Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-6086-12T4
08-25-2015
FRANCIS ROBERTS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STELLA SCARANO, Defendant-Respondent.
Veronica M. Davis, attorney for appellant (Jessica L. Berg, on the brief). The Anthony Pope Law Firm, attorneys for respondent (Annette Verdesco, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Ashrafi and Kennedy. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Monmouth County, Docket No. FM-13-151-98. Veronica M. Davis, attorney for appellant (Jessica L. Berg, on the brief). The Anthony Pope Law Firm, attorneys for respondent (Annette Verdesco, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Francis Roberts appeals from the July 3, 2013 order requiring him to pay thirty percent of the college costs of his two sons, then 22 and 21 years of age, and continue to pay child support for the oldest child "until he completes his last year of college" or "until May 12, 2014[,]" notwithstanding an interspousal agreement (IA) and a consent order entered by the court on September 5, 2012, which contained provisions that differ from the order under appeal.
Plaintiff argues on appeal:
POINT IWe agree, and we reverse the order at issue, and remand for further proceedings as set forth in our opinion.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN THE TRIAL COURT ORDERED APPELLANT TO PAY 30% OF COLLEGE LOANS AND COLLEGE EXPENSES BECAUSE IT IS CONTRARY TO THE PARTIES' INTERSPOUSAL AGREEMENT AND GAC V. GAC, 186 N.J. 535 (2006).
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN THE TRIAL COURT GRANTED THE RESPONDENT'S REQUEST THAT THE APPELLANT BE COMPELLED TO CONTINUE TO PAY CHILD SUPPORT BEYOND THE DATE THE PARTIES AGREED THEIR SON WOULD BE EMANCIPATED.
I.
The parties divorced on October 22, 1997, after nearly ten years of marriage. Their two sons were then almost seven and five years old. In the IA, the parties defined emancipation in pertinent part as:
3.8 . . . [T]he first occurring of any one of the following six events:The parties agreed to equally divide the cost of their children's college education, stating "their intention that their unemancipated children, if academically inclined, should attend college."
(a) Reaching the age of eighteen [] years or completion of high school or four years of academic college education at an accredited school, whichever last occurs;
. . . .
(f) Engaging in full-time employment upon or after the child's attainment of eighteen [] years of age, except that the child's engagement in full-time employment during vacation and/or summer periods shall not be deemed emancipation.
Regarding the parties' respective obligations to pay for college expenses, the IA provided:
3.9 . . . . If it is decided that the children will attend college, based upon the family's means and the child's abilities, then it is specifically understood and agreed by and between the Husband and Wife that both parties have an obligation to provide equally for the college education of their children, taking into consideration their respective incomes and assets at the time the children attain the appropriate age. Said contribution shall be made after all scholarships, grants, loans, child's earnings and child's savings have been taken into consideration. The parties agree to consult with a view toward adopting a harmonious policy concerning the college education of the child. Accordingly, when the children are prepared to enroll in college, both parties shall have the right to approve in advance an undergraduate college consistent with the family's means and the child's abilities.
After the divorce, the children lived primarily with defendant, and in the intervening years, plaintiff relocated to another state, remarried, fathered two children, and retired. Sadly, the intervening years also gave rise to a deteriorating relationship between plaintiff and his two sons.
On August 12, 2011, plaintiff moved for an order declaring his younger son, then eighteen and enrolled part-time in community college, emancipated. Defendant filed a cross-motion requesting that plaintiff pay 50% of the outstanding student loan and tuition balances for both sons.
On August 19, 2011, the Family Part judge denied plaintiff's motion to emancipate the younger son, finding the IA did not provide that a child must attend college full-time to avoid emancipation. The judge further held that any college attendance coupled with full-time employment would defeat emancipation for four years after high school.
The judge also denied defendant's cross-motion without prejudice, explaining that if defendant subsequently proved "that all scholarships, grants, loans, child's earnings and child's savings have been considered prior to seeking contribution . . . she shall be entitled to reimbursement pursuant to the parties' respective incomes, which according to the Child Support Guidelines are approximately 30% for Plaintiff and 70% for Defendant." This order was entered without any hearing on the record to ascertain the intent of the parties.
On September 23, 2011, plaintiff appealed the denial of his motion to emancipate the younger son. We held that the Family Part's interpretation of the parties' IA was not "the only reasonable one," and we remanded the matter for a plenary hearing to determine the parties' intent with respect to the IA term which defined emancipation as after "four (4) years of academic college education at an accredited school." Roberts v. Scarano, No. A-0414-11 (App. Div. June 22, 2012) (slip op. at 4). We clarified in a footnote that:
Defendant's request for contribution for the children's college expenses was denied without prejudice because she did not provide adequate proof of seeking payment through other sources, such as scholarships or loans. These decisions have not been appealed, except insofar as the child support would be impacted by the emancipation of the younger son. [Roberts, supra, No. A-0414-11 (slip op. at 2 n.2).]
Rather than participate in a plenary hearing, however, the parties executed a consent order which the Family Part approved and entered on September 5, 2012. The order stated:
1) The parties agree that effective 9/5/12, the parties' [younger] son . . . is emancipated.
2) The plaintiff agrees to pay child support in the amount of $467.40 on behalf of the parties' [older] son based on Defendant's representation that [he] is a full-time college student residing with her not living on campus. The Plaintiff's obligation to
pay child support on behalf of [the older son] shall terminate on July 1, 2013.
Defendant, pro se, thereafter moved for an order requiring plaintiff to pay thirty percent of the sons' "college costs" and to continue child support payments for the older son until he graduated from college "on or about May 21, 2014." Plaintiff opposed the motion and argued that defendant was seeking an order requiring him to pay a percentage of the children's student loans, contrary to the IA, and that the relief sought respecting child support was contrary to the consent order.
A different Family Part judge considered the motion and on July 3, 2013, ordered plaintiff to pay thirty percent of the college costs of each son, including the loans, and to continue to pay child support for the older son until he graduated from college, "or until May 21, 2014." The order also required plaintiff to pay thirty percent of the "college education expenses" of the older son for the school year ending May 21, 2014. This appeal followed.
II.
A Family Court's fact-finding supported by "'adequate, substantial, credible evidence,'" is owed deference because of the court's "special expertise" in family matters. Parish v. Parish, 412 N.J. Super. 39, 47 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-13 (1998)). "Minimally adequate fact finding requires a discussion that demonstrates that the court has heard and addressed the relevant facts and claims under the controlling legal standards." Gordon v. Rozenwald, 380 N.J. Super. 55, 76-77 (App. Div. 2005). "A trial court's rulings in such matters are discretionary and not overturned unless the court abused its discretion, failed to consider controlling legal principles or made findings inconsistent with or unsupported by competent evidence." Id. at 76.
Here, the motion judge's findings were based on "the papers and the documents filed by the parties." Thus, we do not owe the same degree of deference to the motion judge's fact finding as we would if the judge had made credibility findings after a plenary hearing. See P.B. v. T.H., 370 N.J. Super. 586, 601 (App. Div. 2004).
Guided by these principles, we initially consider the issue of the amount of money plaintiff is obligated to contribute to his sons' college expenses.
While, in addressing the issue of a parent's contribution toward a child's college education, a "trial court has substantial discretion[,]" Gotlib v. Gotlib, 399 N.J. Super. 295, 308 (App. Div. 2008) (citing Foust v. Glaser, 340 N.J. Super. 312, 315 (App. Div. 2001)), that discretion is not unlimited. For example, where the parties have reasonably reached an agreement respecting their obligation to contribute toward a child's college expenses, that agreement ordinarily will control and bind the parties. Settlement of family matters by agreement of the parties is favored, and judges are directed to enforce settlement agreements in accordance with the parties' expression of their intent and general purposes unless enforcement would be unfair or inequitable in the circumstances. J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 326 (2013); Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 146 (1980).
The interpretation of a matrimonial settlement agreement involves a question of law that we must decide de novo. Pacifico v. Pacifico, 190 N.J. 258, 265-66 (2007) (recognizing contractual nature of matrimonial agreements); Kaur v. Assured Lending Corp., 405 N.J. Super. 468, 474 (App. Div. 2009) (holding that interpretation and construction of contracts are subject to de novo review). True, judges have more discretion in interpreting matrimonial agreements than other contracts, but nonetheless must enforce the agreements in light of the intent of the parties. Sachau v. Sachau, 206 N.J. 1, 5 (2011); Guglielmo v. Guglielmo, 253 N.J. Super. 531, 542 (App. Div. 1992). If the "court ignores applicable standards, we are compelled to reverse and remand for further proceedings." Gotlib, supra, 399 N.J. Super. at 309.
In this case, the judge misinterpreted provisions of the prior order and the IA. For that reason, we reverse the provisions of the order addressing those issues and remand for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
Here, there is a disagreement between the parties as to how they intended to calculate their contribution to their children's college expenses. As we said in our opinion on the earlier appeal, "[t]he only method to determine the parties' intentions when entering into the IA is to hold a plenary hearing." Roberts, supra, No. A-0414-11 (slip op. at 6). Plaintiff argues that the motion judge erred by requiring him to pay thirty percent of the total cost of the college educations, and by not excluding the costs associated with the loans obtained by his sons. While plaintiff's argument has much to commend it, we recognize that the parties' intent will control and that can only be ascertained after a plenary hearing.
Further, the IA provides:
The parties agree[d] to consult with a view toward adopting a harmonious policy concerning the college education of the child. Accordingly, when the children are prepared to enroll in college, both parties shall have the right to approve in advance an undergraduate college consistent with the family's means and the child's abilities.This provision is consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Gac v. Gac, 186 N.J. 535, 546-47 (2006):
[A] parent or child seeking contribution towards the expenses of higher education will make the request before the educational expenses are incurred. As soon as practical, the parent or child should communicate with the other parent concerning the many issues inherent in selecting a college. At a minimum, a parent or child seeking contribution should initiate the application to the court before the expenses are incurred. The failure to do so will weigh heavily against the grant of a future application.
Here, there is no indication that plaintiff had any input in his children's choice of school and their decision to finance their education with student loans. Defendant did not seek contribution from plaintiff until after one child had been enrolled at Rutgers for two years, the other had been enrolled in automotive trade school for several months, and after plaintiff sought to terminate his child support obligation. Thus the decision to hold plaintiff liable for a percentage of the total educational costs of the sons, without netting out their loans and scholarships, which were incurred without his input, appears to violate both the terms of the IA and the legal principles announced in Gac.
Turning to the question of child support for the older son, it is clear that the order under appeal is directly contrary to the terms of the prior order that extinguished plaintiff's child support obligation after July 2013. Here, the parties set forth in their IA the terms of their children's emancipation. When a dispute arose as to the parties' intent on these terms, the parties further memorialized intent by setting emancipation dates in a consent order. The motion court erred by not enforcing the parties' agreed-upon date under the circumstances of this case.
Accordingly, the order under appeal is reversed and the matter is remanded to the Family Part. The Family Part shall enter an order enforcing the parties' agreed-upon date for the emancipation of the older son, and shall hold a plenary hearing to determine the parties' intent, as expressed in the IA, respecting the obligation of plaintiff to contribute toward the college expenses of the older son, and whether that obligation is limited to such expenses, net of loans and other specified sources of funding. We do not retain jurisdiction. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION