Summary
In Signature Realty, Inc. v. Tallman (2 NY3d 810), the Court of Appeals held that nothing in the parties' agreement limited the commission to the initial lease period.
Summary of this case from YUE-SAI KAN v. COTY INC.Opinion
74.
Argued April 28, 2004.
Decided June 3, 2004.
APPEAL from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department, entered March 21, 2003. The Appellate Division order, insofar as appealed from, with two Justices dissenting, affirmed an order of the Supreme Court, Oneida County (John S. Parker, J.), which had granted plaintiff summary judgment on its first cause of action related to the first term under the agreement and granted in part and denied in part defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint.
Signature Realty v. Tallman, 303 AD2d 925, reversed.
Law Office of Richard L. Wolfe, Utica ( Richard L. Wolfe of counsel), for appellant.
Kowalczyk, Tolles Deery, LLP, Utica ( Robert K. Hilton, III, of counsel), for respondent.
Chief Judge Kaye and Judges G.B. Smith, Ciparick, Rosenblatt, Graffeo, Read and R.S. Smith concur in memorandum.
OPINION OF THE COURT
MEMORANDUM.
The order of the Appellate Division, insofar as appealed from, should be reversed, with costs, and the case remitted to Supreme Court for further proceedings in accordance with this memorandum.
As we recently stated in R/S Assoc. v. New York Job Dev. Auth. ( 98 NY2d 29, 32), "when parties set down their agreement in a clear, complete document, their writing should as a rule be enforced according to its terms" ( see also Reiss v. Financial Performance Corp., 97 NY2d 195, 198, quoting W.W.W. Assoc. v. Giancontieri, 77 NY2d 157, 162). Nothing in the parties' agreement limits the commission to the initial lease period. On the contrary, an option to renew a lease for three five-year periods, as provided for in the subject lease, would fall within the broad category of "a lease, rental arrangement or other occupancy," unambiguously requiring payment of 10% of the rent over the period of occupancy.
Given that plaintiff did not cross-move for summary judgment, this Court is not empowered to grant it summary relief ( see Merritt Hill Vineyards v. Windy Hgts. Vineyard, 61 NY2d 106, 110-111).
Order, insofar as appealed from, reversed, etc.