plaintiff's claims seek remedies against defendants not named in the present lawsuit and to the extent plaintiff seeks to recover for harms incurred by parties not currently named as plaintiffs.
I. Motion to Dismiss Standards
To state a claim for relief, a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). This standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,' ” but does demand “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citingBellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' ” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' ”Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court must accept the allegations of material fact as true and construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. ParksSch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). In addition to the allegations in the complaint, the court may consider documents that are attached to or incorporated by reference in the complaint, where the parties do not contest the authenticity of those documents, as well as matters capable of judicial notice. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005).
II. Background
The following facts are taken from the Second Amended Complaint and are, for the purposes of this motion, assumed to be true. Plaintiff bought a condominium in the Farmington Estates development in Beaverton, Oregon, in December of 2019. Sec. Am. Compl. 2, ECF 48. His family was the only African-American family in the development. Id. at 5 The development is governed by the HOA, the recorded Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (“CCRs”), and the HOA's bylaws. Id. Almost immediately after moving in, plaintiff began experiencing issues with his neighbors, whom he alleges were operating a car repair business out of their home in violation of the CCRs, which limited the condominiums to only residential use. Id. at 3. The neighbor's business was a constant annoyance: plaintiff alleges that the neighbors parked inoperable cars on the street, ran noisy tools, and caused oil, hazardous waste, and garbage to invade plaintiff's property, and the neighbors' visitors or clients blocked plaintiff's sidewalk and driveway and invaded plaintiff's yard and front entryway. Id. at 3-4.
Plaintiff repeatedly reported the neighbors to HOA board members and HOA staff, but the board and defendant Northwest Community Management, the management company hired by the HOA to manage the property, did not take any action. Id. at 4-6. Board members told plaintiff they could not do anything to resolve his complaints, and that he should either sell his property and move or contact the police. Id. at 6. Plaintiff contacted the Washington County Sheriff who in turn told plaintiff that the complaints were the HOA's responsibility. Id. at 7.
Plaintiff sought election to the HOA board and joined as a board member and treasurer in 2021. Id. at 6. Once on the board, plaintiff discovered that the HOA board and Northwest Community Management were regularly resolving problems for other white homeowners while failing to act on his complaints, which plaintiff alleges are covered by the CCRs and other relevant documents. Id. at 6-7.
In an attempt to reduce the invasions from his neighbors, plaintiff installed a fence that he alleges conformed with the relevant CCRs; when plaintiff informed the HOA board of his intention to install the fence, the board did not object. Id. at 7-8. Soon after plaintiff's neighbor complained about the fence, however, defendants required plaintiff to seek approval for the fence from the board and the board rejected his proposed fence as too tall, despite allowing other fences in the community that were taller than his. Id. at 8-9. Plaintiff then attempted to plant privacy shrubs, but again the board told him he could not have shrubs taller than two feet, even though other houses in the community had shrubs that were much taller. Id. at 9.
When plaintiff attempted to express his frustration at a February 2021 general HOA meeting, defendants did not allow him to speak. Id. at 11. In April of 2021, another neighbor, who was white, alleged that plaintiff was feeding rats instead of birds in his backyard and blamed him for a rat problem. Id. at 18-19. The board acted promptly and took steps that plaintiff had requested for his own complaints to no avail, such as calling a board meeting to address the complaint, proposing mediation between the neighbors, and inspecting plaintiff's property. Id. at 18-22. Also, later, although the timing is not entirely clear, when a white homeowner complained about “inoperable cars” in the community, as plaintiff had been doing for months, the board acted quickly to investigate the complaint and seemingly resolved the issue. Id. at 25-26. Plaintiff alleges that the white homeowner's complaint was kept anonymous, though the board did not keep his complaints anonymous, which plaintiff alleges contributed to the ongoing disputes with his neighbors. Id. at 26.
Finally, plaintiff alleges that two of the defendants used racially derogatory language against him by calling him “boy,” id. at 5-6, and suggested that other community members “belong[ed] there” and that plaintiff “should know all about complying from his background,” which was a reference to the “current climate of Police Brutality on African-American men[.]” Id. at 15.
Tensions between plaintiff and his neighbors continued to escalate: one neighbor began throwing “lynched rats” into plaintiff's backyard, and another threatened plaintiff and his family's lives and brandished a gun on plaintiff's property. Id. at 24-25. When defendants still failed to act on his complaints, plaintiff felt he “had no choice but to leave the home as quickly as possible” and find another place to live. Id. at 25.
Plaintiff filed this suit in July of 2021, accusing defendants of discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. Id. at 28-31. Plaintiff alleges that, in response to the law suit, defendants removed him as treasurer of the board without explanation and told him to “not report any issues to [the] HOA and Northwest Community Management.” Resp. 7, ECF 53; see also Sec. Am. Compl. 30, ECF 48. Apparently, defendants told plaintiff he could not be a board member and simultaneously hold the treasurer position, but plaintiff alleges that the treasurer position was given to another currently serving board member without further explanation. Sec. Am. Compl. 17, ECF 48.
III. Discussion
A. Fair Housing Act Discrimination
Plaintiff asserts claims for “discrimination,” “harassment,” and “hostile environment,” which are construed as claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). That section of the Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful to “discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). “To state a claim under § 3604(b), a plaintiff must show she was subjected to different ‘terms, conditions, or privileges because of a protected status.' ” Ohana v. Marriott, No. 2:14-cv-04274-SVW-MRW, 2016 WL 11760169, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2016) (quoting Hous. RightsCtr. v. Sterling, 404 F.Supp.2d 1179, 1192 (C.D. Cal. 2004)). The claim can be based on either a disparate treatment or disparate impact theory. Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 304 (9th Cir. 1997). To bring a disparate treatment claim, the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show (1) the plaintiff is a member of a class protected under Fair Housing Act, (2) the defendant exhibited discriminatory conduct violating the Fair Housing Act, and (3) as a result of discriminatory conduct, the plaintiff suffered a distinct and palpable injury. Ohana, 2016 WL 11760169, at *5 (citing Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999)).
A Fair Housing Act discrimination claim can be brought in relation to pre-acquisition conduct-for example, alleging that a landlord refused to rent to individuals because they belonged to one of the statute's protected classes. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). The Ninth Circuit and many other circuits have held that the Fair Housing Act also “reaches post-acquisition discrimination.” The Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 713 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Georgia State Conf. of the NAACP v. City of LaGrange, Georgia, 940 F.3d 627, 632 (11th Cir. 2019); Webb v. United States Veterans Initiative, 993 F.3d 970, 973 (D.C. Cir. 2021). Thus, the Fair Housing Act not only requires that individuals be given the opportunity to secure housing in a non-discriminatory manner, but also “guarantees their right to equal treatment once they have become residents of that housing.” Sterling, 404 F.Supp.2d at 1192.
Defendants assert that the Fair Housing Act was “passed to ensure fairness and equality in housing . . . not to become some all purpose civility code regulating conduct between neighbors.” Mot. 10, ECF 50. Defendants rely on Haynes v. Wilder Corp. of Delaware, 721 F.Supp.2d 1218 (M.D. Fla. 2010), in support. There, the plaintiff brought a Fair Housing Act claim against the owner and operator of an “RV Resort” where the plaintiff had lived for several years. Id. at 1220-21. A group of residents at the resort formed a “Neighborhood Association”, which maintained a checking account and elected board members and an officer who served as a liaison between the Neighborhood Association and the defendant-owner. Id. at 1221.
The Neighborhood Association also planned social activities for residents such as a “bingo night” and billiards tournaments in the neighborhood's community clubhouse. Id. The plaintiff sued the defendant after conflicts arose with the Neighborhood Association about the social events. The plaintiff, who is a woman, entered a “men's billiard tournament” using an alias, and although she was allowed to compete in the event for which she had already paid the registration fee, a member of the neighborhood association banned her from any future men's tournaments. Id. at 1221-22. At the neighborhood's weekly “bingo night,” the plaintiff, who also used a wheelchair, took issue with how the Neighborhood Association organized wheelchair accessible seating for the event. Id. at 1222.
The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant for several reasons, including that “neither [the plaintiff's] neighbors' excluding her nor the defendant's failure to prevent the exclusion” from bingo night and the billiard tournament “constitute[d] a refusal to ‘provide services in connection with' the rental of [the plaintiff's] dwelling.” Id. at 1226. The plaintiff still enjoyed “unfettered access to her dwelling, to the billiard room and equipment . . . and to all of the common areas” at the resort. Id.
This case is distinguishable. Plaintiff is not alleging a dispute over access to social events, nor are plaintiff's allegations directed at a volunteer board unassociated with and insulated from a homeowner's association or owner/operator of the property. Rather, plaintiff alleges that defendants, including HOA board members and employees of the community management company, failed to act on his complaints when other complaints made by white homeowners were addressed quickly. See Mehta v. Beaconridge Improvement Ass'n, 432 Fed.Appx. 614, 617 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that pro se plaintiff stated claim for discrimination under Fair Housing Act based on allegations that homeowners' association “doled out privileges and services to white homeowners, while withholding them from his family”). Plaintiff also alleges that defendants discriminated against him by unfairly enforcing rules against him regarding his proposed fence and privacy shrubs when other white homeowners were allowed to have fences or shrubs that violated the same rules. See Hill v. River Run Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 438 F.Supp.3d 1155, 1182 (D. Idaho 2020) (finding question of fact existed regarding whether homeowners' association's inconsistent application of rules regarding fence installation for residents with children and residents without children was illegal discrimination under Fair Housing Act). He also alleges that some of the defendants, one of whom was an HOA board member, directed racially derogatory insults and language at him. See Mehta, 432 Fed.Appx. at 617 (allegation that homeowners association “shouted at him in racial terms, ‘you are not moved out yet, you Indian' ” were among allegations sufficient to state a claim for discrimination under Fair Housing Act).
Thus, unlike Haynes, defendants' alleged inaction regarding plaintiff's complaints and other alleged discriminatory conduct had a more severe impact on plaintiff than simply being excluded from social events. See Haynes, 721 F.Supp.2d at 1226. Defendants' alleged refusal to treat plaintiff's complaints in the same way it treated those of white homeowners, refusal to allow plaintiff to install a fence or privacy shrubs when white homeowners were allowed to do so, use of racially disparaging remarks, and ostracization of plaintiff from the board, among other things, eventually forced plaintiff the leave the community. Plaintiff's allegations, especially considering the liberal reading that must be given to a pro se plaintiff's complaint, are sufficient to state a claim for post-acquisition discrimination under the Fair Housing Act. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that “pro se pleadings are liberally construed, particularly where civil rights claims are involved”).
Defendants downplay plaintiff's specific allegations of discrimination by characterizing the complaint as alleging a “conspiracy to discriminate.” Mot. 3, 11-13, ECF 50. While plaintiff does at times allege that defendants were “colluding” against him, e.g. Sec. Am. Compl. 8, ECF 48, the majority of plaintiff's allegations have specific factual details that are sufficient to plead a plausible claim for discrimination. Harris, 183 F.3d at 1051 (holding a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show (1) the plaintiff is a member of a class protected under Fair Housing Act, (2) the defendant exhibited discriminatory conduct violating the Fair Housing Act, and (3) as a result of discriminatory conduct, the plaintiff suffered a distinct and palpable injury). Defendants' narrow characterization of plaintiff's allegations fails to account for all of the details that plaintiff has provided and does not support dismissal.
In their Reply, defendants assert a new argument that plaintiff's claims should be dismissed against both the individual defendants and the HOA because there is no contractual privity between plaintiff and the individually named defendants. Reply 2-3, ECF 54 (citing Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 780 (7th Cir. 2004). But “a party may not raise new legal issues for the first time in its reply brief.” Ruiz v. Fernandez, 949 F.Supp.2d 1055, 1063 (E.D. Wash. 2013) (citing Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999)). Further, even if the court were to consider this argument, it would not change the outcome of this motion. Plaintiff has alleged the existence of CCRs and other written documents that would establish a contractual connection with the HOA, and has alleged that defendants were personally involved in the decisions to inconsistently enforce or not enforce those documents because of his race (not to mention that two of the defendants allegedly made racially discriminatory remarks to plaintiff). That is all that is required for plaintiff's claims to survive defendants' motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hernandez v. Golf Course Ests. Home Owners Assn, 454 F.Supp.3d 1029, 1039 (D. Or. 2020) (noting that while the “Ninth Circuit has not yet ruled on whether an individual defendant can be held liable for violating the [Fair Housing Act] . . . ., several district courts within our circuit have imposed individual liability” and collecting cases).
In another new argument, defendants rely on the Seventh Circuit's decision in Bloch for the proposition that plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed for “not provid[ing] the documents or quot[ing] any applicable provision” of the HOA's rules or covenants. Reply 4, ECF 54 (citing Bloch, 587 F.3d at 780). Importantly, however, the court in Bloch was reviewing the district court's grant of summary judgment, which requires an analysis of the evidence in the record. Bloch, 587 F.3d at 772. Here, the court's task is simply to assess the facts as alleged in the complaint and analyze whether, if those facts are taken as true, plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Egbukichi v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, No. 3:15-CV-2033-SI, 2017 WL 1199737, at *6 (D. Or. Mar. 29, 2017) (noting that the Ninth Circuit's “threshold for pleading discrimination claims under the [Fair Housing Act] is low”) (quoting McGary v.City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1262 (9th Cir. 2004)). As explained above, plaintiff has done so here.
Finally, defendants make a passing reference to plaintiff's “hostile environment” claim. Mot. 3 n.1, ECF 50; see also Sec. Am. Compl. 29-30, ECF 48. Defendants do not, however, offer any specific argument as to why plaintiff's hostile environment claim should be dismissed. Mot 3 n.1, ECF 50. Instead, defendants seem to be attacking the hostile environment claim on the same basis they attack plaintiff's discrimination claims. Id. For the reasons that defendants' motion fails as to plaintiff's discrimination claim, it fails as to the hostile environment claim, at least at this stage in the litigation. See Hicks v. Makaha Valley Plantation Homeowners Ass'n, No. CIV. 14-00254 HG-BMK, 2015 WL 4041531, at *12 (D. Haw. June 30, 2015) (stating elements of hostile environment claim: (1) the plaintiff was subject to unwelcome harassment based on race, (2) the harassment was sufficiently severe to deprive right to enjoy the plaintiff's home, and (3) HOA knew or should have known of the harassment in question and failed to take prompt remedial action).
In sum, plaintiff alleges that board members directed racist insults at him, ignored his complaints while acting on white homeowners' complaints, including one that targeted him and led to an inspection of his property, and unfairly prevented him from taking actions to lessen the conflicts with his neighbors. That is sufficient to state a section 3604(b) claim. Edwards v. MarinPark, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1061 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that plaintiff need not “adduce a prima facie claim in the complaint itself-before discovery, often necessary to uncover a trail of evidence regarding the defendants' intent in undertaking allegedly discriminatory action, has taken place”); see also Egbukichi, 2017 WL 1199737, at *6.
B. Fair Housing Act Retaliation
Plaintiff also brings a “retaliation” and “retaliatory harassment” claim, which is construed as a claim arising under 42 U.S.C. § 3617. Sec. Am. Compl. 30-31, ECF 48. Section 3617 makes it unlawful “to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by [§ 3604].” 42 U.S.C. § 3617. To state a claim for retaliation under section 3617, a plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) the plaintiff was engaged in protected activity, (2) the plaintiff suffered an adverse action, and (3) there was a causal link between the two. Brown v.City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Dean v. Jones, No. CV 09-1102-AC, 2010 WL 1873089, at *3 (D. Or. Mar. 2, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 1838962 (D. Or. Apr. 30, 2010) (citing Walker v. City of Lakewood, 272 F.3d 1114, 1128 (9th Cir. 2001)).
“Protected activity covers many types of actions but must relate to a plaintiff exercising rights granted or protected by the [Fair Housing Act].” Macon v. Proud Ground Org., No. 3:20-CV-01660-HZ, 2021 WL 3354157, at *6 (D. Or. July 30, 2021) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3617) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Examples of ‘protected activity' include advocating for fair housing rights, reporting discrimination to a public body, requesting a reasonable accommodation for a disability, or filing a complaint with a landlord or housing organization.” Id. (collecting cases).
Defendants assert that plaintiff's retaliation claim should be dismissed because (1) a retaliation claim under section 3617 cannot survive without an underlying violation of section 3604, (2) plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to shows that he engaged in protected activity, and (3) plaintiff also failed to allege defendants subjected him to an adverse action. Mot. 14-15, ECF 50.
As detailed above, plaintiff has stated a claim arising under section 3604; therefore, it is unnecessary to reach the question of whether plaintiff can bring a stand-alone claim under section 3617. See Mot. 14, ECF 50. Also, plaintiff alleges that in response to filing the present lawsuit, the board removed him from the treasurer position and “isolated [him] from information that other board members receive from the management team.” Sec. Am. Compl. 30, ECF 48. Filing a lawsuit seeking to enforce rights under the Fair Housing Act is a protected activity. See Smith-Jeter v. ArtSpace Everett Lofts Condo. Ass'n, No. C17-1857-JPD, 2018 WL 6042312, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 19, 2018), aff'd, 773 Fed.Appx. 1009 (9th Cir. 2019); Jimenez v. David YTsai, No. 5:16-CV-04434-EJD, 2017 WL 2423186, at *11 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2017).
Regarding adverse action, plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded interference. 42 U.S.C. § 3617. “Interference” under the Fair Housing Act “has been broadly applied to reach all practices which have the effect of interfering with the exercise of rights under the federal fair housing laws.” Walker, 272 F.3d at 1128. And again, plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts to plausibly allege that defendants took adverse action against him by removing him from the treasurer position he held on the homeowners' association board and preventing him from lodging further complaints in retaliation for his filing of this lawsuit. Sec. Am. Compl. 14, 16-18, ECF 48. Plaintiff's allegations include that the board spent homeowner's association money to resolve other white homeowners' complaints but failed to do so for his complaints. Id. at 15, 19. The removal of plaintiff from his position as treasurer and the refusal to discuss financial and budgeting decisions of the board with him are directly relevant to those allegations. Those facts are sufficient to state a claim for retaliation under section 3617 of the Fair Housing Act because the refusal of the board to hear plaintiff's complaints and the lack of access to the board's financial documents negatively impacted how effectively plaintiff could assert his rights as a member of the homeowners' association. See Donovan v. Woodbridge Maint. Ass'n, No. 2:14-CV-00995 JAM-EF, 2015 WL 1241020, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2015) (finding allegations that defendants' denied access to homeowners' association documents was sufficient to state a claim for Fair Housing Act retaliation).
C. Claims Involving Non-Parties
Finally, to the extent some of plaintiff's claims seek to recover for harms inflicted on others, those claims must be dismissed without prejudice. See Sec. Am. Compl. 26, ECF 48 (mentioning harm to plaintiff's “family health” and seeking relief to “make [his] family whole”); Yazdinian v. Las Virgenes Vill. Cmty. Ass'n, No. CV1107611SJOJCX, 2012 WL 13009122, at *14 (C.D. Cal. July 2, 2012) (“[P]laintiffs may not recover in this action for harms inflicted on other residents. Defendants' actions directed at other residents with children might be relevant as evidence of Defendants' motives and discriminatory animus; however, Plaintiffs cannot recover for injuries suffered by others.”). And to the extent plaintiff seeks remedies against the two neighbors with whom he had conflicts, they are not parties to this lawsuit and the court therefore cannot grant any relief against them. See Sec. Am. Compl. 32, ECF 48 (asking that “both the neighbor, one with illegal business and the one with rat problem, to be penalized monetarily along with the [defendants]”); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Rsch., Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 110 (1969) (“The consistent constitutional rule has been that a court has no power to adjudicate a personal claim or obligation unless it has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.”); Zepedav. U.S. I.N.S., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983) (“A federal court . . . may not attempt to determine the rights of persons not before the court.”).
RECOMMENDATIONS
Defendants' motion to dismiss (ECF 50) plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (ECF 48) should be granted in part and denied in part. The motion should be denied as to plaintiff's claims of discrimination and retaliation under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(b) and 3617, against the defendants named in the caption of the Second Amended Complaint. To the extent plaintiff's claims are directed at non-parties, those portions of plaintiff's claims should be dismissed without prejudice. Finally, to the extent plaintiff's claims seek to recover damages based on harms to individuals not named as plaintiffs in this lawsuit, those portions of plaintiff's claims should also be dismissed without prejudice.
SCHEDULING ORDER
These Findings and Recommendations will be referred to a district judge. Objections, if any, are due Monday, August 01, 2022. If no objections are filed, then the Findings and Recommendations will go under advisement on that date.
If objections are filed, then a response is due within 14 days after being served with a copy of the objections. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings and Recommendations will go under advisement.
NOTICE
These Findings and Recommendations are not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any Notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of a judgment.