Opinion
No. 1 CA-JV 15-0328
02-25-2016
ZACHARY H., ALEXANDRA S., Appellants, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, T.H., Appellees.
COUNSEL John L. Popilek, P.C., Scottsdale By John L. Popilek Counsel for Appellant Zachary H. Maricopa County Public Advocate, Mesa By Suzanne Sanchez Counsel for Appellant Alexandra S. Arizona Attorney General's Office, Mesa By Michael F. Valenzuela Counsel for Appellees
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JS17737
The Honorable Bruce R. Cohen, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL John L. Popilek, P.C., Scottsdale
By John L. Popilek
Counsel for Appellant Zachary H. Maricopa County Public Advocate, Mesa
By Suzanne Sanchez
Counsel for Appellant Alexandra S. Arizona Attorney General's Office, Mesa
By Michael F. Valenzuela
Counsel for Appellees
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined. HOWE, Judge:
¶1 Zachary H. ("Father") and Alexandra S. ("Mother") appeal the juvenile court's order terminating their parental rights to T.H., born February 2014, on ground of fifteen months in out-of-home placement pursuant to court order. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 In April 2014, T.H. came into the care of the Department of Child Safety ("Department") because of concerns about ongoing domestic violence between Father and Mother. Although a dependency case preceded the Department's petition to terminate parental rights, originally filed in November 2014 and amended in August 2015, this appeal arises out of the juvenile court's order granting the Department's petition to terminate. The Department sought termination based on history of chronic substance abuse, six months in out-of-home placement, and fifteen months in out-of-home placement. Accordingly, the facts and procedural history are those relevant leading up to the court's order granting the Department's petition for termination.
1. Pre-Petition Domestic Violence Incidents
¶3 In April 2014, Father, Mother, and T.H. were living with the baby's maternal grandmother, even though Father was on probation for domestic violence he had inflicted upon Mother. That month, the Department received a report that the police had been to the home because of domestic violence and that maternal grandmother was no longer willing to allow Father, Mother, or T.H. to stay with her. After the Department unsuccessfully attempted to place T.H. with other family members and after Father and Mother could not find housing where they could receive in-home services, the Department placed T.H. in a licensed foster home.
¶4 The Department listed the case plan as family reunification with a concurrent plan of severance and adoption. Father and Mother's case manager subsequently received information about another child protective services case from Ohio regarding their other child. While speaking with their Ohio case manager, the Department's case manager learned about domestic violence between the parents, including an incident in which Father was arrested and ultimately pled guilty to a misdemeanor domestic violence charge. For the Department to return T.H. to their care, the Department's case manager explained to Father and Mother the behavioral changes they needed to demonstrate. Father and Mother were required to maintain a normal parent/child relationship with T.H. and demonstrate their understanding of how domestic violence affected them, their baby, and their ability to parent.
¶5 Two months later in June 2014, Father and Mother went to their case manager's office to pick up a service letter and bus passes. Mother told the case manager that Father refused to come inside, and Mother went back outside to talk to him. From inside the building, the case manager watched Mother yell at and then hit Father.
¶6 The next month, Father and Mother had another domestic violence incident, and Mother called the police. Father was arrested and spent five weeks in jail. Mother did not tell the case aide that Father was in jail, but instead said that he was in Ohio taking care of the dependency action there. Mother also told the case aide that she was no longer involved with Father and that once he returned, she would not live with him. After his release, Father called the Department and left a message, saying that he had just returned to Arizona from Ohio. But the message continued after Father thought he had hung up and Mother's voice could be heard saying, "Oh . . . , you missed your TERROS appointment when you were in jail."
¶7 In September 2014, after Father was arrested for shoplifting, Father and Mother had another domestic violence incident, leading to a no-contact order between them. The case manager thereafter set up individual visits with T.H. for them. Father and Mother refused to attend visits, however, because they wanted to visit together.
¶8 When the case manager explained to Father why the visits had to be separate, Father responded, "[Y]ou are [expletive] on our life, we are a couple, we will always be a couple and we will visit our child as a family." The case manager told him that because of their domestic violence and minimization of their behavior, the Department was not willing to conduct joint visitations to ensure the baby's safety. Father nevertheless argued that he had a "very good relationship" with Mother.
¶9 Meanwhile, Mother inconsistently told the Department that she was no longer in a relationship with Father, but would not attend visits without him. Although Mother told the case manager that Father had not hit her since July 2014 and that he had his anger under control, the case manager could hear Father making threats to staff members in the other room. The staff called the police, but Father left before they arrived. In December, Father's probation officer removed the no-contact order.
2. Post-Petition Domestic Violence Incidents
¶10 In January 2015, while Mother was visiting T.H. with a case aide, Father called the case aide from Mother's phone. Father told the case aide that he had an emergency, and therefore, the case aide handed the phone to Mother. Mother told Father, "The police are looking for you for what you did to me," "It's the same cop that tased you last time," and "I'm done dealing with this." After Mother hung up, Father called again, and when the case aide would not let Father talk to Mother, Father threatened to come down to the office to get T.H.
¶11 Soon after in February, Father and Mother had another domestic violence incident. Father "pushed" Mother, and she called the police. They had yet another incident in March when Father "freaked out" and "broke stuff." Their neighbors called the police, and Father was arrested and charged with domestic violence. This incident resulted in Father's probation officer reinstating the no-contact order.
¶12 Despite the probation officer's prohibition, Father had contact with Mother one month later in April 2015. Father was taken to court, but ran away from the courtroom before his hearing. A warrant was issued for his arrest, and Father's probation officer contacted the Department, reporting that T.H. was at a high risk of being kidnapped by Father during a supervised visit. Father was subsequently arrested and released.
¶13 Father and Mother had another domestic violence incident in June 2015, when Mother was pregnant with their third child. Mother was sleeping when Father—drunk—came into their bedroom and started arguing with her. Father bit Mother on the back and hit her leg. Mother called the police, and the operator could hear her saying, "Please don't hurt me." Father was arrested and subsequently pled guilty to violating his probation. Mother moved out and began living with her grandmother.
3. Services Offered to Father and Mother
¶14 Father participated in a psychological evaluation and reported a history of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder ("ADHD"), denied any drug or alcohol history, but tested positive for marijuana in a hair follicle test. The psychologist found that Father was a perpetrator of domestic violence and diagnosed him with a history of unspecified mood disorder, a learning disability, and cannabis abuse. The psychologist opined that Father's "parenting deficiencies [were] intricately woven into his social and emotional instabilities" and that he was "ill equipped to fulfill the role of primary parenting." The psychologist opined that the prognosis that Father would "be able to demonstrate minimally adequate parenting skills in the foreseeable future [was] quite poor." The psychologist noted that "[e]ven with the proposed [service] interventions, [Father had] a dismissive attitude, [did] not appear willing to accept guidance and advice, and overrate[d] and confuse[d] attendance with progress." The psychologist recommended that Father receive individual and couples counseling, supervised visits, and parent aide and parenting skills training. She also recommended that Father receive urinalysis testing with substance abuse programming, continued psychiatric services, and employment and residential stability, and that the Department consider a referral for education and job training.
¶15 Mother was also evaluated and reported a history of moving between foster homes and relatives and of relationships involving domestic violence and abuse; a family history of drug abuse and heavy drinking; and a family history of mental illnesses including bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and depression. The psychologist diagnosed Mother with a history of partner violence—as victim and perpetrator—an unspecified depressive disorder, a borderline personality disorder, and cannabis abuse in early remission. The psychologist opined that the prognosis that Mother would "be able to demonstrate minimally adequate parenting skills in the foreseeable future [was] poor." The psychologist found that Mother "gave the impression of going through the motions of compliance rather than accepting and understanding the need for stability." The psychologist also concluded that any child in Mother's care "would be at high risk of neglect and inadvertent injury due to the likelihood that domestic violence and physical aggressiveness [that] may reoccur." The psychologist recommended that Mother receive individual counseling, parent aide services, supervised visitations, and couples counseling "when deemed safe and appropriate by counselor." She also recommended that Mother receive urinalysis testing with substance abuse programming and continued psychiatric services for depression, and that the Department consider a referral for education and job training.
¶16 Consistent with the psychologist's recommendations, the Department offered Father and Mother individual counseling, visitations, parent aide, and transportation services and substance abuse treatment and urinalysis testing. Father and Mother were allowed two two-hour visits with T.H. twice a week. In July 2014, the parents attended only 6 of 9 visits. When the Department offered to extend the hours to make up for lost visits, the parents declined, explaining that "4 hours were too long to have a visit with the child due to the child being a baby and having nothing to do." Due to domestic violence concerns, however, the Department subsequently separated Mother and Father's visitation times. The following month, Mother attended only 3 of 7 visits; Father could not attended any because he was incarcerated. Mother continued to decline to make up for lost visits.
¶17 Mother referred herself for behavioral health services and completed a psychiatric evaluation. Although Mother agreed to participate in individual counseling, from September 2014 to January 2015, she either canceled or did not attend individual sessions. However, in April 2014, Mother referred herself for domestic violence counseling. Mother completed the perpetrator class in September 2014 and then enrolled in the victim class in December 2014. Because Mother was repeatedly absent, the Department restarted services several times and ultimately closed them because she failed to participate. The Department again referred Mother for such services in August 2015, and she completed domestic violence training shortly before the severance hearing.
¶18 Father also referred himself for behavioral health services. He completed a psychiatric evaluation and was diagnosed with ADHD and obsessive-compulsive disorder ("OCD"). Father was prescribed medication, but did not comply with medication monitoring. Father eventually stopped engaging in such services. However, the Department again referred Father for domestic abuse counseling and a substance abuse assessment. Father completed an 8-hour substance abuse class. Father continued to attend counseling classes, but did not attend them consistently. The Department also referred Father for individual counseling in July 2014, but because Father was incarcerated during that time period, the counselor was unable to contact him. Father's services were later closed out because he failed to maintain contact with the service provider.
¶19 Mother received two referrals for parent aide services, but canceled the first appointment and did not show up for the third appointment. Consequently, that referral was closed for lack of contact. A month later, the Department submitted a second referral and Mother completed the intake. During the intake process, however, Mother became upset and stated that she did not have domestic violence issues and that the incident in January 2015, "was a lie and she only called the police to get [Father] into trouble because she was mad at him." Mother's attendance at her parent aide visits with T.H. was inconsistent. Her case manager thus warned her that if she missed any more visits, her services would be terminated. Mother nonetheless explained that she had to miss the next visit to go to court because of a domestic violence incident with her mother. The Department later discovered that the incident was actually with Father and that Mother went to court to speak for him.
¶20 At the same time, Mother received three case aide referrals. Her case aide reported that she could not provide the basic needs for T.H. or her other child during visits. Mother's referrals ultimately closed because Mother would first engage, but then miss sessions without calling in.
¶21 Father completed parent aide intake in February 2015, but was only able to schedule one visit in March and attend 1 of 5 visits in April and 1 of 1 in May. Because of Father's lack of transportation and scheduling conflicts, the Department was unable to schedule visits during the months leading up to the severance hearing. Further, Father missed several case aide visits with T.H., and when Father did attend visits, he did not focus on the baby. Because of Father's inattentiveness, T.H. hurt himself on two visits, even though the case aide warned Father that the baby would get hurt if he did not do anything.
4. Termination of Parental Rights
¶22 In November 2014, the Department petitioned, as amended and as relevant here, to sever Father and Mother's parental rights to T.H. on the ground of fifteen months in out-of-home placement pursuant to court order. The Department alleged that Mother had not completed an individual counseling program and that any child in her care would be "at high risk for neglect and inadvertent injury due to ongoing domestic violence concerns." The Department also alleged that although Mother had parent aide referrals, she had not yet completed a parent aide program and had reported a domestic violence incident with Father in January 2015. Moreover, the Department alleged that Father had self-reported smoking marijuana for a long time, had been diagnosed with ADHD, OCD, and partner violence, and had a poor prognosis for being able to demonstrate minimally adequate parenting skills in the foreseeable future.
¶23 At the severance hearing, Father testified that he first used marijuana when he was 23 years old and stopped "around the time of the hair follicle" test. Father also testified that he and Mother had been together for five years and were trying to co-parent T.H. He admitted that during the first year of their relationship, they had "domestic issues," involving "fighting" and "breaking things." Father also admitted that he and Mother gave his mother guardianship over their first child because they had not addressed their issues. Father further admitted that even though he and Mother "had altercations but never physical," after T.H. was removed, "things started to kind of escalate" "because there was a lot of animosity." Father testified that he had been on probation for domestic violence against Mother for a year and a half in Arizona and that he had completed his probation term for domestic violence in Ohio. At the end of his testimony, Father admitted that he and Mother had domestic violence issues and that such issues generally affected parenting. But Father stated that the domestic violence did not and would not affect his ability to parent T.H.
¶24 Mother testified that she was currently living with her grandmother, but from January to July 2015, she lived with Father "[o]n and off." She also testified that she lived with Father from October 2014 to January 2015 at an apartment complex in Glendale and from May 2014 to October 2014 at a different apartment complex in Glendale. Mother further testified that she had been in a relationship with Father during the entire dependency proceedings, that she was still in a relationship with Father, and that they planned to live together. When asked whether she believed any child would be safe with Father, Mother responded, "Yeah, I do actually," and explained, "Because he has never done anything to ever hurt a child and never would, our issues are our issues."
¶25 Father and Mother's case manager testified that they were not making the necessary behavioral changes and that a child in their care would be put at risk. She further testified that T.H. was "doing very well in his placement." Father and Mother's former case manager testified that T.H. was adoptable and was in an adoptive placement. The baby had been in the same foster family throughout the dependency, which spanned seventeen months. She said that he was "overall a really happy, go-lucky kind of kid," who needed stability and a safe environment to grow up in without worrying about domestic violence.
¶26 The juvenile court terminated Father and Mother's parental rights to T.H. on the ground of fifteen months in an out-of-home placement pursuant to court order and concluded that termination was in the baby's best interests. The court found that T.H. had been in an out-of-home placement for approximately seventeen months and that the Department provided appropriate reunification services to Father and Mother, with the evidence "demonstrat[ing] the extent and depth of effort the Department put forth to address all of the issues that led to out-of-home placement." The court also found that Father and Mother had been unable to remedy the circumstances that caused the out-of-home placement, specifically their domestic violence issues, and that a substantial likelihood existed that Father and Mother would be unable to exercise proper and effective parenting in the near future. Father and Mother timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
1. Admissibility of Evidence
¶27 Father and Mother first argue that the juvenile court erred in admitting two reports because the authors were not available for cross-examination as required by Arizona Rule of Juvenile Procedure 45(C), which provides that a report shall be admitted "into evidence if the worker who prepared the report is available for cross-examination" and the report was properly disclosed to the parties. Both Father and Mother challenge the admissibility of an April 2014 Department report to the juvenile court, and Father separately challenges the admissibility of an April 2014 team decision making summary report. We need not address whether the two reports were properly admitted, however, because the evidence presented independent of the reports was sufficient to establish the ground for termination. Accordingly, any arguable error was harmless. See Alice M. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 237 Ariz. 70, 73 ¶ 12, 345 P.3d 125, 128 (App. 2015) (providing that even if the juvenile court erred in admitting disputed exhibits, the error was harmless); see also State v. Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, 205 ¶ 39, 84 P.3d 456, 470 (2004) (providing that error is harmless when "the reviewing court can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict"); Lashonda M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 210 Ariz. 77, 82-83 ¶¶ 19-20, 107 P.3d 923, 928-28 (App. 2005) (stating that this Court will not reverse the juvenile court based on an evidentiary ruling "absent a clear abuse of its discretion and resulting prejudice").
2. Statutory Ground for Termination
¶28 Father and Mother next argue that insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court's order terminating their parental rights to T.H. We review a juvenile court's termination order for an abuse of discretion. E.R. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 237 Ariz. 56, 58 ¶ 9, 344 P.3d 842, 844 (App. 2015). We accept the juvenile court's factual findings unless no reasonable evidence supports those findings, and we will affirm a severance order unless it is clearly erroneous. Bobby G. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 219 Ariz. 506, 508 ¶ 1, 200 P.3d 1003, 1005 (App. 2008). Here, sufficient evidence, without the two reports, support each element of termination on the ground of fifteen months in out-of-home placement for Father and Mother. Accordingly, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Mother and Father's parental rights to T.H.
¶29 A parent's right to care, custody, and control his or her child has long been recognized as fundamental, but that right is not absolute. Linda V. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 76, 78 ¶ 6, 117 P.3d 795, 797 (App. 2005). The State may terminate a parent's fundamental right to a child under statutorily enumerated conditions after following specified procedures. Id. As pertinent here, to terminate parental rights for time in an out-of-home placement, the juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the child had been in an out-of-home placement for a cumulative total period of fifteen months or longer pursuant to court order; (2) the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that caused the child to be in an out-of-home placement; and (3) a substantial likelihood exists that the parent will be incapable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c); Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288 ¶ 41, 110 P.3d 1013, 1022 (2005). In its determination, the court must consider "the availability of reunification services to the parent and the participation of the parent in these services." A.R.S. § 8-533(D).
¶30 Here, excluding any evidence included in the reports Father and Mother challenge on appeal, reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court's termination on the ground of fifteen months in out-of-home placement. The record shows that on the date of the severance hearing, the baby had been in an out-of-home placement pursuant to court order for seventeen months. The record also shows that Father and Mother were unable to remedy the circumstances that caused the baby to be in an out-of-home placement and that a substantial likelihood exists that they will not be capable of exercising effective parental care and control in the near future. Although Father and Mother had other lingering mental health and substance abuse issues, the Department was mainly concerned about their domestic violence issues. The record shows that Father and Mother engaged in a variety of services, but nevertheless continuously engaged in domestic violence incidents. From April 2014, when the Department first became involved, to September 2015, the severance hearing, Father and Mother had seven known domestic violence incidents. Mother testified that they had incidents dating back to 2012, whereas Father attempted to minimize the situation by saying that they only had one incident while in Ohio. Further, the seven known incidents occurred even though Father and Mother were aware that the Department had put forth a concurrent case plan of severance and adoption and while Father and Mother were participating in services to address their domestic violence issues. These incidents also occurred while Father was on probation for domestic violence against Mother.
¶31 Significantly, three months before the severance hearing, Father and Mother had a domestic violence incident after Mother had informed Father that she was pregnant with their third child, Father had been in a domestic violence program since October 2014, and Mother had completed a domestic violence class. The incident occurred after they had at least two other domestic violence incidents in 2015 and Father's probation terms prohibited him from having contact with Mother. Moreover, even with the no-contact order, Father and Mother continued to be in a relationship with each other—oftentimes hiding it from the Department. In fact, Mother testified—inconsistent with her statements to their case managers during the proceedings—that she and Father lived together throughout the entire course of the proceedings.
¶32 Further, at the severance hearing, although Father and Mother stated that they understood what domestic violence was, they both made other statements minimizing the risk of collateral injury that T.H. would suffer if either of them engaged in domestic violence against the other. Father stated that although he and Mother had domestic violence issues, the domestic violence did not and would not impact his ability to parent T.H. Mother made similar statements, testifying that she thought T.H. would be safe with Father because he had never hurt the baby and their issues were theirs alone. These statements—coupled with their behavior towards each other during the entire course of the dependency proceedings—demonstrate that even though Father and Mother engaged in services, mere engagement was not enough for them to change their behavior to become adequate parents such that they would be capable of exercising proper parental care of T.H. Consequently, the record shows that Father and Mother have been unable to remedy the circumstances that caused T.H. to be removed and that a substantial likelihood exists that they will be unable to exercise proper parental care in the near future.
¶33 Father and Mother counter that the juvenile court erred in terminating their parental rights because the Department did not provide them with adequate reunification services. But the record shows that the Department made diligent efforts to provide appropriate reunification services for Father and Mother, including psychological evaluations, parent and case aide services, supervised visitations, transportation and bus passes, and referrals to three different service providers for drug testing and substance abuse assessments and treatment. The record also shows that even though Father and Mother terminated unsuccessfully for certain services, the Department offered additional referrals to support them. Although the parents argue that they should have also been offered couples counseling, their case manager explained to them on several occasions that—consistent with their psychologist's recommendation—the Department would not offer them couples counseling until they completed their individual counseling. Only Mother completed individual counseling, and therefore, the Department did not offer them couples counseling.
¶34 Moreover, although Father and Mother participated in these services, the record demonstrates that they failed to make the necessary behavioral changes that allowed for family reunification. By the time of the severance hearing, only Mother had completed domestic violence counseling; Father had not completed any of his counseling. Further, Father and Mother were unable to maintain a normal parent/child relationship with T.H. They missed a number of visits, and when the Department offered them the opportunity to make up lost visits, they declined because the child was "a baby and [they had] nothing to do." After the Department determined that joint visits would be unsafe due to domestic violence concerns, Father and Mother refused to attend visits separately. Father lashed out and threatened his case manager, while Mother tried to minimize their domestic violence issues.
¶35 Individually, Father would not pay attention to the baby during visits, such that the baby hurt himself on two occasions, and Mother missed visits, including one to go defend Father in court regarding a domestic violence incident. Further, Father and Mother were unable to demonstrate an understanding of how domestic violence affected them, their baby, and their parenting. Throughout the course of the proceedings, Father maintained that he had a good relationship with Mother, even though Mother was telling their case manager at the same time that she was no longer with Father and that their issues were theirs alone. Consequently, despite the numerous services offered to Father and Mother, they were unable to make the necessary behavioral changes that allowed for family reunification. Accordingly, the juvenile court properly terminated Father and Mother's parental rights to T.H. on ground of fifteen months in out-of-home placement pursuant to court order.
3. Child's Best Interests
¶36 Mother also argues that the juvenile court's termination order was invalid because the court's conclusion of law regarding the baby's best interests lacked sufficient specificity to comply with Arizona Rule of Juvenile Procedure 66(F)(2)(a). Rule 66 requires the juvenile court to "[m]ake specific findings of fact in support of the termination of parental rights" in a signed order at the conclusion of the severance hearing. Ariz. R. Juv. P. 66(F)(2)(a). "The plain meaning [of the Rule] indicates that the court must specify at least one factual finding sufficient to support each of [its] conclusions of law." Ruben M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 230 Ariz. 236, 240 ¶ 22, 282 P.3d 437, 441 (App. 2012). In other words, "findings of fact and conclusions of law should be sufficiently specific to enable the appellate court to provide effective review." Id. at 241 ¶ 25, 282 P.3d at 442.
¶37 Here, the juvenile court provided sufficient specificity to allow this Court effective review of its order. The juvenile court began the order by recognizing that it may not terminate a parent's rights unless it also finds that termination was in the baby's best interests. The court noted that severance would be in the baby's best interest if it finds that "the child [would] benefit from termination of the relationship or that the child would be harmed by continuation of the parental relationship." After recognizing the domestic violence between Mother and Father, their age and maturity, and their inability to break the "cycle of violence," the court stated that "if [T.H.] is not extricated, he will be at risk in a similar fashion when he becomes an adult if he is raised in the home of these two parents."
¶38 The juvenile court then analyzed the relevant factors to determine whether severance was in the baby's best interests. See Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 383 ¶ 30, 231 P.3d 377, 379 (App. 2010) (stating that relevant factors include an adoptive placement is immediately available and the existing placement is meeting the child's needs). The court found that T.H. had been in the same foster home since the initiation of the case and that he had been thriving in that environment and his needs were being met. The court also found that the placement offered the baby permanency and stability and that it kept him from being exposed to a home environment threatened by domestic violence. These statements of law and factual findings are sufficiently specific to enable this Court to decide whether the juvenile court correctly applied the law. Accordingly, the order is legally sufficient, and the court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Father and Mother's parental rights to T.H.
CONCLUSION
¶39 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.