Opinion
HHBCR140274864
03-11-2019
STATE of Connecticut v. Noah SNYDER
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Dewey, J.
Pursuant to Connecticut Practice Book Section § 43-22, the defendant moves to correct an illegal sentence. He has alleged that legislation enacted after his arrest and conviction eliminated the term of special parole that the trial court ordered this defendant to serve upon completion of his incarceration. For reasons stated below, the defendant’s request for relief is denied.
I. Procedural History
On June 14, 2017, the defendant was convicted, following his guilty plea, of conspiracy to commit larceny in the second degree, burglary in the third degree and failure to appear in the first degree. Connecticut General Statutes § § 53a-48, 53a-123(a)(2), 53a-103 and 53a-172, respectively. He received three years of incarceration, execution suspended followed by five years of special parole.
At the time of the defendant’s offenses, Connecticut General Statutes § 53a-28 provided that upon conviction "the court shall impose one of the following sentences ... a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole ..."
On October 24, 2018 the defendant filed an amended motion to correct an illegal sentence. He claims that a 2018 amendment to General Statutes § 53a-28; see Public Acts 2018 § 18-63, which eliminated special parole for individuals sentenced under chapter 420b of the general statutes, should apply retroactively and to his benefit. The defendant’s primary argument is that the special parole portion of his sentence violates the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution. The defendant also contends that violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the law as well as the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
Chapter 420b provides a trial court with the authority to impose specified sentences for certain specified offenses related to controlled substances.
The state filed a motion to dismiss. After reviewing the arguments presented by both the defendant and the state, this court agrees with the state and, accordingly, denies the defendant’s motion to correct.
II. Legal Analysis
Connecticut Practice Book § 43-22 provides that "The judicial authority may at any time correct an illegal sentence or other illegal disposition, or it may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner ..." A claim is cognizable in a motion to correct an illegal sentence "if it is a challenge specifically directed to the punishment imposed." State v. Evans, 329 Conn. 770, 781, 189 A.3d 1184 (2018). A sentence might be illegal in two situations: (1) "when the sentence either exceeds the relevant statutory maximum limits, violates a defendant’s right against double jeopardy, is ambiguous, or is internally contradictory" or (2) when "the sentence is within the relevant statutory limits ... but [is] imposed in a way which violates [the] defendant’s right ... to be addressed personally at sentencing and to speak in mitigation of punishment ... or his right to be sentenced by a judge relying on accurate information or considerations solely in the record, or his right that the government keep its plea agreement promises ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Casiano, 282 Conn. 614, 624, n.14, 922 A.2d 1065 (2007).
In State v. Robles, 169 Conn.App. 127, 150 A.3d 687 (2016), cert. denied, 325 Conn. 901 (2017), the Connecticut Appellate Court observed, "The Superior Court is a constitutional court of general jurisdiction. In the absence of statutory or constitutional provisions, the limits of its jurisdiction are delineated by the common law ... It is well established that under the common law a trial court has the discretionary power to modify or vacate a criminal judgment before the sentence has been executed ... This is so because the court loses jurisdiction over the case when the defendant is committed to the custody of the commissioner of correction and begins serving the sentence ... Because it is well established that the jurisdiction of the trial court terminates once a defendant has been sentenced, a trial court may no longer take any action affecting a defendant’s sentence unless it expressly has been authorized to act." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Robles, 169 Conn. at 132.
The Robles Court continued, "Connecticut courts have considered four categories of claims pursuant to [Practice Book] § 43-22. The first category has addressed whether the sentence was within the permissible range for the crimes charged ... The second category has considered violations of the prohibition against double jeopardy ... The third category has involved claims pertaining to the computation of the length of the sentence and the question of consecutive or concurrent prison time ... The fourth category has involved questions as to which sentencing statute was applicable ... [I]f a defendant’s claim falls within one of these four categories the trial court has jurisdiction to modify a sentence after it has commenced ... If the claim is not within one of these categories, then the court must dismiss the claim for a lack of jurisdiction and not consider its merits." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Robles, 169 Conn. at 133. This defendant’s claims do not fit into any of these categories.
Before turning to the defendant’s constitutional claims, this court must note that the defendant’s incarceration was not the result of a drug conviction. His offenses can be categorized as property crimes and crimes against the administration of justice. Although he relies on Public Act 18-63, there is no ambiguity in the legislation as enacted; the statute is not susceptible to more than one interpretation. Consequently there is no need to look to legislative history to ascertain legislative intent. State v. Moore, 180 Conn.App. 116, 122-3, 182 A.3d 696, cert. denied, 329 Conn. 905 (2018). Given the plain language of the statute, any attempted judicial enlargement is barred. See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353-4 (1964).
"The United States Supreme Court has recognized that, there is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence ... A state may ... establish a parole system, but it has no duty to do so. Accordingly, whether and to what extent a state creates a liberty interest in parole by state statute is entirely at the discretion of the state." (Citations omitted; internal quotations marks omitted.) Perez v. Commissioner of Correction, 326 Conn. 357, 370-71, 163 A.3d 597 (2017). In Public Act 18-63 the legislature had the authority to prohibit special parole in all cases. Instead it limited the statutory modification at issue to drug offenses. This court is bound by that limitation. "Each of the separate magistracies of our government owes to the others a duty not to trespass on the lawful domain of the others. The judiciary has a duty to test legislative action by constitutional principles, but it cannot, in that process usurp the power of the legislature." Buxton v. Ullman, 147 Conn. 48, 58, 156 A.2d 508 (1959). Since the 2018 changes in sentencing relating to parole clearly do not apply to the crimes this defendant committed, the defendant’s claims must fail. The defendant’s suggestion that his crimes were the result of a drug addiction does not change this analysis.
The defendant suggests that Public Act 18-63, unless applied to him, violates the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution.
"The ex post facto clause of the United States constitution prohibits retroactive application of a law that inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. In other words, the clause forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated, to the detriment or material disadvantage of the wrongdoer." (Citations omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.) Breton v. Commissioner of Correction, 330 Conn. 462, 470, 196 A.3d 789 (2017). "Critical to relief under the ex post facto clause is not an individual’s right to less punishment, but the lack of fair notice and governmental restraint when the legislature increases punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was consummated. Thus, even if a statute merely alters penal provisions accorded by the grace of the legislature, it violates the clause if it is both retrospective and more onerous than the law in effect on the date of the offense ..." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Breton, supra, 330 Conn. at 471. The primary focus of an ex post facto claim is the probability of increased punishment. Perez v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 326 Conn. at 366. Here the defendant’s punishment remained unchanged. Therefore, his argument fails.
If the law changes between the date of the offense and the time of sentencing, courts generally apply the law in effect at the time of the offense. In re Daniel H., 237 Conn. 364, 377, 678 A.2d 462 (1996). This principle, setting forth the application of the law in place at the time of the offense, "is derived from the legislature’s enactment of savings statutes such as General Statutes § 54-194, which provides that the repeal of any statute defining or prescribing the punishment for any crime shall not affect any pending prosecution or any existing liability to prosecution and punishment therefor, unless expressly provided in the repealing statute that such repeal shall have that effect, and General Statutes § 1-1(t), which provides that the repeal of an act shall not affect any punishment, penalty or forfeiture incurred before the repeal takes effect, or any suit, or prosecution, or proceeding pending at the time of the repeal, for an offense committed, or for the recovery of a penalty or forfeiture incurred under the act repealed." (Internal quotation marks omitted). State v. Kalil, 314 Conn. 529, 552, 107 A.3d 343 (2014).
In the present case, the offenses were committed years before the effective date of Public Act 18-63. There is no language in the act that compels a retrospective construction. It simply provides an effective date. Similarly there is nothing in the legislative history to indicate that the legislature "clearly and unequivocally" intended for Public Act 18-63 to apply retroactively. In re Daniel H., supra, 327 Conn. at 376. The legislature had the option to apply Public Act 18-63 retroactively. "It chose not to do so. [I]t is a well settled principle of statutory construction that the legislature knows how to convey its intent expressly ... or to use broader or limiting terms when it chooses to do so." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Marchesi v. Board of Selectmen, 309 Conn. 608, 618, 72 A.3d 394 (2013). The legislature is presumed to know about the existing law when it passes legislation. The enactment is prospective only.
The defendant next argues that Public Act 18-63 violates the equal protection clause of the federal constitution. He suggests that persons who commit crimes when they are addicted to narcotics should receive the same benefits as those who commit substance control offenses.
"To implicate the equal protection [clause] ... it is necessary that the state statute ... in question, either on its face or in practice, treat persons standing in the same relation to it differently ... [Consequently], the analytical predicate [of consideration of an equal protection claim] is a determination of who are the persons similarly situated. Having determined the persons who are similarly situated, the court must then establish the standard by which the challenged statute’s constitutional validity will be determined. If, in distinguishing between classes, the statute either intrudes on the exercise of a fundamental right or burdens a suspect class of persons, the court will apply a strict scrutiny standard [under which] the state must demonstrate that the challenged statute is necessary to the achievement of a compelling state interest ... If the statute does not touch upon either a fundamental right or a suspect class, its classification need only be rationally related to some legitimate government purpose in order to withstand an equal protection challenge." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Perez, supra, 326 Conn. at 383.
To the extent the defendant has alleged that his continued parole status constitutes an equal protection violation, his claim fails. Defendants are protected under the equal protection clause from invidious discrimination based on race, religion, or membership in a protected class subject to restrictions and limitations necessitated by legitimate penological interests. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). All persons similarly situated should be treated alike. Violations of equal protection are shown when the state intentionally discriminates against a defendant based on membership in a protected class, or when the state intentionally treats a member of an identifiable class differently from other similarly situated individuals without a rational basis, or a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
There is no constitutional right to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 16 (1979). Thus this court must turn to the rational basis analysis. To prevail the defendant must allege that he was intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated without a rational basis for the difference in treatment. City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). The defendant’s argument is similar to that advanced in United States v. Speed, 656 F.3d 714 (7th Cir. 2011). In that case, the defendant argued that failure to apply a statute retroactively to all cases violated his right to equal protection under the law. The Seventh Circuit noted, "Because no fundamental right or suspect classification is at issue, we review his claim under the rational-basis standard of review. Under this standard, [the defendant] must show that there is no rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose. But the disparate treatment to which [the defendant] points is plainly rational, as discrepancies among persons who committed similar crimes are inescapable whenever [the legislature] raises or lowers the penalties for an offense. Someone, in the end, will always be left behind to live with the earlier, harsher penalty, whenever [the legislature] chooses to amend a sentencing statute. Whatever arbitrariness there may be is therefore unavoidable." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) United States v. Speed, supra, 656 F.3d at 720. The defendant’s equal protection argument has no merit.
The defendant’s final substantive argument is that his parole status violates the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution. That protection "establishes the minimum standards for what constitutes impermissibly cruel and unusual punishment. Specifically, the United States Supreme Court has indicated that at least three types of punishment may be deemed unconstitutionally cruel: (1) inherently barbaric punishments; (2) excessive and disproportionate punishments; and (3) arbitrary or discriminatory punishments." (Citation marks omitted.) State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 1, 18-19, 122 A.3d 1, reconsideration denied, 319 Conn. 912, 124 A.3d 496 (2015). This protection does not require that the crime and sentence be strictly proportional; rather it "forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime." Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991).
Contrary to the defendant’s suggestion, an amendment to a statutory penalty does not transform the preexisting sentence into a cruel and unusual one. Although the defendant argues that drug addiction was the cause of his crimes, he ignores the fact that he is not being punished for his addiction but rather for larceny, burglary and failure to appear. His criminal record supports the sentence imposed. This court has no authority to modify the defendant’s lawful sentence. The legislature’s change in policy concerning substance abuse offenses does not change this analysis. The defendant’s focus on the remarks of our legislators nothing to support a contrary position. In summary the defendant failed to demonstrate that his parole status is disproportionate and excessive in violation of the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution.
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion to correct is denied.