Opinion
NNHCV156058673S
01-24-2018
Burton S. ROSENBERG v. CITY OF STAMFORD et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
JUDGE: SHEILA ANN OZALIS
The defendants Joseph Capalbo, Vicki Cooper, Emmet Hibson and Clemon Williams (defendants) have filed a motion for summary judgment as to all claims against them asserted in the plaintiff, Burton Rosenberg’s Second Revised Complaint dated October 11, 2016.
The defendants have first moved for summary judgment on Counts Three, Five, Seven and Nine alleging violations of General Statutes Section 46a-60(a)(1) on the ground that there is no individual liability under this statutory section. At oral argument on this claim, plaintiff’s counsel conceded that there is no individual liability pursuant to this statutory section and this court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on Counts Three, Five, Seven and Nine.
The defendants have also moved for summary judgment as to Counts Twelve, Thirteen, Fourteen and Fifteen, which allege violations of General Statutes Section 31-51q on the ground that there is no individual liability under this statutory section. At oral argument, the plaintiff’s counsel conceded that there is no individual liability under this statutory section and this court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on Counts Twelve, Thirteen, Fourteen and Fifteen.
The defendants have also moved for summary judgment as to Counts Sixteen, Seventeen, Eighteen and Nineteen, which allege claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, on the ground that the defendants’ claimed conduct was not extreme and outrageous, as required to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiff contends that the defendants’ actions were extreme and outrageous and are sufficient for a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
" In order for the plaintiff to prevail in a case for liability under ... [intentional infliction of emotional distress], four elements must be established. It must be shown: (1) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the defendant’s conduct was the cause of the plaintiff’s distress; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Geiger v. Carey, 170 Conn.App. 459, 496-97, 154 A.3d 1093 (2017). " Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires conduct that exceeds all bounds usually tolerated by decent society ... Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, Outrageous!" (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Appleton v. Board of Education, 254 Conn. 205, 210-11, 757 A.2d 1059 (2000).
" Conduct that is merely insulting, displays bad manners or results in hurt feelings is insufficient to form the basis for an intentional infliction of emotional distress action." Perez-Dickson v. Bridgeport, 304 Conn. 483, 527, 43 A.3d 69 (2012). It is the act itself that must be outrageous, and a wrongful motivation for subjecting the plaintiff to the alleged conduct does not meet the standard for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id., 528. Further, " individuals in the workplace reasonably should expect to experience some level of emotional distress, even significant emotional distress, as a result of conduct in the workplace." Perodeau v. Hartford, 259 Conn. 729, 757, 792 A.2d 752 (2002). Those in an ongoing employment relationship " reasonably should expect to be subject to routine employment-related conduct, including performance evaluations, both formal and informal; decisions related to such evaluations, such as those involving transfer, demotion, promotion and compensation; similar decisions based on the employer’s business needs and desires, independent of the employee’s performance; and disciplinary or investigatory action arising from actual or alleged employee misconduct. In addition, such individuals reasonably should expect to be subject to other vicissitudes of employment, such as workplace gossip, rivalry, personality conflicts and the like." Id.
An employer’s investigation to determine if an employee committed a criminal act is insufficient to support an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. In Carnemolla v. Walsh, 75 Conn.App. 319, 332-33, 815 A.2d 1251, cert. denied, 263 Conn. 913, 821 A.2d 768 (2003), an action by an employee against her former employers, our Appellate Court held, " as a matter of law, that the defendants’ conduct did not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct. In so doing, [the court] ... summarize[d] the relevant facts and define[d] the defendants’ conduct. In support of her claim, the plaintiff allege[d] the following facts to illustrate the alleged extreme and outrageous conduct of the defendants. The plaintiff was a devoted mother and employee, she was an honest person who had never been accused of a crime, she was confronted by the defendants, who accused her of embezzling company funds and requested that she sign documents that purportedly were resignation and release forms, a coworker resigned after observing the way in which the plaintiff was treated, and the plaintiff received medical treatment and counseling for emotional upset." The court explained that " [a]lthough the conduct alleged in this case may have been distressful or hurtful to the plaintiff, it was not outrageous or extreme. We therefore agree with the court that summary judgment as to the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress was proper." Id., 333.
In this action, the plaintiff has alleged that the defendants falsely and maliciously accused him of misconduct, including altering city documents, which if true could be construed as criminal conduct. The plaintiff contends that as a matter of law such facts could be found to be extreme and outrageous conduct. While this conduct may have been distressing and hurtful to the plaintiff and this court does not condone conduct of this nature as alleged by the plaintiff, the alleged conduct does not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct as required by our appellate courts. Accordingly, this court finds in defendants’ favor on their motion for summary judgment as to Counts Sixteen, Seventeen, Eighteen and Nineteen with respect to the plaintiff’s claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The defendants have also moved for summary judgment as to Counts Twenty, Twenty-One, Twenty-Two and Twenty-Three, which allege claims of tortious interference with the plaintiff’s employment relationship. The defendants contend that judgment should enter in their favor on the grounds that the plaintiff has offered no evidence as to any actual loss he suffered from such alleged tortious interference, that the defendants’ conduct was not tortious, and that the defendants acted legitimately within the scope of their duty.
" A successful action for tortious interference with business expectancies requires the satisfaction of three elements: (1) a business relationship between the plaintiff and another party; (2) the defendant’s intentional interference with the business relationship while knowing of the relationship; and (3) as a result of the interference, the plaintiff suffers actual loss." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Reyes v. Chetta, 143 Conn.App. 758, 763, 71 A.3d 1255 (2013).
After review of the plaintiff’s claimed evidence of actual loss, with respect to the claims remaining in this case that arose from November 2013, the court finds that the plaintiff has not provided any evidence of actual loss to support a claim for tortious interference with employment relationship. Accordingly, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Counts Twenty, Twenty-One, Twenty-Two and Twenty-Three is granted. Finally, the defendants have moved for summary judgment as to Counts Four, Six, Eight and Ten, which allege violations of General Statutes Section 46a-60(a)(4) on the grounds that the plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation and has failed to produce evidence demonstrating that the defendants’ legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for their actions were retaliatory. The court finds that there are genuine issues of material facts to whether the defendants violated Section 46a-60(a)(4) and the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Counts Four, Six, Eight and Ten is denied.
Based on the foregoing, summary judgment is granted in the defendants’ favor on Counts Three, Five, Seven, Nine, Twelve, Thirteen, Fourteen, Fifteen, Sixteen, Seventeen, Eighteen, Nineteen, Twenty, Twenty-One, Twenty-Two and Twenty-Three and judgment shall enter in the defendants’ favor on these counts. Summary judgment is denied as to Counts Four, Six, Eight and Ten of the plaintiff’s Second Revised Complaint."