Opinion
A21-1062
02-17-2023
Kera QUINN, Respondent, v. LMC NE MINNEAPOLIS HOLDINGS, LLC, et al., Appellants.
ORDER
In April 2021, respondent Kera Quinn filed a request for emergency relief under Minnesota Statutes section 504B.375 (2022), commonly called a lockout petition. At that time, Quinn had been staying in NordHaus—an apartment building in Minneapolis owned by appellant LMC NE Minneapolis Holdings, LLC ("LMC")—for over 2 years. Quinn originally began staying in NordHaus with her former partner, J.S., who had a written lease with LMC. Quinn was never on that lease, nor did she have LMC's express permission to live in the building. Instead, Quinn testified that she paid rent monthly to J.S. and that she shared the one electronic key fob that allowed access to the unit with J.S., but she otherwise behaved as any normal tenant would.
In February 2021, J.S. notified LMC that she did not wish to renew her lease when it expired in April. Quinn testified that J.S. failed to inform her that the lease was ending. Quinn claimed that she only learned this news when a member of NordHaus's maintenance staff came to the unit after the lease had expired. Upon discovering Quinn still in the unit, LMC responded by deactivating the key fob that Quinn still had in her possession, in turn prompting Quinn to file the lockout petition. In response, LMC argued that Quinn was not a "residential tenant" under Minnesota Statutes section 504B.001, subdivision 12 (2022), but rather a trespasser who was not qualified for relief under section 504B.375. LMC also counterclaimed for eviction.
"Residential tenant" is defined as "a person who is occupying a dwelling in a residential building under a lease or contract, whether oral or written, that requires the payment of money or exchange of services, all other regular occupants of that dwelling unit, or a resident of a manufactured home park." Minn. Stat. § 504B.001, subd. 12.
A housing court referee, after a trial on the matter, found that Quinn was a "regular occupant of Nordhaus" and therefore a "residential tenant" of the apartment. Accordingly, the referee found that Quinn could petition for relief under section 504B.375. The referee recommended ordering LMC to reactivate the key fob and to pay a $500 penalty fee and attorney's costs to Quinn. The district court confirmed the referee's recommendations, except for the penalty and costs.
In a precedential opinion, the court of appeals affirmed. Quinn v. LMC NE Minneapolis Holdings, LLC , 972 N.W.2d 881, 890 (Minn. App. 2022), rev. granted (June 29, 2022). The court held that the question of who qualifies as an "other regular occupant" under the definition of "residential tenant" in Minnesota Statutes section 504B.001, subdivision 12, is a question of fact to be decided by the district court after considering the totality of the circumstances on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 888. The court explained that "the relevant circumstances include but are not limited to the duration, continuity, and nature of the occupancy, the existence and terms of a lease or any other agreements related to the occupancy, and whether the landlord knew of or reasonably should have known of the person's occupancy." Id. The court of appeals held that the referee and district court adequately considered the circumstances here and properly determined that Quinn qualified as a residential tenant. Id. at 890.
We granted LMC's petition for further review. As the parties prepared their briefs and prepared for oral argument before this court, Quinn was evicted and removed from NordHaus after two separate eviction proceedings. Quinn then moved this court to dismiss the matter as moot.
"[W]e require the presence of a justiciable controversy as essential to our exercise of jurisdiction." Schowalter v. State , 822 N.W.2d 292, 298 (Minn. 2012). Justiciability is an issue of law that we review de novo. Dean v. City of Winona , 868 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 2015). The jurisdictional question presented here "is one of mootness." Id. A moot case is nonjusticiable. State ex rel. Ford v. Schnell , 933 N.W.2d 393, 401 (Minn. 2019). Mootness is not, however, "a mechanical rule that is automatically invoked whenever the underlying dispute between the parties is settled or otherwise resolved." Dean , 868 N.W.2d at 4 (citing State v. Rud , 359 N.W.2d 573, 576 (Minn. 1984) ). It instead is "a flexible discretionary doctrine" that is subject to some limited exceptions. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We dismiss an issue on appeal as moot "when a decision on the merits is no longer necessary or an award of effective relief is no longer possible." Id. at 5.
Minnesota courts may only hear actual cases and controversies. In re Application of the Senate , 10 Minn. 78, 81 (1865). We routinely decline to hear moot cases because our court "does not issue advisory opinions or decide cases merely to make precedents." Sinn v. City of St. Cloud , 295 Minn. 532, 203 N.W.2d 365, 366 (1972).
Quinn argues that this litigation involves no live issue or personal interest now that she has been evicted from NordHaus. She contends that a decision on the merits here will accomplish nothing because the district court has already issued a writ of recovery extinguishing any right she may have to possession of the unit and returning possession to LMC. LMC argues, by contrast, that at least one of three mootness exceptions applies and that we should decide this case on the merits. For the reasons stated below, we agree with Quinn that the case is moot and that no mootness exception applies.
The first mootness exception that LMC relies upon applies when a matter is "functionally justiciable" and involves an "important public issue[ ] of statewide significance that should be decided immediately." Rud , 359 N.W.2d at 575–76 (applying the exception to determine defendants’ rights to call witnesses on a motion to dismiss in sex abuse cases). "A case is functionally justiciable if the record contains the raw material (including effective presentation of both sides of the issues raised) traditionally associated with effective judicial decision-making." Id. at 576. This exception focuses on the specific legal issue at hand, and we apply it narrowly. Dean , 868 N.W.2d at 6–7.
See also State v. Brooks , 604 N.W.2d 345, 346–48 (Minn. 2000) (applying the exception to determine whether the Minnesota Constitution prohibits monetary bail); Jasper v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety , 642 N.W.2d 435, 436, 439–40 (Minn. 2002) (applying the exception to address the procedures that the Minnesota Commissioner of Public Safety needed to use to approve a breathalyzer machine); In re Guardianship of Tschumy , 853 N.W.2d 728, 740–41 (Minn. 2014) (applying the exception to determine whether a court-appointed guardian could consent to removing a ward from life support); Pfoser v. Harpstead , 953 N.W.2d 507, 511, 514 n.4, 515 (Minn. 2021) (applying the exception to determine if the Minnesota Department of Human Services could impose penalties on disabled persons aged 65 or older who wanted to transfer funds into a pooled special-needs trust); Snell v. Walz , 985 N.W.2d 277, 283-87 (Minn. Feb. 8, 2023) (applying the exception to allow the court of appeals to consider whether the Emergency Management Act gives the Governor power to declare a peacetime emergency for a public health crisis).
This case does not meet the exception for functionally justiciable matters of statewide significance. To be sure, this matter is functionally justiciable. Each party has been represented by counsel who have adequately briefed and argued this legal issue before the housing court referee, the district court, the court of appeals, and here. LMC fails, however, to demonstrate that this case presents a matter of urgent statewide significance. Instead, at its core, the case requires us merely to adjudicate competing property interests between two private parties. LMC asserts that Quinn's behavior and the harm it suffered as a result can be, and likely is being, replicated across "conceivably every building in Minnesota that is capable of being occupied." But nothing in the record supports the broad claim that these parties’ unique circumstances present a statewide issue affecting most landlord-tenant relationships so as to require an immediate decision from this court. We therefore hold that this case does not qualify as a matter of statewide significance, and we decline to apply this narrow exception here.
The context of this matter also occurred during an unprecedented time concerning landlord-tenant disputes: during the eviction moratorium imposed by the state because of a worldwide pandemic. See Emerg. Exec. Order No. 20-14, Suspending Evictions and Writs of Recovery During the COVID-19 Peacetime Emergency (Mar. 23, 2020). The moratorium has since ended, and landlords once again have the right immediately to file for evictions and writs of recovery under Chapter 504B. See Act of June 29, 2021, ch. 8, art. 5, §§ 2, 4, 2021 Minn. Laws 1825, 1849–50 (implementing an eviction moratorium phaseout plan so that on June 1, 2022, eviction proceedings could return to normal, pre-pandemic process).
The second exception that LMC urges us to apply is available when the harm to the particular plaintiff is capable of repetition yet evading review. See e.g. , Kahn v. Griffin , 701 N.W.2d 815, 821 (Minn. 2005) ("But we will not deem a case moot if it implicates issues that are capable of repetition, yet likely to evade review."). The capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception concerns the specific complained-of problem, rather than a general legal issue. See Moore v. Ogilvie , 394 U.S. 814, 816, 89 S.Ct. 1493, 23 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969). The two-pronged exception applies when: (1) "there is a reasonable expectation that a complaining party would be subjected to the same action again," and (2) "the duration of the challenged action is too short to be fully litigated before it ceases or expires." Dean , 868 N.W.2d at 5. The party seeking the exception, here LMC, must show each requirement for this exception to apply. See Snell v. Walz , 985 N.W.2d 277, 287-88 (Minn. Feb. 8, 2023).
The capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception is inapplicable because LMC fails to meet the first of the exception's two requirements. Under prong one, LMC argues that it could be subject to this type of behavior by Quinn again. But that possibility is too unlikely to qualify for this mootness exception. For this case to recur, Quinn would have to move in with another person who has a lease in an LMC building and live there for an extended period before being discovered. Such an occurrence, while conceivable, is not reasonably likely. See Dean , 868 N.W.2d at 5 (requiring "a reasonable expectation that a complaining party would be subjected to the same action again"). Moreover, LMC's hypothesis that other potential occupants could repeat Quinn's behavior is misplaced. We apply this mootness exception only when there is a reasonable expectation of recurrence of the same dispute between the same parties. See Snell , 985 N.W.2d at 287-88. Accordingly, we decline to hear the case on the merits under this second exception because the doctrine's requirements have not been met.
For this exception to apply, both elements of the doctrine must be met. Because LMC has not met the first element, we need not consider whether it satisfies the second element. See Snell , 985 N.W.2d at 287 n.6.
The third exception that LMC contends applies is the collateral-consequences exception. It claims that any damages that it may recover from Quinn would differ depending upon her status as a "residential tenant" or a trespasser. We have stated that when "an appellant produces evidence that collateral consequences actually resulted from a judgment, the appeal is not moot." In re McCaskill , 603 N.W.2d 326, 329 (Minn. 1999). Historically, however, we have primarily applied this exception in the context of criminal convictions or civil commitments. Id. (civil commitment); State v. Jones , 516 N.W.2d 545, 546 n.1 (Minn. 1994) (criminal conviction); Effinger v. State , 380 N.W.2d 483, 486–87 (Minn. 1986) (criminal conviction); Elzie v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety , 298 N.W.2d 29, 32 (Minn. 1980) (suspension and cancellation of driver's licenses); Madonna , State ex rel. Doe v. Madonna , 295 N.W.2d 356, 360–61 (Minn. 1980) (prehearing civil commitment); State v. Goodrich , 256 N.W.2d 506, 511–12 (Minn. 1977) (criminal conviction); State ex rel. Djonne v. Schoen , 299 Minn. 131, 217 N.W.2d 508, 509–10 (1974) (criminal conviction). LMC has failed to provide persuasive authority to explain why we should expand this exception here, and we therefore decline to do so.
In sum, this appeal is moot, and no mootness exception applies. We therefore grant Quinn's motion to dismiss the appeal.
Based upon all the files, records, and proceedings herein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed as moot.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ __________
Margaret H. Chutich
Associate Justice