Summary
In Liljedahl Bros., Inc. v. Grigsby, supra, 215 Conn. 350, the contractor claimed that there was an implied contract, and we concluded that an implied contract claim was barred by the requirement of § 20-429 (a) that the home improvement contract be in writing.
Summary of this case from Wright Brothers Builders, Inc. v. DowlingOpinion
(13785)
The plaintiffs sought damages for allegedly defective remodeling work done by the defendant contractor, C, on their home. C counterclaimed for the value of materials and labor he had furnished to the plaintiffs. The trial court rendered judgment for C on the complaint and for the plaintiffs on the counterclaim, and C appealed to the Appellate Court. That court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and, on the sting of certification, C appealed to this court. Held that the Appellate Court correctly affirmed the trial court's ruling that the written contract requirement of the Home Improvement Act ( 20-429) barred C from recovering under a claim of quantum meruit arising out of an oral contract.
(Two Justices dissenting)
Argued February 6, 1990
Decision released June 12, 1990
Action to recover damages for breach of a construction contract, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Litchfield, where the defendant Rex K. Collum filed a counterclaim; thereafter, the action was withdrawn as to the named defendant and the matter was tried to the court, Heiman, J.; judgment for the defendant Rex K. Collum on the complaint and for the plaintiffs on the counterclaim, from which the defendant Rex K. Collum appealed to the Appellate Court, Dupont, C.J., Stoughton and Jacobson, Js., which affirmed the trial court's decision, and the defendant Rex K. Collum, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Robert L. Fisher, Jr., for the appellant (defendant Rex K. Collum).
John Febbroriello, for the appellees (plaintiffs).
Clarine Nardi Riddle, attorney general, and Robert M. Langer, Stephen R. Park and Neil G. Fishman, assistant attorneys general, submitted a brief on behalf of the state as amicus curiae.
The sole issue in this appeal is whether a contractor who has failed to comply with the requirements of the Home Improvement Act; General Statutes 20-418 et seq.; can nonetheless recover in quasi contract by demonstrating unjust enrichment on the part of the homeowner for whom the contractor has performed work. The defendant, Rex K. Collum, a general contractor, raised this claim as one count of a counterclaim to an action brought by the plaintiffs, Judith and Selig Sidney, for defective remodeling work at their home. The trial court found for the defendant in the plaintiffs' cause of action, and for the plaintiffs in the action on the defendant's counterclaim. In the defendant's subsequent appeal to the Appellate Court, that court upheld the judgment of the trial court. Sidney v. DeVries, 18 Conn. App. 581, 559 A.2d 1145 (1989). We granted the defendant's petition for certification; Sidney v. DeVries, 212 Conn. 810, 564 A.2d 1071 (1989); and now affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The defendant has at various times denominated the relevant count in his counterclaim against the plaintiff as sounding in quasi contract, quantum meruit and unjust enrichment. Since these three theories, each based upon common law principles of restitution, are all noncontractual actions by which a party may recover despite the absence of a valid contract; see Burns v. Koellmer, 11 Conn. App. 375, 384, 527 A.2d 1210 (1987); G. Palmer, "History of Restitution in Anglo-American Law," c. 3, vol. Restitution — Unjust Enrichment and Negotiorum Gestio, International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (P. Schlechtriem Chief Ed.) pp. 32-33 (1989); we will refer to the theories collectively as quasi contract claims.
The named defendant, Philip N. DeVries, is another contractor. The plaintiffs and DeVries have filed reciprocal withdrawals of their actions against each other.
The record and the pleadings disclose the following by way of background. In February, 1983, at the request of the plaintiffs, the defendant, a self-employed contractor and carpenter, began to perform renovation work on the plaintiffs' house in Woodbury. In October, 1983, dissatisfied with the defendant's performance, the plaintiffs terminated their relationship with him. At that point, the plaintiffs had paid the defendant $11,800. The defendant alleged in his counterclaim that the materials and labor that he had furnished to the plaintiffs had a reasonable value of $39,650 and claimed a right to recover the balance of $27,850.
The trial court found that, although certain documents had been exchanged between the parties, "there is in evidence no written contract containing the entire agreement between the owner and the contractor. It is impossible to harmonize the agreements in evidence to form a contract containing the entire agreement between the parties since they are full of contradictory terms. Additionally, no writing exists which clearly sets out the scope of the work, extras, or many other details necessary to a complete agreement." Absent a complete written agreement, the court held that General Statutes 20-429 barred the defendant's recovery on the counterclaim insofar as it alleged a breach of an oral contract or a claim in quasi contract. On the plaintiffs' cause of action, the court concluded that they also could not recover because they had failed to meet their burden of establishing the terms of their contract and its breach by the defendant.
General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) 20-429 provides in pertinent part "CONTRACT TO BE IN WRITING. NEGATIVE OPTION PROVISIONS PROHIBITED. OWNER TO RECEIVE COPY. REQUIRED PROVISIONS. (a) No home improvement contract shall be valid unless it is in writing and unless it contains the entire agreement between the owner and the contractor. . . . "(c) The contractor shall provide and deliver to the owner, without charge, a completed copy of the home improvement contract at the time such contract is executed." Prior to 1986, the provision now codified as subsection (c) was subsection (b). See Public Acts 1986, No. 86-94. The substance of the provision was not changed in the recodification. Amendments to 20-429, in 1988, which added several other required provisions for a valid contract; Public Acts 1988, No. 88-269, 9, No. 88-364, 108, 123; are not relevant to our analysis since the transactions in this case took place prior to the effective date of the amendments.
Only the defendant filed an appeal to the Appellate Court. In rejecting the defendant's oral contract claim, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's ruling "that the agreement between the parties fell within the Home Improvement Act and that the defendant's counterclaim, relying on an oral contract, was barred by General Statutes 20-429 (a)." Sidney v. DeVries, supra, 18 Conn. App. 588. The Appellate Court also rejected the defendant's claim that he had a right to recover on a theory of quantum meruit. We granted the defendant's petition for certification, limited to the following question: "Does Connecticut General Statutes 20-429 bar a home improvement contractor from recovering against a homeowner under a claim of quantum meruit arising out of an oral contract?" Sidney v. DeVries, supra, 212 Conn. 810.
In the Appellate Court, the defendant also argued that the Home Improvement Act was not properly before the court because the plaintiffs had not invoked this act in their special defense to the defendant's counterclaim. This contention, which the Appellate Court rejected on the ground of waiver; Sidney v. DeVries, 18 Conn. App. 581, 587, 559 A.2d 1145 (1989); is not at issue in this appeal.
The question that we certified in this case was fully examined and discussed in Barrett Builders v. Miller, 215 Conn. 316, 576 A.2d 455 (1990). We there concluded that, absent proof of bad faith on the part of the homeowner, 20-429 does not permit recovery in quasi contract by a contractor who has failed to comply with the statutory requirement that "[n]o home improvement contract shall be valid unless it is in writing and unless it contains the entire agreement between the owner and the contractor." That precedent is dispositive of this appeal.
with whom CALLAHAN, J., joins, dissenting.
For the reasons expressed in my dissenting opinion in Barrett Builders v. Miller, 215 Conn. 316, 576 A.2d 455 (1990), I also dissent in this case, which further illustrates the inequity of imposing the penalty of forfeiture upon a tradesman who performs a home improvement without a contract conforming to General Statutes 20-429.