Opinion
I.D. No. 87001256DI, I.D. No. 87001255DI.
Submitted: December 7, 2007.
Decided: April 1, 2008.
Upon Defendants' Motions for Postconviction Relief DENIED.
Josette D. Manning, Esq., Dept. of Justice, Wilmington, DE.
Paul R. Wallace, Esq., Dept. of Justice, Wilmington, DE.
James J. Haley, Jr., Esq., Ferrara, Haley, Bevis Collins, Wilmington, DE.
Drew Gonser, Esq., Wilmington, DE.
OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendants collaterally attack their convictions for Felony Murder claiming that the revised interpretation of Del. C § 636(a)(2) as set forth in Williams v. State requires this Court to vacate their convictions or grant them a new trial. Because the Defendants fail to show that the jury instruction on Felony Murder was insufficient or that the murder of Raphael Lopez was not committed "in furtherance of" robbery, their claims are DENIED.
818 A.2d 906 (Del. 2002).
II. BACKGROUND
On November 16, 1987, a jury convicted Carmelo Claudio ("Claudio") and Enrique Maymi ("Maymi") of Murder First Degree (Felony Murder), Attempted Murder First Degree, two counts of Conspiracy First Degree, two counts of Robbery First Degree and four counts of Possession of a Deadly Weapon during the Commission of a Felony. Claudio and Maymi appealed their convictions and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed on January 22, 1991. On August 9, 2001, Claudio filed his first motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. On December 17, 2001, this Court denied the motion and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed on March 28, 2002. On August 21, Claudio and Maymi filed a joint motion for postconviction relief. On January 21, 2003, this Court denied the motion and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed on September 15, 2003. On June 29, 2005, Claudio filed a third motion for postconviction relief. On August 4, 2005, this Court denied the motion. Claudio appealed the Court's decision and on November 1, 1005, the Delaware Supreme Court dismissed his appeal.On July 12, 2007, Claudio and Maymi filed separate motions for postconviction relief and the Court appointed counsel to represent them in connection with these motions. Counsel for both Defendants filed amendments to their respective postconviction motions. Because Claudio and Maymi assert similar claims based on the decision in Williams v. State, the Court will address their claims together.
Claudio's Mot. for Postconviction Relief, D.I. 66; Maymi's Mot. for Postconviction Relief, D.I. 45.
III. DISCUSSION
Before addressing the merits of a postconviction relief claim, the Court must first determine whether the claims pass through the procedural filters of Rule 61. To protect the integrity of the procedural rules, the Court will not address the substantive aspects of the claims if a defendant's claims are procedurally barred. Rule 61(i) provides:
Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del. 1991)("The first inquiry in any analysis of a post-conviction relief claim is whether the petition meets the procedural requirements of Rule 61.") See also Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
(1) Time limitation. A motion for postconviction relief may not be filed more than one year after the judgment of conviction is final or, if it asserts a retroactively applicable right that is newly recognized after the judgment of conviction is final, more than one year after the right is first recognized by the Supreme Court of Delaware or by the United States Supreme Court;
(2) Repetitive motion. Any ground for relief that was not asserted in a prior postconviction proceeding, as required by subdivision (b)(2) of this rule, is thereafter barred, unless consideration of the claim in warranted in the interest of justice;
(3) Procedural default. Any ground for relief that was not asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, as required by the rules of this court, is thereafter barred, unless the movant shows
(A) Cause for relief from the procedural default and
(B) Prejudice from violation of the movant's rights;
(4) Former adjudication. Any ground for relief that was formerly adjudicated, whether in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a postconviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, is thereafter barred, unless reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice;
(5) Bars inapplicable. The bars to relief in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of this subdivision shall not apply to a claim that the court lacked jurisdiction or to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction.
A. The Jury Instruction on Felony Murder was Sufficient.
Claudio and Maymi claim that the jury instruction on Felony Murder failed to sufficiently state the substantive law as set forth in Williams. Under Delaware law, a defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on a correct statement of substantive law but he is not entitled to receive the statement in a particular form. The jury instruction in this case adequately stated the substantive law for Felony Murder as set forth in Williams and its progeny. In Williams, the Delaware Supreme Court revised the interpretation of the "in furtherance of" language of 11 Del. C. § 636(a)(2) and held:In our view, the statutory language of the Delaware felony murder statute not only requires that the murder occur during the course of the felony but also that the murder occur to facilitate commission of the felony. To the extent that the Chao opinion states that the "in furtherance of" language of the statute addresses solely the identity of the person who is committing the actual killing, it is overruled. Accordingly, we adhere to the holding of Weick and hold that the felony murder language requires not only that the defendant, or his accomplices, if any, commit the killing but also that the murder helps to move the felony forward.
Here, the jury was instructed on Felony Murder, in pertinent part, as follows:
Claudio, Tr. Trial, 14:1-15:1, D.I. 23.
Murder in the first degree is defined as follows. A person is guilty of murder in the first degree when in the course of, and in furtherance of the commission of a felony, he causes the death of another person. In order to find the defendants guilty of murder in the first degree, as charged in Count three of the indictment, you must first find the following four elements have been established beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . The fourth element. The killing was in furtherance of, or was intended to assist in the commission of the felony. (Emphasis added).
Although not verbatim, the jury instruction given in this case properly characterizes the requisite finding to support a Felony Murder conviction. Ultimately, the jury was instructed to decide whether the murder of Raphael Lopez ("Lopez") was intended to assist in the commission of the robbery. The language "intended to assist in the commission of the felony" is substantively akin to the language "helps to move the felony forward." Because the instruction adequately informed the jury of the substantive law on Felony Murder, this claim is without merit.
B. The Murder of Raphael Lopez Was Committed "in furtherance of" Robbery.
Sufficient evidence exists to support Claudio and Maymi's convictions for Felony Murder. Williams and its progeny require a two-part analysis to determine whether a killing was committed "in furtherance of" the underlying felony: (1) did defendant intend to commit a felony that was independent of the killing, and (2) was the murder a necessary part or step in enabling defendant to perpetuate the intended felony?
This case satisfies the two-part analysis. First, it is clear that Claudio and Maymi intended to rob Lopez and Juan Soto ("Soto"). In its January 22, 1991 Opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court aptly stated, ". . . there appears to be no question that the defendants conspired to rob the decedent, Lopez, and his companion, Soto, on the night in question at knife point." Second, the facts show that the murder of Lopez, and attempted murder of Soto, served to further the underlying felony of robbery.
Id. at 1282.
The record reflects that on the early morning of February 14, 1987, Claudio and Maymi offered to give Lopez and Soto a ride home from a bar. After driving a short time, Maymi stopped the car. Claudio demanded Lopez and Soto hand over all of their money. Soto got out of the car and attempted to flee but Claudio struck him in the face twice and stabbed him in the chest. Soto fell to the ground and Claudio removed several hundred dollars from his pocket. Soto lay injured on the ground and listened as Lopez struggled with Claudio and Maymi. Lopez's dead body was later found on the side of the road.
The facts of this case are more fully set out in the Delaware Supreme Court's decision on Claudio's direct appeal. Claudio, 585 A.2d at 1279-80.
The fact that Soto exited the car and attempted to flee is a significant fact in this case because it shows that the victims were not going to cooperate with the Defendants. In order to overcome Soto's resistance, Claudio hit Soto in the face and stabbed him in the chest. Soto fell to the ground injured and was unable to prevent Claudio from removing the money from his pockets. Claudio and Maymi then turned their attack on Lopez. Lopez was stabbed multiple times in the chest, arms and back. Before heading to the bar, Lopez cashed his paycheck. He carried almost $200 in cash. When the police recovered his body, however, Lopez had no money in his pockets. Claudio and Maymi clearly used force in order to incapacitate their victims, making it easier for them to execute the robbery. Without the use of such force, Soto and Lopez would have fled leaving Defendants unable to perpetuate the robbery. Based on these facts, the Court finds that the murder of Lopez, and the attempted murder of Soto, was meant to help Claudio and Maymi proceed with the robbery. Because Lopez's murder was committed "in furtherance of" robbery, this claim has not merit.
Tr. Trial, Nov. 30, 1987, 7:21-8:14.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above mentioned reasons, Claudio and Maymi's Motions for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 are DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.