Opinion
No. CV 10 6001580
October 1, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE #106
ISSUE
The issue is whether the court should grant the defendant's motion to strike the sole count of the complaint pursuant to General Statutes § 52-572n (the exclusivity provision of the Connecticut Products Liability Act). The Court holds that the motion to strike should be denied because the complaint alleges sufficient facts to support a cause of action under the products liability act.
FACTS
On February 2, 2010, the plaintiffs, State Farm Fire and Casualty Corporation and David Casella, filed a one-count complaint against Regal-Beloit Corporation alleging misrepresentation, breach of the implied warrantee of merchantability, breach of an express warrantee and negligence. The complaint alleges that on or about January 19, 2007 Casella owned a furnace blower motor which had been "manufactured and/or distributed for sale" by the defendant. The complaint further alleges that on or about that same date the motor malfunctioned and caught fire causing damage to the plaintiff's realty and personalty in the amount of $7,852.14.
On June 8, 2010, the defendant filed a motion to strike the sole count of the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff has failed to allege a cause of action under the products liability act or, in the alternative, because the action is barred by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in General Statutes § 52-557a. The motion was filed with a supporting memorandum of law. The plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion on August 6, 2010. Oral argument on the motion was heard at short calendar on August 9, 2010.
DISCUSSION CT Page 19568
"(a) Whenever any party wishes to contest (1) the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . . that party may do so by filing a motion to strike the contested pleading or part thereof." Practice Book § 10-39(a). "The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). In this context, "[t]he role of the trial court [is] to examine the [complaint] to determine whether the [plaintiff has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378, 698 A.2d 859 (1997). "In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997). "[I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) American Progressive Life Health Ins. Co. of New York v. Better Benefits, LLC, 292 Conn. 111, 120, 971 A.2d 17 (2009). The court must "construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
The defendant argues that the sole count of the complaint should be stricken because it alleges a claim for products liability, but seeks recovery based on common-law causes of action rather than the products liability act. The plaintiffs' respond by arguing that the complaint falls within the purview of the products liability act and therefore presents a claim under the act despite the use of common-law terminology.
The defendant also argues that this action is barred by the three-year statute of limitations contained within General Statutes § 52-577a. The plaintiffs respond by arguing, inter alia, that General Statutes § 52-593a renders this action timely. The plaintiffs are correct.
The term "[p]roduct liability claim includes all claims or actions brought for personal injury, death or property damage caused by the manufacture, construction, design, formula, preparation, assembly, installation, testing, warnings, instructions, marketing, packaging or labeling of any product. Products liability claim shall include, but is not limited to, all actions based on the following theories: Strict liability in tort; negligence; breach of warranty, express or implied; breach of or failure to discharge a duty to warn or instruct, whether negligent or innocent; misrepresentation or nondisclosure, whether negligent or innocent." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 52-572m(b).
The parties agree that the causes of action alleged in the complaint fall within the scope of the products liability act. The complaint alleges that "[t]he defendant . . . is liable and legally responsible . . . in one or more of the following ways (a) in that the defendant . . . misrepresented to the plaintiff and the general public that the furnace blower motor in question was safe for use by the public; (b) in that the defendant . . . breached an implied warranty of merchantability in that said furnace blower motor was not of merchantable quality and fit for its intended purpose and/or use; (c) in that the defendant . . . breached its express warranties that said motor was safe and effected for its intended use; [and] (d) in that the defendant . . . failed to effectuate a recall of the plaintiff's furnace blower motor." These allegations set forth common law causes of action for misrepresentation, breach of the implied warrantee of merchantability, breach of an express warrantee and negligence, respectively. Each of these causes of action appear in § 52-572m(b) and are therefore "products liability claims" and within the scope of the products liability act.
General Statutes § 52-572n of the products liability act provides: "A product liability claim . . . may be asserted and shall be in lieu of all other claims against product sellers, including actions of negligence, strict liability and warranty, for harm caused by a product." Indeed, "[i]t is now beyond dispute that this provision provides the exclusive remedy for a claim falling within its scope, thereby denying a claimant the option of bringing common law causes of action for the same claim." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Allard v. Liberty Oil Equipment Co., 253 Conn. 787, 800, 756 A.2d 237 (2000); see also Winslow v. Lewis-Shepard, Inc., 212 Conn. 462, 52l, 562 A.2d 517 (1989) ("[t]he legislature clearly intended to make our products liability act an exclusive remedy for claims falling within its scope").
While the failure to state the statutory language giving rise to a cause of action within a complaint is generally not fatal to a plaintiff's claim, courts presented with such an absence in the context of the products liability act tend to construe the requirement more strictly. Mazureck v. Great Am. Ins. Co., Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Waterbury, Docket No. X02 CV 01 0177433 (February 10, 2005, Schuman, J.), aff'd, 284 Conn. 16, 930 A.2d 682 (2007), is particularly instructive in this regard and bears quoting at length: "[t]he plaintiffs suggest that, if the court finds that any of the specifications against [the defendant] fall within the products liability act, then the case should proceed on that theory under the current complaint [rather than the common law theory presented in the complaint]. While it is true that the label given [to] a count does not control its legal characterization, that fact does not mean that the plaintiffs may just attach the correct label to their fourth count and then go forward. The cases concluding that counts or complaints labeled as `negligence' actually fell within the products liability statute have not merely overlooked the labeling of the count but rather have affirmed trial court actions granting motions to strike or motions for summary judgment." See Allard v. Liberty Oil Equipment Co., supra, 253 Conn. 790 (affirming granting of motion to strike); Winslow v. Lewis-Shepard, Inc., supra, 212 Conn. 465 (same); Daily v. New Britain Machine Co., 200 Conn. 562, 565-66, 512 A.2d 893 (1986) (affirming grant of summary judgment).
On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed this reasoning, stating: "[t]he plaintiff seems to suggest, however, that the trial court was required to construe his negligence and recklessness claims as a products liability claim if it determined that they fell within the products liability act. We disagree. Practice Book § 10-3(a) provides that, [w]hen any claim made in a complaint, cross complaint, special defense, or other pleading is grounded on a statute, the statute shall be specifically identified by its number. We have held that [a]s long as the defendant is sufficiently apprised of the nature of the action . . . the failure to comply with the directive of Practice Book § 10-3(a) will not bar recovery . . . We also have held, however, that the trial court is not obligated to substitute a cognizable legal theory that the facts, as pleaded, might conceivably support . . . the noncognizable theory that was actually pleaded . . . In the present case, the plaintiff simply did not frame his allegation of a breach of the duty to warn as a products liability claim in his complaint. As the trial court observed, the elements of a negligence claim are not the same as the elements of a products liability claim, and the defenses to the two types of claims are different. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of [the defendant] on the failure to warn allegations." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mazureck v. Great Am. Ins. Co., supra, 284 Conn. 28-29.
Although failure to cite the products liability act by name within the complaint may be fatal to a plaintiffs' complaint, in the present case, our Supreme Court has clearly indicated that the trial court retains discretion to construe the claim more liberally. Id., 28 (stating that the trial court was not "required to construe" claims using common law terminology as products liability claims and that "the trial court is not obligated" to substitute a cognizable legal theory). The complaint sets forth, in a single count, all of the basic elements needed to support a claim under the products liability act and the defendant was therefore sufficiently apprised of the nature of the action from the outset. For these reasons, the defendant's motion to strike is denied.