Opinion
Case No. 00-3286-JTM
April 9, 2004
ORDER
This matter comes before the court on defendant John Gamble, D.O.'s renewed motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 80); plaintiff John Sandifer's motion for leave to amend complaint (Dkt. No. 82); defendants Leroy Green, J.B. Hopkins and Prison Health Services, Inc.'s renewed motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 86); plaintiffs motion for costs (Dkt. No. 88). These motions are briefed and ripe for disposition. For the reasons stated below, the court grants defendant John Gamble, D.O.'s renewed motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 80) and defendants Leroy Green, J.B. Hopkins and Prison Health Services, Inc.'s renewed motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 86). The court denies plaintiffs motion for leave to amend complaint (Dkt. No. 82) as moot and denies plaintiffs motion for costs (Dkt. No. 88).
I. Background
Plaintiff, a Kansas state inmate, brings this case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging deliberate indifference to his medical needs during his pretrial detention. On February 28, 2002, the court granted motions to dismiss filed by defendants. (Dkt. No. 70). The court's order was issued due to plaintiffs failure to respond to defendants' motions and based on D. Kan. R. 7.4. On February 12, 2003, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the decision. (Dkt. No. 79). Defendants and plaintiff then filed the motions at issue here. Accordingly, the court examines these motions in conjunction with the entire record in order to make the specific determinations required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
II. Standard
Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgments as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must examine all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the opposing party. Jurasekv. Utah State Hosp., 158 F.3d 506, 510 (10th Cir. 1998). The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate its entitlement to summary judgment beyond a reasonable doubt. Baker v. Board of Regents, 991 F.2d 628, 630 (10th Cir. 1993). The moving party need not disprove the nonmoving party's claim or defense; it need only establish that the factual allegations have no legal significance. Dayton Hudson Corp. v. Macerich Real Estate Co., 812 F.2d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1987).
The party opposing summary judgment must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. "In the language of the Rule, the nonmoving party must come forward with `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)) (emphasis in Matsushita). The opposing party may not rely upon mere allegations or denials contained in its pleadings or briefs. Rather, the opposing party must present significant admissible probative evidence supporting that party's allegations. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986).
III. Analysis
A. Defendants' motions
Defendant Gamble renews his motion for summary judgment arguing plaintiff fails to present sufficient evidence concerning his claims of deliberate indifference. In response, plaintiff points to the statement of facts included in his complaint.
Reviewing plaintiff's complaint, the Martinez report, and defendant Gamble's pleadings, the court finds defendant Gamble is entitled to summary judgment. Plaintiff's complaints fall into two general categories: claims concerning a delay in receiving his HIV medications and claims concerning his medical treatment in August, 1999. The Martinez report provides an thorough analysis of defendant Gamble's treatment of plaintiff and plaintiff's medical records. The report shows plaintiff was arrested on May 1, 1999, he saw defendant Gamble two days later, and he started receiving his medications on May 6, 1999. Plaintiff continued to receive medications with an eventual adjustment by Dr. Sahgal. A review of plaintiff's medical records shows his overall condition did begin to deteriorate in late August, 1999. However, the records fail to show any lack of care on the part of defendant Gamble who treated plaintiff, ordered medication and blood tests for plaintiff, reviewed plaintiff's lab findings, and noted that plaintiff was to be transferred to a medical center for a blood transfusion and a lab work-up. Plaintiff provides only the allegations in his complaint and fails to provide any significant admissible probative evidence supporting his allegations of a delay in receiving his medications and failure to receive adequate treatment in August, 1999. Plaintiff also fails to provide any evidence countering the analysis of his medical records in the Martinez report. As the Martinez report fails to lend any support to plaintiffs claims and the court can find no other evidence supporting a claim of deliberate indifference on the part of defendant Gamble, the court grants defendant Gamble's motion for summary judgment.
Defendants Leroy Green, J.B. Hopkins and Prison Health Services, Inc. renew their motion for summary judgment arguing the records do not support plaintiff's claims concerning his treatment while at Wyandotte County Detention Center. Defendants Green and Hopkins also argue they are entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff does not respond to these arguments.
Reviewing plaintiff's complaint, the Martinez report, and defendants' pleadings, the court finds defendants Leroy Green, J.B. Hopkins and Prison Health Services, Inc. are entitled to summary judgment. "Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they are deliberately indifferent to an inmate's serious medical needs." Johnson v. Kurth, 2002 WL 31855266 *3 (D. Kan. 2002) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)) (additional citations omitted). Both the defendants and the Martinez report readily acknowledge defendant experienced discomfort and an overall weakened condition as a result of complications from his HIV-positive status and side-effects from the medication Combvir. However, there is no indication plaintiff's symptoms resulted from substandard medical care, delay in treatment, or indifference on the part of defendants. As discussed above, plaintiff's medical records fail to demonstrate any delay in treatment or lack of care on the part of the defendants and plaintiff fails to provide any admissible evidence countering such a finding. Accordingly, the court grants defendants Leroy Green, J.B. Hopkins and Prison Health Services, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment.
The court also notes to the extent plaintiff is seeking damages against defendants Green and Hopkins in their personal or individual capacities, they are immune from such an award. "Once the defendant has adequately raised the [qualified immunity] defense, the plaintiff must show that the law was clearly established when the alleged violation occurred and come forward with facts or allegations sufficient to show that the official violated the clearly established law." Woodward v. City of Worland, 977 F.2d 1392, 1396 (10th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff fails to provide any specific facts concerning how defendants Green and Hopkins were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs.
B. Plaintiff's motions
Plaintiff requests leave to amend his complaint to add additional defendants to the case. Plaintiff states he was provided with additional names of defendants through the discovery process. Based on the grant of defendants' motions and the dismissal of plaintiff's claim, the court denies plaintiffs request as moot.
Plaintiff also moves to recover the costs incurred in the appeal of his case. Plaintiff is seeking a total of $134.78 (filing fee of $105.00 and postage of $29.78). Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 54(d)(1) provides:
Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of the U.S. or in these rules, costs other than attorneys' fees shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs.
In Centennial Management Services, Inc. v. Axa Re Vie, 2001 WL 123871 *2 (D. Kan. 2001), the court discusses prevailing parties under Rule 54(d)(1) stating:
It is well settled that a plaintiff, to qualify as a prevailing party, must obtain at least some relief on the merits of its claim . . . In essence, a plaintiff "prevails" when actual relief on the merits of her claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.
(citations omitted). Here, plaintiff does not qualify as the prevailing party. Plaintiff fails to obtain any relief on the merits of his claim nor does he achieve any relief altering his legal relationship with defendants. Accordingly, plaintiffs motions for costs is denied.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED this 9th day of April, 2004 that the court grants defendant John Gamble, D.O.'s renewed motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 80) and defendants Leroy Green, J.B. Hopkins and Prison Health Services, Inc.'s renewed motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 86). The court denies plaintiffs motion for leave to amend complaint (Dkt. No. 82) as moot and denies plaintiff's motion for costs (Dkt. No. 88). Accordingly, the court dismisses the claims against defendants.