Opinion
No. 64259-6-I.
Filed: March 7, 2011.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 08-1-00331-7, Michael Heavey, J., entered September 9, 2009.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Lau, J., concurred in by Grosse and Ellington, JJ.
Jake Rider appeals his convictions for one count of first degree animal cruelty and ten counts of second degree animal cruelty, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting ER 404(b) motive evidence. Rider argues that evidence that he kept animals on his property solely for beneficial tax purposes was not proper motive evidence. But because the trial court could reasonably conclude that tax incentives provided a rational explanation for why he underfed the animals, we find no abuse of discretion.
FACTS
The facts are undisputed. Jacob Rider and his partner, Richard Vrban, moved onto a farm near Covington in April 2007. The two men bought a number of animals at auction. In the late fall, Rider and Vrban bought a calf the day after it was born. About two weeks later, after a very cold night, the calf died.
In November 2007, Rider and Vrban bought three horses. They fed the animals hay, grain mixture, cob, and high protein grain pellets. Neighbors Jack and Rebecca Parsons testified that the animals appeared fit but over time began to look thinner and lethargic. When Vrban and Rider got the horses, there was a pasture for them to graze in, but they soon chewed it down to dirt and it turned to mud when it rained. The animals then began to knaw at the wooden fences.
In December, the Parsons saw a horse lying on its side in the mud and called King County Animal Control (KCAC). KCAC officers Jenee Westerberg and David Morris responded to the farm and eventually called veterinarian Dr. Heather Stewart. Morris observed one llama, three goats, two sheep, and two calves — all of whom were underweight.
Westerberg, Morris, and Stewart met at the farm the next day, but Rider was not there. They attempted to get the horse, named Missy, on her feet, but were unsuccessful, and Stewart decided to transport Missy to her clinic. Missy died several hours later.
The following day, KCAC and a local animal rescue agency seized the remaining animals and exhumed a dead calf from a grave on the farm. Laboratory tests revealed that Missy died of malnutrition, pneumonia, and inflammation of the colon. The calf, who was also very thin, died of pneumonia.
The State charged Rider with two counts of felony first degree animal cruelty for the deaths of Missy and the calf and nine second degree animal cruelty counts for infliction of "unnecessary suffering or pain" on other animals at the farm. Before trial, the State sought to admit testimony of Rider's former tenant, Jessica Ashley, as ER 404(b) motive evidence. Ashley would testify that Rider only fed his animals enough to keep them alive and would not feed them for weeks. According to the State's offer of proof, when Ashley asked him "why he even had animals if he was not going to feed them," he replied that he kept them so he could classify his property as a farm for advantageous tax purposes. Report of Proceedings (RP) (July 6, 2009) at 36. Rider objected to the testimony, arguing that the State could not prove it occurred by a preponderance of the evidence and that it showed only why he had the animals but did not establish his motive for underfeeding them.
The court admitted the testimony ruling:
Okay. 404(b) requires the court to do an analysis on the record. Because of the importance, because it's powerful evidence when allowed in, to Jessica Ashley, the motive is not that he wrote off to depreciate his farm, he wrote off certain costs, the motive to me when you put it in the context as to why are you not spending the money to feed those animals properly, and the answer was for taxes, the motive is to save money, as far as economic advantages, as far as — I don't know how Mr. Elsner put it, but that is the motive to me. And there is a connection between the underfeeding and the corresponding tax statutes, both of them save money, that he didn't have to spend money on food, but he would get the benefit of the tax advantages. He has a double win there, hopefully. I'm not saying that that is what he did. I'm sure he cared about his animals and was hoping that they would live off the land, off the pasture, and that if he didn't feed, it is probably because he didn't have the money. However, I do understand that the Jessica Ashley conversation took place. I do find by a preponderance that it did. I think her testimony should be related to how the conversation came about, her experience with the horses, what her concern was.
RP (July 8, 2009) at 21-22. Ashley testified consistent with the State's offer of proof, stating,
I asked him, I said why are you not — why do you have animals on your property and he said because it's a tax write-off and I can write it off as a farm.
RP (July 13, 2009) at 113.
The jury convicted Rider of one count of first degree animal cruelty for Missy's death, a lesser included offense of second degree animal cruelty for the dead calf, and the remaining nine counts of second degree animal cruelty. Rider appeals his judgment and sentence.
ANALYSIS
Rider's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Ashley's testimony and "concluding the 2002 evidence that Rider kept animals solely for tax purposes was relevant to provide a motive for why he may have underfed the animals in 2007." Br. of Appellant at 12. "A trial court's ruling under ER 404(b) will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion such that no reasonable judge would have ruled as the trial court did." State v. Mason, 160 Wn.2d 910, 933-34, 162 P.3d 396 (2007). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. State v. Dixon, 159 Wn.2d 65, 75-76, 147 P.3d 991 (2006)
Evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts is not admissible to establish character or to show that the defendant acted in conformity with that character. ER 404(b). Such evidence is admissible, however, for other purposes, such as to show motive, intent, or identity. ER 404(b); State v. Suttle, 61 Wn. App. 703, 710, 812 P.2d 119 (1991). In making its decision, the trial court must identify on the record the purpose for which the evidence is offered and must determine its relevance to prove an essential element of the charge. State v. Dennison, 115 Wn.2d 609, 628, 801 P.2d 193 (1990). After determining the evidence is relevant, the trial court must balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect. Dennison, 115 Wn.2d at 628; Suttle, 61 Wn. App. at 711.
Motive is an inducement that tempts the mind to a criminal act. State v. Saltarelli, 98 Wn.2d 358, 365, 655 P.2d 697 (1982). Motive evidence can be brought in to show "impulse, desire, or any other moving power which causes an individual to act." Powell, 126 Wn.2d 244, 259, 893 P.2d 615 (1995). We have recognized that "[t]he human mind searches for a rational explanation for an irrational act. . . ." State v. Matthews, 75 Wn. App. 278, 284, 877 P.2d 252 (1994) (discussing motive for murder of shopkeeper at noon in a shopping mall). Therefore, whether a suspect had a motive to commit a crime becomes relevant, otherwise the likelihood that he or she committed the crime is rationally reduced. Matthews, 75 Wn. App. at 284. Accordingly, even though motive is not an element of murder, it is still a relevant and permissible area of inquiry. State v. Haga, 13 Wn. App. 630, 637, 536 P.2d 648 (1975).
Here, a reasonable juror would search for a rational explanation for the seemingly irrational act of underfeeding animals. Farm animals are typically kept for several purposes — for labor, food, as pets, or for recreation. All of these purposes require that the animals be kept in reasonable health and well fed. The fact that Rider kept his animals solely for beneficial tax purposes provides a rational explanation for why he underfed them. First, unlike keeping animals for food, labor, or recreation, he did not need the animals to be in good health. Second, as the trial court noted, Rider was concerned about saving money — testimony showing he kept the animals for tax reasons demonstrates that concern and the corresponding motive to save money by underfeeding the animals:
[T]he motive to me when you put it in the context as to why are you not spending the money to feed those animals properly, and the answer was for taxes, the motive is to save money, as far as economic advantages, as far as — I don't know how Mr. Elsner put it, but that is the motive to me. And there is a connection between the underfeeding and the corresponding tax statutes, both of them save money, that he didn't have to spend money on food, but he would get the benefit of the tax advantages.
RP (July 8, 2009) at 21. Rider argues, "Desiring to qualify for a tax break in 2002 is not a motive for underfeeding different animals in 2007." Br. of Appellant at 13. But Rider's purpose for keeping the animals, which he revealed to Ashley in 2002, does provide a rational explanation for why he underfed them. And the time discrepancy and the fact that he may have had different animals in 2002 properly goes to the weight of the evidence, not to its admissibility for motive purposes under ER 404(b). We cannot say that the trial court's ruling rested on manifestly unreasonable reasons or grounds or that no reasonable judge would have admitted the evidence. Rider has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.
Rider also argues that the trial court's "rationale — that the 2002 tax break and 2007 underfeeding indicated a common desire to save money — is improper insofar as it implies Rider suffered from financial woes and was thus motivated to save money by depriving the animals." Br. of Appellant at 14. Rider maintains that this improperly allowed evidence of poverty, which "is generally not admissible to show motive." Br. of Appellant at 14. But Rider failed to raise this argument below, and it is therefore not properly before us now. Regardless, Ashley's testimony was not evidence of poverty, only evidence that Rider wanted to claim tax benefits. As the State correctly notes, seeking a tax benefit alone is not evidence of poverty. "[W]hether the defendant was rich or poor has no bearing on whether he would have sought a tax break." Br. of Resp't. at 10. Thus, the evidence provided a rational reason for why Rider did not feed the animals — he needed them only for tax purposes and not for common uses that require fit animals such as labor, recreation, or food. That inference is perfectly permissible, does not implicate his financial status, and properly provides a motive for his criminal actions.
Finally, even if the evidence was indicative of his desire to save money, frugalness is not the same as poverty. And we note that Rider does not argue that other evidence that more clearly indicated his financial status, such as his testimony that he did not buy other feed for the animals because he couldn't afford it, created an impermissible poverty inference. Rider has failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion.
Rider cites to three cases to support his impermissible poverty inference argument. State v. Matthews, 75 Wn. App. 278, 284, 877 P.2d 252 (1994); State v. Suttle, 61 Wn. App. 703, 812 P.2d. 119 (1991); State v. Newton, 42 Wn. App. 718, 724, 714 P.2d 684 (1986). Mathews and Newton offer little guidance here. In those cases, the trial court admitted direct evidence of financial status, whereas here, the court admitted only testimony that Rider sought a tax break, which is not indicative of financial status. Matthews, 75 Wn. App. 278 (evidence of employment status, income, and recent bankruptcy admissible to show motive for robbery); Newton, 42 Wn. App. 718 (evidence that defendant had incurred charges on stolen credit card and was locked out of hotel room for nonpayment admissible in forgery and possession of stolen credit card prosecution). In Suttle, the court held evidence of robbery defendant's prison escape was admissible to show defendant's need to leave the state and resultant compelling need for money. Suttle, 61 Wn. App. 703. Rider argues, "Unlike in . . . Suttle . . ., the state offered nothing more than an inference of poverty." Br. of Appellant at 16. But, as noted above, seeking a tax break is not synonymous with poverty.
We affirm Rider's judgment and sentence.