Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Marin County Super. Ct. No. CV072244
Jenkins, J.
The question here is whether the insurance policies at issue violate “the well established rule that an exclusion clause . . . cannot be upheld unless the clause is phrased in clear and unmistakable language.” (California State Auto. Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Warwick (1976) 17 Cal.3d 190, 194 (Warwick).) We conclude they do not. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff and respondent State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) on its complaint for declaratory relief against defendants and appellants Susan Ranft and her minor children, Sophia and Jordan Ranft (jointly “the Ranfts”).
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In August 2003, State Farm issued automobile insurance policy number G16 4188-E02-05E (auto policy) to Susan Ranft and her husband, Joseph Ranft, covering their 2004 Honda Element. State Farm also issued a personal liability umbrella policy number 05-NA-0883-8 (umbrella policy) to Susan and Joseph Ranft. Both policies were in effect on August 16, 2005.
On August 16, 2005, Joseph Ranft was traveling in Mendocino County on State Route 1 as a passenger in his Honda Element driven by Elegbra Earl. Both Joseph Ranft and Elegbra Earl were killed when the vehicle went off the road and plunged into the water below. On January 19, 2007, the Ranfts filed a wrongful death action seeking damages against the State of California, the estate of Elegbra Earl and Kathleen Rzeplinski, the driver of another vehicle involved in the accident. The complaint in the wrongful death action alleged the State of California was responsible for creating and maintaining a defective and dangerous condition at the location of the accident. The complaint also alleged that the negligence of Earl and Rzeplinski caused the accident.
On May 11, 2007, State Farm sued the Ranfts seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the Estate of Elegbra Earl (“Earl”) in the Ranfts’ wrongful death action as a result of applicable exclusion clauses in Ranfts’ State Farm insurance policies. On November 2, 2007, State Farm filed its motion for summary judgment arguing that coverage for the Ranfts’ claims against Earl was excluded as a matter of law. After oral argument on January 18, 2008, the court granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm. An order granting State Farm’s motion for summary judgment was filed on February 4, 2008. Judgment in favor of State Farm was entered on February 21, 2008, and the Ranfts filed a timely notice of appeal on March 7, 2008.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Legal Standards
“Where a case turns on the interpretation of an insurance policy, the court reviews the policy’s terms under the ordinary rules of contract interpretation. (Citation.) If the policy language is clear and explicit, it governs. (Citation.) If the policy terms are ambiguous or uncertain, the court must attempt to determine whether coverage is consistent with the insured’s objectively reasonable expectations. (Citation.) If this rule does not resolve the ambiguity, it must be resolved against the insurer. (Citation.)
“In determining whether an ambiguity exists, the words of the policy must be interpreted according to the plain meaning that a layman would ordinarily attach to them. (Citation.) Policy language is ambiguous when it reasonably may be interpreted in two or more ways. (Citation.) ‘Courts will not adopt a strained or absurd interpretation in order to create an ambiguity where none exists.’ (Citation.) Moreover, the language must be interpreted in the context of the policy as a whole, and in light of the circumstances of the case. It cannot be deemed to be ambiguous in the abstract. (Citation.)” (Mercury Ins. Co. v. Pearson (Jan. 5, 2009, A119346) ___ Cal.App.4th ___ [2008 Cal.App. Lexis 2481 at pp. *9-10] [italics in original].)
B. Relevant Policy Provisions
1. The Auto Policy
In the coverage section of the auto policy, State Farm undertakes to “pay damages which an insured becomes legally liable to pay because of . . . bodily injury to others[.]” The policy defines “an Insured ” as “ you ; your spouse ; . . . any other person while using such a car and its use is within the scope of consent of you or your spouse .” The policy’s definition of “an Insured” also includes “the relatives of the first person named in the declarations.”
Unless otherwise noted, the use of bold, italics and capitals in the quoted text is as shown in the insurance policies.
The auto policy contains the following exclusion clause: “THERE IS NO COVERAGE . . . FOR BODILY INJURY TO ANY INSURED .” The auto policy defines “bodily injury” as “injury to a person and sickness, disease or death which results from it.”
2. The Umbrella Policy
The insuring clause in the umbrella policy states: “If you are legally obligated to pay damages for a loss, we will pay your net loss minus the retained limit.” “You” refers to the “insured” as defined in the policy. “Insured” is defined as “the named insured [and] a person . . . while using . . . an automobile . . . owned by . . . the named insured, provided that the named insured gave permission for the type of use.” The definition of “Insured” also includes “b. the following residents of the named insured’s household: (1) the named insured’s relatives.” Also, the umbrella policy defines “loss” as “an accident that results in personal injury . . . during the policy period.”
It is undisputed Susan and Joseph Ranft were named insureds under both the auto and the umbrella policy, that their minor children Jordan and Sophie were insureds under both policies, and Earl was an insured under both policies because when the accident occurred Earl was operating the Ranfts’ vehicle with the permission of Joseph Ranft.
The umbrella policy contains the following exclusion clause: “We will not provide insurance . . . for personal injury to the named insured, spouse, or anyone within the meaning of part a. or b. of the definition of insured.” The umbrella policy defines “personal injury” as “bodily harm, sickness, disease, shock, mental anguish or mental injury. This includes required care, loss of services and death resulting therefrom.”
C. Analysis
The Ranfts contend that the policy language which excludes coverage in each policy is ambiguous in two respects. First, the Ranfts argue that the exclusion set forth in each policy is ambiguous because the policy language could reasonably be construed: (1) to preclude coverage where an insured seeks coverage for his or her own injuries up to and including death or (2) to preclude coverage for any person suing for personal or bodily injuries to any insured up to and including death. Second, the Ranfts contend that the policies are ambiguous because they do not expressly exclude coverage for permissive users in defending against wrongful death actions. We shall address each contention in turn.
Any suggestion that the exclusion clauses at issue violate public policy is without merit. It is well settled that policy exclusions for injury to insureds do not violate public policy because they are expressly sanctioned under Section 11580.1, subdivision (c) of the Insurance Code (section 11580.1), which “itself constitutes and expresses [public] policy. (Citation.)” (Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Cocking (1981) 29 Cal.3d 383, 388, italics omitted, (Cocking).)
Having carefully examined the language excluding coverage in each policy, we find the Ranfts’ contentions unavailing. As noted above, an exclusion clause is ambiguous only when it “reasonably may be interpreted in two or more ways [and] ‘[c]ourts will not adopt a strained or absurd interpretation in order to create an ambiguity where none exists.’ ” (Mercury Ins. Co. v. Pearson, supra, 2008 Cal.App. Lexis at pp. *9-10; accord Powerine Oil Co., Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 37 Cal.4th 377, 390 [“A policy provision will be considered ambiguous when it is capable of two or more constructions, both of which are reasonable.”].)
Here, the Ranfts’ assertion that the exclusion clauses can be read to only exclude coverage to a permissive user when that user seeks to recover for his or her own injuries is patently unreasonable because it is inconsistent with the plain language in the policies and seeks to create an ambiguity where none exists. The exclusion clause in the auto policy precludes coverage for bodily injury to “ANY” insured. The exclusionary language in the umbrella policy is equally explicit in precluding coverage for personal injury to the named insureds and any relatives residing in their household. Interpreted according to its plain meaning, the clear and explicit contractual language of the exclusionary clauses means that coverage is precluded for bodily or personal injury to any person insured under the policies. Such comprehensive exclusionary language cannot reasonably be read as limiting the exclusion only to an insured who seeks coverage for his or her own injuries.
Indeed, other courts have found no ambiguity in similar exclusionary language. For example, in Warwick, supra, Bernice Warwick sued her husband Harry for personal injuries sustained in an accident which occurred while she was a passenger in a vehicle insured and driven by Harry. (Warwick, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 192.) The policy excluded coverage for liability for “bodily injury to any insured.” (Id. at p. 193.) The policy defined an “insured” to include the named insured (Harry) and “his spouse, if a resident of the same household.” (Id. at p. 192.) It was undisputed that at the time of the accident Bernice and Harry “were wife and husband residing in the same household.” (Ibid.) The trial court declared that the insurer had no duty to defend Harry in Bernice’s suit against him, and the Warwicks appealed. (Ibid.) On appeal, the Warwicks argued “that the exclusion of coverage for injury to ‘any insured’ can be interpreted reasonably as excluding only injuries sustained by the insured driver.” (Warwick, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 194.) The Supreme Court rejected the Warwicks’ interpretation. “Under this interpretation of the exclusion clause,” the court stated, “any person insured under the policy would be entitled to indemnity if he sustained injury while riding as a passenger in the insured vehicle.” (Ibid.) Rather, the court held, “In view of the popular and accepted meaning of the word ‘any,’ the term ‘any insured’ unmistakably refers to any person insured under the policy, whether such person is a named or unnamed insured, a driver or a passenger.” (Id. at p. 195.) Thus, the court concluded that “the exclusion clause in the policy is susceptible to only one interpretation by the lay reader: that the insurer would not pay indemnity for injuries suffered by Bernice Warwick while she was riding as a passenger in the insured vehicle.” (Ibid.; see also Meritplan Ins. Co. v. Woollum (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 167, 170 [auto policy excluding coverage for “bodily injury to (1) the spouse or any parent, son, or daughter of the insured, or (2) the named insured” was unambiguous and precluded coverage for injuries to wife sustained while riding as a passenger in an automobile registered in husband’s name and driven by him].) In sum, the language of the Ranfts’ auto and umbrella policies is not ambiguous and clearly excludes coverage for claims seeking damages for bodily and personal injury to any insured which results in death. Thus, the policies do not cover the Ranfts’ claims against Earl for the injuries to Joseph Ranft which resulted in his death.
The Ranfts’ reliance on State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jacober (1973) 10 Cal.3d 193 (Jacober) is misplaced. The issue in Jacober was whether a State Farm auto policy covered a permissive user of the insured vehicle sued for negligence in causing injury or death to the owner of the vehicle. (Jacober, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 196.) The policy covered permissive users of the owned automobile for liability to “other persons” but excluded liability coverage for “bodily injury to the insured.” (Ibid.) The court declined to enforce the exclusion. The court agreed that the exclusion provision was reasonably susceptible of claimants’ interpretation that coverage is excluded “only for injuries sustained by the ‘insured’ seeking the protection of the insurance policy in the particular case at hand.” (Jacober, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 207.) Unlike Jacober, however, the exclusion clauses at issue here apply unambiguously and comprehensively to “any” person insured under the policy, and are not limited, as in Jacober, by the singular and ambiguous term, “the” insured.
We turn next to the Ranfts’ contention that the policies are ambiguous because they do not expressly exclude coverage for permissive users in defending against wrongful death actions by heirs of the deceased. Despite the Ranfts’ assertions to the contrary, the weight of authority holds that coverage for a wrongful death action arising from the death of an insured is excluded where the policy defines bodily injury to include death.
Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Stratton (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 612 (Stratton) exemplifies that authority. Louise Stratton was killed while riding as a passenger in her car as it was being driven by Gerald Apoian with Stratton’s permission. Stratton’s minor children filed an action for her wrongful death through their guardians. The trial court denied Farmers request for declaratory relief that it did not have to defend against the wrongful death action. (Id. at p. 614.)
The appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial court. (Stratton, supra, 145 Cal.App.3d at p. 616.) The court first noted that in Cocking, supra, the California Supreme Court held that “Farmers’ ‘named insured’ exclusion is authorized by Insurance Code section 11580.1, subdivision (c)” and stated that the purpose of the exclusion “ ‘is to prevent suspect inter-family legal actions which may not be truly adversary and over which the insurer has little or no control.’ ” (Stratton, supra, 145 Cal.App.3d at p. 615, quoting Cocking, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 389.)
Turning to the question of whether Cocking and the ‘named insured’ exclusion in the policy barred wrongful death actions against non-family members, the Stratton court drew upon our reasoning in Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Brown (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 120, in which “the adult children of Mr. and Mrs. Brown commenced a wrongful death action against their father for the death of their mother which ensued as a result of her riding as a passenger in a vehicle driven by him.” (Stratton, supra, 145 Cal.App.3d at pp. 615-616.) The Stratton court noted that in Brown, supra, we held that the ‘named insured’ exclusion applied to the heirs since any other construction would “ ‘permit an insurer to exclude coverage for any injury to an assured, however permanent and crippling, but would bar such exclusion if the injury resulted in death. That construction unjustifiably assumes a legislative illiberality to the maimed [expressed in section 11580.1], in contrast to an oddly inconsistent concern for adult heirs of the dead.’ ” (Stratton, supra, 145 Cal.App.3d at p. 616, quoting Brown, supra, 252 Cal.App.2d at p. 123.)
Adopting our reasoning in Brown, supra, the Stratton court stated: “Common sense dictates that the Brown reasoning is sound. There is nothing to indicate that Cocking would sanction the incredible position that the family of a ‘named insured’ who has become crippled by an accident should be ‘punished’ because he has inconsiderately failed to die.” (Stratton, supra, 145 Cal.App.3d at p. 616.) On this basis the court concluded the ‘named insured’ exclusion in the Farmers policy excludes coverage for a wrongful death action commenced against an unrelated party. (Ibid.)
The court further concluded that “it is clear that the ‘named insured’ exclusion includes wrongful death actions.” (Stratton, supra, 145 Cal.App.3d at p. 616.) Noting that “the policy excludes ‘liability . . . for bodily injury to the named insured,’ and defines bodily injury as including ‘death at anytime resulting therefrom[,]’ ” the court stated that “[t]his language has already been held to be unambiguous, and effectively excludes wrongful death claims arising by reason of the death of an insured. (Citation.)” (Ibid.; see also California State Auto. Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Antonelli (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 113, 122 [insurer not obligated to defend permissive driver in wrongful death action by parents of car owner killed in an accident while riding as a passenger because ‘bodily injury’ “is unambiguously defined to include death”]; Brown, supra, 252 Cal App.2d at pp. 122-123 [insurer not obligated to defend wrongful death action against husband by wife’s adult children where wife died from injuries sustained in accident while riding as passenger in vehicle driven by husband].) In sum, we conclude that based on the foregoing authorities, the Rafts’ action for wrongful death based on Joseph’s injuries and resulting death is clearly excluded under the policies.
We note that in Brown, supra, Justice Salsman dissented on the grounds the policy did not specifically exclude a wrongful death action in which heirs sought damages on a claim “wholly separate and distinct” to that of the ancestor. (Brown, supra, 252 Cal.App.2d at p. 124, Salsman, A.J., dissenting.)
The Ranfts urge us to repudiate these authorities and adopt the reasoning of Interinsurance Exchange v. Campbell (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 242 (Campbell). The Campbell court, noting Justice Salsman’s dissent in Brown, supra, stated that an action by children for wrongful death of a parent is “a new cause of action based upon their pecuniary loss and distinct from any the parent might have maintained had he or she survived.” (Id. at p. 246.) “[R]espectfully disagree[ing] with the holdings in Brown and Stratton,” the Campbell court opined that “[t]he exclusion of policy coverage for the death of an insured occasioned by an insured under the same policy does not compel the conclusion an uninsured third party claim for the wrongful death of an insured is likewise excluded.” (Id. at pp. 246-247, italics added.) Nevertheless, although disagreeing with Brown and Stratton, the Campbell court affirmed the judgment under the doctrine of stare decisis, stating: “We assume the insurance industry in determination of policy language and rate fixing has relied on Brown, decided in 1967, as affirmed in 1983 by Stratton. While we believe those cases were wrongly decided, an ordered jurisprudence suggests the conflict should be reviewed by higher authority.” However, the Supreme Court subsequently denied review in Campbell. Moreover, even if the rationale of Campbell was applicable here, it would not compel reversal. The crucial factual distinction between Campbell and this case is that in Campbell the adult children were not residents of the household and therefore were not insureds under the policy (Campbell, supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at p. 244), whereas here it is undisputed the minor children are insureds under the policies.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Pollak, Acting P. J., Siggins, J.