Appeals, Nos. 399 and 400, Jan. T., 1935, by plaintiffs, from judgments of C. P. No. 3, Phila. Co., March T., 1933, No. 6480, in case of Hyman Shapiro et ux. v. Peter Grabosky. Judgments affirmed.

Trespass. Before LARRABEE, J., specially presiding.

Verdicts, in favor of wife plaintiff for $3,000 and in favor of husband plaintiff for $863. Judgment entered for defendant n. o. v.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the lower court, STERN, P. J., as follows:

Frances Shapiro was driving an automobile east on Poplar Street, Philadelphia, at about 1 P. M. on March 19, 1933. Dora Shapiro, her sister-in-law, was a passenger in the car. The weather was drizzling and misty. In crossing 11th Street the car came in collision with an automobile going north on 11th Street driven by the defendant. Frances Shapiro was injured and she and her husband brought suit for damages. Dora Shapiro was also injured and she and her husband likewise sued the defendant. The two cases were tried at the same time. The verdicts rendered by the jury were manifestly inconsistent. Frances Shapiro was awarded $3,000, and her husband Hyman Shapiro $863. Dora Shapiro's husband was awarded $153, but the jury found for the defendant as to Dora Shapiro. Dora's case was better than that of Frances, because, being merely a passenger, she might not be guilty of contributory negligence under circumstances which would fasten such negligence upon Frances, who drove the car.

The court granted a new trial as to Dora Shapiro and her husband.

In the case of Frances Shapiro and her husband, the defendant filed a motion for judgment n. o. v., which was granted by the court, and it is this ruling which is the subject of the present appeal to the Supreme Court.

The action of the court in granting the motion for judgment n. o. v. was based upon the contributory negligence of Frances Shapiro. She testified:

"As I got toward the corner I slowed down and blew my horn. As I got close to the houseline I looked right and left, and didn't see anything, and I didn't hear anything in answer to this horn blowing. I started to change gears, because the car would have come to a standstill if I didn't. I started across the street. Well, when I got almost to the east side of 11th Street, I felt something strike me. That is all I know."

"Q. When you got to the curbline — that is where the pavement ends and the street begins — did you look again?

"A. No. After I looked the first time and blew my horn, I did not look again. I did not think it was necessary.

"Q. You looked when you were at the houseline, and did not look again; and the next thing you knew this accident had occurred?

"A. Yes, sir.

"Q. You never saw this other car until the collision?

"A. No, sir."

She further testified that she was crossing 11th Street at "about 8 or 10 miles an hour." Eleventh Street at that point is 26 feet wide from curb to curb, with 12 feet wide sidewalks.

We therefore have a case where the plaintiff admits that on a rainy, misty day she looked down the intersecting street only as she came close to the houseline, and did not look again at the curb or at any subsequent point in her passage across the street, and she never saw the other car at all until the collision actually occurred. Her automobile was struck just after it had passed the track and was near the east curb.

Under such circumstances it would seem clear that Frances Shapiro was contributorily negligent. Her duty was not fulfilled merely by looking when she came close to the houseline and then proceeding across without looking again for any oncoming traffic. This is especially true because of the weather conditions which prevailed at the time. It was her duty to look when she reached the curbline, that being the point where her car entered the zone of danger. It was also her duty to be on the alert for automobiles that might be coming up 11th Street, especially as that street is comparatively narrow and the trolley and traffic move northward, so that it was to the south that her attention was primarily required.

There are a number of decisions in the Superior Court which hold that the operator of an automobile is required to continue looking as he crosses an intersecting street, and especially where his last glance had been at the houseline and not at the curb: Frank v. Pleet, 87 Pa. Super. 494; Wescott v. Geiger, 92 Pa. Super. 80; Fraser v. Voight, 100 Pa. Super. 248; Newman v. Reinish, 106 Pa. Super. 351; Lewis v. Hermann, 112 Pa. Super. 338; Gooden v. Hale, 116 Pa. Super. 335.

All of these cases hold that, even though the operator of a car may have the right of way to cross an intersecting street, he becomes contributorily negligent if he goes across blindly and without performing his duty to look and keep looking for approaching traffic.

In the Lewis v. Hermann case (supra) the court held that the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence. The plaintiff in that case looked when she reached the curbline of the intersecting street, and as she was crossing looked first in the one direction and then in the other, the street being a two-way street. The court pointed out that because traffic went in both directions on the intersecting street the plaintiff had to look both ways and could not confine her attention to one direction. Moreover the court distinguishes the Frank v. Pleet and Fraser v. Voight cases, above cited, in that in them the plaintiff looked merely at the houseline and not at the curbline. In the present case the plaintiff did look merely before coming to the houseline and not at the curbline, and the traffic came only in one direction on the intersecting street.

On both authority and reason therefore the plaintiffs Frances Shapiro and her husband should not be allowed to recover. Having looked as she approached the houseline through a drizzling rain and seen nothing, she had no right to continue crossing without further attention to the one direction from which traffic was likely to come. She had to traverse from the west curb approximately 50 feet in order to get the rear of her car beyond the east curbline, and, going, as she says she was, at the rate of 8 or 10 miles an hour, this would have required about four seconds, during which time a car coming up 11th Street at a rate of say 40 miles an hour, would have traversed about 240 feet. Having failed to look at the curbline or at any time thereafter until her car was struck on the easterly half of the intersecting street, she was obviously negligent in a way that contributed vitally to the happening of the accident. For these reasons the court granted the defendant's motion for judgment n. o. v.

Plaintiffs appealed.

Error assigned was judgment n. o. v.