Opinion
Submitted October 21, 1996.
Editorial Note:
This opinion appears in the Federal reporter in a table titled "Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions". (See FI CTA9 Rule 36-3 regarding use of unpublished opinions)
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, No. CV-94-00090-BJR; Barbara J. Rothstein, Chief Judge, Presiding.
W.D.Wash.
AFFIRMED.
Before: BEEZER, KOZINSKI, and KLEINFELD, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3.
Clyde Sprague appeals pro se the district court's summary judgment for the defendants in his action asserting violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1961-1968, due process violations, and supplemental state claims because they were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Kruso v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 872 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 937 (1990), and we affirm.
On October 13, 1994, the district court entered (1) an order granting defendants Lenihan and Schwabe, Williamson, Wyatt & Lenihan's ("Schwabe") motion for summary judgment of dismissal; (2) an order granting the Schwabe's motion for injunctive relief; and (3) an order granting Takahiro, Kiyotaka, Jill, Jackie, and Kobayashi America's ("Koybayashi") motion for summary judgment and injunctive relief. Sprague appeals all three orders.
Federal courts must give the same preclusive effect to a state court judgment as another court of that state would give. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738; Palomar Mobilehome Park Ass'n. v. City of San Marcos, 989 F.2d 362, 364 (9th Cir.1993). Under Washington state law, res judicata bars relitigation of claims the were or should have been decided among the parties in an earlier proceeding. See Loveridge v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 887 P.2d 898, 900 (1995) (en banc).
Here, the defendants and factual allegations in Sprague's present federal and prior state actions are identical. Final judgment was entered on the merits of the claims asserted in the prior state court proceedings thereby barring relitigation of those claims in federal court. See id. In addition, Sprague's state RICO claim is also barred by res judicata because he could have asserted it in his prior state court actions. See id. Finally, because state courts are as competent as federal courts to decide due process and RICO claims, Sprague could have raised those claims in his prior state court action. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990). Because he failed to do so, those claims are also barred by res judicata. See Hoffman Constr. Co. v. Active Erectors & Installers, 969 F.2d 796 (9th Cir.1992) cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by staying discovery pending its determination of the defendant's summary judgment motion. See Wood v. McEwen, 644 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir.1981) (per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 942 (1982).
Sprague also contends that the district court abused its discretion by issuing an injunction preventing him from filing further lawsuits against the Schwabe and Kobayashi defendants without the court's permission. This contention lacks merit.
Under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, district courts have the power to reinforce the effects of res judicata and collateral estoppel by issuing an injunction against repetitive litigation. See Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 705 F.2d 1515, 1524 (9th Cir.1983), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1081 (1987). Here, Sprague demonstrated his intention to continually litigate the issues that were decided by the Washington State Court of Appeals by filing three additional lawsuits against these defendants based on the same factual allegations. Because the district court structured the injunction to prevent only those actions which would be barred by res judicata, the district court did not abuse its discretion. See id.
AFFIRMED.
See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); 9th Cir.R. 34-4.