Opinion
16-CV-03579 (LDH) (SJB)
2019-09-04
Jerusha THEOBALD, Plaintiff, v. The CITY OF NEW YORK, a municipal entity, New York City Police Officer Jonathan Nika, Shield No. 4579, individually and in his official capacity, New York City Police Officers "John Doe" Nos. 1, 2, et al., in their individual and official capacities, New York City Police Officer Louis Soland, Shield No. 1678, individually and in his official capacity, New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, a municipal entity, "Joe/Joan Smith" Nos. 1, 2, et al., employees and agents of the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, in their individual and official capacities, New York City Department of Education, a governmental entity, Carmen Farina, in her official capacity as Chancellor of the New York City Department of Education, "John/Sally Roe", Nos. 1, 2, et al., agents and employees of the New York City Department of Education, in their official capacities, Defendants.
James I. Meyerson, New York, NY, for Plaintiff Daniel H. Oliner, New York City Law Department, Elissa Paulette Fudim, Corporation Counsel of The City of New York, New York, NY, for Defendants
James I. Meyerson, New York, NY, for Plaintiff
Daniel H. Oliner, New York City Law Department, Elissa Paulette Fudim, Corporation Counsel of The City of New York, New York, NY, for Defendants
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
LaSHANN DeARCY HALL,United States District Judge
Plaintiff Jerusha Theobald brings the instant action against the City of New York (the "City"); New York Police Department ("NYPD") Officers Jonathan Nika, Louis Soland, and "John Doe" Nos. 1-2; the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation ("NYC HHC"); and "Joe/Joan Smith" Nos. 1-2, employees and agents of the NYC HHC. Specifically, Plaintiff brings the following claims: false arrest, excessive force, unreasonable terms and conditions of seizure, fabrication of evidence, negligence, and respondeat superior. (See generally Am. Compl., ECF No. 22.) Defendants move for partial summary judgment on Plaintiff's false-arrest and respondeat-superior claims. (ECF No. 76.)
On August 6, 2018, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the following causes of action: racial discrimination in violation of the New York State Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment; unreasonable seizure in violation of the New York State Constitution and the Fourth Amendment; reckless disregard for medical needs in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; and Monell liability. (ECF No. 72.) On September 14, 2018, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her claim for reckless disregard to medical needs in violation of the New York State Constitution. (ECF No. 77.)
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. Facts within the parties' 56.1 statements that are not contradicted by citations to admissible evidence are deemed admitted. See Giannullo v. City of New York , 322 F.3d 139, 140 (2d Cir. 2003) ("If the opposing party ... fails to controvert a fact so set forth in the moving party's Rule 56.1 statement, that fact will be deemed admitted."). Local Civil Rule 56.1(c) provides that "[e]ach numbered paragraph in the statement of material facts set forth in the statement required to be served by the moving party will be deemed to be admitted for purposes of the motion unless specifically controverted by a correspondingly numbered paragraph in the statement required to be served by the opposing party." Further, any statements of denial within the parties' 56.1 statements that are not supported by citations to evidence in the record are also deemed admitted. Green v. Rochdale Village Social Servs., Inc. , No. 15-cv-5824, 2016 WL 4148322, at *1 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2016) ("Notwithstanding the basic principle that the facts must be construed in favor of the opponent to a summary judgment motion, Local Civil Rule 56.1 provides that unless a party responding to a statement of undisputed facts cites evidence as to those statements that she denies, the statements will be deemed admitted if they are supported by citations to evidence in the record."). In direct contravention of Local Rule 56.1, Plaintiff has failed to cite to a single piece of evidence in responding to Defendants' Statement of Material Facts. In particular, at a number of points in her response to Defendants' 56.1 Statement, Plaintiff responds: "Plaintiff contests such." (Defs.' Reply R. 56.1 Statement Material Facts Supp. Partial Summ. J. ("Defs.' Reply 56.1") ¶¶ 6, 8, 12, 24-28, ECF No. 75.) In those instances, Plaintiff does not cite to any evidence to contradict the fact at issue. The Court has provided Plaintiff with two other opportunities to revise her response 56.1 statement to comply with the Court's Individual Practices and Local Rule 56.1. The Court warned Plaintiff on two previous occasions that if she failed to comport with the Court's Individual Practices and Local Rule 56.1, the statements would be deemed admitted for purposes of the motion. (See May 23, 2018 and Aug. 1, 2018 orders.) Notwithstanding the Court's warnings, Plaintiff's third attempt suffers the same deficiencies as her previous submissions. Therefore, these facts are deemed undisputed.
Plaintiff's claims arise out of her arrest stemming from her failure to allow firefighters into her home in what firefighters described as a water emergency. Plaintiff was the tenant of Apartment 3L in a multi-floored, residential apartment building. (Defs.' R. 56.1 Statement Material Facts Supp. Partial Summ. J. ("Defs.' Reply 56.1") ¶ 1, ECF No. 75.) On April 30, 2015, Winston Roach, the building manager, observed water coming from Apartment 2L, which is the apartment directly below Plaintiff's unit. (Id. ¶¶ 3-5.) Unable to reach Plaintiff by phone, Mr. Roach went to Plaintiff's apartment, "rang the doorbell, and knocked/banged on the door." (Id. ¶¶ 6-7.) No one responded. (Id. ¶ 9.) Mr. Roach, believing the leak was "extremely dangerous" because of its close proximity to electrical lines, called 911. (Id. ¶ 10.) Mr. Roach informed the 911 operator that there was a water emergency, that he needed to get into Plaintiff's apartment, and that the "people in the above apartment refuse to open the door." (Id. ¶¶ 11-12.) Firefighters subsequently arrived on the scene. (Id. ¶ 13.)
Once firefighters arrived, they went to Apartment 2L and spoke with Mr. Roach. (Id. ¶ 14.) New York Fire Department Lieutenant Schenck determined that the water leak in Apartment 2L was coming from the kitchen ceiling. (Id. ¶ 16.) Mr. Roach told Lieutenant Schenck that he had attempted to gain access to Plaintiff's apartment but was unsuccessful. (Id. ¶ 19.) Lieutenant Schenck then knocked on Plaintiff's door repeatedly, announced that it was the fire department, but still no one answered the door. (Id. ¶ 22.) Lieutenant Schenck then ordered the fire department chauffeur to call the police. (Id. ¶ 23.) NYPD officers Nika and Soland arrived at the apartment complex and first spoke with Lieutenant Schenck and Mr. Roach. (Id. ¶ 24.) Lieutenant Schenck informed the officers that the water leak constituted an emergency situation, that he had spoken to Plaintiff through the door of her apartment, and that Plaintiff was refusing entry to her apartment. (Id. ¶¶ 24-26.) Officer Nika then went to Apartment 2L and observed water coming through the walls and leaking towards electrical sources. (Id. ¶ 28.) Officers Nika and Soland then knocked on Plaintiff's door. (Id. ¶ 30.) When Plaintiff opened the door, Officer Soland went to grab Plaintiff's arm to arrest her, but Plaintiff began to resist. (Id. ¶ 32.) Plaintiff was eventually handcuffed. (Id. ¶ 33.) After Plaintiff was secured, Lieutenant Schenck, two additional firefighters, Officer Nika, and Mr. Roach entered Plaintiff's apartment. (Id. ¶ 34.) There, Lieutenant Schenck saw water on Plaintiff's bathroom floor and determined the leak was coming from either Plaintiff's sink or toilet. (Id. ¶ 35.) Plaintiff was arrested for obstruction of governmental administration ("OGA"), disorderly conduct, and resisting arrest. (Pl.'s Counterstatement Facts & Defs.' Responses ¶ 37, ECF No. 75.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment must be granted when there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the evidence as to a fact that might affect the suit's outcome is such that a reasonable jury could find in favor of the non-movant at trial. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. At summary judgment, the movants bear the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; see also Feingold v. New York , 366 F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 2004). Once the movants meet that burden, the non-movant may defeat summary judgment only by producing evidence of specific facts that raise a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ; see also Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; Davis v. New York , 316 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2002). The Court is to view all such facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant, drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Still, to survive summary judgment, a non-movant must present concrete evidence and may not rely on mere conclusory or speculative claims or denials. Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp. , 613 F.2d 438, 445 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The litigant opposing summary judgment, therefore, ‘may not rest upon mere conclusory allegations or denials’ as a vehicle for obtaining a trial.") (quoting SEC v. Research Automation Corp. , 585 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1978) ).
DISCUSSION
"To state a claim for false arrest under New York law, a plaintiff must show that ‘(1) the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement, and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.’ " Savino v. City of New York , 331 F. 3d 63, 75 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Bernard v. United States , 25 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 1994) ). With respect to privilege, "the existence of probable cause is an absolute defense to a false arrest claim." Jaegly v. Couch , 439 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2006). "A police officer has probable cause for an arrest when he has ‘knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime.’ " Swartz v. Insogna , 704 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Weyant v. Okst , 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996) ). This includes, of course, instances where "a law enforcement official ... received his information from some person, normally the putative victim or eyewitness," Martinez v. Simonetti , 202 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted), unless the circumstances raise doubt as to the person's veracity, Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff , 63 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 1995).
"[L]iability for false arrest [under state law] also gives rise to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Savino , 331 F.3d at 75.
Defendants contend that there was probable cause for Officers Nika and Soland to arrest Plaintiff for OGA, disorderly conduct, and resisting arrest, thereby defeating Plaintiff's claim. (Mem. Law Supp. Defs.' Partial Mot. Summ. J. ("Defs.' Mot.") 5, ECF No. 76-1.) In particular, Defendants contend that Lieutenant Schenck told Officers Nika and Soland that Plaintiff was refusing the fire department entry to her apartment to address an emergency situation in violation of N.Y. Admin Code F.C. 104.11.2. (Id. ) This is confirmed by Lieutenant Schenck's testimony at deposition. (Defs.' Mot. Ex. F at 108:3-7, ECF No. 76-7.) Therefore, Officers Nika and Soland had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. See Marcavage v. City of New York , No. 05-cv-4949, 2010 WL 3910355, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010) ("An officer has probable cause to arrest for obstructing governmental administration where a person refuses to comply with an order from a police officer." (citation omitted)), aff'd , 689 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2012) ; see also Quon v. City of New York , No. 14-cv-9909, 2017 WL 1406279, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. March 27, 2017) (finding probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff for obstruction of government administration following bench trial where the fire department determined a water leak in plaintiff's apartment posed an emergency, plaintiff refused the fire department entry, and fire department informed the arresting officers that the situation posed an emergency and plaintiff was refusing to open the door).
Plaintiff seeks to defeat a finding of probable cause on the naked assertion that neither Officer Nika nor Officer Soland was informed by anyone prior to Plaintiff's arrest that she had refused the fire department entry into her apartment. (Pl.'s Mem. Opp. Defs.' Mot. Partial Summ. J. 8, ECF No. 79.) There is simply no evidence to support this assertion. Indeed, Plaintiff notes that she was asleep during the ordeal and did not wake up until she heard a radio and saw Mr. Roach, firefighters, and Officer Soland standing at her apartment door. (Id. at 3-4.) It is factually impossible for Plaintiff to have been asleep, yet personally knowledgeable of a conversation taking place outside of her apartment. Likewise, Plaintiff's contention that the officers were mistaken in their belief that Plaintiff refused the fire department's entry into the apartment cannot save Plaintiff's claim. (Id. at 7-8.) "[P]robable cause exists even where it is based upon mistaken information, so long as the arresting officer was reasonable in relying on that information." Bernard v. United States , 25 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 1994).
Furthermore, even if Officers Nika and Soland lacked probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, they would nonetheless be entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields an officer from liability under § 1983 "if (1) his conduct does not violate a clearly established constitutional right, or (2) it was ‘objectively reasonable’ for the officer to believe that his conduct did not violate a clearly established right." Hartline v. Gallo , 546 F.3d 95, 102 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Lennon v. Miller , 66 F.3d 416, 420 (2d Cir. 1995) ). In the context of a false-arrest claim, qualified immunity protects an officer if he had "arguable probable cause" to arrest the plaintiff. Myers v. Patterson , 819 F.3d 625, 632 (2d Cir. 2016). "Arguable probable cause exists if either (a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met." Id. The question then is whether it was objectively reasonable for Officers Nika and Soland to believe that Plaintiff violated the offense of OGA. Or, could reasonable officers disagree about whether Plaintiff was preventing or attempting to prevent an authorized official function by means of intimidation, force, or interference?
Under the circumstances presented here, Officers Nika and Soland were advised that the water leak posed an emergency and Plaintiff was refusing to allow them entry. Reasonable officers could disagree about whether Plaintiff's conduct was such that she was interfering in a way to prevent an authorized official function. See Lennon , 66 F.3d at 424-25 (finding that even if a rational jury could find lack of actual probable cause to arrest plaintiff for obstruction of government administration, it could not find officers' judgment so flawed that no reasonable officer would have made a similar choice); Quon , 2017 WL 1406279, at *9 (finding that reasonably competent police officers could disagree about whether probable cause existed to detain plaintiff where they were informed that plaintiff refused to open door for the fire department and the circumstances presented an exigent water leak). However, no reasonable jury could find that it was objectively unreasonable for Officers Nika and Soland to believe that there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for OGA. * * *
Additionally, Plaintiff's sixteenth cause of action seeks to hold the City liable for the individual officers' conduct under a theory of respondeat superior. Although, during a pre-motion conference held on August 1, 2018, the Court informed Plaintiff that the claim would be dismissed, Plaintiff has refused to voluntarily dismiss the claim. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has expressly held that no such claim exists against a municipality. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y. , 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) ("[A] municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory."). For this reason, Plaintiff's respondeat-superior claim is dismissed with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' partial motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Plaintiff's federal and state-law claims against Defendants for false arrest are dismissed with prejudice. As such, only Plaintiff's excessive-force (under § 1983 and New York state law), malicious-prosecution (under § 1983 and New York state law), and negligence causes of action survive summary judgment.
SO ORDERED: