Opinion
Civil No. 05-210 (PAM/RLE).
May 10, 2005
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. For the reasons that follow, the Motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
The parties in this case are neighbors and residents of Norman County, Minnesota. In 2001, Plaintiff Valley Tissue Culture, Inc. sued Defendants Juel and Bjorn Furuseth in Norman County District Court, File No. C6-01-208, claiming that Valley Tissue Culture had acquired property at the northern edge of the Furuseth property by adverse possession. The district court dismissed Valley Tissue Culture's adverse possession claim with prejudice, finding that the Furuseths still owned all of the land up to the boundary line described by the surveyor's legal description of the Furuseth property. In 2003, the district court amended its order to clarify that the judgment pertained only to the northern boundary of the Furuseth property, and did not affect Valley Tissue Culture's potential adverse possession claims to property on the western edge of the Furuseth property.
In May 2004, Valley Tissue Culture filed a second lawsuit against the Furuseths in Norman County District Court, File No. C7-04-121. Valley Tissue Culture claimed that it had acquired a strip of the Furuseths' land west of County Road 102 by adverse possession. The Furuseths filed a motion to dismiss on July 30, 2004, claiming that the second suit was barred by res judicata. The court denied the motion.
The Furuseths nevertheless insist that the second lawsuit violates the principle of res judicata. The Furuseths also believe that the judges who have heard their cases in state court are biased, and that their "only hope of a fair trial before a non-bias [sic] forum is in the United States District Court." (Clerk Doc. No. 12 at 8.) Therefore, on January 31, 2005, the Furuseths removed this case from state court to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. They allege that the state court proceedings violate the Fifth Amendment prohibition on double jeopardy and the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of a trial by jury. They assert that federal jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Valley Tissue Culture filed this Motion to Remand, claiming that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs have also requested an award of actual expenses, including attorney's fees and costs, under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
A defendant may remove to federal court "any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). A defendant must file his or her notice of removal within thirty days of receiving the plaintiff's initial pleading or complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). The Court must construe the removal statute narrowly and "resolve all doubts about federal jurisdiction in favor of remand." In re Bus. Men's Assurance Co. of Am., 992 F.2d 181, 183 (8th Cir. 1993).
The Court notes that the Furuseths' notice of removal was untimely, as it was filed over eight months after the Furuseths received Valley Tissue Culture's initial complaint. However, since Valley Tissue Culture did not raise this procedural defect in its Motion to Remand, the Court will not remand the case on these grounds.
The Furuseths assert that the Court has original jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Federal courts have original jurisdiction "of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In order to determine whether a claim filed in state court raises a federal question, the Court looks to the contents of the plaintiff's complaint, and not to any arguments raised by the defendants. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 229 U.S. 109, 112-13 (1936). "A federal question is raised in those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law." Peters v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 80 F.3d 257, 260 (8th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, a case filed in state court can only be removed to federal court if the plaintiff could have filed the case in federal court from the outset. Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 392.
The well-pleaded complaint rule acknowledges that the plaintiff is "master of his claim," and that a plaintiff can legitimately avoid federal jurisdiction by foregoing federal claims and remedies and basing his arguments solely on state law. Id. at 398-99. On the other hand, "a plaintiff cannot thwart the removal of a case by inadvertently, mistakenly or fraudulently concealing the federal question that would necessarily have appeared if the complaint had been well pleaded." M. Nahas Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Hot Springs, 930 F.2d 608, 612 (8th Cir. 1991). Thus, the Court must examine whether a plaintiff has cast essentially federal law claims as state law claims simply to avoid federal jurisdiction.See Stephens v. Cowles Media Co., 995 F. Supp. 974, 977-78 (D. Minn. 1998) (Tunheim, J.).
B. Furuseths' Petition for Removal
Valley Tissue Culture's sole claim against the Furuseths is one of adverse possession, which is a question of state law arising between citizens of the same state. The Constitutional arguments raised by the Furuseths are not part of Valley Tissue Culture's "well-pleaded complaint," and therefore do not constitute a basis for federal jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's claim. See Caterpillar, Inc., 482 U.S. at 399. There is no indication that Valley Tissue Culture has "artfully pleaded" its adverse possession claims so as to avoid federal jurisdiction. Since this claim between Minnesota citizens raises no issues "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States," this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case and removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 is not permitted. Therefore, Valley Tissue Culture's Motion to Remand is granted.
C. Recovery of Expenses under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)
The Court has broad discretion to either award or deny fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). See Workforce Dev., Inc. v. Corporate Benefit Servs. of Am., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 2d 854, 859 (D. Minn. 2004) (Kyle, J.). "The propriety of the defendant's removal should be the focus of a decision regarding whether to impose fees."Masepohl v. Am. Tobacco Co., 974 F. Supp. 1245, 1256 (D. Minn. 1997) (Magnuson, J.). There is no evidence that the Furuseths acted improperly in seeking removal. Furthermore, the Furuseths are pro se, and thus the Court declines to award fees and costs to Valley Tissue Culture. See, e.g., Anderson v. State of Nebraska, 530 F. Supp. 19, 22 (D. Neb. 1981) (declining to award costs and fees when remand involved a pro se plaintiff).
CONCLUSION
The Furuseths fail to demonstrate that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 is improper. Accordingly, based on all the records, files, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Valley Tissue Culture's Motion to Remand (Clerk Doc. No. 3) is GRANTED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.