Opinion
C/A: 8:21-cv-01595-TMC-JDA
06-03-2021
Mikayh T. Salters, d/b/a Absolute Response Express, Plaintiff, v. Greenwood County Circuit Court, 8th Judicial Circuit Court, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Mikayh T. Salters ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, files this action against the Greenwood County Circuit Court. This matter is before the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the undersigned concludes that this action should be summarily dismissed without issuance and service of process.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his Complaint. [Doc. 1.] Plaintiff purports to bring this action "to rectify the errors and reckless mistakes that [were] made in [his] past case under the Greenwood County Circuit Court system." [Id. at 5.] Plaintiff contends Defendant engaged in gross negligence in judicial conduct by denying Plaintiff an order for default judgment in a state court action at 2012-cp-24-00928. [Id. at 5, 7.] For his relief, Plaintiff asks that the Court adjudicate the underlying claims in the state court action by granting him an order for default judgment and money damages in the amount of $287,500. [Id.]
The Court takes judicial notice of Plaintiff's state court action. See Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining courts "may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record"); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) ("We note that 'the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'").
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint. This Court possesses the inherent authority to review a pro se complaint to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction exists and that a case is not frivolous. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1989); Ross v. Baron, 493 F. App'x 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012) ("[F]rivolous complaints are subject to dismissal pursuant to the inherent authority of the court, even when the filing fee has been paid . . . [and] because a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an obviously frivolous complaint, dismissal prior to service of process is permitted.") (citations omitted); see also Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[D]istrict courts may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when the plaintiff has paid the required filing fee[.]"); Ricketts v. Midwest Nat'l Bank, 874 F.2d 1177, 1181 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[A] district court's obligation to review its own jurisdiction is a matter that must be raised sua sponte, and it exists independent of the 'defenses' a party might either make or waive under the Federal Rules."); Franklin v. State of Or., State Welfare Div., 662 F.2d 1337, 1342 (9th Cir. 1981) (providing a judge may dismiss an action sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without issuing a summons or following other procedural requirements). Accordingly, "[t]he present Complaint is subject to review pursuant to the inherent authority of this Court to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction exists and that the case is not frivolous." Trawick v. Med. Univ. of S.C., No. 2:16-cv-730-DCN-MGB, 2016 WL 8650132, at *4 (D.S.C. June 28, 2016) (citing Carter v. Ervin, No. 0:14-cv-00865-TLW-PJG, 2014 WL 2468351, *3 (D.S.C. June 2, 2014); Mayhew v. Duffy, No. 2:14-cv-24-RMG, 2014 WL 468938, at *1 (D.S.C. Feb. 4, 2014) (exercising inherent authority to summarily dismiss a frivolous case where pro se plaintiff filed new case seeking to vacate a previously-adjudicated case)).
As a pro se litigant, Plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that, if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but the Court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he filed a state court action in 2012 and that Defendant never answered but the court failed to enter default judgment in Plaintiff's favor. As such, it appears that Plaintiff is attempting to challenge certain rulings made by the state court in his state court action. Nevertheless, the action is subject to dismissal because the Court lacks jurisdiction, Plaintiff's claims are barred by Rooker-Feldman, and Defendant is entitled to immunity.
The Court lacks jurisdiction.
Plaintiff has filed a Complaint purportedly on the basis of federal question jurisdiction; however, he has failed to state a federal cause of action. A district court has original jurisdiction over a civil action "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. "The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the 'well-pleaded complaint rule,' which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
Here, Plaintiff purports to bring his claims under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 55(a) and 55(b)(1). [Doc. 1 at 3.] However, the rules referenced by Plaintiff in his Complaint are not sufficient to support federal question jurisdiction. See Pineville Real Estate Operation Corp. v. Michael, 32 F.3d 88, 90 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide an independent ground for subject matter jurisdiction under § 1331); Dinkins v. Region Ten CSB, 289 F. Supp. 3d 756, 758-59 (W.D. Va. 2018) (same). Further, Plaintiff has not identified any other basis in his Complaint for this Court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over his claims. Therefore, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff's claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Additionally, Plaintiff's claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. "Longstanding precedents preclude the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina from reviewing the findings or rulings made by state courts." McRae v. Evans, No. 2:06-cv-3075-CWH, 2006 WL 3327639, at *2 (D.S.C. Nov. 15, 2006). "This prohibition on review of state court proceedings or judgments by federal district courts is commonly referred to as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine . . . [which] precludes review of adjudications of the state's highest court [and] also the decisions of its lower courts." Hollander v. Early, No. 1:11-cv-2620-TLW-JRM, 2011 WL 9918820, at *3 (D.S.C. Dec. 22, 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2013 WL 227768 (D.S.C. Jan. 22, 2013); see also D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923). For the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply, divesting a federal court of jurisdiction, the following four elements must be met: "(1) the federal court plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff complains of 'injuries caused by state-court judgments;' (3) the state court judgment became final before the proceedings in federal court commenced; and (4) the federal plaintiff 'invit[es] district court review and rejection of those judgments.'" Willner v. Frey, 243 F. App'x 744, 746 (4th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted) (alteration in original). The prohibition extends not only to issues actually decided by a state court but also to those that are "inextricably intertwined with questions ruled upon by a state court." Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A federal claim is 'inextricably intertwined' with a state court decision if 'success on the federal claim depends upon a determination that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.'" Safety-Kleen, Inc. v. Wyche, 274 F.3d 846, 857-58 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
Here, all four elements are met. First, Plaintiff apparently lost in the state court because he alleges his motion for default judgment was denied by the state court. Second, Plaintiff seeks to appeal the ruling regarding his motion. Although Plaintiff couches his claim as one for a violation of Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the crux of his claim is that the state court should have entered default judgment in his favor. As such, his claim appears to be an appeal from the state court's ruling on that issue. Third, the state court judgment became final before the proceedings in federal court commenced. Finally, Plaintiff's requested relief would require this Court to review and reject the state court judgment. Specifically, to award Plaintiff damages in this case, this Court must find the state court's ruling was made in error. In sum, each of the four elements of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is met, and this Court cannot sit in judgment of the state court decision. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to challenge the state court rulings or enforce such rulings, his remedy lies in the state appellate courts and not in this federal court. See Moore v. Va. Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 3:15-cv-515, 2016 WL 775783, at *4 (E.D. Va. Feb. 25, 2016) (explaining that the plaintiff was "the sort of 'state court loser' whom Rooker-Feldman says must travel through the state appellate courts, rather than jumping into a federal court"). Thus, Plaintiff should have appealed the issue in the state courts rather than bringing it to this federal court. Accordingly, this action should be dismissed as the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims. See, e.g., Cooper v. Youngblood, 842 F.2d 1289 (4th Cir. 1988); Glazebrook v. Supreme Court Justices of Va., No. 86-0153-L, 1987 WL 89232, at *1 (W.D. Va. May 20, 1987).
Defendant is entitled to immunity.
Finally, even if the Court had jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims, this action nevertheless would be subject to dismissal because Defendant is entitled to immunity from suit. The crux of Plaintiff's claim is that Defendant failed to enter a default judgment in Plaintiff's state court action. Thus, Plaintiff's claim is actually against the state court judge that denied his motion. However, to the extent Plaintiff's action is properly brought against a judge in Greenwood County, any such judge is entitled to immunity. Judges have absolute immunity from claims for damages arising out of their judicial actions unless they have acted in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991); see also Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985) (explaining that, even if a challenged judicial act was unauthorized by law, the judge still has immunity from a suit seeking damages). Whether an act is judicial or non-judicial relates to the nature of the act, such as whether it is a function normally performed by a judge and whether the parties dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12. Immunity applies even when the judge's acts were in error, malicious, or in excess of his authority. Id. at 12-13. Absolute immunity is "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (emphasis in original).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that a Greenwood County judge failed to enter a default judgment in his favor. Plaintiff is complaining about the judge's alleged erroneous judicial actions, and he does not mention any pertinent nonjudicial actions. Thus, because all of the alleged misconduct arose out of a judicial action, judicial immunity squarely applies and should bar this lawsuit against any state judge. See Bey v. Jefferson, No. 2:17-cv-1007-RMG-MGB, 2017 WL 9250348, at *8 (D.S.C. Apr. 24, 2017) (recommending summary dismissal of case against a judge, who was entitled to immunity, with prejudice as frivolous), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 1956979 (D.S.C. May 11, 2017). Therefore, Defendant is immune from this suit and is entitled to dismissal from this action.
RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss this action without issuance and service of process.
The undersigned finds that Plaintiff cannot cure the defects in his Complaint by mere amendment and therefore recommends that the instant action be dismissed without affording Plaintiff an opportunity to amend. See Thomas v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., Inc., No. 6:18-cv-169-AMQ, 2018 WL 5258811, at *2 (D.S.C. July 25, 2018) (declining to automatically give plaintiff leave to amend because plaintiff could not cure the defects in his claims against defendant by mere amendment), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 5255183 (D.S.C. Oct. 22, 2018); Workman v. Kernell, No. 6:18-cv-00355-RBH-KFM, 2018 WL 4826535, at *2 n.7 (D.S.C. Oct. 2, 2018).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge June 3, 2021
Greenville, South Carolina
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).