Opinion
KNLCV954013217S
01-26-2016
Town of Griswold v. Pasquale Camputaro et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Filed Date January 27, 2016
RULING RE PETITIONERS' MOTIONS TO INTERVENE AND JOINT OBJECTIONS THERETO, DOC. NOS. 133.00, 137.00, 138.00 AND 139.00
Robert F. Vacchelli, Judge
This case consolidated two actions: one was an injunction action by the plaintiff, Town of Griswold, against the owners/operators of an asphalt plant located at 630 Plainfield Road in the Town of Griswold, CT; and the other was a zoning appeal by the owner/operators from certain cease and desist orders issued by the town respecting those same operations. The defendants were Pasquale Camputaro, Jr., Executor of the Estate of Pasquale Camputaro and American Industries, Inc. The case was resolved between the plaintiff and defendants (the " parties") by a stipulated judgment on August 4, 1997, as modified on November 16, 2015. Pending before the court are verified motions to intervene filed on November 23, 2015 and December 9, 2015 by the petitioners, Kathryn B. Londe and Jeffrey Ryan. The motions were filed pursuant to General Statutes § 22a-19. Doc. Nos. 133.00 and 138.00. The parties objected. Doc. Nos. 137.00 and 139.00. Following hearing, and for the following reasons, the motions to intervene are denied, and the objections thereto are sustained, because the motions were not filed timely in compliance with the statute.
The petitioners filed their verified motions to intervene pursuant to § 22a-19 of the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act (" CEPA"). That section provides as follows:
(a)(1) In any administrative, licensing or other proceeding, and in any judicial review thereof made available by law, the Attorney General, any political subdivision of the state, any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political subdivision thereof, any person, partnership, corporation, association, organization or other legal entity may intervene as a party on the filing of a verified pleading asserting that the proceeding or action for judicial review involves conduct which has, or which is reasonably likely to have, the effect of unreasonably polluting, impairing or destroying the public trust in the air, water or other natural resources of the state.
(2) The verified pleading shall contain specific factual allegations setting forth the nature of the alleged unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction of the public trust in air, water or other natural resources of the state and should be sufficient to allow the reviewing authority to determine from the verified pleading whether the intervention implicates an issue within the reviewing authority's jurisdiction. For purposes of this section, " reviewing authority" means the board, commission or other decision-making authority in any administrative, licensing or other proceeding or the court in any judicial review.
(b) In any administrative, licensing or other proceeding, the agency shall consider the alleged unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction of the public trust in the air, water or other natural resources of the state and no conduct shall be authorized or approved which does, or is reasonably likely to, have such effect as long as, considering all relevant surrounding circumstances and factors, there is a feasible and prudent alternative consistent with the reasonable requirements of the public health, safety and welfare.
General Statutes § 22a-19 (emphasis added).
This statute " makes intervention a matter of right once a verified pleading is filed complying with the statute, whether or not those allegations ultimately prove to be unfounded." Red Hill Coalition, Inc. v. Town Planning & Zoning Commission, 212 Conn. 727, 734, 563 A.2d 1347 (1989). In the instant case, the parties object to the motions to intervene on the grounds that the motions are not timely because the intervention statute only allows intervention in a pending proceeding, and, in this case, there is no proceeding pending. The court agrees.
" The principles that govern statutory construction are well established. When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply . . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered . . . When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Grady v. Somers, 294 Conn. 324, 333, 984 A.2d 684 (2009). The statute in this case, by its plain language emphasized above, applies only where there is some administrative proceeding or appeal therefrom pending. This case concluded on November 16, 2015, when the court granted the parties' motion to open and modify judgment and entered a modified stipulated judgment. See order on Doc. No. 132.00. Ipso facto, there is nothing into which the petitioners can intervene. Accordingly, the motions must be denied, and the objections sustained.
Petitioners challenge the parties' opposition to their petitions arguing that (a) the issues can only be raised by motion to dismiss, not by objection; (b) the parties unfairly manipulated the court's calendar to avoid notice to and participation by them; and (c) the case is still pending because, subsequent to the petitioner's motion, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, and the complaint must still be answered by the defendants. The court is not persuaded.
With regard to the pleading available to challenge a motion to intervene under General Statutes § 22a-19, petitioners argue that the parties cannot challenge the petition by objection; rather, such challenges can only be made in a motion to dismiss because (a) their petition is by right and, therefore, it is akin to a complaint, which is challenged by a motion--not an objection; and (b) the parties are challenging the court's jurisdiction to hear the petition, and it has been held that such a challenge ordinarily is raised by the filing of a motion to dismiss, citing Park City Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 210 Conn. 697, 702, 556 A.2d 602 (1989). The court agrees that, upon filing of verified petition that complies with General Statutes § 22a-19, petitioners become parties. See Pathways, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 259 Conn. 619, 624, 793 A.2d 222 (2002). However, where a petition fails to comply with the CEPA, the petitioner lacks standing and the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear that petition. See Berkshire-Litchfield Environmental Council, Inc. v. Esty, 162 Conn.App. 478 (2016). " Once a question of lack of jurisdiction of a court is raised . . . [it] must be disposed of no matter in what form it is presented . . . and the court must fully resolve it before proceeding further with the case." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added.) Dow & Condon, Inc. v. Brookfield Development Corp., 266 Conn. 572, 579, 833 A.2d 908 (2003). The issue can be raised by the court sua sponte. See, e.g., Cannata v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 215 Conn. 616, 618, 577 A.2d 1017 (1990). Therefore, the court can consider the issues raised by objection, and it can deny a motion to intervene when appropriate. See, e.g., Polymer Resources, Ltd. v. Keeney, 32 Conn.App. 340, 345, 629 A.2d 447 (1993).
With regard to the court calendar issue, the court is not persuaded that the parties unfairly manipulated the court's calendar to avoid notice to and participation by the petitioners. The court agrees with the petitioners that a hearing on the motion to open and modify judgment was necessary, as it was in the nature, at least in part, of a settlement of a land use appeal. General Statutes § 8-8(n); cf. Brookridge District Ass'n v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 259 Conn. 607, 618, 793 A.2d 215 (2002). Such a hearing was held in this case: on November 16, 2015, albeit it was held earlier than ordinarily permitted. Practice Book § 11-15. However, the early hearing was consented to and requested by all appearing parties and approved by the court. See Order on Doc. No. 131.00. The hearing was public, and the parties had notice and opportunity to be heard, and that is all that § 8-8(n) requires. See Dietzel v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 60 Conn.App. 153, 161, 758 A.2d 906 (2000). If the petitioners had called the parties' counsel, or the clerk's office, or looked at the court file, they would have known when the hearing was taking place. Their failure to attend or file their petition in a pending case was due to their own lack of timely action. Ordinarily, basic fairness dictates that the painstaking work by the parties and the court to settle and resolve the case should not be disrupted by intervention. Rosado v. Bridgeport Catholic Diocesan Corp., 276 Conn. 168, 229, 884 A.2d 981 (2005). There is no legal or equitable argument that persuades the court to undo the settlement in this case at this time due to the way the matter was scheduled for court action.
Finally, petitioners argue that this case is still pending because an answer has not yet been filed to the amended complaint. Again, the court is not persuaded. The case was resolved by a stipulated judgment on November 16, 2015. The case concluded on that date. " The essence of the [stipulated] judgment is that the parties to the litigation have voluntarily entered into an agreement setting their dispute or disputes at rest and that, upon this agreement, the court has entered judgment conforming to the terms of the agreement . . . [A] judgment by consent is just as conclusive as one rendered upon controverted facts." (Citation omitted.) Gillis v. Gillis, 214 Conn. 336, 339-40, 572 A.2d 323 (1990).
Having concluded that the motions to intervene cannot be granted and the petitions cannot be considered because they were not filed timely in compliance with the statute, it is unnecessary to consider the other grounds for denial of the motions advocated.
For the foregoing reasons, the motions to intervene are denied and the objections are sustained.