Opinion
EP-04-CV-0218-FM.
December 22, 2005.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On this date, the Court considered "Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment" [Rec. No. 50], "Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion fo [sic] Summary Judgment" [Rec. No. 55], and Defendants' "Objections and Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment" [Rec. No. 57] filed in the above-numbered and styled cause.
After careful review of the pleadings and applicable law, the Court is of the opinion that "Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment" [Rec. No. 50] should be GRANTED for the reasons that follow.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 5, 2004, Plaintiff Sergio Torres ("Plaintiff") commenced this action in the 168th Judicial District Court of El Paso County, Texas, as Cause No. 2004-1981. The original complaint alleged "Defendants violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights," "Defendants defamed Plaintiff by making slanderous statements," and "Defendants [sic] conduct constitutes an invasion of privacy." [Rec. No. 1]. The causes of action are alleged against Defendants Tornillo Independent School District (TISD), Paul Vranish, Rudy Barreda, Leticia Trejo, Gloria Blanco, Sylvia Guerra, and Ofelia Bosquez in their official and individual capacity. [Rec. No. 1]. Defendants TISD, Paul Vranish, and Rudy Barreda filed their original answer and affirmative defenses and removed this matter to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). [Rec. No. 1].
On July 1, 2004, Defendants TISD, Vranish, and Barreda filed "Defendants' 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted" [Rec. No. 6]. On July 12, 2004, Plaintiff filed and served a Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver on Defendants Trejo, Blanco, Guerra and Bosquez. On July 29, 2004, these Defendants agreed to waive service. Thereafter, all Defendants filed a second motion to dismiss joining the remaining Defendants in "Defendants' Second 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted" [Rec. No. 18].
On October 1, 2004, the Court entered an Order granting in part and denying in part the "Defendants' Second 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted" [Rec. No. 18]. Specifically, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's state-law tort claims against Defendants Vranish and Barreda. To allow Plaintiff every opportunity to avoid dismissal if he could cure his pleadings, the Court required Plaintiff to file a Rule 7(a) reply "setting forth with particularity, the specific allegations against all the Defendants, the facts supporting each allegation, and the reasons why this Court should not dismiss these claims against Defendants on the basis of qualified immunity." [Rec. No. 27].
On November 1, 2004, Plaintiff filed his "Second Amended Complaint and Rule 7(a) Reply" [Rec. No. 28]. "Defendants' Third 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted and Response to Plaintiff's Rule 7(a) Reply" [Rec. No. 29] was filed on November 8, 2004 and denied on February 3, 2005 by this Court's "Memorandum Opinion and Order" [Rec. No. 38]. Plaintiff Sergio Torres now brings this action against TISD and its officials: Paul Vranish, Rudy Barreda, Leticia Trejo, Gloria Blanco, Sylvia Guerra, and Ofelia Bosquez, alleging violations of Plaintiff's rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The factual allegations can be summarized as follows. Defendant TISD hired Plaintiff to serve as the Tornillo High School principal in September of 2002. The term of Plaintiff's one-year probationary contract was to run from September 30, 2002 to June 30, 2003. The Court notes that the employment contract did not contain provisions for renewal. Additionally, Plaintiff admits that neither the Board nor the Superintendent ever told him that the contract was going to be extended beyond the term set out in the contract.
In fact, the employment contract specifically stated the following: "The board may terminate the employment of employee in accordance with state and board policy at the end of the contract term set forth herein if, in the judgment of the board, the best interests of the district will be served by terminating the employment. The board's decision to terminate the employemet of an employee at the end of the contract term shall be final and may not be appealed." [Rec. No. 50, Ex. J, pgs. 70-71].
On March 31, 2003, the Board met at a duly called meeting under the Texas Open Meeting Act to consider the employment contracts of several staff members, including the Plaintiff. As allowed by the Texas Open Meetings Act, the Board entered into a closed session to deliberate the employment of these staff members. Defendants supplied ample evidence from the attendees that Plaintiff's performance problems during his term as principal were addressed in the closed door session. Specifically, Defendants produced evidence that the Plaintiff, as principal of Tornillo High School, failed to administer "benchmark testing" required under an agreement with the Texas Education Agency (TEA). In addition, Defendants produced affidavits from some of the Board members who stated they had been contacted directly by community members and were informed of discipline problems at Tornillo High School. Defendants also produced evidence of problems experienced with the Plaintiff during an employee evaluation of the Plaintiff.
In the fall of 2002, the TEA threatened to take over the District because of the District's poor performance on student assessment tests administered by the state. In late 2002, the District and the TEA came to an agreement that in exchange for not placing a Master to take over the District, an agreement was reached to reconfigure the District's schools. Additionally, the District agreed to institute a program of benchmark testing. The Board subsequently voted at a duly called meeting to approve this plan with the TEA.
Upon returning to the open session, the Board unanimously voted to terminate Plaintiff's probationary contract at the end of its term. Under District Policy, the Superintendent does not have the authority to terminate a probationary contract, as the authority rests solely with the Board. Moreover, the Superintendent is not a voting member.
Plaintiff asserts that in January of 2003, Plaintiff Informed Defendant Vranish that members of the Board were violating the Texas Open Meetings Act. Plaintiff alleges the Board subsequently terminated his employment contract in retaliation for his complaints regarding the violations. Plaintiff pleads that he was in good standing as principal at Tornillo High School when he informed Defendant Vranish of his belief that the Board was violating the Texas Open Meetings Act by holding meetings in private homes. Defendants Trejo, Blanco, Guerra, and Bosquez, as Board members, subsequently voted not to renew Plaintiff's employment contract. Plaintiff states that all of the Board members "relied heavily, or exclusively, on Paul Vranish's guidance and recommendations when making board decisions." [Rec. No. 55, pg. 5]. Plaintiff further alleges that the individuals who terminated his employment were the same individuals who were meeting in violation of the Texas Open Meetings Act. To support the allegations of the violations, Plaintiff cites as evidence that "[a]ccording to at least two disinterested witnesses, it was common knowledge in the community that certain Board Members would meet at their homes or at times other than those designated by duly posted meetings." [Rec. No. 55, pg. 5].
The Complaint also alleges the decision to terminate the Plaintiff's employment was made before the Board's meeting. To support this, Plaintiff argues that "Board Member Sally Upchurch stopped attending board meetings when it became clear to her that the Defendant Board Members had already made up their mind on matters that were supposed to be discussed in executive session." [Rec. No. 55, pg. 5]. Plaintiff further argues that "[c]ontrary to Board Member Sylvia Guerra's insistence that she never discussed school district business with her husband or her sons, there is at least one disinterested witness, Deena Acosta, who testified that Adrian Guerra, one of Ms. Guerra's sons, openly discussed that Mr. Torres would be terminated, prior to the actual meeting" and Ms. Acosta testified that "Leticiea Trejo's nephew, David Garcia, openly discussed that her aunt was going to get Plaintiff fired, prior to the actual vote taking place." [Rec. No. 55, pg.s 5-6]. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Barreda later pressured and coerced Plaintiff to submit a letter of resignation.
II. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment is appropriate where the facts and law as represented in the pleadings, affidavits and other summary judgment evidence show that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party as to any material fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 56; Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986); Innovative Database Sys. v. Morales, 990 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1993). "The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery in the record that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, but is not required to negate elements of the nonmoving party's case." Lynch Props, Inc. v. Potomac Ins. Co. of Ill., 140 F.3d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-25). If the movant fails to meet its initial burden, the motion must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant's response. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).
If the movant does meet its burden, the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Edwards v. Your Credit, Inc., 148 F.3d 427, 431 (5th Cir. 1998). A party opposing summary judgment may not rest on mere conclusory allegations or denials in its pleadings unsupported by specific facts presented in affidavits opposing the motion for summary judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); Lujan, 497 U.S. at 888; Hightower v. Texas Hosp. Ass'n, 65 F.3d 443, 447 (5th Cir. 1995).
In determining whether genuine issues of fact exist, "[f]actual controversies are construed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, but only if both parties have introduced evidence showing that a controversy exists." Lynch, 140 F.3d at 625; see also Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). However, in the absence of any proof, the Court will not assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts. Lynch, 140 F.3d at 625. A party must do more than simply show some "metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. "If the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Friou v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 948 F.2d 972, 974 (5th Cir. 1991).
III. PLAINTIFF'S SECTION 1983 CLAIM: FIRST AMENDMENT RETALIATION
Section 1983 provides a claim against anyone who, under color of state law, deprives another of his or her constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is well established that a state may not retaliate against a public employee for exercising his First Amendment right to free speech. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383 (1987); Honore v. Douglas, 833 F.2d 565, 569 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 941 (1992). In order to prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim, Plaintiff must establish that: (1) he suffered an adverse employment decision; (2) his speech involved a matter of public concern; (3) his interest in commenting on matters of public concern outweighs the Defendant's interest in promoting efficiency; and (4) his speech motivated Defendant's action. Harris v. Victoria I.S.D., 168 F.3d 216, 220 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1022 (1999).
A. Defendant Tornillo Independent School District
In Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., the Supreme Court recognized municipal liability under § 1983 where the execution of a municipal policy or custom inflicts a constitutional deprivation. 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). In recognizing municipal liability, the Court made it clear that a municipality may only be held liable when an action taken pursuant to official municipal policy or custom caused the constitutional violation. Id.; see also Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). Circuit precedent defines official policy or custom as:
The term "municipality" means a government entity below the state level. See Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 416 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting). Defendant Tornillo Independent School District is a governmental entity below the state level.
1. A policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that is officially adopted and promulgated by the municipality's lawmaking officers or by an official to whom the lawmakers have delegated policy-making authority; or
2. A persistent, widespread practice of city officials or employees, which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy. Actual or constructive knowledge of such custom must be attributable to the governing body of the municipality or to an official to whom that body had delegated policy-making authority.Johnson v. Moore, 958 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting Bennett v. City of Slidell, 735 F.2d 861, 862 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1016 (1985)). "[A] single action by a municipal official possessing final policymaking authority regarding the action in question constitutes the official policy of the municipality and . . . the determination of whether a municipal official wields final policymaking authority regarding a particular action constitutes a question of state law." Beattie v. Madison County Sch. Dist., 254 F.3d 595, 602 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court also held that a "municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor — or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
In the case at bar, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant TISD is liable because it adopted a decision, through its Board, to terminate Plaintiff's employment in retaliation for his exercise of a constitutional right. [Rec. No. 55, pg.3]. However, Plaintiff has failed to adduce sufficient evidence that the Defendant TISD retaliated against him independently; sufficient evidence demonstrating a policy or custom of Defendant TISD that permitted the alleged retaliation; or any improper motives of Superintendent Vranish that can be imputed to the Board. The facts, as Defendant has illustrated, of the instant case are very similar to the facts of Beattie v. Madison County School Dist., 254 F.3d 595 (5th Cir. 2001).
In Beattie, a school employee claimed she was fired for supporting a candidate running against the incumbent school superintendent. Id. at 599-600. In the election, the principal form whom she worked, Acton, supported the incumbent while Beattie supported the challenger. Id. Acton and Jones, the school superintendent, recommended first her transfer and later her removal from her position with the school. Id. The school board terminated her employment, citing complaints that Beattie was rude to parents, students, and teachers. Id. Beattie then sued a variety of school officials and the school district under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging the transfer was in violation of her First Amendment rights. Id. at 600-01.
The Fifth Circuit in Beattie held that "[b]ecause the board oversaw the precise action in question," not the individuals Acton and Jones, "neither the board nor the school district is liable for their actions unless their allegedly improper motives can be imputed to the board." Id. at 603. Finding that the board "had no actual knowledge of [Beattie's] campaign activities," the court held the board, and therefore the school district, was not liable. Id. at 604. The court wrote "[w]ithout a showing that the board had actual knowledge of the alleged improper basis of Jones's and Acton's recommendation, the board cannot be liable for the alleged retaliation." Id. at 604-05. Additionally, the Court held that even assuming that the board did terminate Beattie in retaliation for her campaign activities, the existence of other non-retaliatory reasons for her discharge shielded it from liability. Id.
Plaintiff attempts to distinguish our case from Beattie by arguing that Plaintiff has alleged far more than the Plaintiff in Beattie and "the individual Board Members' motivation to vote to terminate Plaintiff's employment is tied directly to their own misconduct — which is the subject of Plaintiff's protected speech." [Rec. No. 55, pg. 6]. However, the fact remains that Plaintiff cannot provide any competent summary judgment evidence that demonstrates that the Board retaliated against him or provide any competent summary judgment evidence that the District's Superintendent's alleged improper motives can be imputed to the Board. Plaintiff has not met his burden and Defendant District is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on this claim. The Court holds that Beattie is controlling on the case at bar.
The Court notes that the board members who voted to terminate Plaintiff's contract not only based their decision on the recommendation of Superintendent Vranish, but their own concerns and circumstances. Further, undisputed summary judgment evidence showed that the individual board members did not become aware Plaintiff made the allegations that form the basis of this lawsuit until May 2003 when Plaintiff was interviewed by local television stations — almost a month after the Board voted to terminate Plaintiff's contract. Thus, even assuming his allegations to be true, the allegations did not form the basis of the vote. Further, competent summary judgment evidence was produced by Defendant that the Defendant District had in place and utilized procedures and policies that prohibit retaliation based on an employee's exercise of free speech. See, e.g., [Rec. No. 50, Ex.s A-10 and A-11].
Plaintiff next argues that the Fifth Circuit's decision in Harris v. Victoria I.S.D., 168 F.3d 216 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1022 (1999) is controlling on our case. In Harris, the Fifth Circuit found a school board liable under § 1983 for approving a superintendent's recommendation to transfer the plaintiffs. However, Harris can be distinguished from our facts because the superintendent in Harris conceded that he reprimanded and transferred the plaintiffs based on their protected conduct. During the grievance procedure, the board in Harris acquired actual knowledge of the basis of the superintendent's decision to transfer these employees and the board affirmed the superintendent's decision. Our case is different than Harris because, as the Fifth Circuit pointed out in Beattie, the summary judgment evidence exhibits Defendant District did not have actual knowledge of the alleged improper bases of the alleged retaliation. See id. at 604 (holding that "[w]ithout a showing that the board had actual knowledge of the alleged improper basis of Jones's and Acton's recommendation, the board cannot be liable for the alleged retaliation."].
In this Court's previous "Memorandum Opinion and Order" [Rec. No. 38], this Court denied Defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss. In that Order, the Court thoroughly examined the Harris opinion and found that Plaintiff alleged a First Amendment violation with legal sufficiency. Today, however, the Court clearly scrutinizes the case at the summary judgment stage where dismissal is appropriate where the facts and law as represented in the pleadings, affidavits and other summary judgment evidence show that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party as to any material fact. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 56 with FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
Finally, Plaintiff has not raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether the Defendant District "rubber-stamped" Superintendant Vranish's recommendation because there is no competent summary judgment evidence that Superintendent Vranish controlled the Board. All of the summary judgment evidence suggests that the Board did not extend Plaintiff's contract based only upon the Plaintiff's poor performance as principal. See, e.g., Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 226 (5th Cir. 2000), (holding that "[i]f the employee can demonstrate that others had influence or leverage over the official decisionmaker . . . it is proper to impute their discriminatory attitudes to the formal decisionmaker.").
After careful consideration and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff, the Court is of the opinion that Plaintiff has not provided any competent summary judgment evidence that demonstrates that the Board retaliated against him or provide any competent summary judgment evidence that the District's Superintendent's alleged improper motives can be imputed to the Board. Because no genuine issue of material fact exists on this issue, the Defendant District is entitled to judgment, as a matter of law, on Plaintiff's Section 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim.
B. Individual Defendants
Defendants Vranish, Barreda, Trejo, Blanco, Guerra and Bosquez argue that because they have properly raised and are entitled to qualified immunity, these individual defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Defendants further argue that "all Plaintiff has done is present to the Court a fantastic story of conspiracy between the individual defendants in an attempt to demonstrate that Plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated." [Rec. No. 50, pg. 12]. Public officials performing discretionary functions are generally shielded from suit unless it is shown by specific allegations that the officials violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which reasonable individuals would be aware. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982); Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1431 (5th Cir. 1995). Lion Boulos v. Wilson, 834 F.2d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1987). The Fifth Circuit has recognized that "the qualified immunity standard `gives ample room for mistaken judgments' by protecting `all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'" Mangieri v. Clifton, 29 F.3d 1012, 1017 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991)).
When defendants claim qualified immunity, the court must first determine whether the plaintiffs have alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Rankin v. Klevenhagen, 5 F.3d 103, 105 (5th Cir. 1993); Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 702 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231-32 (1991)). If it is determined that the official's conduct was unconstitutional, then the court must decide whether the conduct was nonetheless "objectively reasonable." Id.; Williams, 180 F.3d at 702 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987)).
Qualified immunity is designed to avoid the "distraction of officials from their governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of able people from public service." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 816; Lion Boulos v. Wilson, 834 F.2d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1987). This limited form of immunity applies only to claims seeking "to impose individual liability upon a government officer for actions taken under color of state law." Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). Thus, if successfully established, qualified immunity requires dismissal of claims against officials in their individual capacity. See id. "If reasonable public officials could differ on the lawfulness of the defendant's actions, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity." Blackwell v. Barton, 34 F.3d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1994).
Once a defendant raises the defense of qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to plead "facts which, if true, would overcome the defense of qualified immunity." Foster v. City of Lake Jackson, 28 F.3d 425, 428 (5th Cir. 1994); Lion Boulos, 834 F.2d at 509. In cases where a defendant asserts qualified immunity, the Fifth Circuit has applied a heightened pleading standard. See Elliot v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1482 (5th Cir. 1985); Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir. 1995). In order to negate the defense, the plaintiff must plead specific facts that demonstrate that defendant "violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights." Wicks v. Mississippi State Employment Serv., 41 F.3d 991, 995 (5th Cir. 1995). These facts must be more than "bald allegations or conclusionary statements." Id. 1. Defendant Paul Vranish
Defendant first argues that "Plaintiff's allegations fail step one of the two-step Rankin analysis, because defendant Vranish maintains and the summary judgment evidence establishes that Vranish did not violate any of Plaintiff's clearly established constitutional rights." [Rec. No. 50, pg. 14]. After careful consideration, the Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff cannot overcome Defendant's qualified immunity defense, and therefore, Defendant Vranish is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
Plaintiff first argues that "this Court already ruled that Plaintiff has adequately alleged the violation of a clearly-established right. Thus, the sole issue left to address is Defendants' assertion that he individual Defendants' conduct was objectively reasonable." [Rec. No. 55, pg. 7]. As previously discussed, however, the Court notes that this is a misreading of the Court's previous order, for that Order considered the legal sufficiency of Plaintiff's pleadings under a Rule 12(b)(6) standard and not competent summary judgment proof. See [Rec. No. 38]. Plaintiff goes on to argue that Defendant Vranish's conduct was not objectively reasonable by arguing "[g]iven the unquestioning reliance that the individual Board Members placed on Defendant Vranish's recommendations and guidance, there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the level of involvement and influence which Defendant Vranish had over the decisions made by the board." [Rec. No. 55, pg. 8].
Plaintiff has failed step one of the "Rankin analysis," for the competent summary judgment evidence shows that Defendant Vranish did not violate any of Plaintiff's clearly established constitutional rights. The summary judgment evidence shows Defendant Vranish recommended Plaintiff's termination to the Board and the Board made the final decision to terminate Plaintiff's contract. Additionally, the Board considered its own separate concerns apart from Defendant Vranish's recommendations according to the summary judgment evidence.
Further, even assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff has established a violation of a clearly established federal constitutional right, the Court today finds that the Superintendents's conduct was in fact objectively reasonable. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. City of San Antonio, 139 F.3d 441, 445 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding if the defendant may invoke qualified immunity if the conduct was objectively reasonable — even if the conduct infringed upon the plaintiff's constitutional rights.). Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant Vranish knew or should have known that the action he was taking would violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Considering the summary judgment evidence regarding Plaintiff's failure to administer the benchmark testing as required by the TEA and the concerns over Plaintiff's performance, the Court finds the recommendation not to renew Plaintiff's employment objectively reasonable. Defendant Vranish is therefore entitled to qualified immunity.
Accordingly, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff, the Court is of the opinion that Plaintiff has not provided any competent summary judgment evidence that demonstrates that Plaintiff can overcome Defendant Vranish's qualified immunity. Because no genuine issue of material fact exists on this issue, the Defendant Vranish is entitled to judgment, as a matter of law, on Plaintiff's Section 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim.
2. Defendant Rudy Barreda
In addition to Plaintiff's arguments discussed in the preceding section, Plaintiff also argues that Defendant Barreda had no interest and no effort to allow Plaintiff "to succeed, and instead, were intent on facilitating his termination." [Rec. No. 55, pg. 9]. Plaintiff ultimately asserts that Defendant Barreda is not entitled to qualified immunity because he did not engage in objectively reasonable conduct.
After careful consideration, the Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff cannot overcome Defendant's qualified immunity defense, and, therefore, Defendant Barreda is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff has failed step one of the "Rankin analysis," for the competent summary judgment evidence shows that Defendant Barreda did not violate any of Plaintiff's clearly established constitutional rights. Defendant Barreda, acting as Assistant Superintendent, simply provided the Board with information about the Plaintiff's performance based on his personal observations and those of the high school staff. Additionally, competent summary judgment exhibits show that Defendant Barreda informed Plaintiff that the Board voted to terminate his probationary contract at the end of its term. Defendant Barreda did not coerce Plaintiff to resign or take any other adverse employment action against Plaintiff but offered Plaintiff this option to assist him in seeking future employment.
Further, Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant Barreda knew or should have known that the action took would violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights. The summary judgment evidence shows that the conduct of Defendant Barreda, as set forth above, was objectively reasonable.
Accordingly, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff, the Court is of the opinion that Plaintiff cannot provide any competent summary judgment evidence that demonstrates that Plaintiff can overcome Defendant Barreda's qualified immunity. Because no genuine issue of material fact exists on this issue, the Defendant Barreda is entitled to judgment, as a matter of law, on Plaintiff's Section 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim.
3. Defendants Bosquez, Guerra, Trejo, and Blanco
Plaintiff argues the summary judgment evidence provided by disinterested witnesses creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding the secrecy in which the District conducts its official business as well as the influence and control which the superintendent exercises over a majority of the board. Further, Plaintiff cites "an unusually high number of social gatherings with board members at his home or theirs, preparing taxes for at least one board member, fixing computers for board member, and generally having an un questioning devotion and reliance on Defendant Vranish's recommendations and guidance." [Rec. No. 55, pgs. 10-11]. Therefore, Plaintiff argues that the individual board member Defendants' conduct was not objectively reasonable and they are not entitled to qualified immunity.
After careful consideration, the Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff cannot overcome the Defendants' qualified immunity defense, and, therefore, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff's allegations again fail step one of the "Rankin analysis" as to Defendants Bosquez, Guerra, Trejo, and Blanco because the evidence establishes these individuals did not violate any of Plaintiff's clearly established constitutional rights. The summary judgment evidence shows six of the District's seven board members were present and voted to terminate Plaintiff's probationary contract at the end of the term at an open session on March 31, 2003. According to competent summary judgment evidence, the board voted to terminate Plaintiff's contract, not because of any complaints made to Superintendent Vranish, but because of their own concerns about the Plaintiff's performance. In fact, the summary judgment evidence shows that the individual board members did not even become aware that Plaintiff was made allegations that form the basis of this lawsuit until May 2003 — almost a month after the Board voted to terminate Plaintiff's contract.
In addition, Plaintiff has not shown that the Defendants knew or should have known that the action they were taking would violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Even assuming that Plaintiff has established a violation of a clearly established federal constitutional right, the individual members' conduct, as set forth above, was objectively reasonable.
Accordingly, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff, the Court is of the opinion that Plaintiff has not provided any competent summary judgment evidence that demonstrates that Plaintiff can overcome Defendants Bosquez, Guerra, Trejo, and Blanco's qualified immunity. Because no genuine issue of material fact exists on this issue, the Defendants are entitled to judgment, as a matter of law, on Plaintiff's Section 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
"The very mission of the summary procedure is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 736 F.2d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1984). Defendants have demonstrated that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. As such, the Court concludes that Defendant's motion for summary judgment is meritorious and should be granted.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that "Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment" [Rec. No. 50] is hereby GRANTED.