Opinion
C/A: 7:20-cv-00178-BHH-JDA
01-27-2020
Latasha Monique Boyd, Plaintiff, v. United States, Spartanburg County Council, Executive Branch, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Latasha Monique Boyd ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, files this action purportedly alleging a claim for violations of her civil rights. This matter is before the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the undersigned concludes that this action should be summarily dismissed without issuance and service of process.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint on the standard form for a civil case. [Doc. 1.] Plaintiff also attached to her Complaint two documents that, taken together, appear to be a statement of her claims. [Docs. 1-1 and 1-2.] While it is unclear who Plaintiff intends to sue, she lists the United States in the caption of her Complaint and the Spartanburg County Council and "Executive Branch" in the Defendants section of the Complaint form. [Doc. 1 at 1-2.] Thus, the Clerk of Court listed these three government entities as the named Defendants on the docket. In the two documents attached to the Complaint, Plaintiff makes allegations against the following individuals and entities: the United States Postal Service; the Duncan Police Department; Chief of Police, Carl E. Long; the DMV; Spartanburg Police Department Officer M.S. Petric; Partnership Property Management; Solicitor Tatyana Stepanoena; Judge J. Mark Hayes, II; Judge James Donald Willingham II; Vickie Rae M. Smith; Quenton M. Wood; Grace Knie; and Clerk of Court Amy Cox and Melody Millwood. [Doc. 1-1.] However, Plaintiff does not name these additional individuals or entities in the caption of her Complaint.
Plaintiff alleges that her claims arise under 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, 552, the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment. [Doc. 1 at 3.] Petitioner alleges that the amount in controversy for this action is "10 billion for being tortured, and someone experiment[ing on her]." [Id. at 4.]
The allegations in the Complaint are nonsensical and difficult to decipher. In the Statement of Claim section on the Complaint form, Plaintiff alleges, verbatim, "Departement [sic] of defense Appropriations Act section 8805 Administrative procedure Act." [Id.] In the attachments to the Complaint, Plaintiff makes the following additional allegations. Plaintiff appears to allege that the United States Postal Service is blocking her mail and that she has attempted to send mail, but it has "been returned or not received." [Doc. 1-1 at 1.] Plaintiff alleges that she surrendered her license to the DMV, but ten minutes later Officer Ward pulled her over and arrested her. [Id.] Plaintiff makes other allegations concerning this traffic stop and her arrest. [Id.] Notably, Plaintiff alleges that she "tried to inform the officer that my right[s] are reserve[d] under common law and that I didn't want to contract with him." [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that, while she was at the Spartanburg Police Department, an officer stated that he smelled alcohol, and she was arrested. [Id.] Plaintiff further alleges
The allegations provided here are only a summary of the allegations made by Plaintiff.
[T]his men went in my home without my permission and stole my money and try to force me to sign my son to him, after he kidnap me and beat me and the judge dismissed the cased this man is helping this system drive me crazy I see, so from what I can tell I see the attack is still on the Natives, because I see the Infrastructure is working hard at attacking my life I see gang stalking and gas lighting and using foreign intelligence using frequencies to cause problem in my life. I have witness a lot of organized crimes just to keep this Christianity system going, spiritual warfare.[Id.] Plaintiff alleges that she has an anxiety disorder. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that she feels that the school district "is using . . . CPS as a weapon [due] to my babies attendance." [Id. at 2.] Plaintiff alleges she has been issued eight tickets within two months, demonstrating a pattern of harassing behavior. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that she rents her home from Summertree Apartments and that a lady is trying to get her kicked out of her home. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that Judge Hayes made an unfair decision. [Id.] Plaintiff appears to allege that she has an order of protection against her child's father and that he beat her, leaving her face swollen. [Id.] Plaintiff makes other similar, disjointed allegations against numerous other individuals. [Id. at 2-3.]
Plaintiff alleges that she suffers from complex post trauma stress disorder. [Doc. 1-2 at 1.] She claims that she has realized her rights have been completely violated and that
[t]his system is based off Christianity and from what I witnessed. It stripe you from your true spirituality. I read into a few articles speaking about a spiritual war, so beside all the abuse and death I had to witness, I have thought back to everything that happen in my life. These war crimes that has been placed on my life, has abused my natural rights. . . . While you have government official placing threats upon in life so you can bow down to its authority. Created different types
of disability by psychological manipulating the environment. Leading us with false teaching and disenfranchise my culture. . . . My family are natives and we have been lied to for years stating that we are African American, to deal with the prejudice, and except that we have been keep from our proper resource. We're being abused and manipulated about our heritage. Tore our family apart force to inherent a poor lifestyle.[Id.] Plaintiff makes numerous other allegations, like those above, concerning many difficulties she has suffered throughout her life. [Id. at 2-5.] Further, Plaintiff believes that she has been subjected to a "CIA mind control program (MK ULTRA)[, which] has walked [her] through this whole system." [Id. at 4.]
For her relief, Plaintiff requests the following:
Legal compensatory, monetary damages, punitive damages, incidental an injunction ad damnum clause, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, injuries, invasion of privacy, equitable relief, account of profits reasonable restrictions on defendants future activities, disgorgement of unlawful proceeds, divestiture, dissolution, reorganization, removal from positions in an entity, and appointment of court officers to administer and supervise the affairs and operations of defrents entites [sic] and to assist courts in monitoring Equitable out of the contract.[Doc. 1 at 4.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., the undersigned is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. Further, Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Further, this Court would possess the inherent authority to review a pro se complaint to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction exists and that a case is not frivolous, even if the complaint were not subject to the prescreening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1989) ("Section 1915(d) . . . authorizes courts to dismiss a 'frivolous or malicious' action, but there is little doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision."); Ross v. Baron, 493 F. App'x 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012) ("[F]rivolous complaints are subject to dismissal pursuant to the inherent authority of the court, even when the filing fee has been paid . . . [and] because a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an obviously frivolous complaint, dismissal prior to service of process is permitted.") (citations omitted); see also Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[D]istrict courts may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when the plaintiff has paid the required filing fee[.]"); Ricketts v. Midwest Nat'l Bank, 874 F.2d 1177, 1181 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[A] district court's obligation to review its own jurisdiction is a matter that must be raised sua sponte, and it exists independent of the 'defenses' a party might either make or waive under the Federal Rules."); Franklin v. State of Or., State Welfare Div., 662 F.2d 1337, 1342 (9th Cir. 1981) (providing a judge may dismiss an action sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without issuing a summons or following other procedural requirements). Accordingly, in addition to the screening requirements of § 1915(e)(2)(B), "[t]he present Complaint is subject to review pursuant to the inherent authority of this Court to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction exists and that the case is not frivolous." Trawick v. Med. Univ. of S.C., No. 2:16-cv-730-DCN-MGB, 2016 WL 8650132, at *4 (D.S.C. June 28, 2016) (citing Carter v. Ervin, No. 0:14-cv-00865-TLW-PJG, 2014 WL 2468351, *3 (D.S.C. June 2, 2014); Mayhew v. Duffy, No. 2:14-cv-24-RMG, 2014 WL 468938, at *1 (D.S.C. Feb. 4, 2014) (exercising inherent authority to summarily dismiss a frivolous case where pro se plaintiff filed new case seeking to vacate a previously-adjudicated case)).
As a pro se litigant, Plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that, if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but the Court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, it is unclear what causes of action Plaintiff intends to assert in her Complaint. While Plaintiff cites the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, her rambling, incoherent allegations simply fail to state any claim for relief. However, because Plaintiff appears to allege that her rights have been violated, the Court therefore construes this action as asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Her claim is nevertheless subject to summary dismissal for the reasons below.
First, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts against the named Defendants to state a claim for relief, and they are therefore entitled to dismissal. While Plaintiff appears to name the United States, the Spartanburg County Council, and the Executive Branch as Defendants in her Complaint, she makes no allegations against these Defendants. In a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must plead facts indicating that a defendant acted personally in the alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights. See Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977); Faltas v. South Carolina, No. 3:11-cv-3077-TLW-SVH, 2012 WL 988105, at *4 (D.S.C. Jan. 27, 2012), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 988083 (D.S.C. Mar. 22, 2012), aff'd, 489 F. App'x 720 (4th Cir. 2012). When a complaint contains no personal allegations against a defendant, that defendant is properly dismissed. See, e.g., Reaves v. Richardson, No. 4:09-cv-820-TLW-SVH, 2011 WL 2119318, at *6 (D.S.C. Mar. 1, 2011) ("without such personal involvement, there can be no liability under section 1983"), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 2112100 (D.S.C. May 27, 2011); Fox v. Drew, No. 8:12-cv-421-MGL, 2013 WL 4776706, at *11 (D.S.C. Sept. 4, 2013) (explaining that a defendant is liable in his individual capacity only for his personal wrongdoing), aff'd, 563 F. App'x 279 (4th Cir. 2014). In the absence of substantive allegations of personal wrongdoing against the named Defendants, the Court is unable to liberally construe any type of plausible cause of action arising from the Complaint against them. See Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1315 (4th Cir. 1996) (explaining statute allowing dismissal of in forma pauperis claims encompasses complaints that are either legally or factually baseless); Weller, 901 F.2d at 389 n.2 (finding dismissal proper where there were no allegations to support claim); Odom v. Trident Hosp. Dir., No. 5:17-cv-02540-RMG-KDW, 2017 WL 6016407, at *4 (D.S.C. Nov. 1, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 5992088 (D.S.C. Dec. 4, 2017). Accordingly, the Defendants named in this action are entitled to summary dismissal.
Additionally, the Complaint as a whole is subject to summary dismissal because it is frivolous and fails to allege facts to support a plausible claim for relief. Liberally construed, the Complaint appears to assert that Defendants, all Government entities, have conspired to engage in a pattern of abuse and using technology to control Plaintiff to deprive her rights.
As noted, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 permits an indigent litigant to proceed in forma pauperis, which allows the litigant to commence a federal court action without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. See Staley v. Witherspoon, No. 9:07-cv-195-PMD-GCK, 2007 WL 1988272, at *1 (D.S.C. July 3, 2007). However, the statute provides limitations to such actions by permitting the Court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted" or is "frivolous or malicious." Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)). A complaint is deemed frivolous when it is "clearly baseless" and includes allegations that are "fanciful," "fantastic," or "delusional." Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 327-28 (1989)).
Here, Plaintiff's Complaint contains assertions that are barely comprehensible and manifestly delusional. Presuming that Plaintiff has set forth these statements sincerely, as assertions of fact, they cannot be given credibility. A district court's review of a case for factual frivolousness under § 1915 is guided by the Supreme Court's decision in Denton. See Thomas v. Barri, No. 8:10-cv-0431-MBS-BHH, 2010 WL 1993881, at *2-3 (D.S.C. Mar. 3, 2010), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2010 WL 1993860 (D.S.C. May 18, 2010). When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, § 1915 "gives courts the authority to 'pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations[,]' mean[ing] that a court is not bound, as it usually is when making a determination based solely on the pleadings, to accept without question the truth of the plaintiff's allegations." Denton, 504 U.S. at 32. The "initial assessment of the in forma pauperis plaintiff's factual allegations must be weighted in favor of the plaintiff," id., and "[a]n in forma pauperis complaint may not be dismissed . . . simply because the court finds the plaintiff's allegations unlikely." Id. at 33. However, the district court is entrusted with the discretion to dismiss the case for factual frivolousness "when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible." Id. "[A] court may dismiss a claim as factually frivolous only if the facts alleged are 'clearly baseless', a category encompassing allegations that are 'fanciful,' 'fantastic,' and 'delusional.'" Id. at 32-33 (citations omitted) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, 328). In reviewing for frivolousness or malice, the Court looks to see whether the Complaint raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios. Harley v. United States, 349 F. Supp. 2d 980, 981 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (citing Neitzke, 490 U.S. 319). The Court must accept all well-pled allegations and review the Complaint in a light most favorable to plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). Nevertheless, it is well-settled that the Court has the authority to dismiss claims that are obviously "fantastic" or "delusional." Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994); Raiford v. FBI, No. 1:10-cv-2751-MBS-JRM, 2010 WL 6737887, at *3 (D.S.C. Nov. 17, 2010), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 2020729 (D.S.C. May 23, 2011) (explaining a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when "the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible").
The present action is comprised of factual allegations that are "wholly incredible," and which fail to state a claim for relief. As noted, the Complaint asserts that Defendants violated Plaintiff's rights by, among other things, torturing and abusing Plaintiff, using a mind control program on Plaintiff, "shooting electromagnet impulses in [her] head," and waging spiritual warfare against her. [Doc. 1-2 at 4.] The Court finds that these allegations clearly fall within the statute's definition of frivolity. McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting examples of frivolous claims include those whose factual allegations are "so nutty," "delusional," or "wholly fanciful" as to be simply "unbelievable." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Simmons v. Clinton Police Dep't, No. 7:14-cv-248-BO, 2014 WL 7151242, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 12, 2014). Plaintiff's conclusory assertions fail to show any arguable basis in fact or law and Plaintiff fails to present other allegations to support a claim for relief. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325 ("A suit is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact."); see also Brock v. Angelone, 105 F.3d 952, 953-54 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding a prisoner's claim, that he was being poisoned or experimented upon via an ingredient in pancake syrup served at his prison, was fanciful or delusional, and dismissing the appeal as frivolous with sanctions); Neal v. Duke Energy, No. 6:11-cv-1420-HFF-KFM, 2011 WL 5083181, at *4 (D.S.C. June 30, 2011), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 5082193 (D.S.C. Oct. 26, 2011) (dismissing action upon finding plaintiff's factual allegations were frivolous, fanciful, and delusional where plaintiff claimed defendants clandestinely placed a GPS device in her car while it was in the shop for repairs and that she was being stalked by the defendants, noting the allegations were "made without any viable factual supporting allegations and appears to be the product of paranoid fantasy"); Feurtado v. McNair, No. 3:05-cv-1933-SB, 2006 WL 1663792, at *2 (D.S.C. Jun. 15, 2006) (noting that frivolousness encompasses inarguable legal conclusions and fanciful factual allegations), aff'd, 227 F. App'x 303 (4th Cir. 2007).
In any case, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to support a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or under any other statute or basis for jurisdiction. Plaintiff has likewise failed to make any specific allegations against any of the named Defendants with regard to her asserted claims. See Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974) ("Where a complaint alleges no specific act or conduct on the part of the defendant and the complaint is silent as to the defendant except for his name appearing in the caption, the complaint is properly dismissed."); Newkirk v. Circuit Court of City of Hampton, No. 3:14-cv-372-HEH, 2014 WL 4072212, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 14, 2014) (finding the complaint was subject to summary dismissal where plaintiff made no factual allegations against the named defendants within the body of the pleading).
Additionally, this action should be dismissed as a duplicative action because Plaintiff has already filed three prior actions in this Court making similar claims to those she raises here. See case numbers 7:19-cv-376; 7:19-cv-867; 7:19-cv-1077. Each of those cases were summarily dismissed. Here, Plaintiff again makes similar allegations concerning Defendants' abuse, harassment, and attempts to engage in mind control, like she does in her prior actions. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff's claims in the instant Complaint are substantially duplicative of the other action she previously filed in this Court. "Because district courts are not required to entertain duplicative or redundant lawsuits, they may dismiss such suits as frivolous pursuant to [section] 1915(e). Generally, a lawsuit is duplicative of another one if the parties, issues and available relief do not significantly differ between the two." Cottle v. Bell, No. 00-6367, 2000 WL 1144623, at *1 (4th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (citations omitted). Given the similarities between the allegations in the prior actions and those in the present action, Plaintiff's claims in this action should be dismissed as duplicative. See, e.g., Harrison v. South Carolina, 126 F. App'x 100, 101 (4th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); see also Shaw v. Byars, No. 9-12-cv-2830-RBH, 2012 WL 6138325, at *2 (D.S.C. Dec. 11, 2012) (dismissing action as duplicative where remedies were available in the identical action); Noonsab v. N.C. Gov't, No. 5:16-CT-3122-FL, 2016 WL 7650591, at *1 (E.D.N.C. July 8, 2016), aff'd, 669 F. App'x 664 (4th Cir. 2016) (same).
The Court takes judicial notice of Plaintiff's other cases filed in this Court, in which Plaintiff makes nearly identical claims as those raised in the instant case. See Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining courts "may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record"); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) ("We note that 'the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'").
Lastly, putting aside the issues already discussed, it is equally clear that Plaintiff's Complaint is substantively without merit to the extent she is asserting claims as a sovereign citizen. Although Plaintiff has not specifically identified herself as a sovereign citizen, her Complaint bears all of the hallmarks of the sovereign citizen theory. For example, Plaintiff refers to herself as a "Native." [Doc. 1-1 at 1.] She also contends that she informed police officers that her "right[s] are reserve[d] under common law and that I didn't want to contract with him." [Id.] Further, Plaintiff takes issue with the United States Postal Service and alleges that she has learned about the Universal Postal Union. [Id.] She refers to having issues with her mother's Trust held by the Social Security Administration. [Doc. 1-2 at 4.] Finally, she alleges that she is bing "forced to surrender to a culture and belief that's designed to use deadly force on Moorish indigenous people." [Id.]
Each of these allegations are couched in terms of the sovereign citizen argument, which "has been rejected repeatedly by the courts." Smith v. United States, No. 1:12-cv-00900, 2013 WL 5464723, at *1 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 30, 2013) (quoting Nunn v. United States, No. 3:13-cv-12-MHT, 2013 WL 1099321, *2 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 27, 2013)). Adherents to the sovereign citizen theory "believe that the state and federal governments lack constitutional legitimacy and therefore have no authority to regulate their behavior." United States v. Ulloa, 511 Fd. App'x 105, 106 n.1 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Presley v. Prodan, No. 3:12-3511-CMC-JDA, 2013 WL 1342465, at *2 (Mar. 11, 2013) (collecting cases describing the sovereign citizen movement and its common features), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2013 WL 1342539 (D.S.C. Apr. 2, 2013).
Federal courts have repeatedly rejected the sovereign citizen theory as baseless. See, e.g., United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir. 2011) ("Regardless of an individual's claimed status . . . as a 'sovereign citizen' . . . that person is not beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. These theories should be rejected summarily, however they are presented."); United States v. Schneider, 910 F.2d 1569, 1570 (7th Cir. 1990) (describing the "sovereign citizen" theory as having "no conceivable validity in American law"); United States v. Jagim, 978 F.2d 1032, 1036 (8th Cir. 1992) (defendant claimed he was "outside" the jurisdiction of the United States; however, the court found this argument to be "completely without merit" and "patently frivolous" and rejected it "without expending any more of this Court's resources on discussion"); Glover v. South Carolina, No. 5:16-CV-00969-JMC, 2017 WL 1836982, at *1 (D.S.C. May 8, 2017), appeal dismissed sub nom., No. 17-6846, 2017 WL 5197454 (4th Cir. Nov. 8, 2017); United States v. Chatman, No. 2016-CP-45-00232, 2017 WL 3704832, at *1 (D.S.C. July 28, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted by No. 4:17-cv-01556-RBH, 2017 WL 3676587 (D.S.C. Aug. 25, 2017). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff is asserting claims here based on the sovereign citizen theory, her claims are subject to summary dismissal as frivilous.
In light of all the foregoing, this case should be dismissed as frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and for failure to state a claim under which relief may be granted pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See Thomas v. Berry, No. 8:10-cv-698-MBS-BHH, 2010 WL 4008333, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 27, 2010), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2010 WL 4007189 (D.S.C. Oct. 13, 2010); Shuler v. Neely, No. 3:11-cv-182-RJC, 2011 WL 9879176, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 19, 2011).
RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss this action pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B) without issuance and service of process.
See Michau v. Charleston Cty., 434 F.3d 725, 728 (4th Cir. 2006) (affirming the district court's dismissal of two complaints pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B), even though the plaintiff was not a prisoner, because the plaintiff was proceeding in forma pauperis).
The undersigned finds that, in light of all of the foregoing, Plaintiff cannot cure the deficiencies in her Complaint and that allowing Plaintiff to amend her pleadings therefore would be futile. See Goode v. Central Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 624 (4th Cir. 2015). This is so because, on the face of the Complaint, Plaintiff's allegations are frivolous. Further, this is the fourth action filed by Plaintiff making nearly identical frivolous claims. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the District Court decline to give Plaintiff an opportunity to amend. See Workman v. Kernell, No. 6:18-cv-00355-RBH-KFM, 2018 WL 4826535, at *2 n.7 (D.S.C. Oct. 2, 2018); Young v. Santos, No. GLR-16-cv-1321, 2018 WL 1583557, at *6 (D. Md. Apr. 2, 2018); McSwain v. Jobs, No. 1:13-cv-00890, 2014 WL 12672619, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 6, 2014) ("[G]iven the preposterous and frivolous nature of [the plaintiff's] complaint, it would be a waste of limited judicial resources to give him an opportunity to amend.").
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge January 27, 2020
Greenville, South Carolina
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).