Opinion
A158072
06-01-2020
In re J.J., Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. C.J., Objector and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (San Francisco City & County Super. Ct. No. JD14-3238A)
C.J. (father) is the father of J.J. (minor). The juvenile court granted the San Francisco Human Service Agency's (agency) petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 to allow the transfer of the minor's mental health services to the county of her placement. C.J. appeals, contending the minor's mental health care services should have remained in the county where he resides. We disagree and will affirm the juvenile court's order.
All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
BACKGROUND
We recite the facts only as necessary to resolve the issues on appeal. The full factual background of this case may be found in our opinions in prior appeals arising from this case. (See In re C.J. (Dec. 30, 2019, A156975) [nonpub. opn.]; In re C.J. (Feb. 2, 2017, A148255) [nonpub. opn.].)
After removing the minor and her brother from father's care and providing father reunification services, in February 2017, the juvenile court in San Francisco permanently placed them with their maternal great-aunt and great-uncle in Alameda County. In April 2019, when the minor's brother was transitioning between therapists, the agency followed the statutory presumption that children receive mental health services in the county of their placement and transferred the responsibility for the minor's brother's mental health services from San Francisco to Alameda County. (See § 14717.1, subd. (c).) However, the agency asked the juvenile court to authorize it to waive the presumptive transfer for the minor and allow her to continue seeing her existing therapist in San Francisco because the minor's residence was within 30 minutes of travel to the therapist. The trial court granted the agency's request.
At the same hearing, the juvenile court denied father's section 388 petition for a change to its visitation order. Father appealed that order, and we affirmed. (In re C.J. (Dec. 30, 2019, A156975) [nonpub. opn.].) Some of the background recounted above is drawn from the record in that case. We previously granted father's request for judicial notice of that record.
In July 2019, the agency's social worker filed a section 388 petition asking the juvenile court to rescind its prior order authorizing the agency to waive the presumptive transfer of the minor's mental health services so that the presumptive transfer could proceed. The social worker stated that the minor's current therapist had delivered her last service the day before the petition was filed. The social worker further explained that the minor and the minor's maternal great-aunt and great-uncle wanted a mental health care provider closer to the minor's residence. Father objected to the social worker's request, so the trial court held a hearing.
At the hearing, the agency reiterated that the court should grant the petition because the minor had lost her previous therapist and she and her caregivers wanted a new therapist who was closer to the minor's home and could be paid faster than a San Francisco therapist. Counsel for the minor "wholeheartedly agree[d]" with the agency, and counsel for the mother took no position on the request. Father, representing himself but accompanied by advisory counsel, explained that he objected because he had health insurance that covered the minor and could afford to pay for her therapy. He told the court he wanted to use his insurance to avoid forcing the court to pay for the minor's mental health care. Father indicated he wanted to use his insurance to "see what was going on with" the minor. He also said he felt that he had been "railroaded" throughout the entire case and that the agency's case was a malicious action against him.
The juvenile court granted the agency's section 388 petition, finding changed circumstances based on the end of the prior therapist's services and further finding that it was in the minor's best interest to obtain mental health services in her county of placement. Father timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Father argues the trial court erred in granting the social worker's section 388 petition because the transfer of services to Alameda County, where the minor resides, was not in the minor's best interest. We disagree.
"Section 388 allows a person having an interest in a dependent child of the court to petition the court for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any previous order on the grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence." (In re Anthony W. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 246, 250.) At a hearing on a petition under section 388, the petitioner asking for a modification of an order has the burden of proof. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(h); see also In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317 [discussing burden of proof for section 388 petitions challenging placement orders].) When a petition does not concern the removal of a child from a parent's home, reunification services, or custody or visitation with a parent for whom reunification services were bypassed under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(4)-(6), the petitioner must establish that modification of the prior order is appropriate by a preponderance of the evidence. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(h)(1)(D).) A section 388 "petition is addressed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court and its decision will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion." (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415.)
Father does not dispute that the agency properly demonstrated a change in circumstances based on the cessation of the minor's relationship with her prior therapist in San Francisco. He argues only that the juvenile court erred in concluding that transferring the minor's mental health services to Alameda County was in the minor's best interest. Specifically, he faults the juvenile court with failing to explore father's ability to pay for the minor's mental health care himself, rather than forcing Alameda County to bear the expense.
Father has not shown the trial court abused its discretion in granting the social worker's petition. Given the end of her relationship with her prior therapist, it was plainly in the minor's best interest to find a suitable therapist close to her home if possible, to avoid spending excessive amounts of time in transit to a therapist farther away. The minor's and her caregivers' support for the social worker's petition demonstrates that the social worker's request was in the minor's best interest. We find further support for the trial court's order in the statutory presumption favoring the transfer of mental health services to the county of a minor's residence. (§ 14717.1, subd. (a)(2) [expressing Legislature's intent "to overcome any barriers to care that may result when responsibility for providing or arranging for specialty mental health services to foster children who are placed outside of their county of original jurisdiction is retained by the county of original jurisdiction"].) Father's desire to shoulder the cost for the therapist is admirable and perhaps could be relevant to whether any county should pay for the minor's mental health services. But it has no bearing on the issue raised in the social worker's petition, which was whether the minor should see a new therapist in San Francisco or Alameda County.
We also note that section 14717.1 sets forth limited grounds for departing from the presumptive transfer of mental health services to the county of placement. Those grounds are that (1) the transfer would disrupt continuity or delay access to the minor's services, (2) the transfer would interfere with family reunification efforts, (3) the minor's placement in another county is expected to last less than six months, or (4) the minor will live less than 30 minutes away from the minor's established therapist. (§ 14717.1, subd. (d)(5)(A)-(D).) The agency originally relied on the last exception but evidently concluded that the exception was no longer justified after the minor stopped seeing her prior therapist. Father does not challenge that determination or argue that any of the other exceptions apply. This confirms that the trial court was correct to grant the agency's petition and allow the presumptive transfer of the minor's care to her county of placement to proceed.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
/s/_________
BROWN, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
POLLAK, P. J. /s/_________
TUCHER, J.