Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4732-13T1
09-06-2016
HECTOR SANABRIA, Appellant, v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
Hector Sanabria, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Marvin L. Freeman, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Carroll and Sumners. On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Corrections. Hector Sanabria, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Marvin L. Freeman, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM
In this prison disciplinary appeal, Hector Sanabria challenges the April 28, 2014 final decision of the New Jersey Department of Corrections (DOC), continuing his placement in the Management Control Unit (MCU). Following our review of the arguments advanced on appeal, in light of the record and applicable law, we affirm.
I.
Sanabria, an inmate at New Jersey State Prison, is serving a ninety-year sentence with a ninety-year mandatory-minimum term for three counts of murder, receiving stolen property, and several weapons and controlled dangerous substance offenses. On October 20, 2006, Sanabria was found guilty of committing disciplinary infractions *.803/*.306, attempting to engage in conduct which disrupts the orderly running of the correctional facility, and .702, unauthorized contact with the public. These charges arose from an investigation by the DOC's Special Investigations Division which concluded that Sanabria was involved in a large-scale contraband smuggling and money laundering operation under the auspices of his leadership role in Hispanic Americans for Progress (HAP), an inmate self-help organization. He had previously been found guilty of seven institutional infractions from 1991 through 1997; the most serious being, *.153, theft, *.003, assaulting any person with a weapon, and *.202, possessing a weapon. Consequently, it was recommended that Sanabria be placed in the MCU, a close custody, segregated unit within the prison. See N.J.A.C. 10A:5-2.1 to -2.31.
A classification hearing was then conducted before the MCU Review Committee (Review Committee) to determine if Sanabria "poses a substantial threat to the safety of others; of damage to or destruction of property; or of interrupting the operation of a State correctional facility." N.J.A.C. 10A:5-1.3. On February 2, 2007, the Review Committee decided that Sanabria's activities "demonstrated he is unwilling or unable to successfully house in a general population setting within the New Jersey Department of Corrections[,]" and needed the safety and structure provided in MCU. Sanabria was placed on the High Risk List, assigned to the non-congregate status with the right to apply for congregate status in 90 days.
Since Sanabria's placement in MCU, the Review Committee has conducted the required reviews of his placement, and has decided to continue his MCU classification. On March 27, 2014, the Review Committee denied Sanabria's request to return to the general population. The Review Committee acknowledged his positive behavior but felt that his affiliation with HAP involved "the transaction of narcotics, weapons, and escape plans[,]" and he continued "to pose a threat to the safety and security of any correctional facility." Sanabria's administrative appeal was denied when the DOC issued its final agency decision on April 28, 2014, continuing his placement in MCU for the same reasons expressed by the Review Committee.
On appeal, Sanabria challenges the agency's final decision on the grounds that the Review Committee's decision is not supported by substantial credible evidence. He argues that the DOC has not met its burden of demonstrating that he will continue to pose an identifiable threat to the safety of others, or disrupt the orderly operation of the correctional facility. Sanabria also claims that he has maintained the highest level of good behavior since 2008 and has successfully completed DOC behavioral programs to warrant placement in general population.
II.
Our review of agency action is limited. Williams v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 423 N.J. Super. 176, 182 (App. Div. 2011) (citing Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997)). "Ordinarily, an appellate court will reverse the decision of the administrative agency only if it is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or it is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole." Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980) (citation omitted). Substantial evidence needed to sustain guilt of an infraction is "'such evidence [that] a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 35 N.J. 358, 376 (1961) (quoting In re Hackensack Water Co., 41 N.J. Super. 408, 418 (App. Div. 1956)).
We defer to the agency's fact-finding and give some deference to the agency's interpretation of regulations that are "'within its implementing and enforcing responsibility.'" Utley v. Bd. of Review, 194 N.J. 534, 551 (2008) (quoting In re Appeal by Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 307 N.J. Super. 93, 102 (App. Div. 1997)). We do so in part because the agency that drafted and promulgated the rule should know its meaning. Essex Cty. Bd. of Taxation v. Twp. of Caldwell, 21 N.J. Tax 188, 197 (App. Div.) (citation omitted), certif. denied, 176 N.J. 426 (2003). We also may choose to defer "when the agency's interpretation is grounded in its technical or specialized expertise." L.C. v. Bd. of Review, Dep't of Labor, 439 N.J. Super. 581, 591 (App. Div. 2015) (citing In re Freshwater Wetlands Prot. Act Rules, 180 N.J. 478, 489 (2004)).
However, an appellate court "may not substitute its own judgment for the agency's, even though the court might have reached a different result." In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011) (citations omitted). Yet, our review is not "perfunctory," nor is "our function . . . merely [to] rubberstamp an agency's decision[.]" Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186, 191 (App. Div. 2010). "[R]ather, our function is to engage in a careful and principled consideration of the agency record and findings." Ibid. (citations omitted).
Moreover, "[a]n appellate tribunal is . . . in no way bound by the agency's . . . determination of a strictly legal issue." Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973). Thus, we may intervene when an agency's decision rests upon a misinterpretation of a regulation. See Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995).
We are also mindful that the DOC has "broad discretionary powers" to promulgate regulations governing correctional facilities. See Jenkins v. Fauver, 108 N.J. 239, 252 (1987). We have noted that "[p]risons are dangerous places, and the courts must afford appropriate deference and flexibility to [DOC] administrators trying to manage this volatile environment." Russo v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 324 N.J. Super. 576, 584 (App. Div. 1999). When reviewing a DOC prison discipline decision, we consider not only whether there is substantial evidence that the inmate committed the prohibited act, but also whether, in making its decision, the DOC followed the regulations adopted to afford inmates due process. See McDonald v. Pinchak, 139 N.J. 188, 194-95 (1995).
The New Jersey State Prison system is maintained and operated by the DOC, N.J.S.A. 30:1B-8 to -38, which is headed by the Commissioner of Corrections. N.J.S.A. 30:1B-4. Classification of state prisoners is confined to the Commissioner's sole discretion. N.J.S.A. 30:1B-6, -9; N.J.S.A. 30:4-91.1 to -91.3. "Basic to the resolution of any proceeding seeking review of prison administrative action is the legal principle that courts will not interfere with the internal administration of the institution, absent action by the prison authorities which deprives an inmate of his constitutional rights or is clearly capricious or arbitrary." State v. Rydzewski, 112 N.J. Super. 517, 521 (App. Div. 1970).
Notably, the United States Constitution and our Constitution do not recognize an inmate's right to a less restrictive custody status. Smith v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 346 N.J. Super. 24, 29 (App. Div. 2001). Thus, inmates in correctional facilities do not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in a reduced custody status. Ibid. As we further observed:
[U]nder State law, the Commissioner of the [DOC] has complete discretion in determining an inmate's place of confinement, N.J.S.A. 30:4-91.2. See Hluchan v. Fauver, 480 F. Supp. 103, 108 (D.N.J. 1979) (observing that inmates have no liberty right to be assigned to any particular custody level); . . . . Classification of prisoners and the decision
as to what privileges they will receive rests solely within the discretion of the Commissioner of the [DOC]. N.J.S.A. 30:1B-6; N.J.S.A. 30:4-91.1.Accordingly, the Commissioner of the DOC has considerable discretion in determining the custody status of inmates. Id. at 29. Further "under New Jersey law, a reduction in custody status is a matter of privilege, not of right." Id. at 30 (citing N.J.A.C. 10A:9-4.2).
[Id. at 29-30.]
At the time of the final agency decision, N.J.A.C. 10A:5-2.11(a) required that the DOC must "conduct a hearing at least annually to review the status of the inmate in order to determine whether an inmate's release from [MCU] is appropriate." At this hearing, the inmate has the burden of demonstrating that he has:
Well after the agency's decision, N.J.A.C. 10A:5-2.11 was repealed by R. 2015 d. 161, effective October 5, 2015. It was replaced by N.J.A.C. 10A:5-2.6, which mirrors the language of N.J.A.C. 10A:5-2.11, pertinent to this appeal. --------
1. Participated in the required programs, jobs, educational and recreational programs afforded the inmate pursuant to this section;
2. Complied with the criteria detailed by the [Review Committee];
3. Remained free from prohibited acts preceded by an asterisk for the program year; and
4. Agreed to reaffirm the obligation to adhere to the rules and regulations for inmate behavior, as described in the Handbook on Discipline and correctional facility inmate handbooks.Thereafter, "[i]f the inmate demonstrates participation and compliance" with the criteria outlined in N.J.A.C. 10A:5-2.11(b),
[N. J.A.C. 10A:5-2.11(b).]
the inmate will be considered for release from the [MCU] and the inmate will be released unless the [DOC] can demonstrate through substantial evidence including behavior, correctional facility adjustment, and disciplinary history that the inmate continues to pose an identifiable threat:
1. To the safety of others;
2. Of damage to, or destruction of property; or
3. Of interrupting the secure and/or orderly operation of a State correctional facility.
[N. J.A.C. 10A:5-2.11(c).]
Applying these regulatory guidelines to the record before us, we are satisfied that Sanabria has demonstrated his participation and compliance with the criteria outlined in N.J.A.C. 10A:5-2.11(b). Specifically, his assignment to Phase III within the MCU demonstrates that he has fully complied with the MCU regulations, he has completed courses offered by the DOC, and has not had any disciplinary infractions since his disciplinary hearing in 2006. Accordingly, the burden shifts to the DOC to demonstrate, through substantial evidence, that Sanabria "continues to pose an identifiable threat: . . . [t]o the safety of others[,] . . . [o]f damage to, or destruction of property[,] or . . . [o]f interrupting the secure and/or orderly operation of a State correctional facility." N.J.A.C. 10A:5-2.11(c).
In this case, the record reflects that the DOC properly considered Sanabria's past criminal history and extensive disciplinary history in making its decision to continue his MCU classification. Given the evidence upon which the agency decision was made, we defer to the agency's expertise in determining that Sanabria's return to general population would be detrimental to the safe operation of the correctional facility. In reaching this conclusion, we remind the agency that it does not have the legal authority to keep Sanabria indefinitely in the MCU and must have substantial credible evidence to satisfy its regulatory guidelines should it choose to continue his MCU placement in the future.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION