McHUGH, Chief Justice:

This case is before this Court upon a writ of mandamus wherein the petitioners, the Boards of Education of Grant and Ritchie counties, maintain that W. Va. Code, 18A-4-5, the statute implemented to assist the State in achieving salary equity among the teachers and service personnel of all counties statewide, is unconstitutional. The petitioners further assert that they are entitled to receive state support in order to maintain the minimum salary requirements for teachers and service personnel set forth in W. Va. Code, 18A-4-2 and 18A-4-8a, as amended, despite the statutory provision to the contrary embodied in W. Va. Code, 18A-4-5. The respondents in this case are the Honorable A. James Manchin, Treasurer of the State of West Virginia, Glen B. Gainer, the State Auditor, and the Honorable W. Tom McNeel, the State Superintendent of Schools. After reviewing the petition, the responses and the supplemental information made a part of the record in this case and after hearing argument of counsel, we conclude that the writ should be granted.

I

The petitioners each had an excess levy in effect on January 1, 1984. This local levy was used for various purposes including the supplementation of professional and service personnel salaries and/or wages.

Effective July 1, 1985, the legislature amended W. Va. Code, 18A-4-5 so as to prohibit counties which discontinued county supplements used for salaries after January 1, 1984, from receiving pro rata equitable distribution of state equity funds. As a result of that statutory prohibition, although a county may have lost its excess levy because of defeat at the polls, the State Board of Education could not consider that loss in its distribution of state equity funds.

Grant County's excess levy expired on June 30, 1985, and Ritchie County's excess levy expired in June of 1986. Despite efforts to continue the levies in both counties, they were ultimately rejected by the voters. Grant County unsuccessfully attempted to continue the levy in August, 1984, March, 1985 and November, 1986; Ritchie County's unsuccessful attempts occurred in November, 1985 and February, 1986.

As a result of the requirement in W. Va. Code, 18A-4-5 that such excess levies be considered under the equity funding formula, despite the loss of such funds to those counties after January 1, 1984, the petitioners contend that school service personnel and teacher salaries in their respective counties have dropped below the minimum mandated by W. Va. Code, 18A-4-2 and 18A-4-8a.

The petitioners maintain that the loss of special levy funds in Ritchie County alone has resulted in an annual minimum loss of $900 to a maximum loss of $1174.50 in teacher salaries. Prior to the expiration of the excess levy, the Grant County Board of Education supplemented a teacher with a bachelor's degree and no years of experience in the amount of $1500. After the loss of excess levies for supplementing salaries, the Grant County Board of Education, like the Ritchie County Board of Education, received no increase in state equity funding. The defeat of the excess levies, coupled with the statutory prohibition preventing the increase of state equity funding for salary supplementation, resulted in Grant County's teachers and service personnel being the lowest paid in the State for fiscal year 1987-88.

II

The narrowly drawn issue before this Court in this proceeding is whether the statutory provision of W. Va. Code, 18A-4-5, which was designed to assist the State in attaining salary equity among the teachers and service personnel in all counties throughout the State, is unconstitutional.

The petitioner's primary contention is that W. Va. Code, 18A-4-5, in effect, permits an unequal and discriminatory compensation system which results in a direct reduction in salaries to teachers and school service personnel in the respective counties. They contend that this statute operates to perpetuate the inequalities it was implemented to abolish because counties which never passed excess levies are treated differently from counties which had excess levies as of January 1, 1984, but failed to renew them.

Article 4 of chapter 18A governs the salaries, wages and other benefits provided to school personnel. Specifically, W. Va. Code, 18A-4-2 and W. Va. Code, 18A-4-8a [1986], establish the state minimum salaries for teachers and service personnel. W. Va. Code, 18A-4-5 was enacted to assist the counties, through the State Board of Education, in attaining statewide salary equity "subject to available state appropriations." Pursuant to the salary equity statute, "each teacher and school service personnel shall receive a supplemental amount in addition to the amount from the state minimum salary schedules" provided for in W. Va. Code, 18A-4-2 and 18A-4-8a. See note 1, supra.

W. Va. Code, 18A-4-5a and -5b [1984] establish guidelines in determining county salary supplements for teachers and school service personnel, respectively. These sections both place a limitation upon the amount of the county salary supplement based upon the state minimum salary for the employees set forth in W. Va. Code, 18A-4-2 and 18A-4-8a. However, these statutes fail to address the situation we are presented with in this mandamus proceeding: the status of the state equity supplement when excess levy funds which were available to the county boards on January 1, 1984, are discontinued.

The petitioners have attached exhibits to the record herein which are illustrative of the disparity created by W. Va. Code, 18A-4-5. Together these exhibits demonstrate that on January 1, 1987, twelve West Virginia counties had no excess levies in effect to supplement the salaries of teachers and service personnel. Each county having no excess levy in effect on January 1, 1984, received from the State Board of Education the maximum supplement permitted under W. Va. Code, 18A-4-5. However, the petitioners who had excess levies in effect on January 1, 1984, were supplemented by the State Board of Education only to the extent necessary to bring the salaries in line with the maximum state equity under the equity funding formula, as if the excess levies in the respective counties were still in effect. Thus, after the defeat of the excess levies at the polls, the petitioners received the same state equity funding with no county supplements, while counties which had no excess levy in effect on January 1, 1984, and still have no excess levy financing, receive the maximum state equity funding.

From the foregoing, it is evident that the application of W. Va. Code, 18A-4-5 results in counties which never passed excess levies being treated more favorably than those counties, like the petitioners, which had excess levies in effect on January 1, 1984, but failed to continue them. The petitioners therefore maintain that W. Va. Code, 18A-4-5 is in violation of article XII, section 1 of the West Virginia Constitution.

The first section of our Constitution's education article succinctly states: "The legislature shall provide, by general law, for a thorough and efficient system of free schools."

The constitutional mandate for a thorough and efficient education in no way precludes us from applying the equal protection principles to the present financing system. In fact, under Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W. Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979), the decision to apply an equal protection analysis to the case now before us is compelled.

This Court examined the "thorough and efficient" provision in Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W. Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979). In Pauley, the appellants, parents of children attending public schools in Lincoln County, alleged that the State's system for financing public schools was unconstitutional because it denied their children the "thorough and efficient" education required by article XII, section 1 and denied them equal protection of the law. The Court was particularly directed to inequalities that existed in secondary education opportunity and achievement resulting from imbalanced annual funding, facilities, curriculum and personnel of schools in property-poor counties, compared with those in more wealthy counties in the State.

The Court defined a "thorough and efficient" system of schools as one which "develops, as best the state of education expertise allows, the minds, bodies and social morality of its charges to prepare them for useful and happy occupations, recreation and citizenship, and does so economically." 162 W. Va. at 705, 255 S.E.2d at 877; see also Bailey v. Truby, 174 W. Va. 8, 16, 321 S.E.2d 302, 310 (1984). After reciting its definition of what constitutes a "thorough and efficient" system of schools, the Court concluded in syllabus point 3 of Pauley, supra:

The mandatory requirements of 'a thorough and efficient system of free schools' found in Article XII, Section 1 of the West Virginia Constitution, make education a fundamental, constitutional right in this State.

This Court has repeatedly recognized that where a fundamental, constitutional right is involved and an equal protection challenge is made, the State's action is given a stricter scrutiny, and the State must advance a compelling state interest to uphold the discriminatory classification. See State ex rel. Longanacre v. Crabtree, 177 W. Va. 132, 135, n. 4, 350 S.E.2d 760, 763 n. 4 (1986); Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W. Va. 672, 707, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (1979); Shackleford v. Catlett, 161 W. Va. 568, 572, 244 S.E.2d 327, 330 (1978); State ex rel. Piccirillo v. City of Follansbee, 160 W. Va. 329, 333, 233 S.E.2d 419, 422 (1977); Cimino v. Board of Education, 158 W. Va. 267, 274, 210 S.E.2d 485, 490 (1974). In syllabus point 4 of Pauley v. Kelly, supra, the Court applied the above reasoning in the context of educational financing and ruled:

Because education is a fundamental, constitutional right in this State, under our Equal Protection Clause any discriminatory classification found in the State's educational financing system cannot stand unless the State can demonstrate some compelling State interest to justify the unequal classification.

Thus, under our edict in Pauley v. Kelly, a statute that creates a lack of uniformity in our State's educational financing system is subject to strict scrutiny, requiring a compelling state interest to sustain its constitutionality. See Bailey v. Truby, 174 W. Va. at 23, 321 S.E.2d at 317.

In the case now before us, the petitioners have demonstrated that the statute, W. Va. Code, 18A-4-5 contains an invidious classification which awards state equity funding for salary supplementation purposes in an amount based upon whether or not the particular county had in effect an excess levy to provide additional financing on a particular date. See Pauley v. Kelly, supra at note 2. The respondents have failed to articulate any specific facts that would justify such disparate treatment nor do they point to any legislative history that would indicate any reason for the classification. We can find no compelling state interest to support this discriminatory system of educational financing.

Accordingly, we conclude that W. Va. Code, 18A-4-5, to the extent that it fixes a county's entitlement to state equity funding based upon whether an excess levy was in effect in that particular county on January 1, 1984, and continues to limit that county's funding to the specific amount awarded on January 1, 1984, despite the fact that the county's voters subsequently rejected continuation of the levy at the polls, violates equal protection principles because such a financing system operates to treat counties which never passed excess levies more favorably than those which had excess levies in effect on January 1, 1984, but failed to renew them. W. Va. Const. art. III, §§ 10 and 17.

The present system for financing salary supplements for teachers and school service personnel pursuant to W. Va. Code, 18A-4-5 allocates funds according to a county's ability not only to pass an excess levy but more significantly it is based upon a county's ability to retain the levy. Because of their inability or refusal to continue their respective levies, the petitioners cannot sustain the level of salaries attained by their teaching and service personnel when the excess levies were in effect. Under W. Va. Code, 18A-4-5, the system of allocation of state equity funds for salary supplementation is impermissibly based upon a county's ability to maintain an excess levy. Clearly, this factor bears no relationship to educational needs.

Several courts throughout the country have recognized that a child's education is vitally important, both to the child as an individual and to society as a whole. See, e.g., Pauley v. Kelly, supra; Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221-24, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2396-98, 72 L.Ed.2d 786, 801-03 (1982); Abbott v. Burke, 100 N.J. 269, 295, 495 A.2d 376, 390 (1985) (collecting cases); Washakie County School District No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 333-34 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824, 101 S.Ct. 86, 66 L.Ed.2d 28 (1980). Critical to the fulfillment of this State's responsibility to provide each child enrolled in its public schools with a "thorough and efficient" education is the ability of a county school board to attract, employ and retain a high quality staff of teaching and school service personnel.

As was feared in Pauley v. Kelly, supra, fluctuation in spending patterns has resulted in an unequal distribution of the State's funds earmarked for education. The case now before this Court is illustrative of the classic problem arising when the financing of a school system is based, even partially, on the passing and retention of excess levies. With such disparate treatment of the counties based upon their retention of excess levies, boards of education in counties which have failed to renew levies, like the petitioners, will undoubtedly be incapable of attaining and maintaining a high quality staff of professional and service personnel because salaries in such counties will naturally fall behind those in counties which never had excess levies.

Recently, in State ex rel. Longanacre v. Crabtree, supra, we considered a challenge by magistrates in certain counties claiming that the statute setting their salaries violated equal protection principles. After determining that the challenged statute was, in fact, violative of equal protection concepts, we deferred entry of a final order in the case to accommodate a legislative solution. In Longanacre, we noted that in the past this Court, when confronted with public pay disputes, has, on occasion, stayed the entry of a final order in order to provide the legislature with a reasonable time to correct the deficiency. See, e.g., State ex rel. Partain v. Oakley, 159 W. Va. 805, 227 S.E.2d 314 (1976). This practice is consistent with our policy of adopting the least intrusive remedy when a statute is found to be unconstitutional. Longanacre, supra, 350 S.E.2d at 765.

In Pauley v. Kelly, supra, we determined that the ultimate responsibility for maintaining a thorough and efficient school system falls upon the State. In Pauley, we cited approvingly the language of the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 513, 303 A.2d 273, 294 (1973):

'Whether the State acts directly or imposes the role upon local government, the end product must be what the Constitution commands. A system of instruction in any district of the State which is not thorough and efficient falls short of the constitutional command. Whatever the reason for the violation, the obligation is the State's to rectify it. If local government fails, the State government must compel it to act, and if the local government cannot carry the burden, the State must itself meet its continuing obligation.'

Pauley, 162 W. Va. at 697, 255 S.E.2d at 873 (emphasis added).

Accordingly, we determine that in view of the unconstitutionality of the equity funding formula in W. Va. Code, 18A-4-5, the legislature has the duty to take corrective action to amend the statute. Because some period of time will be necessary for the legislature to develop a statutory financing scheme which will pass constitutional muster, the effect of this decision will be stayed until fiscal year 1988-89 begins.

Writ granted.