Summary
In Gamble, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the Superintendent had the authority to take over and perform law enforcement functions previously vested in the county sheriff and constable.
Summary of this case from St. Louis Cnty. v. StateOpinion
No. 44978.
June 28, 1955.
Quo warranto to oust the Board of Police Commissioners and Superintendent of Police of St. Louis County. Charter counties have dual functions. Sheriffs and constables are county officers within the meaning of the constitutional provisions relating to charter counties. The debates of the 1945 Constitutional Convention are of aid in interpreting such provisions. The ballot covering the charter amendment was sufficient. The St. Louis County police force was validly established. Ouster is denied.
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Counties: Powers of Charter Counties. A county under the special charter provisions of our constitution is possessed to a limited extent of a dual nature and functions in a dual capacity. It must perform state functions over the entire county and may perform functions of a local or municipal nature at least in the unincorporated parts of the county. This is a proper constitutional provision.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Counties: Officers: Charter Counties: Sheriff a County Officer. The sheriff is a county officer within the meaning of the constitutional provisions for county charters.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Counties: Officers: Charter Counties: Constables County Officers. Constables are county officers within the meaning of the constitutional provisions for county charters.
4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Counties: Officers: Debates of Constitutional Convention: Aid to Interpretation. The debates of the 1945 Constitutional Convention are an aid to interpretation of the provisions relating to charter counties.
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Elections: Counties: Charter Amendment: Ballot Sufficient. Enough was printed on the ballot covering the amendment of the charter of St. Louis County to identify the amendment and show its character and purpose. The several parts of the amendment were so related that they form but one rounded whole. The ballot was legal, proper and valid.
6. QUO WARRANTO: Counties: Officers: St. Louis County Charter Amendment: Police Force Valid. The amendment of the charter of St. Louis County is valid and takes precedence over general statutory provisions with respect to the agencies for law enforcement. The Board of Police Commissioners and the Superintendent of Police of St. Louis are properly organized and established in accord with constitutional authority.
OUSTER DENIED.
Carroll J. Donohue and Lynn Meyer for relator.
(1) This court has original jurisdiction over this proceeding and quo warranto is the proper mode of determination of the right of respondents to hold their purported offices. State ex rel. Attorney General v. Vail, 53 Mo. 97; State on inf. Dalton v. Dearing, 263 S.W.2d 381; State ex rel. Taylor v. Cumpton, 240 S.W.2d 877. (2) The purported establishment by St. Louis County of a Department of Police, a Board of Police Commissioners and a Superintendent of Police is wholly invalid, unconstitutional and without legal sanction. The protection of life, liberty and property and preservation of public peace and order is a governmental duty which devolves upon the state and not upon counties save as the state may delegate the same to them. State ex rel. v. Mason, 54 S.W. 524, 153 Mo. 23; Pearson v. Kansas City, 55 S.W.2d 485; State ex rel. v. Jost, 175 S.W. 591. (3) Powers and duties of the sheriff and constables, who are State of Missouri officers and not county officers, are fixed by the laws of the state and may not be destroyed, transferred, altered or abridged by the several counties. State ex rel. v. McKee, 69 Mo. 505; State ex rel. v. Finn, 4 Mo. App. 347; State ex rel. v. Williams, 144 S.W.2d 98; Chapters 57 and 63, RSMo 1949. (4) Article VI, Sections 18 (a) (b) and (c) of the Constitution of the State of Missouri, confer no power on St. Louis County to destroy, transfer, alter or abridge the powers of the sheriff and constables and to usurp the state's law enforcement powers. Missouri Constitution 1945, Art. VI, Secs. 18 (a) (b) (c); McGrew v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 132 S.W. 1076, 230 Mo. 496; Ralls County Court v. U.S., 105 U.S. 733, 26 L.Ed. 1220; State ex rel. v. Canada, 113 S.W.2d 783; Vrooman v. St. Louis, 88 S.W.2d 189; State ex rel. v. Board of Curators, 188 S.W. 128, 268 Mo. 598; State v. Shelby, 64 S.W.2d 269, 333 Mo. 1036; State v. Wilson, 175 S.W. 603, 265 Mo. 1; State v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 240 S.W.2d 886; Lancaster v. County of Atchison, 180 S.W.2d 706, 352 Mo. 1039; Blades v. Hawkins, 112 S.W. 979, 133 Mo. App. 328. (5) The election at which the Police Department charter amendment was adopted was void and the ballot under which the proposition was submitted to the voters was a nullity because of its inaccuracy, vagueness and generality and because it submitted a multiplicity of propositions. State ex rel. v. St. Louis, 5 S.W.2d 1080, 319 Mo. 497; Hart v. Bd. of Education, 252 S.W. 441, 299 Mo. 36; State ex rel. Becker v. Smith, 75 S.W.2d 574, 335 Mo. 1046; State ex rel. v. St. Louis, 11 S.W.2d 1010. (6) The respondents, having assumed and usurped their offices under void ordinances and as a result of a void election, are wholly without right, power, jurisdiction or authority to act in their assumed and usurped capacities and must be ousted therefrom. State ex rel. Harrison v. Frazier, 11 S.W. 973, 98 Mo. 426; State ex rel. Morehead v. Cartwright, 99 S.W. 48, 122 Mo. App. 257; State ex rel. Crain v. Baker, 104 S.W.2d 726.
Herbert C. Funke, Counselor of St. Louis County, and David L. Millar for respondents.
(1) The St. Louis County Charter is the source of the powers and duties of all of its county officers. Missouri Constitution 1945, Art. VI, Sec. 18; State ex rel. Kansas City v. North Kansas City, 228 S.W.2d 762. (2) The Amendment of November 2, 1954, to the St. Louis County Charter and implementing Ordinance No. 570 are legal and valid. The constitutional Charter of St. Louis County is a legislative act, the organic law of St. Louis County, and is the legal equivalent of, and stands on a par with, an Act of the legislature. Tremayne v. St. Louis, 6 S.W.2d 935; Giers Improvement Corp. v. Investment Service, Inc., 235 S.W.2d 355; Turner v. Kansas City, 191 S.W.2d 612; State ex rel. v. Darby, 137 S.W.2d 532; Ex parte Smith, 132 S.W. 607. (3) The making of a municipal Charter under constitutional authority is in itself legislative. Tremayne v. St. Louis, 6 S.W.2d 935; Morrow v. Kansas City, 186 Mo. 685, 85 S.W. 572; Giers v. Investment Service, Inc., 235 S.W.2d 355. (4) The intent of the constitutional provision (Art. VI, Sec. 18) authorizing creation of a county government (distinct from that provided by the legislature) under special charter was to give the voters of the county power to do whatever the legislature could do with respect to the creation, organization, and authority of such county and its officers including its police or other administrative department under such charter. State on inf. of Dalton v. Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 275 S.W.2d 225. (5) The designation of the county law enforcement office and the powers and duties to be given it under a constitutional county government under special charter are matters for the legislative discretion of the voters. State on inf. of Dalton v. Metropolitan Sewer District, 275 S.W.2d 225. (6) The powers which St. Louis County can exercise through the constitutional grant of the right to adopt and amend its own special charter, if unrestrained by constitutional limitation, are all the powers which the people delegate to it under that charter. State ex rel. Kansas City v. North Kansas City, 228 S.W.2d 771. (7) A constitutional charter, such as that of St. Louis County, is the organic law of the county, and Art. VI, Sec. 18, of the Constitution of Missouri, authorizing the adoption of such charters, necessarily implies the power to adopt a complete and harmonious system of county government. City of Kansas City v. Marsh Oil Co., 41 S.W. 943; State ex rel. Kansas City v. North Kansas City, 228 S.W.2d 762; Missouri Constitution 1945, Art. VI, Secs. 18 (b), (c), (e); Sec. 18 of Art. VI of the Constitution of 1945 is a broad grant of legislative power to the electorate of St. Louis County to provide its own special government. State on inf. of Dalton v. Metropolitan Sewer District, 275 S.W.2d 225. (8) Where the Constitution provides for the establishment of county government by special charter with provision for the number, kinds, terms of office of county officers and for the exercise of their powers and duties, the Constitution clearly contemplates that it may provide for such proper officer or officers, by whatever name or designation desired, including a superintendent of police and a police department, as may be necessary for the preservation of the peace and enforcement of law. State on inf. of Dalton v. Metropolitan Sewer District, 275 S.W.2d 225; State ex rel. Kansas City v. North Kansas City, 228 S.W.2d 762. (9) It is is well established that counties have, in addition to the powers expressly granted, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted and also those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the county. Lancaster v. County of Atchison, 180 S.W.2d 706, 352 Mo. 1039; State ex rel. Kansas City v. North Kansas City, 228 S.W.2d 762. (10) The creation of the Board of Police Commissioners, a Department of Police and a Superintendent of Police for St. Louis County and the vesting in such Department and Superintendent law enforcement powers and duties for that county are valid and authorized by the Constitution of Missouri and the Charter of St. Louis County. Missouri Constitution, 1945, Art. VI, Secs. 18 (b), (e); St. Louis County Charter, Amendment of Nov. 2, 1954, Art. II, Secs. 4.10, 4.20, 4.30, 4.40, Secs. 37, 49, 49.10, 49.20. (11) The Amendment to the Charter of St. Louis County and Ordinance 570 implementing that Amendment properly provide for a Department of Police, a Board of Police Commissioners and a Superintendent of Police, as county officers, as required by Art. VI, Sec. 18 (b) of the Constitution of Missouri; and vests in that department and those county officers the exercise of law enforcement powers and duties formerly lodged in the sheriff, a county officer, as also required by Art. VI, Sec. 18 (b) of the Constitution. Constitution of Missouri 1945, Art. VI, Sec. 18 (b); St. Louis County Charter, Amendment of Nov. 2, 1954, Art. II, supra. (12) The sheriff of St. Louis County is a county officer and not a state officer. The constable is likewise a municipal or county officer. State on inf. v. Williams, 144 S.W.2d 98; State ex rel. v. Imel, 146 S.W. 783; State ex rel. v. Finn, 4 Mo. App. 347; 57 C.J., pp. 730, 731; St. Louis County Charter, Art. II, Sec. 3. And no state law can provide otherwise. Missouri Constitution 1945, Art. VI, Sec. 18 (e). The sheriff is not a constitutional officer. Missouri Constitution 1945. (13) A state officer is one whose official duties and functions are coextensive with the boundaries of the state and does not include a sheriff or constables. State ex rel. Holmes v. Dillon, 90 Mo. 229, 2 S.W. 417; State ex rel. Bender v. Spencer, 91 Mo. 296, 3 S.W. 410; 57 C.J., p. 731. (14) The statutory provisions relative to law enforcement duties and powers of sheriffs and constables provided for general application, are not applicable to St. Louis County. The Constitution of Missouri, Art. VI, Secs. 18 (b) and 18 (e) makes inapplicable to constitutional charter counties, of which St. Louis County is one, Secs. 57.010, 57.090, 57.100 and 57.110, RSMo 1949. Constitution of Mo., Art. VI, Secs. 18 (b) and 18 (e). (15) It is only by reason of a constitutional direction that a state statute may supersede a constitutional charter provision. There is no constitutional direction that state statutes shall supersede county constitutional charter provisions nor is there any constitutional or statutory requirement that county constitutional charters shall be consistent with and subject to the Constitution and laws of this state. Tremayne v. St. Louis, 6 S.W.2d 935; State ex rel. v. Kirby, 163 S.W.2d 990; Constitution of Mo., Art. VI, Sec. 18. (16) The statutory provisions of the legislature designating the sheriff's law enforcement powers which were applicable under the old Constitution of 1875 under which the sheriff was a constitutional officer are not applicable to the office of sheriff in St. Louis County under its special charter under the new Constitution. State ex rel. Kansas City v. North Kansas City, 228 S.W.2d 771. (17) The St. Louis County Charter Amendment of November 2, 1954, validly retains in the sheriff and constables of St. Louis County the powers and duties of sheriffs and constables prescribed by statutes of the State of Missouri except with respect to preservation of order, prevention of crimes and misdemeanors, apprehension and arrest, conservation of the peace, and other police and law enforcement functions other than those relating to civil actions and the detention, care, custody and control of persons in the county jail and such assistance in the preservation of the public peace and quiet of the county as they may be called upon to perform by the Superintendent of Police. St. Louis County Charter, as amended Nov. 2, 1954, Art. II, Secs. 4.10, 4.20, 4.30, 4.40; Missouri Constitution 1945, Art. VI, Sec. 18. (18) The ballot used at the election adopting the St. Louis County Charter Amendment was valid. In popular voting upon the adoption of the amendment to the county charter it is neither customary nor necessary to print in extenso the amendment upon the ballot. The ballot is sufficient if enough is printed to identify the amendment and show its character and purpose. State ex rel. v. St. Louis, 5 S.W.2d 1080, 319 Mo. 497; 20 C.J., Sec. 178 (h), p. 150. (19) Section 49.40 of the St. Louis County Charter as amended is valid. The provision of the amendment to the charter (Sec. 49.40) for the Police Department to take over all records, equipment and property relating to law enforcement of any office of the county is proper as all such property is public property and the transfer is mere transfer of custodianship. State on inf. of Dalton v. Metropolitan Sewer District, 275 S.W.2d 225. (20) The writ of ouster should be denied and the validity of the charter amendment and its implementing ordinance upheld by decree. The nature and character of the judgment in quo warranto is largely in the discretion of the court. State ex rel. v. Brackman, 272 S.W.2d 289; State ex rel. v. Wymore, 345 Mo. 169, 132 S.W.2d 979.
Erwin Tzinberg, amicus curiae; Elmer E. Hilpert of counsel.
(1) Does Art. VI, Sec. 18, Missouri Constitution 1945, delegate to the electorate of St. Louis County authority to withdraw law enforcement powers from the duly elected sheriff and invest those powers in a county police force? A state is the one sovereign political entity and all local government is created by this entity. Sec. 70.210, RSMo 1949; Mo. Constitution, 1945, Art. VI, Sec. 18; Secs. 48.020, 72.010- 72.040, RSMo 1949. (2) If the state, by Constitution or by statute, creates all local governmental offices, are admittedly local officers, such as a mayor and councilman, also state officers in the same sense in which a sheriff is a state officer and are also county officers? State ex rel. Carter v. Bolinger, 219 Mo. 204, 117 S.W. 1132; State ex rel. Hanlon v. City of Maplewood, 98 S.W.2d 138. (3) Is the sheriff a county officer within the meaning of Art. VI, Sec. 18, of the Constitution of Missouri, 1945? Chapter 57, RSMo 1949. (4) Is the law enforcement function included in the constitutional delegation of authority to charter counties to provide their own forms of government? Constitution of Missouri, 1945, Art. VI, Sec. 18. (5) Did the electorate of St. Louis County have the power and authority to withdraw law enforcement and invest it in a county police force? McIlwain, Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern, p. 28; Aristotle's Constitution of Athens (Fritz and Kap Translation, 1950).
This information in the nature of quo warranto attacks the authority of the newly created police department of St. Louis County to take over and perform the law enforcement functions heretofore vested in the sheriff and constables of St. Louis County. The proceeding, instituted by the attorney general at the relation of the acting marshal and chief of police of the city of Ladue in St. Louis County, is directed against the members of the board of police commissioners and the superintendent of police of St. Louis County. It is an original remedial writ of which this court has jurisdiction. Sec. 4, Art. V, Constitution of Missouri, 1945.
On March 28, 1950, the county of St. Louis, by a vote of its people, adopted a charter for its own government pursuant to § 18, Art. VI, of the 1945 Constitution of Missouri. Art. II of the charter provided that among the "County Officers" to be elected were four constables and a sheriff. It also provided that the "elective County Officers * * * shall have all the powers and perform all the duties provided by law, except as otherwise provided by this charter" and in the event of a vacancy in any elective county office "the same shall be filled by the County Supervisor subject to confirmation by a majority of the Council." Art. III, § 6 of the charter provided: "The governing body of the County shall be the County Council which, except as otherwise provided in this charter, shall have and exercise all the powers and duties vested in counties and county governing bodies by the Constitution and laws of the State of Missouri and by this charter. All legislative power of the County shall be vested in the Council."
Section 22 of Art. III of the charter provided: "Pursuant to and in conformity with the Constitution of Missouri and without limiting the generality of the powers vested in the Council by this Charter, the Council shall have, by ordinance, the power: * * * (2) To provide for the compensation of elective County officers unless such compensation of all elective officers [658] shall remain the same as now set by law until changed by ordinance."
The charter as permitted by the constitution provided for its amendment "By ordinance adopted by the Council and submitted to the voters at a general or special election and approved by a majority of those voting on the proposition;" St. Louis County Charter, Art. VIII, § 82(2). Thereafter, on August 25, 1954, the county council enacted Ordinance No. 500 which provided for the submission to the voters of St. Louis County of a proposal to amend the county charter. This proposal was adopted by the voters of St. Louis County at the November 2, 1954, election.
The central purpose of the amendment is shown by § 4.10, Art. II of the charter as amended, which reads as follows:
"All powers and duties of the offices of Sheriff and Constables of the County with respect to preservation of order, prevention of crimes, and misdemeanors, apprehension and arrest, conserving the peace, and other police and law enforcement functions other than those relating to civil actions and the detention, care, custody and control of persons or prisoners in the County Jail, provided by law, shall be vested in and performed by the Superintendent of Police and the Department of Police of the County as hereinafter provided, and the Sheriff and Constables of the County shall have no power or duties with respect to the same except when called upon by the Superintendent of Police as hereinafter provided."
Section 49, Article V of the amendment makes provision for a department of police consisting of a board of five police commissioners, a superintendent of police and the department personnel. The superintendent of police is appointed by the board of police commissioners and the superintendent selects the other personnel on the basis of merit.
The substantial duties and powers of the superintendent and the police department appear in the charter as amended, § 49.10 of Art. V, in part, as follows:
"The Superintendent of Police and the Department of Police, including the duly authorized officers, agents and deputized representatives thereof shall have all the powers and perform all the duties of the Sheriff and the Constables, as provided by law, except those powers and duties expressly vested in the Sheriff and Constables of the County under Section 4.10 of this Charter. In addition thereto, the Superintendent and the Department of Police shall enforce the ordinances and orders of the Council, and have such other powers and duties as may be provided by ordinances of the Council, including, but not limited to, the performance of police duties in incorporated areas of the County under contract authorized or entered into by the Council with the governing body of any such incorporated area. He shall also have the power to deputize members of the police departments of the various municipalities of the County under such standards, conditions and regulations as the Board of Police Commissioners shall approve."
Other parts of the charter amendment are more or less definitive and in aid of the provisions quoted. The St. Louis County Council on February 11, 1955, adopted its Ordinance No. 570 implementing the charter amendment with respect to the creation, organization, administration and operation of the police department. Under the terms of the amendment and Ordinance No. 570, the transfer of functions from the offices of sheriff and constables to the department of police is scheduled to become effective July 1, 1955.
The charter of St. Louis County, the amendment, the ordinances attacked and the form of ballot are all before us in their entirety and there is no dispute about the facts. We have been aided by able briefs of the parties and of the St. Louis County Bar Association as amicus curiae. The [659] case is thus submitted without oral argument.
The relator makes numerous attacks upon the right and authority of the respondents to hold and to exercise the powers and duties of the offices of members of the board of police commissioners and of superintendent of police of St. Louis County. Generally, the essence of these charges is the contention that the sheriff and constables of St. Louis County are not county officers within the meaning of § 18 of Art. VI of the Constitution of 1945, but, on the other hand, are state officers performing governmental functions which cannot be taken from them by the charter of St. Louis County. Most of the other contentions are ancillary or supplementary to this central proposition.
If St. Louis County has the right to do what it is undertaking, its authority must be derived from § 18, Art. VI, of the 1945 Constitution. This being so, we must determine the intent and purpose of these constitutional provisions. The section first appeared in the 1945 Constitution and is wholly new. So far as we have been able to discover, it has never been interpreted or construed by this court. Because of the novel provisions of the section, prior decisions are of little help. Fortunately, the intent is expressed with sufficient clarity that few, if any, construction aids are needed.
The sections of Article VI with which we are chiefly concerned are:
"Section 18(a). County Government by Special Charter — Limitation. — Any county having more than 85,000 inhabitants, according to the census of the United States, may frame and adopt and amend a charter for its own government as provided in this article, and upon such adoption shall be a body corporate and politic.
"Section 18(b). Provisions Required in County Charters. — The charter shall provide for its amendment, for the form of the county government, the number, kinds, manner of selection, terms of office and salaries of the county officers, and for the exercise of all powers and duties of counties and county officers prescribed by the Constitution and laws of the state.
"Section 18(c). Provisions Authorized in County Charters — Participation by County in Government of Other Local Units. — The charter may provide for the vesting and exercise of legislative power pertaining to public health, police and traffic, building construction, and planning and zoning, in the part of the county outside incorporated cities; and it may provide, or authorize its governing body to provide, the terms upon which the county shall perform any of the services and functions of any municipality, or political subdivision in the county, except school districts, when accepted by vote of a majority of the qualified electors voting thereon in the municipality or subdivision, which acceptance may be revoked by like vote.
* * * * * *
"Section 18(e). Laws Affecting Charter Counties — Limitations. — Laws shall be enacted providing for free and open elections in such counties, and laws may be enacted providing the number and salaries of the judicial officers therein as provided by this Constitution and by law, but no law shall provide for any other office or employee of the county or fix the salary of any of its officers or employees."
St. Louis County, regardless of its charter, remains a legal subdivision of the state. Art. VI, §§ 1 and 18(a). As such, it is charged with the performance of the state functions just as other counties are. Section 18(b), supra, expressly requires that the charter must provide "for the exercise of all powers and duties of counties and county officers prescribed by the Constitution and laws of the state."
A charter county differs from others chiefly in the form of county government which it may adopt. The charter must provide [660] for the structure of county government and shall provide for "the number, kinds, manner of selection, terms of office and salaries of the county officers." Section 18(b), supra. In fact, the General Assembly is prohibited from providing for any office or employee of the county or fixing the salary of any of its officers or employees other than election and judicial offices and officers. Section 18(e), supra. This is an express limitation on the legislative power.
Moreover, charter counties are endowed with some of the powers and functions of a municipal corporation in the area outside incorporated cities. They are empowered to exercise legislative power pertaining to public health, police and traffic, building construction, and planning and zoning in such areas. Section 18(c), supra. These are police powers ordinarily vested in municipal corporations. See, for example, §§ 73.010 and 73.110, RSMo 1949, relating to the organization and powers of cities of the first class. A county under the special charter provisions of our constitution is possessed to a limited extent of a dual nature and functions in a dual capacity. It must perform state functions over the entire county and may perform functions of a local or municipal nature at least in the unincorporated parts of the county. These are constitutional grants which are not subject to, but take precedence over, the legislative power. St. Louis County alone has the right to determine "the number, kinds, manner of selection, terms of office and salaries" of its county officers. There can be no doubt that this is a proper constitutional provision, since the people of the state are sovereign (Art. I, § 1) and they "have the inherent, sole and exclusive right to regulate the internal government and police thereof * * *." Art. I, § 3. The constitution is harmonious in recognizing an exception to the provision for general laws for the organization and classification of counties. Art. VI, § 8.
In the case of State on inf. of McKittrick v. Williams, 346 Mo. 1003, 144 S.W.2d 98, a sheriff was held to be a county officer within the meaning of a constitutional provision authorizing the General Assembly to provide for the removal from office of county officers. It was pointed out in this case that the words "state officer" are generally used to refer to officers whose official duties and functions are co-extensive with the boundaries of a state and not to a sheriff whose functions are confined to his county and who is commonly known as and called a county officer. There is now even less reason for doubt that a sheriff is a county officer, since the 1945 Constitution eliminated the sheriff as a constitutional officer. Our state statutes tend generally to classify the sheriff at the county level. For instance, § 57.080, RSMo 1949, provides that when the office of sheriff becomes vacant it shall be filled by the county court.
We hold that the sheriff is a county officer within the meaning of the constitutional provisions for county charters, and particularly §§ 18(b) and 18(e), Art VI. This clearly appears from the language of the pertinent sections. The result is that provision must be made by the charter county for the performance of the duties enjoined upon sheriffs by our statutes, but the county has the choice as to what officer or agency will be designated to perform the duties. Or the duties may be divided for the purpose of performance as provided by the amendment to the St. Louis County Charter.
What we have said with respect to the sheriff's office applies with even greater force to the constables of St. Louis County. The territorial jurisdiction of a constable is even more limited, and § 63.050 of our statutes provides that the county court shall appoint a constable if a vacancy shall occur in that office. We also hold that the constables of St. Louis County are county officers as that term is used in the various parts of § 18, Art. VI of the Constitution.
The records and debates of the 1943-44 Constitutional Convention fortify our conclusion as to the purpose and intent of these county charter provisions of the constitution. [661] Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution was § 20 of File No. 12 which was the report of the Committee on Local Government (City of St. Louis, St. Louis County and Jackson County), No. 8. During the consideration by the convention of this file and section, Delegate Charles H. Mayer, a member of the committee and one of the advocates of the provision, stated: "Of course, officers would have the same power inside the city as outside to enforce the state laws, to enforce any state law * * *. It couldn't enforce those local regulations inside the city but it would enforce the state laws just the same as any other county would do it." Transcript of Debates, page 2127. And further, on pages 2127 and 2128 of the transcript, this exchange occurred:
"MR. MAYER: Well, you may notice in Section 2 [a part of § 20] that it provides what the charter may provide for. It says what officers the county shall have — their selection and their terms of office and their salary. The exercise of powers vested in [and] the performance of all duties imposed upon counties and county officers by the Constitution [and] laws of the State.
"MR. TEE: May I inquire further? You mention that the new governmental creature here would determine what officers they would have. Now, if determining those officers they would or would not determine to have a sheriff, would they . . .
"MR. MAYER (Interrupting): They might call him anything but they must provide some officer to carry out the laws of the State." (Italics added.)
It is proper to consult the proceedings and debates of the Constitutional Convention even though they are never of binding force on the courts and their persuasive value depends upon the circumstances of each case. See Household Finance Corporation v. Shaffner, 356 Mo. 808, 203 S.W.2d 734, 737; Ex parte Oppenstein, 289 Mo. 421, 233 S.W. 440, 444; State ex rel. Aqamsi Land Co. v. Hostetter, 336 Mo. 391, 79 S.W.2d 463, 469; and State ex rel. Russell v. State Highway Commission, 328 Mo. 942, 42 S.W.2d 196, 202; 11 Am. Jur. 707.
The relator contends that the ballot under which the proposition was submitted to the voters was a nullity "because of its inaccuracy, vagueness, and generality and because it submitted a multiplicity of propositions," and therefore that the election at which the charter amendment was adopted was void. The official ballot, except for the voting spaces, reads as follows:
"SHALL THE CHARTER OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY BE AMENDED AS PROPOSED BY ORDINANCE NO. 500, 1954, ENACTED BY THE ST. LOUIS COUNTY COUNCIL ON THE 25TH DAY OF AUGUST, 1954?
"Said Charter as so amended would provide for the establishment and operation of a County Department of Police, for the transfer to such Department of all police powers and duties now vested in the Sheriff and Constables of St. Louis County, for the administration of such Department by a Superintendent of Police appointed by a Citizens Board of Police Commissioners, for the establishment of rules and regulations relating to the employment, promotion and retention of employees in such Department, for the powers and duties of the Supervisor, Sheriff and Constables of St. Louis County, and for the establishment of a Department of Justice, all as provided in Ordinance No. 500, 1954, enacted by the St. Louis County Council on the 25th day of August, 1954."
It was not necessary to reproduce on the ballot the charter amendment in its entirety. Enough was printed on the ballot to identify the amendment and show its character and purpose. The ordinance reference was sufficient for those who were interested in further details. State ex rel. Harry L. Hussman Refrigerator and Supply Co. v. City of St. Louis, 319 Mo. 497, 5 S.W.2d 1080, 1085.
[662] The charter was amended in six different places in order to accomplish the purpose of the amendment and to harmonize the charter provisions with respect thereto. The new Department of Police was added to the departments listed in § 37, and to avoid confusion with this new department, the name of the Department of Law Enforcement was changed to the Department of Justice in § 46 and elsewhere where it occurred in the charter. However, the several parts of the amendment submitted were "plainly so related that, united, they form in fact but one rounded whole" and cannot be said to submit a multiplicity of purposes. Hart v. Board of Education of Nevada School District, 299 Mo. 36, 252 S.W. 441, 442. We rule this assignment against the relator and hold that the ballot provided was a legal, proper and valid one.
It follows from what we have said that Ordinance No. 500 enacted August 25, 1954, the charter amendments approved November 2, 1954, and Ordinance No. 570 enacted February 9, 1955, dealing as they do with the mechanics of law enforcement in St. Louis County, are in harmony with the 1945 Constitution of Missouri. The charter as amended and the ordinances are valid enactments and take precedence over general statutory provisions with respect to the agencies for law enforcement in the various counties of the state, being exceptions thereto provided by the constitution. Tremayne v. City of St. Louis, 320 Mo. 120, 6 S.W.2d 935, 940-941. The amended charter and these ordinances of St. Louis County make adequate provision for the enforcement of state laws in St. Louis County. The sheriff and the constables of St. Louis County are bound by the provisions of the charter as amended and by the ordinances specified.
Relator's duties with respect to the enforcement of the laws of the State of Missouri and the ordinances of the city of Ladue remain unaffected by the charter amendments and these ordinances; he simply deals with and cooperates with a different officer or agency of St. Louis County. This is also true of the other members of the police departments of the various municipalities located in St. Louis County.
The relator places great reliance upon the case of State ex rel. v. Mason, 153 Mo. 23, 54 S.W. 524, which was a mandamus action by the police commissioners of the city of St. Louis against the state auditor to compel him to issue warrants for the payment of the monthly payroll and police expenses. As we have observed previously, the county charter provisions are wholly unlike others in the constitution. The sections of the constitution relating to county charters specifically provide what the county must do with respect to performing state and constitutional functions, and further states what the legislature cannot do. We have considered carefully the numerous other cases and authorities cited by the relator. It would unduly lengthen this opinion and serve no good purpose to discuss each of them in detail. It is sufficient to say that they are not controlling in ruling the matter now before the court.
We have considered all of relator's contentions and find that they are not well taken. We hold that the board of police commissioners and the office of superintendent of police of St. Louis County are properly organized and established in accordance with constitutional authority; that the challenged powers are proper and valid; and that the respondents, Clark B. Gamble, Irving Edison, Walter L. Metcalfe, Arthur B. Baer and Frank P. Aschemeyer, are the duly authorized members of the board of police commissioners of St. Louis County, Missouri, and that the respondent Albert E. DuBois is the duly authorized superintendent of police of St. Louis County, Missouri.
The judgment of ouster is denied. All concur.