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In Martin, the district court had accepted the defendant's Alford plea, sentenced him to five years of probation and the five-year period had not lapsed at the time the court imposed the restitution.
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No. 2-523 / 01-1525.
Filed July 31, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, TIMOTHY O'GRADY, Judge.
Gary Michael Martin II appeals following his Alford plea and subsequent sentencing for homicide by vehicle in violation of Iowa Code section 717.6A(2)(a) (1997). AFFIRMED.
Joseph Hrvol of Joseph J. Hrvol, P.C., Council Bluffs, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Linda Hines, Assistant Attorney General, Richard Crowl, County Attorney, and Daniel McGinn, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by MAHAN, P.J., and ZIMMER and EISENHAUER, JJ.
Gary Michael Martin II appeals following his Alford plea and subsequent sentencing for homicide by vehicle in violation of Iowa Code section 717.6A(2)(a) (1997). On appeal Martin contends the district court erred (1) in finding Iowa Code section 910.3B is constitutional; and (2) in finding that a deferred judgment pursuant to an Alford plea is a "conviction" under section 910.3B. We affirm.
Background Facts and Proceedings. On January 17, 1998, Martin, along with several acquaintances, had been out riding snowmobiles together late at night. They had visited several towns and taverns. Some of the riders, including Martin, carried alcohol on their snowmobiles. While leaving the Tripper's Blue Moon Bar in Neola around 2 a.m., there was an argument about which of the riders had the fastest snowmobile. The group proceeded to a nearby open field to race. During a race, Martin crashed his snowmobile into a group of riders who were watching. Richard Furrow was killed at the scene, and Eric Lausen was left severely injured.
On August 21, 1998, Martin entered an Alford plea of guilty to homicide by vehicle, in violation of section 707.6A(2)(a). Martin received a deferred judgment and was placed on five years probation. A condition of the probation required Martin to make payments under a plan of restitution pursuant to chapter 910. A restitution hearing was held on August 14, 2001. The district court ordered Martin, pursuant to section 910.3B, to pay restitution in the amount of $150,000 to Richard Furrow's estate. Martin appeals.
In August 1999 a temporary restitution hearing was held. Martin was ordered to make monthly payments to the victims under a temporary plan of restitution. Determination of the final amounts of restitution was reserved until pending civil actions had been resolved.
Constitutionality of Iowa Code Section 910.3B . We reject Martin's request that we overrule the holding in State v. Izzolena, 609 N.W.2d 541 (Iowa 2000). We are cognizant that Izzolena was a close case and there were three dissenters. However, it is the prerogative of the supreme court, as the court of last resort in our state, to determine the law. As the supreme court pointed out in State v. Eichler:
In Izzolena our supreme court determined that the minimum restitution award of $150,000 does not on its face violate the Excessive Fines Clause of our state and federal constitutions. State v. Izzolena, 609 N.W.2d 541, 550-51 (Iowa 2000). Although the minimum award of $150,000 was found by the court to be "high," it was not deemed grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offenses covered under the statute. Id.
[I]t is the prerogative of this court to determine the law, and we think that generally the trial courts are under a duty to follow it as expressed by the courts of last resort, as they understand it, even though they may disagree. If our previous holdings are to be overruled, we should ordinarily prefer to do it ourselves.State v. Eichler, 248 Iowa 1267, 1270, 83 N.W.2d 576, 578 (1957); see also Chambers v. Trettco, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 910, 914 n. 3 (Mich. 2000) (recognizing that "[I]t is the Supreme Court's obligation to overrule or modify case law if it becomes obsolete, and until this Court takes such action, the Court of Appeals and all lower courts are bound by that authority."); Boyd v. W.G. Wade Shows, 505 N.W.2d 544, 547 (1993) (stating "While the Court of Appeals may properly express its belief that a decision of this Court was wrongly decided or is no longer viable, that conclusion does not excuse the Court of Appeals from applying the decision to the case before it."); State v. Hughes, 457 N.W.2d 25, 28 (Iowa Ct.App. 1990) (declining defendant's invitation to overrule a prior case by recognizing it is the prerogative of the supreme court to overrule previous holdings); State v. Blanton, 454 N.W.2d 901, 902 n. 1 (Iowa Ct.App. 1990) (same); Healy v. Carr, 449 N.W.2d 883, 885 (Iowa Ct.App. 1989) (same). Accordingly, we are obliged to follow this law and decline Martin's request to overrule Izzolena.
Applicability of Iowa Code Section 910.3B . Martin further contends the mandatory restitution provision of section 910.3B was inapplicable because his deferred judgment was not a "conviction" for the purposes of section 910.3B. We disagree. The word "conviction" is subject to various interpretations. Schilling v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., ___ N.W.2d ___ (Iowa 2002). Our courts have distinguished between a conviction used to increase a criminal penalty and one used to protect the public:
Section 910.3B states, in relevant part:
In all criminal cases in which the offender is convicted of a felony . . . [which] caused the death of another person, in addition to the amount determined to be payable and ordered to be paid to a victim for pecuniary damages, . . . the court shall also order the offender to pay at least one hundred fifty thousand dollars in restitution to the victim's estate.
Iowa Code § 910.3B(1) (2001).
While we have construed the word "conviction" to have a relatively narrow and technical meaning where it appears in statutes used to enhance punishment, we have accepted a broader definition when protection of the public has been at stake.Id. (quoting State v. Kluesner, 389 N.W.2d 370, 372 (Iowa 1986)). We therefore must determine whether section 910.3B is aimed at the protection of the public or as a punishment measure. A restitution award under section 910.3B has multiple purposes:
It serves a remedial purpose in compensating the victim's estate. It also serves a punitive purpose in punishing the defendant. In doing so, it also serves a rehabilitative purpose for the defendant. We have previously found restitution "is designed to instill responsibility in criminal offenders." Additionally, the Supreme Court has noted "[s]uch a penalty will affect the defendant differently than a traditional fine, paid to the State as an abstract and impersonal entity. . . ."
. . . The government interests in restitution awards under section 910.3B are both compensation to the family and punishment for the defendant.State v. Klawonn, 609 N.W.2d 515, 520 (Iowa 2000) (citations omitted).
With protection of the public and rehabilitation of the offender as purposes of this section, we believe a broad definition of "conviction" is appropriate. See Kluesner, 389 N.W.2d at 372. Applying the test set forth by Schilling, we conclude that Martin's deferred judgment constitutes a conviction, and the district court was required under section 910.3B to impose the minimum restitution award. See Klawonn, 609 N.W.2d at 517; Kluesner, 389 N.W.2d at 373. Accordingly, we affirm the restitution award.
Our supreme court recently stated that if the revocation statute is protective in nature, the establishment of the following elements will be sufficient to show that a conviction exists:
(1) A judge or jury has found the defendant guilty, or the defendant has entered a plea of guilty; (2) the court has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the person's liberty to be imposed; (3) a judgment of guilty may be entered if the person violates the terms of probation or fails to comply with the requirements of the court's order; and (4) the conviction has become final. A conviction is final if the defendant has exhausted or waived any postorder challenge.Schilling v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., ___ N.W.2d ___ (Iowa 2002).
AFFIRMED.