Opinion
No. CV 01-508780-S
March 16, 2007
Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment
The plaintiff, Devon Smith, has filed a civil rights suit arising from his confinement in prison. The defendants, former Department of Correction Commissioner John Armstrong, Deputy Commissioner Peter Matos, Warden Brian Murphy, Captain Stewart, Lieutenant Santiago, and three John Doe defendants, move for summary judgment. The court grants the motion.
Neither the complaint nor the plaintiff's affidavits supplies a first name for Captain Stewart or Lieutenant Santiago.
I
The undisputed facts are as follows. The plaintiff was arrested for murder on December 13, 1993, and was detained in the Morgan Street detention center. The department of correction (the department) transferred the plaintiff to the Hartford correctional center one day later, where the department placed him in segregation status. On January 27, 1994, the department placed the plaintiff in "close custody" status as a "security risk group safety threat member."
Department of correction administrative directive 9.4.3.D defines "close custody" in this context as "[a] level 4 Restrictive Housing Status that results in segregation of an inmate whose behavior, while incarcerated, poses a threat to the security and orderly operation of the facility, or a risk to the safety of staff or other inmates due to . . . being designated as a Security Risk Group Safety Threat Member."
At the time, administrative directive 6.14(3)(9) defined a "security risk group" as a "specifically designated group of inmates possessing common characteristics which serve to distinguish them from other inmates or groups of inmates and which as a discrete entity poses a threat to the safety of staff, the facility, other inmates or the community." See State v. Santiago, 39 Conn.App. 674, 677 n. 2, 667 A.2d 304 (1995).
On or about May 11, 1995, the plaintiff received a sentence of sixty years for the murder and began serving his sentence. Meanwhile, on January 16, 1995, the plaintiff had received a disciplinary report for assaulting an officer at the Hartford jail. The department transferred the plaintiff to the Garner correctional institution on May 17, 1995, and then to the Northern Correctional Institution on June 6, 1995. Ten days later, the department placed the plaintiff in administrative segregation at Northern.
Administrative directive 9.4.3.B defines "administrative segregation" as the "[p]]acement of an inmate on a Restrictive Housing Status that results in segregation of the inmate whose behavior or management factors pose a threat to the security of the facility or a risk to the safety of staff or other inmates and that the inmate can no longer be safely managed in general population."
As of May 1, 2003, the plaintiff had received fifty-five disciplinary reports for prison infractions, including at least seven assaults on correctional officers, during his incarceration. The plaintiff remained in administrative segregation at Northern until approximately November 2006, when the department transferred him to another institution. The plaintiff's placement in close custody status and administrative segregation made him ineligible to earn good time credits during that time period under General Statutes § 18-7a[c].
Section 18-7a[c] provides: "Any person sentenced to a term of imprisonment for an offense committed on or after July 1, 1983, may, while held in default of bond or while serving such sentence, by good conduct and obedience to the rules which have been established for the service of his sentence, earn a reduction of his sentence as such sentence is served in the amount of ten days for each month served and pro rata for a part of a month served of a sentence up to five years, and twelve days for each month served and pro rata for a part of a month served for the sixth and each subsequent year of a sentence which is more than five years. Misconduct or refusal to obey the rules which have been established for the service of his sentence shall subject the prisoner to the loss of all or any portion of such reduction by the commissioner or his designee. In the event a prisoner has not yet earned sufficient good time to satisfy the good time loss, such lost good time shall be deducted from any good time earned in the future by such prisoner."
Persons convicted of crimes committed on or after October 1, 1994 are not eligible to receive these good time credits. See General Statutes § 18-100d; Velez v. Commissioner of Correction, 250 Conn. 536, 738 A.2d 604 (1999).
The plaintiff filed this suit pro se on May 30, 2001. The defendants moved for summary judgment on May 2, 2003. The plaintiff eventually obtained counsel, who filed a brief, affidavit of the plaintiff, and exhibits in opposition on February 7, 2007. The court heard argument on February 13, 2007.
The plaintiff had previously filed a pro se affidavit on July 14, 2003. The court will consider this affidavit as part of the evidence submitted by the plaintiff in opposition to the defendants' motion.
II
In sum, the plaintiff's complaint alleges that the defendants wrongly placed him in close custody or administrative segregation status, thereby depriving him of good time credits and causing him mental distress; and improperly denied him various prison privileges. The pro se complaint seeks redress only under the state constitution and does not allege any federal constitutional violations. Counsel for the plaintiff now asserts both federal constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state constitutional violations under the direct action doctrine of Binette v. Sabo, 244 Conn. 23, 710 A.2d 688 (1998). The court will consider the federal claims because, although they are not in the pro se complaint, both sides have briefed them.
The defendants contend that the plaintiff has abandoned the state constitutional claims. They correctly observe that the plaintiff has failed to brief the state constitutional claims separately or to provide any analysis of how they might differ from their treatment under analogous provisions of the federal constitution. Under these circumstances, the court agrees that the plaintiff has abandoned the state constitutional claims. See State v. Santiago, 39 Conn.App. 674, 677 n. 3, 667 A.2d 304 (1995).
The plaintiff seeks three substantive types of relief 1) restoration of good time credits; 2) removal from administrative segregation status; and 3) compensatory and punitive damages totaling four million dollars. Much of this relief is unavailable in this lawsuit. The plaintiff cannot use the federal civil rights statutes to obtain a restoration of good time credits, because such relief would affect the "duration of his physical imprisonment" and therefore must be sought by habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). Nor can the plaintiff obtain money damages under § 1983 as a result of a wrongful deprivation of good time credits. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1997). Further, given that the department has transferred the plaintiff from Northern and removed him from administrative segregation, the plaintiff's request in this suit for removal from administrative segregation is moot. Accordingly, the only relief sought by the plaintiff that bears further analysis is his request for money damages for matters other than the denial of good time credits.
Although the plaintiff has abandoned his state law claims, it is noteworthy that the leading cases involving state law challenges to the denial of good time credits also arose in habeas corpus rather than civil rights suits. See Velez v. Commissioner of Correction, 250 Conn. 536, 738 A.2d 604 (1999); Beasley v. Commissioner of Correction, 50 Conn.App. 421, 434-36, 718 A.2d 487 (1998), aff'd, 249 Conn. 499, 733 A.2d 833 (1999). Further, our courts have observed that "[t]he history of Connecticut's habeas corpus jurisprudence is wholly in accord with federal habeas corpus jurisprudence . . . [and] we may rely on federal cases interpreting the contours of the great writ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Oliphant v. Commissioner of Correction, 83 Conn.App. 10, 14, 847 A.2d 1080 (2004), aff'd, 274 Conn. 563, 877 A.2d 761 (2005).
III
Practice Book § 17-49 provides for summary judgment "if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden "to bring forward . . . evidentiary facts or substantial evidence outside the pleadings to show the absence of any material dispute." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doty v. Shawmut Bank, 58 Conn.App. 427, 430, 755 A.2d 219 (2000). "Correspondingly, the party opposing summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. "[U]nadmitted allegations in the pleadings do not constitute proof of the existence of a genuine issue as to any material fact on a motion for summary judgment." New Milford Savings Bank v. Roina, 38 Conn.App. 240, 245, 659 A.2d 1226, cert. denied, 235 Conn. 915, 665 A.2d 609 (1995). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Doty v. Shawmut Bank, supra, 58 Conn.App. 431. "The test is whether a party would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
IV
The plaintiff, through counsel, asks the court to interpret the pro se complaint to allege actions against the defendants in their individual rather than official capacity. The defendants do not substantially object to this approach and the court will adopt it. The parties also agreed at oral argument to resolve the merits of this summary judgment motion based on the evidence submitted, as is customary on summary judgment, rather than focus on the allegations of the complaint, as in a motion to strike filed at the beginning of a case.
The defense of sovereign immunity does not apply to individual capacity suits against state officials. See Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 307, 828 A.2d 549 (2003). On the other hand, in an individual capacity federal civil rights suit, the plaintiff must demonstrate a defendant's "personal involvement" in the actions alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation. See Koehl v. Dalsheim, 85 F.3d 86, 89 (2d Cir. 1996). Respondeat superior liability does not apply, and merely being a link in the prison chain of responsibility is not sufficient. See Hernandez v. Keane, 341 F.3d 137, 144-45 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1093 (2005).
Under these standards, the court grants summary judgment to defendants Armstrong and Matos. Neither of the affidavits supplied by the plaintiff or the attached materials even mentions defendants Armstrong or Matos by name. At most, the plaintiff's pro se affidavit alleges that "[p]laintiff has written complaints to all of the defendant's [sic] requesting his removal from segregation and they have refused to do so." Even assuming that this vague allegation refers to defendants Armstrong and Matos, it does not demonstrate any direct or personal involvement in any constitutional deprivations, as the department has now done what the letters requested and removed the plaintiff from segregation.
Defendants Armstrong and Matos would also have a valid defense under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, as discussed below.
The court also grants summary judgment to the three John Doe defendants. The only allegation against the John Doe defendants is in the pro se affidavit, which recites that "[three (3) weeks following plaintiff's transfer to H.C.C.C. he filed numerous written complaints and grievances to defendant warden John Doe seeking removal from seg. status." Again, the plaintiff's grievance is moot, as the department long ago transferred the plaintiff out of the Hartford facility and more recently removed him from segregation. Further, the defendants briefed the argument that the court should dismiss the John Doe defendants due to the plaintiff's failure to name or serve them, despite now having had almost six years to discover their identities. See Schiff v. Kennedy, 691 F.2d 196, 198 (4th Cir. 1982). The plaintiff failed to respond to this argument in his brief. The court accordingly concludes that the plaintiff has abandoned the claims against these defendants. See Merchant v. State Ethics Commission, 53 Conn.App. 808, 818, 733 A.2d 287 (1999).
The John Doe defendants would also have valid defenses under the statute of limitations and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, as discussed below.
V
The remaining defendants are Stewart, Santiago, and Murphy. The plaintiff supplies some evidence against these defendants, although it is scant. The sole evidence against defendants Stewart and Santiago is the claim in the plaintiff's second affidavit that "[w]hile on close custody status, the Defendants Stewart and Santiago denied me access to prison privileges, including religious services and access to a law library, and I was denied an opportunity to be removed from close custody status." From the context of the affidavit, it is clear that this episode occurred when the plaintiff was detained at the Hartford correctional center sometime before his transfer to Garner on May 17, 1995. See also note 9 supra.
The plaintiff also attaches a May 11, 1995 memo from Lieutenant Santiago to the plaintiff informing him that a hearing would take place the next day to determine whether the department will place the plaintiff in administrative segregation because of his assault on a correctional lieutenant. But there is no evidence that Santiago or, for that matter, any of the other named defendants actually participated in the decision to place the plaintiff in close custody or administrative segregation or served on a classification committee.
As such, these claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Section 1983 has no statute of limitations of its own, but instead borrows the general or residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions of the state in question. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 245-50 (1989); Lounsbury v. Jeffries, 25 F.3d 131, 133 (2d Cir. 1994). The applicable statute of limitations in Connecticut is General Statutes § 52-577, which provides: "No action founded upon a tort shall be brought but within three years from the date of the act or omission complained of." See Lounsbury v. Jeffries, supra, 134. This statute is an occurrence statute that runs from the date of the act or omission rather than when the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the wrong. See Farnsworth v. O'Doherty, 85 Conn.App. 145, 149-50, 856 A.2d 518 (2004). Given that the plaintiff filed this suit in May 2001, which is more than three years after any incident at the Hartford jail in 1995, the limitations statute bars the claims against defendants Stewart and Santiago.
The plaintiff suggests that the continuing course of conduct doctrine may postpone the running of the statute. Under this doctrine, a statute of limitations may be tolled when there is "evidence of the breach of a duty that remained in existence after commission of the original wrong related thereto." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vanliner Ins. Co. v. Fay, 98 Conn.App. 125, 140, 907 A.2d 1220 (2006). The plaintiff's reliance on this doctrine, however, focuses on the denial of good time credits and, to a lesser extent, his allegedly improper placement in close custody. The plaintiff makes no argument in his brief that Stewart's and Santiago's alleged actions in denying the plaintiff certain privileges while in close custody constitute a continuing course of conduct. No such argument would be valid, as the alleged actions and duties of Stewart and Santiago at the Hartford jail relating to the plaintiff did not continue into the three-year period preceding May 2001, during which period the department confined the plaintiff in a different facility. Accordingly, the statute of limitations bars the claims against defendants Stewart and Santiago.
VI
The defendants additionally contend that the plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This provision states: "No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this Title, or any other Federal Law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." The exhaustion requirement applies without exception "to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong." Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Inmates must therefore exhaust all available administrative remedies, at all levels of appeal, in order for their claims to survive. See Cole v. Litscher, 343 F.Sup.2d 733, 739 (W.D.Wis. 2004).
The department's administrative directive 9.6 provides a three-level grievance procedure for prisoners. The directive broadly applies to "[t]he existence or substance of policies, rules and procedures of the unit, division and Department . . ." and "[a]ny other matter relating to access to privileges, programs and services, conditions of care or supervision and living unit conditions within the authority of the Department of Correction . . ." Administrative directive 9.6.6.A(2) and (5). The directive specifically makes several matters not grievable, including "[c]lassification decisions, which are appealable through the classification procedure provided in Administrative Directive 9.2, Inmate Classification." Administrative directive 9.6.6.B(4) (effective August 16, 1999).
The department has revised directive 9.6 several times since August 16, 1999, but the substance, insofar as pertinent here, remains the same. See www.ct.gov/doc/LIB/doc/PDF/AD/ad0906.pdf. (effective March 5, 2003). Administrative directive 9.2.15 provides for inmate involvement and inmate appeal of classification decisions. See www.ct.gov/doc/LIB/doc/PDF/AD/ad0902.pdf. (effective July 1, 2006).
The plaintiff alleges in his pro se affidavit that, three weeks following his transfer to the Hartford jail and placement in segregation status, he filed numerous complaints and grievances seeking removal from segregation. He alleges that the department then removed him from segregation status and placed him in the close custody unit. It was there, according to his second affidavit, that defendants Stewart and Santiago denied him various privileges and programs. The plaintiff, however, makes no allegation that he filed any grievances concerning Stewart or Santiago or the denial of privileges while in close custody status. Thus, the plaintiff did not exhaust any administrative remedies addressing his claims against defendants Stewart or Santiago.
The plaintiff's allegation against defendant Murphy is that, while at Northern, Murphy placed him on the "extended review list," despite "not being issued a disciplinary report for over seven months." The extended review list apparently would have denied the plaintiff opportunities for review and advancement within the three-part "Phase" program for administrative segregation inmates. The plaintiff attaches a January 2, 2001 letter from Warden Murphy acknowledging the plaintiff's "correspondence concerning classification review," but the plaintiff does not supply the actual correspondence and thus the court cannot determine whether it addresses the extended review list. In any event, it is not an exhaustion of remedies for a prisoner simply to write letters or make requests outside of the formal grievance process. See Harris v. Totten, 244 F.Sup.2d 229, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
The plaintiff also attaches a January 24, 2001 grievance that he did file in which he complained about placement on an extended review list. The department denied the grievance on the ground that the issue was a non-grievable classification matter and suggested that the plaintiff use the classification appeals procedure found in administrative directive 9.2. See note 10 supra. There is no evidence that the plaintiff did so. Accordingly, the plaintiff did not exhaust the administrative remedies made available by the department and thus cannot maintain his claims here for these reasons.
VII
The defendants also move for summary judgment on the merits. The plaintiff states that his federal claims arise under the eighth amendment and the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. The Supreme Court has held, in the context of prison life, that the eighth amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment addresses "only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). Prison privileges such as religious services, a law library, and advancement in a rehabilitation program do not involve necessities of life and, therefore, their alleged deprivation while the plaintiff was in restricted housing does not amount to an eighth amendment violation. See Santiago v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 39 Conn.App. 683-84 (finding that erroneous designation as security risk group members does not violate eighth amendment because there was no "deprivation of the minimal civilized measures of life's necessities or excessive force . . ."); see also Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 847-48 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that eighth amendment not violated when inmate denied contact visitation and religious services for thirty-seven days because no deprivation of life necessities involved).
The court does not address the defendants' claims to qualified immunity under the federal civil rights laws because they bear the burden of proving these claims and they have not filed their own affidavits concerning their actions. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 591 (1998). The defendants' immunity defense under General Statutes § 4-165 for actions that are "not wanton, reckless or malicious" would also not apply, because "[c]onduct by persons acting under color of state law which is wrongful under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . cannot be immunized by state law." Sullins v. Rodriguez, 281 Conn. 128, 133-34, 913 A.2d 415 (2007) (quoting Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 n. 8 (1980)).
The plaintiff does not identify whether his due process claim invokes substantive or procedural due process and he provides no meaningful analysis of either. The only clue that the plaintiff provides is his reference to his "arbitrary and capricious" treatment. This reference suggests reliance on substantive due process. See Hunt v. Prior, 236 Conn. 421, 442, 673 A.2d 514 (1996); see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331-32 (1986) (holding that due process clause was "intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government . . . [a]nd by barring certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them . . . it serves to prevent governmental power from being used for purposes of oppression . . ." [citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted]). However, a claimant cannot establish any due process violation, whether substantive or procedural, without a showing of a deprivation of a protected life, liberty, or property interest, because the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . ." U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Hunt v. Prior, supra, 442-43; see also Kelley Property Development, Inc. v. Lebanon, 226 Conn. 314, 321-22, 627 A.2d 909 (1993) (noting that Connecticut has adopted the "clear entitlement" test in land use cases under which claimant must show a constitutionally protected property interest as threshold requirement for successful substantive or procedural federal due process claim).
The parties also fail to address the fact that most of the plaintiff's time at the Hartford jail was as a pretrial detainee, a status that gives the plaintiff a due process clause right to be free from punishment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-39 (1979). However, the due process clause does not prohibit the imposition of restrictions on pretrial detainees reasonably related to a nonpunitive governmental purpose. Id., 538-39. Under this standard, at least one court has approved administrative segregation for appropriate pretrial detainees. See Collazo-Leon v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 51 F.3d 315, 318 (1st Cir. 1995).
In addition, "where a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) ATC Partnership v. Windham, 251 Conn. 597, 607, 741 A.2d 305 (1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1214 (2000).
In order for a prisoner to establish a property or liberty interest in prison classification or rehabilitation programs, the interest must be secured by the constitution, a statute, judicial decree, regulation, or state policy. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005); Wheway v. Warden, 215 Conn. 418, 431-32, 576 A.2d 494 (1990). A prisoner claiming deprivation of a state-created liberty interest must specify the source of that interest. See Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1326 (5th Cir. 1996). In the context of prison conditions, a claimed state-created interest receives due process protection only if its restriction or deprivation creates an "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).
The plaintiff points to no constitutional provision, statute, decree, regulation, or policy that entitles him to any of the privileges or programs that he asserts the defendants denied. Further, the plaintiff makes no showing that his assignment to close custody or administrative segregation created an "atypical and significant hardship" on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. See id., 486 (prisoner has no inherent liberty interest in avoiding disciplinary segregation for thirty days); cf. Wilkinson v. Austin, supra, 545 U.S. 221-24 (liberty interest exists in avoiding transfer to Ohio's "Supermax" prison where prisoner can be confined indefinitely in solitary confinement conditions with loss of parole). Indeed, our Appellate Court has held that a Connecticut prisoner classified as a security group risk threat has no constitutionally protected interest in prison employment, increased recreation, educational courses, visitation, or access to a law library. See State v. Santiago, supra, 39 Conn.App. 680-81. Because the plaintiff does not establish the denial of any protected liberty or property interest, his due process claim cannot succeed. See Hunt v. Prior, supra, 236 Conn. 442-43.
The plaintiff does not address administrative directive 9.4, which the defendants attach to their brief and which may have the force of a regulation. See Beasley v. Commissioner of Correction, CT Page 8323 50 Conn.App. 421, 434-36, 718 A.2d 487 (1998), aff'd, 249 Conn. 499, 773 A.2d 833 (1999). Section 6 of directive 9.4 provides that an inmate on "Restrictive Housing Status," a category that includes close custody and administrative segregation; see notes 1 and 2 supra; "shall not be entitled access to the same programs or privileges afforded an inmate in general population." However, section 6 does grant an inmate in this status the right to the use of law materials, access to educational and library programs "consistent with the security needs of the housing unit and/or facility . . ." visits on at least a weekly basis from facility chaplains, and recreation for a minimum of one hour daily five days a week outside the cell, unless a supervisor denies recreation for a documented reason. Attachment B to administrative directive 9.4 outlines procedures for review of administrative segregation status at least every thirty days. Administrative directive 6.14, also not discussed by the plaintiff, provides guidelines for hearing, review, and appeal for close custody security risk group members. See www.ct.gov/doc/LIB/doc/PDF/AD/ad0614.pdf. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff cannot show that his classification subjected him to an "atypical and significant hardship" that would create a liberty interest. Moreover, even if a liberty interest existed, the substantive rights to privileges and programs created by these directives are the antithesis of the arbitrary and capricious treatment that the plaintiff claims constituted a substantive due process violation.
Although there is therefore no need to reach the plaintiff's claim of damages, the court observes that, under § 1983, the plaintiff cannot request damages for emotional distress unless he first establishes physical injury, which he does not claim in this suit. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
VI
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment in its entirety.
It is so ordered,