Opinion
C. A. 8:23-cv-06176-HMH-JDA
01-16-2024
Cecil Jerome Quinn, Jr., Plaintiff, v. State of South Carolina Marshals, Agent Dillion, Warden Robert Michael Stevenston III, Warden Nelson, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jacquelyn D. Austin United States Magistrate Judge
Cecil Jerome Quinn, Jr. (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights.Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) and is presently confined at the Broad River Correctional Institution. [Doc. 1-8 at 2.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. For the reasons below, the undersigned finds that this action is subject to summary dismissal.
The caption above includes the Defendants identified on the Complaint form. [Doc. 1-8 at 2, 4.] Plaintiff has attached a page to the Complaint form listing numerous other individuals and entities. [Id. at 3.] It is unclear whether Plaintiff intends to name those individuals and entities as Defendants in this case. Regardless, the Complaint as a whole is subject to dismissal for the reasons herein notwithstanding who Plaintiff intends to name as Defendants.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing approximately 200 pages of documents including handwritten allegations and documents from Plaintiff's state court proceedings. [Docs. 1; 1-1; 1-2; 1-3; 1-4; 1-5; 1-6.] Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the standard form [Doc. 1-8] along with an additional 254 pages of documents [Docs. 1-9; 1-10; 1-11; 1-12; 1-13]. The Court has carefully reviewed all of Plaintiff's filings.
Although the Complaint is confusing and difficult to decipher, the Court is able to glean the following pertinent allegations. Plaintiff purports to bring this action to address “100% true capital criminalistic crimes.” [Doc. 1-8 at 5.] Plaintiff contends he was subjected to a “conspiracy by all accu[]sed” in violation of the Eighth Amendment, resulting in torture, “[insane] asylum methods,” and electro-convulsive practices. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges he was subjected to “mental mind manipulation” from 2012 through 2015, and “mind invasion, tele-communication, [and insane] asylum” methods from 2016 through 2023, and someone “entered the mind of a 9 year old girl.” [Id. at 6.] Plaintiff contends that Defendant Dillion “was tele-communicating by way of mind invasion” and “using mental mind manipulation” on Plaintiff's step-daughter such that he controlled “her every thought” and “she was continually explaining that she was talking to the same man that was talking to [Plaintiff] for 3 years.” [Id. at 7.] Plaintiff contends that Defendant Dillion and other state officials “d[e]stroyed [his] life in order to [illegally] set [Plaintiff] up . . . so he could use emulated simulation of [Plaintiff's] DNA [and his] entire [neurological] system.” [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dillion is “using [insane] asylum methods to mentally and physically torture [Plaintiff] with electricity and he is being allowed to do this by [SCDC].” [Id.]
For his injuries, Plaintiff contends he has been mentally and physically tortured through various “[insane] asylum methods of electro-[convulsion], electrolysis, electrocution, [and] electro-magnetic pulse.” [Id. at 9.] For his relief, Plaintiff requests a judgment from the Court against Defendants for “the maximum sentence.” [Id.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court would be charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Complaint if (1) it were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) if it sought monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even under this less stringent standard, Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in his pleadings, the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact); cf. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (holding that plaintiff need not pin his claim for relief to precise legal theory). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). “And, although the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) are very liberal, more detail often is required than the bald statement by plaintiff that he has a valid claim of some type against defendant.” Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 326 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotations omitted). This is particularly true in a § 1983 action where “liability is personal, based upon each defendant's own constitutional violations.” Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001). “In order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights.... Consequently, [defendants] must have had personal knowledge of and involvement in the alleged deprivation of [plaintiff]'s rights in order to be liable.” Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). While Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in his Complaint, he must allege facts that support a claim for relief. Bass v. DuPont, 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003); White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 723-74 (4th Cir.1989) (dismissing complaint dismissed because it “failed to contain any factual allegations tending to support his bare assertion”).
DISCUSSION
As noted, Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Here, the Complaint as a whole is subject to summary dismissal because it is frivolous and fails to allege facts to support a plausible claim for relief. Indeed, Plaintiff's Complaint is devoid of any allegations that can be construed as asserting a cognizable claim for relief. The Complaint is patently frivolous and subject to dismissal.
As noted, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 permits an indigent litigant to proceed in forma pauperis, which allows the litigant to commence a federal court action without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. See Staley v. Witherspoon, No. 9:07-cv-195-PMD-GCK, 2007 WL 1988272, at *1 (D.S.C. July 3, 2007). However, the statute provides limitations to such actions by permitting the Court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted” or is “frivolous or malicious.” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)). A complaint is deemed frivolous when it is “clearly baseless” and includes allegations that are “fanciful,” “fantastic,” or “delusional.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In reviewing for frivolousness or malice, the Court looks to see whether the Complaint raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios. See Harley v. United States, 349 F.Supp.2d 980, 981 (M.D. N.C. 2004). Although the Court must accept all well-pled allegations and review the Complaint in a light most favorable to plaintiff, Mylan Lab'ys, Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993), it is well-settled that the Court has the authority to dismiss claims that are obviously “fantastic” or “delusional,” Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994).
Here, the Complaint contains assertions that are barely comprehensible and manifestly delusional. Even if Plaintiff has set forth his statements sincerely, as assertions of fact, they cannot be given credibility. The Court finds that Plaintiff's allegations-to the extent they can be understood-clearly fall within the statute's definition of frivolity. McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting examples of frivolous claims include those whose factual allegations are “so nutty,” “delusional,” or “wholly fanciful” as to be simply “unbelievable.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)), abrogated on other grounds by Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S.Ct. 1721 (2020). Plaintiff's conclusory assertions-i.e. that he has been subjected to mind control and “[insane] asylum” torture tactics-fail to show any arguable basis in fact or law and Plaintiff fails to present allegations to support a claim for relief that is plausible. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (“A suit is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.”); see also Brock v. Angelone, 105 F.3d 952, 953-54 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding a prisoner's claim, that he was being poisoned or experimented upon via an ingredient in pancake syrup served at his prison, was fanciful or delusional, and dismissing the appeal as frivolous with sanctions); Ghouralal v. Rambo, No. 2:20-cv-02875-BHH-MGB, 2020 WL 6749348, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 25, 2020) (concluding that the “Plaintiff's allegations-that the Government and others are stealing her technology and perpetrating a high-tech mind-control plot upon her in order to cover up illegal acts-are not believable”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2020 WL 6749026 (D.S.C. Nov. 17, 2020); Boyd v. United States, No. 7:20-cv-178-BHH-JDA, 2020 WL 823099, at *5 (D.S.C. Jan. 27, 2020) (finding the complaint was frivolous and subject to dismissal where the plaintiff alleged the defendants were using a mind-control program on her and “shooting electromagnet impulses in [her] head”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2020 WL 816077 (D.S.C. Feb. 19, 2020). In sum, “Plaintiff's filings are so outlandish and unmoored from reality that the Court finds this entire action to be frivolous.” Anderson v. Dye, No. 5:21-cv-00168-MR, 2022 WL 1213619, at *3 (W.D. N.C. Apr. 25, 2022).
CONCLUSION
Consequently, for the reasons stated above, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss this action without issuance and service of process pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
The undersigned finds that Plaintiff cannot cure the defects in his Complaint by mere amendment and therefore recommends that the instant action be dismissed without affording Plaintiff an opportunity to amend because further amendment would be futile. See Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605, 610-12, 614-15 (4th Cir. 2020).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 250 East North Street, Suite 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).