Opinion
HHDCV166072114S
07-03-2018
STATE of Connecticut v. Charles M. BRADLEY
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Cesar A. Noble, J.
General Statutes § 52-362d(a) creates a lien in favor of the Department of Social Services’ Office of Child Support Services (Office) against an obligor of past due child support for child support payments ordered by the Superior Court to be made through the Office. When a person has or expects to have custody of funds due to an obligor under any judgment or settlement they are obliged to withhold delivery or distribution of such funds to the obligor upon notice to do so by the Office. § 52-362d(d). In the present case, the plaintiff, the State of Connecticut, seeks to enforce such a lien by, inter alia, an interpleader making claim to such funds held by the defendant, Michael Bradley, an attorney who represented Stanley Coffey, an obligor of past due child support who is not a party to the present action. The defendant asserts he has a greater right than the plaintiff to settlement proceeds from a civil rights action brought by Coffey of which the defendant is the stakeholder. The motion for summary judgment of the plaintiff presently before the court requires it to determine whether the defendant’s claim for attorneys fees, purportedly entitling him to receive the entirety of the settlement proceeds, defeats the plaintiff’s statutory claim to the funds. The court concludes that it does not and grants judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
Section 52-362d(a) provides in relevant part: "Whenever an order of the Superior Court or a family support magistrate for support of a minor child or children is issued and such payments have been ordered to be made to the state acting by and through the IV-D agency and the person against whom such support order was issued owes past-due support in the amount of five hundred dollars or more, the state shall have a lien on any property, real or personal, in which such person has an interest to enforce payment of such past-due support."
Section 52-362d(d) provides in pertinent part: "Whenever an order of the Superior Court or a family support magistrate of this state ... for support of a minor child or children is issued and such payments have been ordered through the IV-D agency, and the obligor against whom such support order was issued owes overdue support under such order in the amount of five hundred dollars or more, the [Office] may notify ... (2) any person having or expecting to have custody or control of or authority to distribute any amounts due such obligor under any judgment or settlement ... that such obligor owes overdue support in an IV-D support case. Upon receipt of such notice, such ... person, ... shall withhold delivery or distribution of any such property, benefits, amounts, assets or funds until receipt of further notice from the IV-D agency."
I. FACTS
The plaintiff, the state of Connecticut, in a two-count amended complaint filed on August 8, 2017, alleges the following facts. In May 2011, Coffey commenced a federal lawsuit as a result of alleged civil rights violations. The defendant, Michael Bradley, represented Coffey in is federal case. The plaintiff learned of Coffey’s pending cause of action, and notified the defendant numerous times through its Department of Social Services’ Bureau of Child Support enforcement that Coffey was subject to an overdue child support order of the Superior Court. It informed the defendant that he was required to withhold distribution of any funds from any judgment or settlement until further notice pursuant to General Statutes § 52-362d(d). The plaintiff also notified Coffey of its actions, and informed Coffey that he was allowed to request a review or an administrative hearing, which Coffey did not do.
The Bureau of Child Support Enforcement is presently known as the Office of Child Support Services and shall be referred to as the Office.
On July 19, 2016, the defendant informed the plaintiff that Coffey’s action had been settled in the amount of $47,500, and that he had disbursed the entire settlement proceeds to himself and another attorney pursuant to his fee agreement with Coffey. At the time of this disbursement, Coffey’s child support delinquency amounted to $12,250. The plaintiff filed a one-count complaint against the defendant for conversion of the settlement proceeds. The defendant later revealed that he still possessed an amount in his clients’ fund account to pay any judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff in this action. The plaintiff thereafter filed an amended complaint, adding an action in the nature of interpleader as a second count. On October 11, 2017, the plaintiff moved for an interlocutory judgment for interpleader, which was granted by the court, Shapiro, J., on December 4, 2017. The court ordered the parties to interplead together by filing statements of their respective claims to the funds and directed the defendant to hold the funds subject to the further and final order of the court.
On January 5, 2018, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment solely on count two of its complaint on the grounds that the defendant’s 100 percent attorneys fee was unenforceable and that the fee agreement between the defendant and Coffey was unreasonable and against public policy. The plaintiff submitted the defendant’s disbursement sheet and a copy of the fee agreement between the defendant and Coffey in support of its motion. The defendant filed an objection to the plaintiff’s motion and a memorandum of law in opposition on February 20, 2018. The defendant attached copies of his fee agreement, portions of deposition transcripts from Coffey’s federal case, and affidavits along with his motion. The court heard oral argument on the motion on March 5, 2018.
II. STANDARD
Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." "In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party ... The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law ... and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact ... A material fact ... [is] a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 310 Conn. 304, 312-13, 77 A.3d 726 (2013).
III. DISCUSSION
The plaintiff argues that the child support lien that it attached to the proceeds of Coffey’s federal civil rights lawsuit settlement pursuant to § 52-362d is subject only to reasonable attorneys fees. The plaintiff also contends that the defendant’s fee agreement does not comply with General Statutes § 52-251c, violates the Rules of Professional Conduct, and is unenforceable because it is unconscionable, unreasonable, and against public policy. In response, the defendant argues that his fee agreement does not violate public policy. The defendant also argues that § 52-251c has no applicability, that Coffey knowingly waived it even if it did, and that it is preempted by 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000). Finally, the defendant contends that his fee agreement with Coffey did not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct.
i. Action in the Nature of Interpleader
Count two of the plaintiff’s amended complaint, the only count at issue in the present summary judgment motion, is for an action in the nature of interpleader. General Statutes § 52-484 provides, in relevant part, that "[w]henever any person has, or is alleged to have, any money or other property in his possession which is claimed by two or more persons, either he, or any of the persons claiming the same, may bring a complaint in equity, in the nature of a bill of interpleader, to any court which by law has equitable jurisdiction of the parties and amount in controversy, making all persons parties who claim to be entitled to or interested in such money or other property." "The equitable purpose of the statute is to give all those interested or entitled to all or a portion of a fund held by another an opportunity to resolve all questions in a single action." Millman v. Paige, 55 Conn.App. 238, 243, 738 A.2d 737 (1999). "Whenever several persons might all be entitled to participate in a common fund held by one of them, the statute authorizes an action in the nature of interpleader and a distribution of the funds by the trial court." Id., 242-43. Section 52-484 permits interested parties to the funds at issue, both possessors and nonpossessors, to pursue an action in the nature of interpleader. Id., 243. Once an interlocutory judgment of interpleader has been granted establishing the propriety of the interpleader, the court shall resolve the parties’ respective claims to the disputed property. Trikona Advisers Ltd. v. Haida Investments Ltd., 318 Conn. 476, 484, 122 A.3d 242 (2015). Summary judgment has been utilized in the disposition of actions in the nature of interpleaders. See, e.g., State v. Burnaka, 61 Conn.App. 45, 762 A.2d 485 (2000); Millman v. Paige, supra, 55 Conn.App. 238. The court, therefore, has the authority to determine which parties are entitled to distributions of the settlement fund from Coffey’s federal civil rights case at the summary judgment stage.
ii. General Statutes § 52-362d
The plaintiff’s claim for a portion of Coffey’s settlement fund is rooted in its child support lien established pursuant to § 52-362d. Section 52-362d(d) provides, in relevant part, that "[w]henever an order of the Superior Court or a family support magistrate of this state ... for support of a minor child is issued and such payments have been ordered through the IV-D agency, and the obligor against whom such support order was issued owes overdue support under such order in the amount of five hundred dollars or more, the IV-D agency ... may notify ... (2) any person having or expecting to have custody or control of or authority to distribute any amounts due such obligor under any judgment or settlement ... Upon receipt of such notice, such ... person ... shall withhold delivery or distribution of any such property, benefits, amounts, assets or funds until receipt of further notice from the IV-D agency." This statute evinces a strong and compelling state policy of ensuring that minor children receive the support to which they are entitled. Torres v. Kunze, 106 Conn.App. 802, 809-10, 945 A.2d 472 (2008).
Section 52-362d is silent as to the plaintiff’s interest in the funds derived from a settlement in relation to attorneys fees. The plaintiff, however, indicated that it is interpreting its § 52-362d(d) lien in the manner set forth in General Statutes § 17b-94, which creates a statutory lien in the plaintiff for reimbursement of public assistance benefits from proceeds of a cause of action of a beneficiary of such aid. Section 17b-94 provides, in relevant part, that "[i]n the case of causes of action ... the claim of the state shall be a lien against the proceeds therefrom ... and shall have priority over all other claims except attorneys fees for said causes, [and] expenses of suit ..." The plaintiff, therefore, has interpreted § 52-362d to mean that its child support lien for $12,250 has priority over all other claims except for the defendant’s reasonable attorneys fees and costs. The defendant does not dispute the propriety of this interpretation. Rather, at issue is whether the fee which he seeks to charge is reasonable and enforceable.
iii. The Defendant’s Fee Agreement with Coffey
The first question that the court must address is which party has priority to the settlement funds from Coffey’s federal civil rights case, which are the funds that the plaintiff’s child support lien attached to. The answer to this question requires a closer examination of the history of the attorney-client relationship between the defendant and Coffey and of the fee agreement at issue in the present matter before the court. In regards to the relationship between the defendant and Coffey, the defendant represented Coffey in two separate matters. He represented Coffey in the underlying criminal case upon which Coffey’s federal civil rights case was based and in the federal civil rights case itself. The defendant secured an acquittal in that criminal case and claims that absent that acquittal the civil rights case from which the settlement proceeds were derived would not have been possible. The defendant further asserts that he was obliged to pay a $4,000 fee to other counsel who also represented Coffey in the criminal case. For the following reasons, the court holds that the $4,000 fee to other counsel and the defendant’s own fees related to the criminal case must be considered not as fees related to the civil rights case but as liens over which the plaintiff’s lien takes precedence.
The defendant did not submit a fee agreement for the criminal case as part of his evidence. Instead, the fee agreement before the court solely relates to Coffey’s federal civil rights case. It makes no mention of the underlying criminal action. The fee agreement is a contingency agreement that provides that the defendant would only receive compensation in the event Coffey received an amount in recovery or a settlement. If the case went to trial and Coffey prevailed, the defendant would receive a 40 percent contingent fee. The fee agreement, however, also contains a fee conversion provision. Under this fee conversion provision, in the event that Coffey decided to settle the case, the defendant’s fee would be calculated as the greater of a 40 percent contingent fee or the amount of attorneys fees earned through the time of the settlement, computed by multiplying the number of hours worked by the defendant’s $325 hourly rate. It is pursuant to this provision that the defendant initially disbursed to himself a 100 percent fee from Coffey’s settlement fund. According to the defendant’s disbursement sheet, the defendant spent a total of 202.33 hours on Coffey’s case, sixty-six of these which were for representation in the underlying criminal matter. When multiplied by his hourly rate, Coffey’s attorneys fees totaled $65,757.25. Since this figure exceeded the amount the defendant would have recovered under a 40 percent contingency fee, the defendant claimed his hourly rate as his proper fee under the fee agreement, and disbursed Coffey’s entire $47,500 settlement to himself.
The disbursement sheet itself does not indicate the number of hours the defendant spent on Coffey’s criminal case. The defendant, however, indicated that he spent sixty-six hours on the criminal case in his memorandum in opposition to the plaintiff’s summary judgment motion.
Whether the defendant was entitled to disburse the entire settlement fund to himself depends upon whether the court should consider the criminal case as part of the civil one or as a separate matter. The defendant argues that the underlying criminal case should be considered a part of the federal civil rights case because success in the criminal case was indispensable to the viability of the civil rights case. The defendant, however, conceded at oral argument that the plaintiff would prevail should the court determine that the fees from the criminal case were a lien on the recovery from the civil case rather than a part of the whole case. This is because the plaintiff’s child support lien is only subject to reasonable attorneys fees for Coffey’s federal civil rights case, and would prevail over any other lien. To determine whether the fees from the criminal case are a lien on recovery or a part of the civil case, the court looks to the language of the fee agreement. "[W]here there is definitive contract language ... the determination of what the parties intended by their contractual commitments is a question of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cruz v. Visual Perceptions, LLC, 311 Conn. 93, 101, 84 A.3d 828 (2014). "Where the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract is to be given effect according to its terms. A court will not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lisko v. Lisko, 158 Conn.App. 734, 739, 121 A.3d 722 (2015).
Based on the plain language of the fee agreement, the court concludes that the criminal case was a separate action from the civil one. The fee agreement only applies to Coffey’s civil action, and does not mention the underlying criminal case at all. Moreover, even if the fee agreement mentioned the criminal case, such an inclusion would violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, as contingency fees in criminal cases are prohibited. The fees from the criminal case, therefore, are not a part of Coffey’s federal case and instead constitute a lien on any recovery that Coffey received in that action. The plaintiff’s child support lien, which has priority over all other claims except for reasonable attorneys fees, therefore has priority over the defendant’s lien on the settlement proceeds stemming from his representation of Coffey in the underlying criminal matter.
Rule 1.5(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides, in relevant part, that "[a] lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect: ... (2) [a] contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case."
iv. Applicability of General Statutes § 52-251c
Having established that the plaintiff’s child support lien is only subject to the defendant’s reasonable attorneys fees for his representation of Coffey in his federal civil rights action, the court must next determine whether the 100 percent attorneys fee that the defendant charged Coffey was reasonable and, if not, what is a reasonable fee. The plaintiff first argues that the defendant’s fee agreement with Coffey is unreasonable and unenforceable because it does not contain a fee cap in contravention of § 52-251c. The defendant argues that § 52-251c has no applicability to the present action. The court agrees with the defendant.
Section 52-251c provides limitations on contingency fees for certain causes of action. Section 52-251c(a) provides, in relevant part, that "[i]n any claim or civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property ... the attorney and the claimant may provide by contract, which contract shall comply with all applicable provisions of the rules of professional conduct governing attorneys adopted by the judges of the Superior Court, that the fee for the attorney shall be paid contingent upon, and as a percentage of: (1) Damages awarded and received by the claimant; or (2) the settlement amount received pursuant to a settlement agreement." Section 52-251c thus "governs only contingency fee agreements for legal services in civil actions for personal injury, wrongful death or property damage." Disciplinary Counsel v. Smigelski, 124 Conn.App. 81, 85 n.3, 4 A.3d 336 (2010), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 906, 12 A.3d 1004, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 818, 132 S.Ct. 101, 181 L.Ed.2d 28 (2011); see also Engelman v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-92-0337028-S (December 5, 1997, Barnett, J.) (21 Conn.L.Rptr. 100, 101) (noting that defendant appreciated fact that § 52-251c applies only to tort actions enumerated therein). Here, the fee agreement at issue applies only to Coffey’s federal civil rights action. Because § 52-251c only governs the tort actions enumerated within and makes no mention of civil rights actions, it is not applicable to the present case.
v. Whether the Fee Agreement Between the Defendant and Coffey was Reasonable and Conformed to Public Policy
Due to § 52-251c’s inapplicability, the plaintiff’s summary judgment motion thus turns on the question of whether the 100 percent attorneys fee that the defendant charged Coffey was reasonable under public policy considerations and the Rules of Professional Conduct. A review of Connecticut case law does not reveal any cases involving a fee agreement that is substantially similar to the one in the present case. See Noel v. Ribbits, LLC, 132 Conn.App. 531, 35 A.3d 1078 (2011) (fee agreement provided that attorney was to receive the greater of one-third of entire settlement or a court award of reasonable attorneys fees); Lapre v. W & K Property Services, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-10-6013031-S, 2014 WL 783653 (January 17, 2014, Schuman, J.) (57 Conn.L.Rptr. 670) (fee agreement called for one-third contingency fee if case settled or hourly rate fee if case went to trial); Charron v. Griswold, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV- 06-5000849-S, 2009 WL 3086234 (August 21, 2009, Peck, J.) (48 Conn.L.Rptr. 476) (partial contingent fee agreement where attorneys entitled to greater of one-third of gross value of any judgment or verdict or court award of attorneys fees by lodestar method). Although these cases contain hybrid agreements and indicate that such agreements are not per se unreasonable, none of them involve fee agreements that allow an attorney to recover the greater of a contingent fee or the attorney’s hourly rate in the event of a settlement. In most of these cases, any lodestar award of attorneys fees that exceeded the amount the attorney would be entitled to on a contingency fee basis came pursuant to a court award and was paid for by the opposing party. Admittedly, Marcus v. DuPerry, 223 Conn. 484, 611 A.2d 859 (1992), features a fee agreement similar to the one from the present case. In that case, the fee agreement provided that the plaintiff attorney would be paid the greater of the plaintiff’s hourly charge or a 33.33 percent contingency fee. Id., 486-87. The defendant cites this case as controlling precedent for the proposition that courts can enforce a fee agreement that allows an attorney to receive the greater of a contingency fee and an hourly rate. However, unlike the fee agreement at issue in the present case, the hybrid arrangement in Marcus was not activated solely in the event the client decided to settle. The facts of Marcus are therefore distinguishable, and Marcus is not controlling precedent.
The determination of whether the fee agreement in the present case is reasonable and enforceable thus turns on general principles of contract law, the Rules of Professional Conduct and public policy. Generally, "[a] trial court should not depart from a reasonable fee agreement in the absence of a persuasive demonstration that enforcing the agreement would result in substantial unfairness ..." Sorrentino v. All Seasons Services, Inc., 245 Conn. 756, 776, 717 A.2d 150 (1998). "[W]hen a contingency fee agreement exists, a two-step analysis is required to determine whether a trial court permissibly may depart from it in awarding a reasonable fee pursuant to a statute or contract. The trial court first must analyze the terms of the agreement itself ... If the agreement is, by its terms, reasonable, the trial court may depart from its terms only when necessary to prevent substantial unfairness to the party ... who bears the ultimate responsibility for payment of the fee. By contrast, if the trial court concludes that the agreement is, by its terms, unreasonable, it may exercise its discretion and award a reasonable fee in accordance with the factors enumerated in rule 1.5(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Schoonmaker v. Lawrence Brunoli, Inc., 265 Conn. 210, 270-72, 828 A.2d 64 (2003).
Fee agreements, such as the one in the present case, are contracts and are thus subject to basic contract law rules. See Parnoff v. Yuille, 139 Conn.App. 147, 57 A.3d 349 (2012), cert. denied, 307 Conn. 956, 59 A.3d 1192 (2013). "Although it is well established that parties are free to contract for whatever terms on which they may agree ... it is equally well established that contracts that violate public policy are unenforceable ... [T]he question [of] whether a contract is against public policy is [a] question of law dependent on the circumstances of the particular case ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Geysen v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc., 322 Conn. 385, 392, 142 A.3d 227 (2016). In other words, "[i]f a contract violates public policy, this would be a ground to not enforce the contract." Schwartz v. Family Dental Group, P.C., 106 Conn.App. 765, 773, 743 A.2d 1122, cert. denied, 288 Conn. 911, 954 A.2d 184 (2008).
Connecticut recognizes a strong public policy of encouraging the voluntary settlement of civil suits. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mottolese, 261 Conn. 521, 531, 803 A.2d 311 (2002). Connecticut law also establishes that in "the context of settlement agreements, the authority to determine whether and on what terms to settle a claim is reserved to the client except when the client has validly authorized the attorney to make such decisions." (Emphasis in original.) Ackerman v. Sobol Family Partnership, LLP, 298 Conn. 495, 509, 4 A.3d 288 (2010). The Rules of Professional Conduct reflect this general policy. Rule 1.2(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides, in relevant part, that "[a] lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a matter." The official commentary elaborates on this concept further, and unequivocally states that the decision to settle a civil matter must be made by the client. Rules of Professional Conduct 1.2, commentary.
A fee agreement that interferes with a client’s exclusive right to decide to settle a civil action may, therefore, violate public policy and be unenforceable. The Alaska Supreme Court invalidated a fee agreement similar to the one at issue in the present case for this very reason. In Compton v. Kittleson, 171 P.3d 172 (2007), the fee agreement was a hybrid one which provided that the defendant attorney would receive a contingent fee unless his clients settled the case. In the event his clients settled the case for an amount that would pay less than $175 per hour, the defendant’s clients would be required to pay him a fee based on his hourly $175 rate. Id., 173. The opposing party tendered a settlement offer that would have almost fully compensated the clients for their injuries had the defendant’s fee been a straight contingent fee. Id., 179. However, the clients ultimately turned it down because under the fee conversion clause, the defendant’s fee would have completely consumed their recovery. Id. The clients subsequently lost at trial, and had to file for bankruptcy due to a judgment that ordered them to pay the opposing party’s attorneys fees. Id., 173. The bankruptcy trustee then sued the defendant to recover their losses, alleging that the defendant committed legal malpractice because his fee agreement violated the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct. Id.
The Alaska Supreme Court agreed with the bankruptcy trustee’s argument. In its analysis, the court noted that the hybrid agreement "combines two active ingredients into a potent mix: first, it uses the client’s decision to settle as the trigger for converting from contingent to hourly fees; then, once the conversion is triggered, it operates retroactively to encompass all work performed from the inception of the case." Compton v. Kittleson, supra, 171 P.3d 176. It then explained that Alaska’s Rules of Professional Conduct place the decision about whether to settle or drop a case with the client, not with the attorney, and that courts had consistently refused to enforce fee agreement provisions that gave attorneys any control over settlements. Id., 176-77. The court also discussed the rulings of ethics opinions from other states that had found hybrid agreements with conversion clauses similar to the one at issue to be invalid. Id., 178. These Opinion had reasoned that such conversion clauses restrict a client’s ability to accept settlement offers and that they resulted in excessive charges. Id.
Based on this discussion, the court held that the defendant’s fee agreement violated the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct and was unenforceable. In so holding, the court reasoned that the fees that such an agreement would generate in the event of settlement were largely incalculable from the inception of the attorney-client relationship, and that it was "unrealistic to expect that prospective clients ... would be able to appreciate the risks and benefits of the disputed fee provision." Id., 179. The court also noted that it seemed unlikely that the agreement, which contained a single sentence devoted to the fee conversion provision, satisfied "an attorney’s duty to fully explain the terms of a fee agreement in such a way that the client can understand." Id. As a result, the court held that the fee conversion provision impermissibly burdened the client’s right to settle their case, and the court invalidated the fee agreement. Compton v. Kittleson, supra, 171 P.3d 179-80.
In the present case, although Coffey ultimately decided to settle his federal lawsuit unlike the clients in Compton, the principles established in Compton are nevertheless helpful in examining the reasonableness and fairness of the defendant’s fee agreement. Like the Compton fee agreement, the defendant’s fee agreement "uses the client’s decision to settle as the trigger for converting from contingent to hourly fees" and "operates retroactively to encompass all work performed from the inception of the case." See id., 176. This is problematic because the fees that such an agreement generates would be "largely incalculable from the inception of the attorney-client relationship" and it is "unrealistic to expect that prospective clients ... would be able to appreciate the risks and benefits of the disputed fee provision." See id., 179. In the present case, the defendant argues that he explained to Coffey that his fee could dramatically exceed the plaintiff’s recovery and that it could entirely consume it in a worst case scenario. While this may be true, this does not excuse the fact that the defendant’s fee agreement may impermissibly inhibit his clients’ right to settle a case or discourage settlement and encourage a trial despite the fact that a reasonable settlement offer was tendered. Since the Rules of Professional Conduct clearly give clients the exclusive right to settle a case unless they validly authorize their attorney to make such decisions and Connecticut recognizes a strong public policy in favor of settling cases, the defendant’s fee agreement, in particular the fee conversion provision, violates public policy. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mottolese, supra, 261 Conn. 531; Rules of Professional Conduct 1.2. Moreover, even if the fee agreement was reasonable and did not violate public policy, allowing the defendant to disburse Coffey’s entire settlement proceeds to himself as his fee is substantially unfair to Coffey, the party bearing the ultimate responsibility for payment of the fee. See Schoonmaker v. Lawrence Brunoli, Inc., supra, 265 Conn. 270-72. The defendant’s fee agreement, therefore, is unreasonable and unenforceable. See Geysen v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc., supra, 322 Conn. 392. As such, the defendant was not entitled to distribute the entire proceeds from Coffey’s civil rights action, and is instead entitled only to an amount constituting a reasonable fee.
Having reached the conclusion that the fee agreement is unreasonable and unenforceable, the court now exercises its discretion and determines that 50 percent of the gross settlement constitutes a reasonable fee for the representation of Coffey in the civil rights matter. See Schoonmaker v. Lawrence Brunoli, Inc., supra, 265 Conn. 270-72. The court does not find that a reasonable fee, given the limited recovery in the present case, can be based on a straight hourly rate. It is unreasonable to expect a client to pay an attorney a sum greater than recovery for the privilege of bringing a lawsuit. Further, in addition to the public policy considerations articulated in Compton v. Kittleson, the court cannot conceive that sound public policy favors litigation in which the fees of counsel take precedence, and control the resolution of the litigation, to the exclusion of a client’s recovery.
The determination that a 50 percent contingency fee is reasonable is based on a consideration of the factors enumerated in rule 1.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Specifically, the court finds applicable only rule 1.5(a)(1) and (4), as the record does not address any information relevant to any of the other factors enumerated in rule 1.5. Subsection (a)(1) requires the court to consider the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly. This weighs in favor of a significant contingency fee because of the complexity and difficulty of civil rights cases. Subsection (a)(4) requires consideration of the amount involved and the results obtained. In the present case, the recovery of $47,500 represents the results obtained. While the court credits the defendant’s assertion that he spent considerable time in the resolution of the claim, any fee in excess of the 50 percent would be unreasonable. This results in a reasonable fee of $23,750 plus the defendant’s costs in the amount of $1,709.11. These reasonable costs and fees, once subtracted from the settlement of $47,500, result in a net recovery to Coffey in the amount of $22,040.89 which allows for the plaintiff to secure reimbursement of its lien in the amount of $12,250.
For the foregoing reasons, the court finds the issues in favor of the plaintiff and awards it the entirety of the stake at issue, $12,250.