Opinion
C/A 4:22-cv-3506-SAL-TER
11-13-2023
RANDOLPH SMITH, PLAINTIFF, v. OFC. JACKSON, SGT. VASQUEZ, OFC. GEE, OFC. MOSES, DEFENDANTS.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THOMAS E. ROGERS, III, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This is a civil action filed pro se by Randolph Smith (“Plaintiff”/ “Smith”) on October 11, 2022. Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the Florence County Detention Center. At all times during the allegations in the complaint, Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages based on alleged civil rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is currently before the court on Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 31). As the Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court issued an order on or about May 16, 2023, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the motion for summary judgment procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately. In response, Plaintiff filed a document entitled “ Verification of Complaint” in which he states that he verifies that the matters alleged in the complaint are true. The document is notarized. (ECF No. 35).
All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d),DSC. Because this is a dispositive motion, the report and recommendation is entered for review by the District Judge.
STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The federal court is charged with liberally construing the complaints filed by pro se litigants, to allow them to fully develop potentially meritorious cases. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). The court's function, however, is not to decide issues of fact, but to decide whether there is an issue of fact to be tried. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a federal claim, Weller v. Dep't of Social Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990), nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists. If none can be shown, the motion should be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
The moving party bears the burden of showing that summary judgment is proper. Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Summary judgment is proper if the non-moving party fails to establish an essential element of any cause of action upon which the non-moving party has the burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. 317. Once the moving party has brought into question whether there is a genuine dispute for trial on a material element of the non-moving party's claims, the non-moving party bears the burden of coming forward with specific facts which show a genuine dispute for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The non-moving party must come forward with enough evidence, beyond a mere scintilla, upon which the fact finder could reasonably find for it. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1011 (4th Cir. 1991). However, the non-moving party may not rely on beliefs, conjecture, speculation, or conclusory allegations to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Barber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 874-75 (4th Cir. 1992). The evidence relied on must meet “the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at a trial on the merits.” Mitchell v. Data General Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4th Cir. 1993).
To show that a genuine dispute of material fact exists, a party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (Rule 56(e) permits a proper summary judgment motion to be opposed by any of the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings themselves). Rather, the party must present evidence supporting his or her position through “depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with . . . affidavits, if any.” Id. at 322; see also Cray Communications, Inc. v. Novatel Computer Systems, Inc., 33 F.3d 390 (4th Cir. 1994); Orsi v. Kickwood, 999 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1993); Local Rules 7.04, 7.05, D.S.C.
ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff alleges his constitutional rights were violated when he was placed into cell #103 in maximum segregation at the FCDC on August 22, 2022, because the cell had fecal matter everywhere resulting in a bad odor. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Jackson placed him in the cell and that Defendants Vasquez and Gee saw him in the cell with feces but left him there. (ECF No. 1 at 7). Plaintiff alleges that “feces was all over the ceiling, wall, vent, floor, mirror, bunk, and everywhere” and the man that had been in that cell for over six months had been smearing and wiping human waste all over the room and air vents for months. (Id. at 8). The cleaning crew “came on my 3rd day there, they said it's too much human waste to clean up in one day.” (Id. at 7). Plaintiff alleges that he was in the feces covered cell for three days before he was moved to another cell. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Jackson and Moses took his jumpsuit when he was placed in the cell. As a result, Plaintiff alleges that he vomited, had chest pain, and was nauseated daily. (Id. at 7). Plaintiff assert that “even the Nurse said “that's not healthy for a human to be in there.” (ECF No. 1 at 8). In the complaint, Plaintiff asserts that “I told Officer Gee, He's the Classification officer, he laughed. I told every officer that worked in that pod they say they couldn't do anything about it.” (ECF No. 1 at 11). Plaintiff seeks monetary damages.
In support of the motion for summary judgment, Defendants submitted the affidavits of Officers Moses, Jackson, Vasquez, and Gee. (ECF Nos. 31-2 through31-5). Officer Hubert Moses attests that he has been employed at the FCDC since 2021 and was working an overtime shift on or about August 22, 2022, when Plaintiff was involved in a physical altercation with his cell mate. (ECF 31-2). Officer Timothy Jackson attests that he has been employed by the FCDC since 2020. (ECF No. 31-3). Sergeant Mayra Vasquez attests that she has been employed by the FCDC since 2017. (ECF No. 31-4). Officer Jevelton Gee attests that he has been employed by the FCDC since 2019. (ECF No. 31-5). Moses, Jackson, Vasquez, and Gee attest that they were working on or about August 22, 2022, when an altercation between Plaintiff and his cell mate occurred. (#1-2 through 31-5). Because of the altercation, both inmates were taken to the maximum segregation unit of the FCDC. Id. Moses, Jackson, and Vasquez escorted Plaintiff to the max seg unit, they do not recall any particular odor or smell emanating from cell #103, and they do not recall seeing any human fecal matter when Plaintiff was placed in the cell. Id. The cells in the max seg unit are cleaned and sanitized after each inmate is transferred out of a cell and each cell is also checked to make sure that the plumbing is in working condition. Id. All affiants attest that they do not recall Plaintiff ever asking one of them to be moved out of cell #103. Id. If an inmate asks to be transferred out of a cell in the max seg unit, a supervisor must request the move and the move must be authorized by classifications. Id. Inmates that are taken to the max seg unit of the FCDC are required to change their jump suits from an orange jumpsuit to a green one. Id. Sergeant Vasquez and Officer Gee attest that cell #103 in the max seg unit of the FCDC had been pressure washed prior to Plaintiff being placed in that cell. (ECF Nos. 31-4 and 31-5). Sergeant Vasquez attests that any remaining residue would be in the form of rust. (ECF No. 31-4). Plaintiff did not complain about the cell when he was first placed in there. Id. Vasquez attests that she does not recall Plaintiff ever asking her to be transferred out of cell #103 and she is a supervisor, so if asked, she was authorized to move an inmate to a different cell if one is available. Id. Neither Gee nor Vasquez recall Plaintiff requesting any medical attention on or about August 22 or 23, 2022. (ECF Nos. 31-4 and 31-5).
DISCUSSION
CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT
Plaintiff brings a conditions-of-confinement claim against Defendants based on alleged unsanitary conditions at the detention center. As set forth above, Plaintiff alleges that the cell he was placed into in Maximum segregation had feces smeared all over it from the previous inmate and he was left in the cell for three days before being moved. As Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee during the time period set forth in the Complaint, his claims are evaluated under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment, which is used to evaluate conditions of confinement for those convicted of crimes. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). Even so, the Fourteenth Amendment standard for evaluating challenges to conditions of confinement is the same as the Eighth Amendment analysis applicable to convicted prisoners. See Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383, 388-89 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding deliberate indifference standard applies to detainees). When a detainee challenges his conditions of confinement, he must show, (1) a serious deprivation of a basic human need (objective prong); and (2) deliberate indifference to prison conditions on the part of prison officials (subjective prong). Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 824 (4th Cir. 1991) (internal citation omitted) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 301-03 (1991)). The subjective prong of a deliberate indifference claim requires the plaintiff to allege that a particular defendant actually knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to his or her person. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “Deliberate indifference is a very high standard-a showing of mere negligence will not meet it.” Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976)). To show an extreme deprivation, a prisoner “must produce evidence of a serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions,” Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d at 1381, or demonstrate a substantial risk of such serious harm resulting from the prisoner's unwilling exposure to the challenged conditions, see Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33-35 (1993).
The Court held in Harris v. FNU Connolly, 2016 WL 676468, at *5 (W.D. N.C. Feb. 18, 2016), aff'd, 667 Fed.Appx. 408 (4th Cir. 2016)that:
Living conditions in prison are often less than ideal. Inmates “cannot expect the amenities, conveniences and services of a good hotel.” Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1235 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding that the inmate was not subjected to cruel and unusual punishment due to prison officials' failure to provide him with toilet paper for five days, or with soap, toothbrush, or toothpaste for ten days). Prisons need only provide reasonably adequate hygiene and sanitation conditions. Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 342 (5th Cir. 2004). Moreover, the length of time a prisoner is exposed to unsanitary conditions is crucial to determining whether a constitutional violation occurred. See, e.g., Howard v. Adkison, 887 F.2d 134, 137 (8th Cir. 1989). Short-term sanitation problems, while unpleasant, do not amount to constitutional violations. Whitnack v. Douglas Cnty., 16 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 1994).(2016 WL 676468 at *5).
“The mere smell or presence of human waste is not sufficiently serious to constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Salmons v. W. Reg'l Jail Auth., No. CV 3:18-1447, 2019 WL 5616916, at *6 (S.D. W.Va. Oct. 30, 2019). While the sight and odor of human waste is distasteful, it does not rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Canterbury v. W. Reg'l Jail Auth., No. 3:18-CV-01440, 2019 WL 6545328, at *12 (S.D. W.Va. Nov. 7, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 3:18-1440, 2019 WL 6598349 (S.D. W.Va. Dec. 4, 2019) (finding no violation where the plaintiff did not come into direct physical contact with human waste for an extended period of time, or that human waste contacted or contaminated his food); see also Harris v. FNU Connolly, No. 5:14-cv-128-FDW, 2016 WL 676468, at *5 (W.D. N.C. Feb. 18, 2016), aff'd, 667 Fed.Appx. 408 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding that unsanitary cell conditions, including the presence of feces, urine, and vomit was less than ideal, but “[s]hort-term sanitation problems, while unpleasant, do not amount to constitutional violations”) (citation omitted); DePaola v. Ray, No. 7:12CV00139, 2013 WL 4451236, at *10 (W.D. Va. July 22, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 4453422 (W.D. Va. Aug. 16, 2013) (finding that the plaintiff's claim that he “suffered from nausea [and psychological trauma] due to the smell of other prisoners smearing their feces/urine while in the B-3 pod” did not demonstrate a violation of a basic human need or a sufficiently serious or significant injury). However, “Not surprisingly, human waste has been considered particularly offensive so that ‘Courts have been especially cautious about condoning conditions that include an inmate's proximity to it.”
Construing Plaintiff's allegations in the light most favorable to him, there are genuine issues of material facts as to the objective and subjective prongs. As to the objective prong, there are genuine issues as to whether or not the cell was covered in feces which created an excessive risk to Plaintiff's health. “[A] prisoner's exposure to human waste may give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation.” Williams v. Collier, 357 Fed.Appx. 532, 535 (4th Cir. 2009)(citing DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 974-75 (10 Cir. 2001)). As to the subjective inquiry, the inmate must show the prison official had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” which, in this context, consists of “deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (internal quotation marks omitted). This inquiry requires “evidence suggesting that the prison official had actual knowledge of an excessive risk to the plaintiff's safety.” Danser v. Stansberry, 772 F.3d 340, 347 (4th Cir. 2014). This is a very high standard, such that the prison official must “be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (emphasis added). The inmate can prove a prison official's actual knowledge of a substantial risk “in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence.” Id. at 842. That is, “a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” Id Construing the facts in favor of the Plaintiff, if the walls and vents were covered in feces and had the odor as alleged by Plaintiff, it would be obvious to the Defendants that fecal matter was present in cell #103 and they did not have Plaintiff removed from the cell. Plaintiff's allegations if taken as true would be sufficient to put a reasonable officer on notice that the Eighth Amendment prohibits forcing an inmate to inhabit a cell with conditions presenting an obvious health hazard. Plaintiff alleges that he “told each of the officers” but they either laughed or stated that they could not do anything about it. Defendants attest that they did not see fecal matter, did not smell an odor, and that Plaintiff never complained or asked them to be moved. Therefore, there is an issue of fact as to whether or not the officers fulfilled their duty to provide Plaintiff with adequate shelter and sanitation.
See Brooks v. Warden 800 F.3d 1295, 1305 (11th Cir. 2015)([T] health risks of prolonged exposure to human excrement are obvious.”).
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY
Defendants first argue that they are immune from suit pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment of the constitution. Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims against them, in their official capacity, fail as a matter of law, as they are not a “person” amendable to suit and are entitled to immunity.
It is noted that Plaintiff only checked the box of “individual capacity” on the complaint form. However, even if Plaintiff was bringing this action against the Defendants in their official capacity, the Defendants would be entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity.
When a defendant is sued in his or her official capacity, the suit is frequently intended as one against the state, the real party in interest. If review of the pleadings indicates that the state is, in fact, the party being sued, then a judgment awarding damages is precluded by the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution. Although declaratory and/or injunctive relief may be granted, damages may not be awarded against the state. The Eleventh Amendment immunity granted to the states “applies only to States or governmental entities that are considered ‘arms of the State' for Eleventh Amendment purposes,” but the court found that state agencies, divisions, departments and officials are entitled to the Eleventh Amendment immunity. Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989). In reaching this conclusion, the court held that a suit against state officials acting in their official capacities is actually against the office itself, and therefore, against the state. State officials may only be sued in their individual capacities.
The United States Supreme Court has long held the Eleventh Amendment also precludes suits against a state by one of its own citizens. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). A plaintiff “is not entitled to monetary damages under §1983 against Defendants in their official capacities.” Moneyhan v. Keller, 563 Fed.Appx. 256, 258 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that Eleventh Amendment bars suits against non-consenting state, its agencies, and its officers acting in their official capacities)). However, suits for damages against state officials sued in their individual capacity are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment does not erect a barrier against suits to impose ‘individual and personal liability' on state officials under § 1983.”) (citation omitted).
To the extent Plaintiff sues Defendants in their official capacities, they are not subject to suit under §1983, and the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment regarding claims brought against them in their official capacity for monetary damages.
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Defendants deny that any of the alleged conduct or conditions complained of by Plaintiff gives rise to a constitutional violation. However, Defendants assert that, even if this Court concludes that the facts are sufficient to establish a Constitutional claim, they are entitled to qualified immunity.
The doctrine of qualified immunity attempts to reconcile two potentially conflicting principles: the need to deter
government officials from violating an individual's federal civil rights and the need for government officials to act decisively without undue fear of judicial second guessing.Akers v. Caperton, 998 F.2d 220, 225-26 (4th Cir. 1993).
As the court has concluded that there is an issue of fact as to a Fourteenth Amendment violation, the court cannot find that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Because there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to Plaintiff's claims of a Fourteenth Amendment violation based on conditions of confinement, Defendants' argument with regard to qualified immunity should be denied. See Gamble v. S.C. Dep't of Corr. 2020 WL 5249223, at *8 (D.S.C. Sept. 3, 2020) quoting Vathekan v. Prince George's County, 154 F.3d 173, 180 (“[S]ummary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is improper as long as there remains any material factual dispute regarding the actual conduct of the defendants.”).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is recommended that Defendants' motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 31) be denied.
The parties' attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.